Norwegian Security and Defence Policy

Background

The end of the cold war and the developments towards increased dialogue and a more co-operative security structure in Europe based on partnership, have greatly enhanced Norway's security. In this new situation, Norway faces no military threats. Nevertheless, considerable uncertainty remains as to future developments which entail a series of security risks. These are primarily linked to the future of democratic, social, economic and military reforms in Russia and the future relationship between Russia and the western world.
  Norway's security policy has the following basic objectives:

• to prevent war and contribute to stability and a peaceful development
• to protect Norway's freedom of action against political and military pressure, and to safeguard Norwegian rights and interests inter alia by ensuring Norwegian participation and influence in international co-operation
• to defend Norwegian territory on land, at sea, and in the air against intrusion and attack.

Security Challenges

Notwithstanding the new political situation in Europe, Norwegian security continues to be determined by two main factors: a) the fact that Norway, as a part of Europe is politically and militarily integrated into the wider European and Atlantic security system, and b) her proximity to the Russian base complex on the Kola peninsula and the military forces deployed there.

A strong and stable national defence effort, membership of NATO, allied solidarity and commitments, as well as NATOs military structure and reinforcement plans, provide the basic elements for Norwegian security. In addition, Norway will continue to play an active role in further developing Partnership for Peace (PfP) under the auspices of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Combined Joint Task Force headquarters concept (CJTF), as well as the strengthening of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Equally, Norway intends to take active part in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC).

NATOs decision at the Madrid Summit in July 1997 to invite Poland, The Czech Republic and Hungary to accession talks with the Alliance has underlined NATOs ability to adapt to a changing security environment. Norway believes that the three invitees and NATO will mutually benefit from each other once the three become full-fledged members of the Alliance. According to the present schedule they will become members of NATO in conjunction with the Alliances 50th anniversary in April 1999. The results of the accession talks need first to be ratified by all members of NATO and the invitees respectively, prior to formal accession.

The changes in the European security environment since the end of the Cold War have led to a reassessment of Norways defence policy priorities. NATOs Strategic Concept, together with the establishment of rapid reaction forces and the increased importance of peace support operations, are important elements in this regard. Norwegian forces are increasingly deployed outside Norways territory. Participation in peace support operations constitutes an integral part of Norwegian defence policy. The purpose is twofold; to prove and demonstrate Norways preparedness and ability to contribute to international security, and to gain experience and assess the military effectiveness of Norwegian personnel. These two aspects are mutually reinforcing. Norways participation depends on the fulfilment of both conditions. Increasingly, peace support operations form an important framework in Norways efforts to introduce partner countries to NATO standards and procedures, as well as democratic control with military forces in general. The BALTBAT project, Polish participation in the Nordic Brigade in IFOR and SFOR, and the successful deployment of an Estonian company into the Norwegian Battalion in UNIFIL illustrates this point. Norways participation in peace support operation serves national defence objectives in the narrow sense, as well as wider security policy interests.

In a geopolitical context, Norway constitutes an island in relation to her NATO allies. Hence, the need to preserve vital sea lines of communications (SLOVCs) is paramount. The strategic importance of Norway for the rest of Europe also stems from considerations of a primarily maritime nature. Control of Norwegian territory is crucial for the protection of the North Atlantic and the SLOCs to North Western Europe. South Norway serves as a base and transit area for the defence of Northern Norway.

Norway is the only member of NATO with a direct landborder to Russia, which remains the single most prominent military power in Europe. Moreover, the north-western part of Russia constitutes the only direct link between Russia and the Western part of the European continent. Consequently, Norways proximity to Russia plays an important role in defining Norways geopolitical position and defence policy considerations. The Northern Fleet, which operates out of Kola, remains Russias strongest and most modern fleet. The military base complex in the Kola region plays a vital role in Russias strategic defence: SSBNs belonging to the Northern Fleet account for two thirds of the former Soviet sea-launched nuclear strategic force. With full implementation of the START Agreements, the relative importance of these forces is likely to increase, and in the future the Northern Fleet may comprise all Russian strategic submarines.

The failure of Russia to fully implement its commitments regarding substantial reduction of Russias substrategic forces is another matter of concern to Norway. The large number of nuclear warheads remaining on Russian soil poses a considerable risk relating both to the safety and security of the weapons and as a potential threat to the security of neighbouring countries.

The many dramatic changes in Europe since 1989 have decisively changed military calculations. In short, Southern Norway in the first place Eastern Norway and the Southernmost parts of Western Norway have become markedly less exposed in military terms. North Norway, however, has not been subject to similar military and geostrategic changes. Russia remains a great power with significant military capabilities close to the Norwegian border. The end of the cold war and the subsequent developments in what used to be the Soviet Union have created a completely new political framework, which made it possible to begin developing a strategic partnership between Russia and NATO. Norway is currently pursuing a policy of close co-operation with Russia in the North, in a large number of fields. Within the context of the enhanced PfP and the principles of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, Norway will seek to broaden co-operation activities with Russia. An important aspect of that policy is, however, to avoid a bilateralisation of Norways relations with Russia.

Nevertheless, political uncertainties and risks remain as to the future of democratic and economic reforms in Russia. Norwegian security policy must still address the purely military realities in the North. Hence, Norway is determined to retain an anti-invasion capability for North Norway, based on a sufficiently strong national defence and Allied reinforcements.

The forces on the Kola peninsula must be considered also in the context of conflicting interests and the correlation of forces between the great powers. The Northern Fleet still operates in the Northern waters, although its surface activities have been significantly reduced in recent years and exercises are now taking place predominantly in local-waters. The reduced level of exercises reflects severe financial cutbacks, while the withdrawn pattern and modest scope of exercises demonstrate a more defensive doctrine. However, the military exercises in the North have become much more complex with increased emphasis on co-operation between sea, land and air forces.

Many of the older vessels of the Northern Fleet are being phased out and scrapped, a process which started already in the 1980s. In spite of the reduction in number of units, the fleets total combat capability will still be significant, due to the nature and armaments of the newer vessels (in particular, modern missile capacity), and in spite of the fact that Russias naval modernisation programme has slowed down. It remains to be seen what the future Russian naval policy and doctrine will be.

The air defence forces on the Kola peninsula have been supplied with new modern aircraft with longer range. These, together with the warning and control aircraft (Mainstay), have increased the effectiveness of the areas air forces as a whole. The large number of air bases on Kola allows major and rapid transfers of various categories of aircraft. In addition, the helicopter fleet in the North-western part of Russia greatly enhances the inherently offensive capabilities in the North.

The results of the CFE Review Conference open for an increased concentration of Main Battle Tanks, Armoured Combat Vehicles and Artillery in Northwest Russia, that is, in Norways proximity. Although Russia under current circumstances has emphasised the need for increased flexibility in the South, it is impossible, in the longer term, to predict future military priorities. Hence the relative distribution between North and South in the relevant Russian areas, as defined by article V of the CFE Treaty, may change considerably over time.

Norway is in favour of adapting the CFE Treaty to better reflect the new security conditions in Europe. The adaptation of the CFE Treaty must aim at improving the operation of the Treaty in a changing environment, and through that, the security of each State Party. The overall aim should be to permit the Treaty to sustain its key role in the European security structure. The main objective for Norway in these negotiations will be to maintain and preferably enhance predictability as regards Russian deployment of forces in the north. This means that we will be trying to reduce Russias ability to concentrate her forces in either the south or the north as a political measure in a possible future crisis situation.

To ensure compatibility between the CFE Treaty and NATOs enlargement Norway finds it necessary to modify the group structure and eliminate the structure of the three nested zones. The concept of national and territorial ceilings is welcomed. Territorial ceilings will offer stabilising benefits for the whole area of application. It is however important that NATO retains the flexibility in defence planning that they presently enjoy as members of a Group of States Party. The geographical Flank zone must be preserved. It is important to avoid changes that would enable nations to concentrate forces in such a way that they create the potential regional instabilities that the CFE Treaty aimed to avoid.

The Norwegian defence concept and defence planning is based on allied reinforcements as a deterrent in crisis and war. In the north the balance of forces is clearly in favour of Russia. Also in the future, reinforcements to Norway will mainly have to come across the Atlantic Ocean, primarily from the United States. The duration of temporary deployment in the north must therefore be determined on the basis of overseas reinforcement. Norway can not accept any time limit on temporary deployment that would impede allied reinforcement plans for Norway.

The outcome of the upcoming modernisation of the CFE Treaty will be of utmost importance to Norway and Norways defence planning. We would become seriously concerned if the modernisation process were to give Russia even greater flexibility in its north-western areas than what has already been accepted.

The results of the CFE Review Conference underscores the importance of Allied security commitments to Norway. It is imperative to retain the prepositioning of various military equipment in Norway. Furthermore, continued allied military exercises in Norway and regular presence of Allied vessels in Northern Waters have not lost their vital role. On the contrary, given the outcome of the CFE Review Conference, the ability of Allied forces to operate in Norway and adjacent waters has gained in importance, and must be retained. The foreseen reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, as a consequence of the implementation of the START Agreements, as well as the mutual withdrawal of all naval nuclear weapons except SLBMs, would entail a positive development. On the other hand, the concept of an extended area defence, as part of a coastal defence concept, including extended air defence, is likely to become a reoccurring issue in Russias defence planning. The outcome of that debate will be of direct concern to Norway and her Allies.

There is a continuing need to link Norway as closely as possible to the European and Atlantic security system as a whole, to prevent a "regionalisation" of security in the North. The military imbalance in the North can only be addressed within a larger European framework and through Norways participation in an effective Western security co-operation. These considerations constitute the rationale for the efforts undertaken by the Norwegian authorities to ensure that a transformed NATO preserves the strategic unity and the political solidarity of the Alliance, including its integrated military structure, and its capacity to reinforce exposed regions. Norways associated membership in the WEU also derives from these considerations.

Equally, NATO membership makes it possible for Norway to contribute constructively to on-going efforts to include Russia in the European security structure. Hence, her close relations with European and Atlantic Allies helps to ensures Norways freedom of action, even on a regional level.

Norways self-imposed restraints on Allied military activities in Norway have been adapted, enabling Norway to face some of the challenges presented by the changed security environment after the end of the Cold War. A major objective has been to allow forces from Allied, as well as Partner countries, to participate in exercises in areas affected by Norways self-imposed restraints. However, the current policies on the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory remain valid. At the same time, the particular restraints on military activity in Finnmark has been made less strict and easier to employ, allowing smaller Allied and Partner units to exercise and practice in Finnmark, especially in relation to the Partnership for Peace programme. Major Allied exercises in Finnmark are, however, not envisaged.

Norways base policy is not an obstacle to Norways full participation and integration in the multinational structures which are gradually being set up under the auspices of NATO and the WEU.

Wider contribution to defence and Security

North Norway remains a potentially very exposed region in military terms. South Norway is the area in which most of the nations military resources are located. Pre-planning for the possible transfer of mobilised forces from South Norway to North Norway at an early stage of a conflict remains a key to national defence.

Norway will continue to depend upon reliable arrangements for the transfer of allied military assistance. In particular, the political and military importance of the arrival of allied forces prior to the outbreak of war, in order to deter an attack, will remain crucial. NATOs new strategy with a focus on war prevention must be combined with a force structure capable of reinforcing any exposed region within the area of Alliance responsibility. The climatic and geographic conditions of North Norway require specialised training and equipment in that regard.

Norways defence policy will continue to stress the need for national defence at a sufficient level, reliable arrangements for Allied reinforcements, host-nation and logistic support arrangements, as well as national and Allied exercises on a regular basis on Norwegian territory as well as in the adjacent waters.

As a result of the new relations in European security, Norway will continue to pursue a policy towards enhanced stability and co-operation in the Nordic and Baltic Sea area. In this regard we will continue our active role in PfP-activities. In a regional context our aim is to promote activities directed towards broad Nordic-Baltic co-operation, based upon Allied support and participation. Thus, Norway will continue to give priority to on-going multilateral defence related projects in the Baltic countries, such as BALTRON, BALTBAT and BALTNET. Our contributions both towards the Euro-Arctic Co-operation programme as well as the Baltic Sea Council will continue.

The oil and gas production on the Norwegian continental shelf is of strategic importance to Europe. For the time being, Norway holds the position as the worlds second largest oil exporting country. In addition, the relative importance of Norwegian gas export to the European markets is increasing. Norway recognises the importance of being able to secure an uninterrupted flow of these products to the receiving countries. In the light of recent political and risk assessments, Norway is updating the plans and policy for the protection of off-shore installations in the North Sea. However Norway will not be able to provide this security in isolation. Assistance from allies will be required.

In December 1995, the Russian and Norwegian Ministers of Defence concluded two bilateral treaties; a treaty on defence co-operation and a treaty on defence-related environmental co-operation. These treaties are framework agreements for further bilateral contacts. The treaty on defence co-operation envisages bilateral meetings between the Norwegian and Russian Ministries of Defence, and between Norwegian and Russian military authorities. The defence-related environmental treaty envisages the organising of conferences and meetings, reciprocal visits, joint investigations, training and so forth. Bilateral co-operation activities in 1997 have been included in a work programme between the Russian and Norwegian Ministries of Defence, covering reciprocal activities within the framework of these bilateral treaties. In addition, in September 1996, the treaty on Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation (AMEC) was signed by the US, Russian and Norwegian Ministers of Defence. The agreement is an important element in the efforts to extend and deepen the co-operation with Russia in the environmental sphere, concerning the environmental challenges from, especially, decommissioned nuclear platforms in the Russian high North.

In May 1997 Norway hosted "Nordic Peace", which was the first joint Nordic "in the spirit of" Partnership for Peace exercise in Norway. It was a unique peace support exercise, inter alia involving co-operation between the military and civil humanitarian organisations. In 1998, Sweden will host "Nordic Peace".

Early summer 1997, Norway hosted a major Partnership for Peace exercise: Co-operative Banners" involved units from 15 Allied and Partner countries. The purpose of the exercise was twofold: to provide training in planning and conduct of a NATO lead Peace Support Operation, and to exercise C2 structures and interoperability in staff operational and technical level procedures for a Peace Support Operation.

In July 1997 Norway participated in the Partnership for Peace exercise "Baltic Challenge". The aim of the exercise is to practice peacekeeping operations. "Baltic Challenge" is to be held in Estonia and a number of allied and partner countries will be represented. Among the participating units from the Baltic states, BALTBAT will be included.

In June 1995, Norway signed an agreement on defence issues with the Czech Republic. Bilateral meetings on a regular basis with the Czech Republic on various assistance programmes are essential parts of the ongoing co-operation. The intention is to develop similar bilateral co-operation programmes with the other Visegrad countries as well.

Support to Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations

In conjunction with the forthcoming Defence Review a new and more coherent framework for Norwegian participation in Peace Support Operations will be discussed.

Norway considers peace support operations to be a crucial political an military instrument for crisis prevention and crisis management in Europe and elsewhere, as well as an important and integrated part of Norway's overall security and defence policy. However, a clear mandate for such operations is paramount.

For the moment, Norway is militarily involved in 6 UN operations, with a total of about 700 personnel. These operations are UNTSO, MONUA, UNIFIL, UNTAES, UNMOP and UNPREDEP. In addition, Norway contributes more than 700 personnel to SFOR, among these one company from Norway's designated IRF force (LAND). Norway also provide military personnel to MFO.

  Most of the increased emphasis on peace support and humanitarian operations remain uncompensated in terms of receiving additional appropriations to the defence budget. This is illustrated by the fact that the increase in UN expenses over the past few years is uncorrelated with the development of the financial framework as such.

As percentage of the defence budget, the share appropriated to peace support operations have increased steadily from 2 per cent in 1992 to 2.9 per cent in 1996, with a peak of 3.2 per cent in 1994. The 1996 budget for UN operations represented a real increase of 43.6 per cent compared with the 1992 benchmark expense level. The expenses related to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations increased by 10.2 per cent from 1995 to 1996, as a result of the Norwegian engagement in Bosnia. This figure includes a reduction in UN income totalling 124 mill NOK.