



Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations:

Trends and Challenges

SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The second seminar in the series of six was organized in Addis Ababa, 26-27 April 2007. This two-day seminar involved stakeholders from the UN missions, UN funds and programs, the World Bank, non-governmental organizations, local and regional partners, and the academic and diplomatic communities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Sudan and Ethiopia/Eritrea. These stakeholders were brought together to share lessons and best practices from their experiences with multidimensional and integrated peace operations. Over two days, the lively discussion ranged from an in-depth exploration of integration – its meaning, implications, and barriers to implementation – to a broader exchange around the peacekeeping-peacebuilding interface, country assistance frameworks, humanitarian and military protection, and cooperation between the UN and the African Union.

During the two days of discussion, participants agreed that since the 2005 *Report on Integrated Missions*, the UN has significantly increased its capacity to plan and manage multidimensional peace operations. Nonetheless, many reforms have been stove-piped within particular UN entities and have not kept pace with the increasing demands placed on peace operations. As a result, much of the progress toward inter-agency integration has occurred in spite of, not as a result of, the UN's policies and procedures.

While participants stressed that integration remains a highly subjective concept that political, humanitarian, development, and military actors all understand differently, they did articulate an emerging understanding of the concept and practice of integration.

1. **Integration occurs at several levels (strategic, programmatic, and administrative).** Participants agreed that strategic integration is the most crucial level – all parts of the UN system must agree on a common strategic plan and develop a shared understanding of priorities. Administrative integration supports all other degrees of integration by making the different UN entities more administratively compatible, enabling UN entities to share resources and assets and prevent systems operating in parallel.
2. **Integration takes place to different degrees – full integration, partial integration, and parallel structures.**¹ All three of these degrees of integration can occur simultaneously in one country. Nonetheless, full integration is very difficult to achieve because of structural, administrative, and financial barriers within the UN system, and a fully integrated structure may be difficult to alter when the context in the field changes. Therefore, full integration (budget, program and premises) should take place only when absolutely necessary for the desired impact.

¹ These labels were developed by MONUC.

3. **The degree of integration at the programmatic level must be determined by the desired impact, which requires flexible structures and administrative regulations.** Integration should not be seen as an administrative measure, or a goal in itself, but as a tool aimed at improving impact on the ground through more efficient delivery, less bureaucracy, reduced duplication of effort, and more effective engagement with partners.
4. **The degree of integration, and the lead agency, should vary with phases of the peace process and the level of violent conflict.** In cases where UN forces are engaged in open confrontation with spoilers, integration may be more politically charged than in circumstances where there is no open conflict. The UN structure should adapt to the changing needs and capacities of the host country and the changing role of the international community therein.

The participants concluded by proposing several principles that should guide future integration efforts.

- *While improved guidance is essential, templates are not.* To the extent possible, the form of the integrated UN system should be determined by the functions required to achieve the desired impact: *form should follow function.*
- Integration should be viewed as an *opportunity to supply good political analysis* to all UN post-conflict efforts.
- *Incentives must be created* within each UN agency² to encourage integration at the field level and at headquarters.
- *Reform of administrative, budgetary, and procedural practices within each UN agency is essential* for the improved efficiency and effectiveness of integrated peace operations.
- Inter-governmental, governmental, and non-governmental *partners should be included* in integration efforts to ensure ownership at the appropriate level and degree.
- *The purpose of integration is to improve internal and external partnerships* – to improve the capacity of UN entities to work together and of the entire UN System to work more effectively with national and international partners.

² The term ‘agency’ or ‘agencies’ refers to all UN Departments, Offices, Programs, Funds, and Specialized Agencies, unless specific distinctions are being made between them.

II. INTRODUCTION

In 2006, the Norwegian Government initiated the Project on Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations to help further institute and support an integrated approach to the implementation of Security Council mandates. This effort builds, in part, on the UN *Report on Integrated Missions* that was commissioned by the UN Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA) in 2004.³ The project includes a global series of seminars designed to engage the multitude of stakeholders involved in implementing the integrated mission concept and take stock of the progress made thus far⁴.

The first seminar was co-organized by the Government of the People's Republic of China in March 2007 in Beijing. It addressed issues with multidimensional peace operations that are of concern to Asian troop-contributing countries. The second seminar in the series of seven was organized in Addis Ababa, 26-27 April 2007. This two-day seminar brought together stakeholders from the UN missions, UN funds and programs, the World Bank, non-governmental organizations, local and regional partners, and the academic and diplomatic communities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Sudan and Ethiopia/Eritrea. These stakeholders were brought together to share lessons and best practices from their experiences with multidimensional and integrated peace operations. Subsequent seminars will take place in Geneva, New York, Johannesburg and Brussels. The series of seminars will conclude in a high-level conference in Oslo in October 2007. This project will culminate in the release of a final report that outlines the trends and challenges facing multidimensional and integrated peace operations and provides recommendations for the planning and implementation of future integrated missions.

This conference report summarizes two days of lively discussion, which ranged from an in-depth exploration of integration – its meaning, implications, and barriers to implementation – to a broader exchange around the peacekeeping-peacebuilding interface, country assistance frameworks, humanitarian and military protection, and cooperation between the UN and the African Union. The report is organized in roughly the same order as conference sessions. It begins by discussing the changing nature of peace operations and the evolution of the concept of integration. It then tackles some of the most conceptually challenging issues facing multidimensional and integrated peace operations – the peacekeeping-peacebuilding interface; building sustainable national capacity; preserving humanitarian space; and partnering with regional organizations. Then it outlines the barriers to integration that were identified during the discussions in Addis

³ Espen Barth Eide et al., "Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations," in *Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group* (May 2005).

⁴ The views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Government. The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the author.

Ababa. Finally, this report summarizes the participants' recommendations for improving the design and implementation of integrated missions⁵.

III. THE GROWTH IN PEACE OPERATIONS: STRETCHING THE LIMITS OF THE UN'S CAPACITY

Since the turn of the century, UN-led peace operations have experienced an unprecedented growth in the number and size of operations, the multidimensionality of their aims, and the duration of their presence. This growth has placed a massive work burden on the UN system, challenging its ability to plan, operate, deliver and monitor its operations effectively. Although significant efforts have been made to increase the capacity of the UN to manage these operations and integrate them with the larger UN system, reforms have been stove-piped and have not kept pace with the demands. This gap between supply and demand threatens to undermine the growing confidence in the UN-led peace operations.

To share the burden, regional organizations have become increasingly engaged in peacekeeping, which has further complicated institutional arrangements. The concept of hybrid operations – “simultaneous deployment of missions by two or more international organizations (and/or individual governments) in a country, or sequential deployments by which one deployer hands over responsibility to another” – has also emerged.⁶ The hybrid mission for Darfur is an important example of such an endeavor. The growing importance of regional peacekeeping and the development of hybrid operations present new institutional challenges for the UN. Not only must the UN ensure that its agencies work together more efficiently, but it must also partner more effectively with other inter-governmental organizations. Partnerships with regional organizations compound the challenges that the UN faces on its own – increasing the complexity of the structures, processes, and cultures involved in one mission. Hybrid operations and other UN partnerships with regional organizations also raise the additional challenge of aligning interests and priorities.

The normative and political context in which peace operations take place continues to evolve, resulting in confusion over the appropriate policy and

⁵ The author would like to extend a warm thank you to all participants at the seminar in Addis Ababa for their engaging presentations and discussions, and for providing helpful feedback on the draft of this report. The author is also grateful to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Minister of Defence Mr. Espen Barth Eide for his active participation and continuously insightful comments. Last, but certainly not least, many thanks go to Anja T. Kaspersen and Kristina L. Revheim for their excellent feedback on the draft of this report and for managing an incredible initiative, of which this seminar was but one component.

⁶ Richard Gowan, "International Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges," in *A submission to the Government of Norway's Project on Integrated Missions by the Center on International Cooperation at New York University*. (2007). p. 7.

doctrine for current and future operations. No longer solely efforts to enforce a previously negotiated peace, many peace operations take place in countries, such as Sudan and the DRC, that experience significant violent conflict at the same time as they implement political power-sharing agreements. In addressing an ongoing conflict and building the framework for sustainable peace, peace operations find themselves engaged in everything from counter-insurgency to building national institutions. Combined with the recent adoption of ‘the responsibility to protect’ as a norm, these operations have led to a backlash from many member states, objecting to this increasingly comprehensive and interventionist approach. The uncertain political environment leads to vague policy and doctrine for peace operations. In sum, peace operations are responding to a moving political and normative target, at the same time as they are contributing to the normative and political reality through their interpretation and implementation of their vague mandates.⁷

IV. PROGRESS TOWARD INTEGRATION: EMERGING CONSENSUS

The 2005 *Report on Integrated Missions*, which included several recommendations from the 2000 Brahimi report,⁸ led to a number of concrete actions and the development of specific policy and guidance notes intended to improve system-wide integration, most notably: 1) the 2005 Guidance Note of the Secretary-General clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC), and 2) the framework for the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP).⁹

The descriptions of integration put forward by the Secretary-General’s 2005 Guidance Note and the IMPP demonstrated policy-level agreement on the purpose of integration – increased efficiency and effectiveness of the UN System during peace operations. According to the Secretary-General’s 2005 Note of Guidance:

Integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent

⁷ “The mandate and conduct of peace operations are shaped by the normative climate in which they occur; in turn, the operations shape that climate.”, p. 4.

⁸ "Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects," (General Assembly of the United Nations, 2000).

⁹ Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions: Clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator” (New York: United Nations, 9 December 2005); Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General, "Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP)," (New York: United Nations, 13 June 2006).

support strategy. An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.¹⁰

The term “integrated mission” most often describes the DPKO-run Mission, which may not be “integrated” with the rest of the UN System in a “coherent and mutually supportive manner”.¹¹ In spite of the above description of the “integrated mission” as maximizing the contribution of the entire UN System to a common strategic plan and priorities, most discussions of “integrated missions” refer only to the DPKO-run Mission, not the broader UN System. The DPKO-run “integrated mission” may not be integrated with the broader UN system in a “coherent and mutually supportive manner”.¹² And, in some cases, “integrated missions” that include the components Human Rights and Justice, Rule of Law (RoL), and Security Sector Reform (SSR) lead to the creation of systems and programs that duplicate those of the UN Country Team (UNCT). Thus, in the design of “integrated missions”, there is no guarantee that the DPKO-run Mission will be integrated with the rest of the UN System under a common strategy and coherent structure. Additionally, “integrated missions” are often not integrated internally, due to the lack of coordination between the different pillars of the mission, which are often managed by different DSRSs.

Peace operations in Sudan, the DRC, and Burundi have struggled to respond to the integration ideal articulated in the Guidance Note and the IMPP, and in so doing have begun to redefine integration in practice. While participants stressed that integration remains a highly subjective concept that political, humanitarian, development, and military actors all understand differently, they did articulate an emerging understanding of the concept and practice of integration.

1) There was general agreement among participants that integration occurs at several levels (strategic, programmatic, and administrative). Participants agreed that strategic integration is the most crucial level – all parts of the UN system must agree on a common strategic plan and develop a shared understanding of priorities. *All other levels of integration flow from strategic integration. Administrative integration supports all*

¹⁰ “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions,” para. 4.

¹¹ Secretary-General of the United Nations, “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions: Clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator” (New York: United Nations, 9 December 2005), para. 4.

¹² “Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions”, para. 4.

other degrees of integration by making the different UN entities more administratively compatible, enabling UN entities to share resources and assets and prevent systems operating in parallel. Administrative integration requires reforms within the UN Secretariat, in the working methods of the UN funds, programs, and specialized agencies, and within and between Member States. *Participants agreed that programmatic integration must be determined by the desired impact*, which requires that the institutional arrangements are flexible enough to allow them to adapt to the structure that will most effectively achieve the desired impact.

2) Integration takes place to different degrees – full integration, partial integration, and parallel structures.¹³ All three of these degrees of integration can occur simultaneously in one country.

- *Parallel structures* occur when the DPKO-run Mission and the members of the UNCT may agree to a common strategic framework for the UN System, but do not develop joint programs or integrate at the administrative level, except for some possible common service arrangements. In some cases, parallel structures may be the only means of achieving complementary objectives that have potentially conflicting imperatives (i.e., security v. humanitarian imperatives).
- *Partial integration* takes place when the Mission and the UNCT develop joint programs but maintain separate reporting lines. Partial integration may be most appropriate for a system-wide approach to integration. The majority of the UN System is integrated around three general joint programs – Peace and Governance, SSR/ Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)/Small Arms, and Human Rights and Justice – all part of a common strategic framework and common monitoring and evaluation system. This arrangement qualifies as partial integration because each agency maintains separate reporting lines for their contribution to the joint programs. The current UN mission in Burundi (BINUB) has achieved partial integration at a system-wide level.
- *Full integration* occurs when the Mission and the UNCT integrate their budgets, programs, and premises. Participants agreed that full integration should only take place when absolutely necessary because: 1) it is very difficult to achieve full integration because of structural, cultural, and administrative barriers; 2) full integration may not lead to the desired impact because it may intensify the unwieldy nature of the bureaucracy and/or sideline crucial priorities; and 3) because it may create a structure that is difficult and costly to undo when the Mission is no longer present in the country, or the structure of the UN System needs to change to achieve a different objective. In some cases, such as with DDR programs, full integration may be the only means to effectively link the various

¹³ These labels were developed by MONUC.

components of the program (i.e., the political, military, humanitarian, and development components of a DDR program).

3) Participants agreed that the degree of integration at the programmatic level must be determined by the desired impact, which requires flexible structures and administrative regulations. Integration should not be seen as an administrative measure, or a goal in itself, but as a tool aimed at improving impact on the ground through more efficient delivery, less bureaucracy, reduced duplication of effort, and more effective engagement with partners. Integration templates and guidelines should be flexible enough to facilitate the appropriate level and degree of integration. During a peace operation – where some of the elements of security, humanitarian, human rights, development, and political imperatives may be incompatible – models of integration should be geared to the specific capacity, needs, and goals of the UN effort within the country concerned.

4) The degree of integration, and the lead agency, should vary with phases of the peace process and the level of violent conflict. In cases where UN forces are engaged in open confrontation with spoilers, integration may be more politically charged than in circumstances where there is no open conflict. Conflict environments are fluid and continuously evolving, as is the role of the international community in supporting a peace process – whether through conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or peacebuilding. The UN structure should adapt to the changing needs and capacities of the host country and the changing role of the international community therein. This is not an argument against integration where conditions call for it, but rather that it should be determined by the desired impact.

V. EFFECTIVE PEACE OPERATIONS: CHALLENGES AND LESSONS LEARNED

In addition to discussing the progress made toward integration, participants addressed some of the larger issues facing peace operation – the peacekeeping-peacebuilding interface, the challenge of building national capacity, the integration of humanitarian and military imperatives, and partnering with regional organizations.

The discussion of these larger issues facing peace operations has important implications for integration. If we see integration as a tool for improving the positive impact of UN-led peace operations, then any discussion of integration should examine the factors that determine the positive impact of a peace operation (or success), and work backwards to assess which structure(s) will facilitate this success. This is the concept of *form following function*, where the *functions* of a peace operation are determined by the desired impact, which in turn dictates the *form* required to achieve these functions. That “form should follow function” was one of the primary arguments of the 2005 ECHA *Report on Integrated Missions*. Nonetheless, as is elaborated in the next section, there are enormous barriers to form following function within the fragmented UN bureaucracy.

The Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding interface

Integration aims to link the tasks of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and humanitarian aid into one common strategy. The achievement of sustainable peace requires much more than the deployment of peacekeeping troops; it requires that both the symptoms and the causes of the conflict are addressed, at the same time that the foundation for future peace is built. According to the draft *Capstone Doctrine for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, “modern multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations support post-conflict efforts to preserve and consolidate peace by helping to rebuild the basic foundations of a secure, functioning State.”¹⁴ Strategic integration aims to create continuity of effort between the various tasks required of multidimensional peace operations - political, military, humanitarian, human rights and development. In other words, the success of peacekeeping depends on the achievement of essential peacebuilding goals, and the goal of integration is to ensure that both peacekeeping and peacebuilding approaches are directed toward the same strategic objectives.

- **The peacekeeping/peacebuilding interface occurs both sequentially and simultaneously:** 1) in the interface between the UNCT and the Mission when the mission arrives; 2) in the implementation of cross-sectoral programs that require military, humanitarian, political, human rights, and development components (i.e., DDR, SSR, RoL, elections); 3) in ensuring that different program approaches which are implemented simultaneously – long-term peacebuilding programs, short-term peace dividends, and short-term peacekeeping efforts – are directed toward the same (or complementary) priorities and objectives; 4) in the transition from the Peacekeeping Mission to the Political Mission (if there is one), from the mission to the UNCT, and from all UN efforts to national capacity.
- **The line between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is blurred.** Security Council mandates now include cross-sectoral programs in peace operation mandates. Consequently, peacekeepers and police now actively participate in cross-sectoral programs that depend on the capacity of political, development, humanitarian, and human rights actors – from DDR, to RoL, to elections. As a result, the DPKO is charged with implementing programs that are beyond its traditional expertise and more within the realm of the UN Funds and Programs. Yet, the UN Funds and Programs still carry no accountability to the Security Council.
- **It is very difficult to synchronize the UN’s multidimensional efforts – diplomatic, military, development, human rights, and humanitarian relief – and direct them toward a common objective, particularly in a fluid post-conflict environment.** An integrated strategy is often biased toward the priorities of the mission leadership. In an immediate post-conflict environment, political and

¹⁴ “Capstone Doctrine for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Draft 2” (New York: United Nations) p. 14.

military priorities often dominate, to the exclusion of development, human rights, and humanitarian priorities. The rapidly changing dynamics in a post-conflict environment can unravel the best-laid integrated plans, leading to the divergence of previously synchronized efforts. In addition, not all post-conflict priorities are necessarily compatible: political imperatives may result in the neglect of human rights (i.e., peace v. justice); political imperatives may also challenge humanitarian imperatives (i.e., providing humanitarian relief directly or indirectly to potential spoilers); and the UN's increasing focus on peace dividends may lead it to neglect the initial stages critical to long-term development.

- **To create a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, the UN is developing a linear, sequential model of post-conflict intervention – from peacemaking, to peacekeeping, to stabilization, to development.** Nonetheless, experience in most post-conflict environments shows that a sequential, linear model does not sufficiently address the complex and fluid needs of a post-conflict environment. Instead, a combination of approaches should be focused on the particular needs of each post-conflict environment, rather than on implementing the same sequential model regardless of the context. Strategic integration, which aims to prioritize and focus UN efforts, will be much less effective if it is based on a linear, sequential approach to intervention.
- **It is important to recognize the political nature of most post-conflict activities.** Peace operations directly influence the political stakes in post-conflict contexts. All resources provided by the international community in post-conflict environments are incentives or disincentives for peace.¹⁵ Because of the potential political impact of post-conflict interventions, all those engaging in international intervention, even humanitarian NGOs, need access to good political analysis. Better information-sharing between the peacekeeping mission and the UNCT can help to impart peacekeeping, humanitarian and development agencies alike with the political analysis necessary to provide incentives, rather than disincentives, for peace.
- **National capacity is crucial for the success of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding.** The effectiveness of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities depends on the capacity of the host state and society, with the support of the UN and other international bodies, to translate the short-term impact achieved by the peace operation into positive medium- and long-term impacts.

Delivering dividends and building national capacity

Integration aims to improve the efficiency (i.e., reduced duplication and parallel structures) and the effectiveness (i.e., impact) of peace operations. Peace operations, however, seek to have multiple impacts: preventing armed groups from disrupting (or

¹⁵ Peter S. Uvin, "Synthesis Report: The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict," (Paris: OECD, 1999).

spoiling) the peace agreement; establishing security; delivering immediate peace dividends; and building the capacity of the state and society to peacefully manage future conflict. This section summarizes the participants' discussion about the latter two impacts sought.

- **In post-conflict reconstruction, there is a tension between speed and ownership.** To deliver immediate peace dividends (i.e., a visible sign that “peace” will change people’s lives) to the population, the international community engages in rapid, short-term service delivery. At the same time, it is essential to build ownership and the capacity of the host state and society to (re)build itself in a way that will enable the peaceful management of future conflict. Building ownership and capacity requires a more involved programming process. Consequently, a tension exists between the international community’s efforts to deliver services directly to the population, and its efforts to build the capacity of the state to deliver these services. With each of these efforts, those engaging in international intervention need to employ very different programmatic approaches.
- **Both speed and ownership have drawbacks.** By focusing too much on the immediate delivery of peace dividends, those engaging in international intervention may never achieve their exit strategy – the development of national capacity to peacefully manage conflict. By focusing only on ownership and long-term capacity-building, the international community may miss crucial “windows of opportunity” to consolidate peace and security in the immediate aftermath of a war.
- **It is important to manage expectations by being transparent about what the international community can provide in the short- and long-term.** While it is important to raise expectations enough to create the psychological impression that the end of a war will change people’s lives, there is a risk of over-selling this. In post-conflict contexts, the host government and people tend to have very high expectations of the international community’s capacity to deliver immediate results. These expectations provide a window of opportunity for the international community to affect significant change. Nonetheless, only some expectations can be met in the short term. Substantial institutional and structural change requires efforts over a much longer term. As a result, peace operations and other post-conflict efforts quickly face expectations that they cannot meet. To avoid falling into this trap, those engaging in international intervention must assess the most urgent needs, both in terms of short- and long-term deliverables, and transparently communicate what resources they will provide.
- **Building capacity in post-conflict contexts is particularly difficult because of the absence or weakness of the governmental counterpart.** The state and society in a post-conflict environment often have low absorptive capacity and are unable to legitimately incorporate the influx of resources from the international

community. Capacity-building is made more difficult by widespread corruption and leaders' reliance on informal patronage networks.

- **In the absence of national capacity, the UN often builds the capacity that it would like to see, prioritizing its own agenda and sometimes its own capacity.** The UN tends to understand capacity-building as the capacity to serve the UN effectively and use its templates. In addition, because of the difficulty of building national capacity to deliver social services, the UN may instead build its own capacity to deliver. For example, a UN 4x4 truck often costs the same price as a medical center. Is the purchase of another 4x4 truck the best way to build capacity?
- **Peace operation staff may have little knowledge of how to build national capacity.** The DPKO does not recruit staff with capacity-building expertise. The UNCT, on the other hand, is often unable to scale up and speed up its activities so that it can respond to the different demands and windows of opportunity presented by the post-conflict context. As a result, in spite of the importance of building the capacity of the host state and society, there are insufficient resources within the DPKO and the UNCT to do so, particularly during a peace operation when the UN may have its highest degree of influence on national capacity.

Integrating humanitarianism?

The initial debate about the integration of humanitarian activities was spurred by International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC), and other NGOs' concerns about the politicization of humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was felt that the focus on "winning hearts and minds" was blurring the distinction between humanitarian action and political action. The 2005 *Report on Integrated Missions* therefore recommended that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) be placed outside of the integrated mission, a recommendation that has been followed by the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), among other missions. Nonetheless, integration and integrated missions remain a contentious issue for many humanitarian actors. This section summarizes the participants' discussion about the integration of humanitarian actors with UN peace operations.

- **The UN should develop better and more inclusive partnerships with NGOs, which would better reflect the increasingly powerful role that NGOs play in the post-conflict context.** Integration has threatened the quality of partnerships between NGOs and the UN because it subsumes NGOs under a strategic framework that NGOs did not participate in developing and with which they may not actually agree. Cooperation between NGOs and the UN works when it is based on common principles, agreement on the boundaries of integration and cooperation, and regular consultation. It does not work when the UN does not

consult with NGOs, particularly when NGOs are responsible for implementing UN programs.

- **Because many NGOs implement both development and humanitarian activities, criteria to determine the inclusion of NGOs in integration efforts should be considered.** Apart from the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), most NGOs should not be considered, or do not consider themselves, as neutral. These NGOs consider themselves to be impartial in the humanitarian sense of assisting on the basis of need alone. But because many NGOs increasingly engage in development activities that have a political impact, they should not be automatically considered as outside of strategic, or even programmatic, integration.
- **Humanitarian assistance can have a negative impact if used in lieu of development over an extended period of time.** Humanitarian assistance can undermine development assistance, just as it can undermine peacebuilding. The fact that humanitarian assistance does not replace capital assets can change and is changing societies.
- **Coordination and dialogue between military and humanitarian actors is essential for the effectiveness of both.** The military can help humanitarian actors with logistics, while humanitarian action can facilitate and favor the restoration of peace. In addition, there are important opportunities for humanitarian and military actors to work together to improve protection. However, both the mandate and the logic of the military and humanitarians are different. Because of their different cultures and approaches, coordination and dialogue between humanitarian and military actors are essential for identifying potential areas of collaboration. Integration efforts should enable this dialogue and not automatically assume that all humanitarian and military approaches are incompatible.
- **The degree of cooperation between humanitarian and military actors should depend on the perceived partiality of the military.** In cases where peacekeeping forces, or coalition forces, are engaged in open combat, the impartiality and neutrality of humanitarian actors could be compromised by any association with the military. In cases where peacekeepers are not using force, direct association and coordination between humanitarian actors and the military threatens humanitarian space to a much lesser degree. Each context and each mission structure is different, so the humanitarian partnership (and integration) should also be different in each case.
- **Pooled humanitarian funding has had some positive results, but is in need of significant reform.** First, Pooled humanitarian funds improve the capacity of the Humanitarian Coordinator to develop a strategic humanitarian response.

Nonetheless, humanitarian actors have serious concerns about the genuine impartiality of a Humanitarian Coordinator who is responsible for political and military mandates in addition to his/her humanitarian mandate. Second, Humanitarian Coordinators tend to equally distribute the funds, rather than allocating funds on the basis of the beneficiaries' need and the integrated UN strategy. Third, pooled funding tends to be distributed among UN agencies rather than to NGOs, which results in decreased funding for NGOs. This has an adverse effect on NGOs and, possibly, on beneficiaries. Fourth, pooled funds may provide the greatest benefit to donors by reducing their transaction costs. Fifth, pooled funds are distributed by the UNDP, which is very slow. For pooled funds to be effective in post-conflict environments, much more efficient disbursement mechanisms are necessary.

Partnering with regional organizations

Although the United Nations remains the custodian of international peace and security, regional organizations are playing an increasingly important peacekeeping role. The growing significance of regional peacekeeping presents important opportunities and challenges for the UN. Participants focused their discussion of regional organizations on the role of the African Union in peacekeeping and the *hybrid* force proposed for Darfur. They agreed that UN integration strategies have neglected the increasingly significant role played by regional organizations, and recommended that future integration strategies should take them into account.

- **Cooperation between the UN and the African Union (AU) remains ad hoc.** The development of the DPKO-AU peace support team has strengthened relations between UN peacekeeping and the AU, but inter-organizational guidance has not yet been developed.
- Because of the low absorptive and management capacity of the AU, **increased UN-AU cooperation will most likely require the UN (and Member States) to invest resources in building the institutional capacity of the AU.** The paradox of the situation in Sudan is that it may lead the UN to fulfill its long-standing promise to build the capacity of regional organizations, including that of the AU.
- **The UN and the AU may interpret their mandates differently, presenting significant challenges for hybrid missions.** Because of their different doctrines, the AU and the UN may have contradictory interpretations of the same mandate, or of purportedly complementary mandates. This has already been visible in Darfur, where UNMIS and the AU Mission in Darfur (AMIS) had different opinions on which actions can and should be taken to protect civilians.
- **Regional organizations may make advances in peacekeeping that are beyond what the UN has achieved.** The African Union is far ahead in its

thinking when it comes to peacekeeping. For example, the AU is already developing the African Standby Force and its constitutive act grants it the right to intervene in the internal affairs of states.

- **Coordination is not sufficiently binding. Coordination with commitment is necessary, particularly when it occurs between inter-governmental organizations.** The UN and regional organizations should establish guidelines that determine how they are, or are not, integrated at the strategic, programmatic and administrative levels. It is important to develop real partnerships between the UN and regional organizations. The inclusion of regional organizations in UN planning processes is particularly important in cases where regional peacekeepers are simply “re-hatted” by the UN.

VI. BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION

In spite of growing agreement on the purpose of integration and possible forms it can take, substantial barriers to integration remain. UN staff charged with developing integrated missions in DRC and Burundi repeatedly struggled with these barriers. In many cases, they found resourceful ways of working around them, often at the expense of significant time and energy. Although participants agreed that more flexible and efficient integration was important for increasing the impact of the UN presence, they also agreed that the barriers outlined below are significant impediments. They argued that the UN’s standard solution of creating additional mechanisms to resolve old problems will not lead to greater integration; it will only add an additional layer of challenges. Improved integration requires that these barriers be considered and addressed to the extent possible.

Structure:

- **The UN structure tends toward fragmentation, not integration.** As a result, integration is one of the UN’s greatest challenges. The United Nations system is a highly complex bureaucracy made up of 16 specialized agencies, 14 funds and programs, and 17 departments and offices, all with different mandates and many with different governance structures, not to mention different partners. As a result, one of the greatest barriers to integration is the UN structure itself.

Administration:

- **The differing administrative rules and regulations of each UN office, department, agency, fund and program are a significant barrier to integration.** The rules, regulations and administrative structures of each UN entity were developed to help that organization meet its particular mandate. They were not designed to support integration at the strategic or programmatic level. Successful strategic or programmatic integration has happened in spite of rules and regulations, and has usually required significant “rule-breaking”.

- **The Director of Administration (DOA) or Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) oversees the implementation of and adapts the rules and regulations to sufficiently meet the needs of integration.** The degree to which rules and regulations can be adapted, however, depends in part on the personalities and understanding of the DOA/CAO and his/her willingness to develop and implement “work around” strategies. Adaptation of rules and regulations also depends on proper backstopping from the Finance Management and Support Service (FMSS), the UN Controllers office and the Peacekeeping Financing Division in the Department of Management, the ACABQ and the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, which may, at times, adopt policies that undermine efforts aimed at improving integration.

Funding:

- **Different budgeting systems (assessed v. voluntary contributions) make it difficult for the Mission and the UNCT to share resources.**¹⁶ Even once a common strategy and priorities are agreed upon, it is difficult for the Mission and the UNCT to work together in the absence of common funding. Because assessed contributions are immediately available to the Mission, integrated programs may be delayed because the UNCT has not yet received the necessary voluntary contributions to implement their component(s) of the joint program. Similarly, because mission timeframes are short and the extension of missions is uncertain, the DPKO rarely allocates assessed funding towards the long-term strategies with which the UNCT and their voluntary funding sources are most concerned.
- **Many of the multidimensional aspects of recent peacekeeping mandates were not funded with assessed contributions because they fell outside of traditional peacekeeping.** They were therefore not considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to be security-related. Consequently, the DSRSG/RC/HC is charged with raising voluntary contributions to cover the aspects of the Security Council mandate that are not provided with assessed funding. Because the DSRSG/RC/HC lacks authority vis a vis the governing boards of UN agencies, or with bilateral initiatives and funds, this is often a difficult, if not impossible, job.
- **Voluntary contributions (from donors to agencies) and bilateral contributions (from donor government to host government) may discourage integration when they are targeted toward pet projects and agencies.** Voluntary contributions are most often given by the same 10 to 15 key donor countries. These voluntary

¹⁶ Assessed contributions are the resources provided directly to the UN by Member States, which are then allocated by Member State bodies to fund peace operations. Voluntary contributions are funds provided by donor governments, multilateral organizations, or individuals directly to UN agencies. Voluntary funding is more unpredictable than assessed contributions.

contributions may, at times, support objectives that detract from the strategy of the UN in a particular country.

- **Voluntary funding is often restricted by static definitions of the type of resources necessary for different phases of conflict, sidelining the multi-sectoral funding that is necessary to support a country's emergence from violence conflict.** Many donors' funding policies and guidelines, in spite of their adoption of the rhetoric of integration, remain based on the assumption that programs should take place in a linear, sequential progression. This goes against most experiences in post-conflict environments, which show that humanitarian, development, political, military, policing human rights, and rule of law programs should be implemented simultaneously to address the multifaceted nature of war and peace.
- **Integrated planning is not systematically linked to integrated funding.** The current guidelines for the IMPP leave bilateral donors and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) out of the strategic planning and program prioritization processes. As a result, there is no guarantee that these integrated strategies will be funded, and thus implemented. MONUC redressed this oversight and included bilateral donors and IFIs in the development of their Country Assistance Framework (CAF). This allowed them to ensure funding for their CAF and bring Official Development Assistance (ODA) in at an earlier stage. BINUB, on the other hand, built its Integrated Peace Consolidation Framework on the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP), developing a joint World Bank-UN-Government of Burundi strategy. This Integrated Peace Consolidation Framework was then funded by the Peacebuilding Support Fund. Thus, integrated funding made the implementation of the integrated strategies possible in both DRC and Burundi.

Guidance:

- **The DPKO tends to develop rigid organizational templates that do not take into account the actual capacity within the mission, the larger UN System, the international community, or even the host state and society.** Headquarters develops templates that are based on ideal circumstances, or on previous missions, whereas few peace operations take place under ideal conditions or should be blueprints for their neighbors. Staffing within a mission is often incomplete, or insufficient in other ways, and the rigid mission structure is, by design, unable to adapt to the existing capacities within and outside of the UN. Currently, adaptation at the field level occurs in spite of guidelines, templates, and procedures. It takes place on the initiative of staff who are willing to fill gaps by carrying out tasks to which they were not assigned, or by finding innovative ways of working around guidelines, templates, and procedures.

- **Security Council mandates include a standard set of multidimensional programs that often replicate programs of the UNCT.** This duplication is due, in part, to the fact that the Security Council has passed resolutions that call for the inclusion of certain program into peace operation mandates. Thus, when issuing mandates, the Security Council is obliged to include these programs, even if they are not necessary for the desired impact in a particular country. For DPKO budgeting processes, the standard multidimensional peace operation templates provide an easy way to decide on staffing. These practices, however, often lead to the creation of unnecessary staff positions and waste valuable resources.

New initiatives:

- **Initiatives intended to increase the integration of the UN System have remained at the surface level without attempting to create incentives for integration within each UN agency.** As a result, few changes have occurred within each UN agency that would encourage staff to consider integration efforts as part of their responsibility. Instead, integrated efforts are often viewed as detracting from the tasks for which staff are held accountable. One notable exception is BINUB, which developed joint programs that allowed each staff person to participate in an integrated program, while still reporting to his/her agency, thus creating agency-specific incentives for an integrated effort.
- **In spite of the development of the framework for the IMPP, there is insufficient capacity to plan and implement integrated missions.** Because integrated mission planning is a comprehensive process, it requires surge staff capacity within the mission and the UNCT. Non-DPKO agencies do not often have surge planning capacity, which can limit their ability to participate in the integrated mission planning process. In addition, non-DPKO agencies may simply continue to implement the same types of programs that they implemented before the DPKO-run mission arrived. The agencies of the UNCT are often unwilling, or unable, to adjust their programmatic approaches to allow them take advantage of the political window of opportunity provided by the presence of the mission, or to adapt their programs to the specific needs of a post-conflict environment. Lack of sufficient involvement, or buy-in, in the integrated planning process (because of an absence of planning capacity) significantly increases agencies' tendency to resist the implementation of an integrated strategy.
- **In spite of the authority granted to mission leadership in the 2005 Note of Guidance of the Secretary-General, the SRSGs and DSRSGs do not have the financial or administrative authority with which to fulfill their significant responsibilities.** The SRSG and the DSRSG/RC/HC are charged with ensuring that all UN components in a country pursue a coherent and coordinated

approach”¹⁷ and coordinate with outside partners – the host government, donors, and NGOs.¹⁸ Nonetheless, the SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC are not automatically given any financial or administrative authority over the UN system outside of the DPKO-run mission. Only in circumstances where funding is funneled through the DSRSG/RC/HC, or the ERSG, is the responsibility of ensuring coherence and coordination combined with the authority necessary to achieve this objective. As a result, most SRSGs’, DSRSG/RC/HCs’ and ERSGs’ jobs involve a high degree of negotiation and persuasion within and outside the UN system. The success or failure of a peace operation is, therefore, highly dependent on the personalities and persuasive capacities of individuals in key positions, especially the CAO or DOA.

Culture:

- **Each UN agency has its own culture that corresponds to its mandate and its programmatic focus (i.e., humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, RoL). UN agencies are rarely familiar with the culture, language, and procedures of other UN agencies, which creates a significant barrier to the development of integrated strategies and approaches.** Experience with the IMPP shows that one of the most time consuming aspects, and perhaps its most important contribution, is the process of breaking down cultural and linguistic barriers between UN agencies.
- **Regional organizations’ structures, cultures and processes are different from those of the UN, which presents a significant challenge to increased cooperation.** Building systematic cooperation between regional organizations and the UN peace operations requires substantial effort to understand these differences, realign procedures and management cultures, create common ground, and develop common objectives and priorities.
- **Peace operations are often so focused on internal UN negotiations, or negotiations within the international community, that they ignore the importance of building national capacity and understanding local culture and customs.** To achieve success in many of its areas of operation, a peace operation must build national capacity. In addition, the host government must give its consent for the peace operation to remain in the country, which also requires respect for local culture, customs, and the political leadership. Therefore, by focusing too much on internal UN politics and ignoring national capacity and local culture, peace operations may greatly reduce the likelihood that they will fulfill important portions of their mandate.

Planning and strategy development:

¹⁷ “Note of Guidance”, para. 5.

¹⁸ “Note of Guidance,” paras 17-22 on the role of the DSRSG/RC/HC.

- **Planning is often inadequate – based on past realities and unconnected to incentives for implementation.** Because integrated planning is not linked to incentives and accountability mechanisms within each UN entity, it rarely trickles down to those charged with implementing activities in the field. There is a tendency to implement yesterday’s plan, rather than today’s or tomorrow’s.

Accountability:

- **The performance review mechanism within the mission is insufficient, and there is no effort to evaluate the overall effectiveness and efficiency of a peace operation.** Without system-wide accountability there are few incentives for the achievement of an integrated strategy. Without an evaluation of the efficiency of peace operations and the impact of the entire UN effort, there are few incentives to change the templates and administrative procedures that block integration. In the absence of effective monitoring and evaluation of the entire UN effort, decision-makers do not have the information necessary to make mid-course corrections or reconfigure the UN structure to respond to changes in the context and the war-to-peace trajectory.
- **The Peacebuilding Commission was intended to have a mandate review function, but this has not materialized.**¹⁹ It is essential to have the capacity to redesign and reconfigure a mission. Mandate review is a necessary option, but should not be the only one.
- **There is no consideration of whether resources should be allocated for expensive peace operations or for less-expensive diplomatic, humanitarian, development and national capacity-building efforts.** The Security Council tends to prescribe peace operations as a “one size fits all” solution to internal or regional conflict, without questioning whether a peace operation is the most effective and efficient use of limited resources. Many host governments view a peace operation as an expensive endeavor that uses resources that would otherwise go directly to them. Greater accountability for impact and evaluation of the efficiency of peace operations could encourage more careful consideration of alternative and complementary options for mitigating violent intra- or inter-state conflict.
- **The push for accountability of individual UN entities can undermine collective accountability.** Integration, in some instances, depends on the flexibility of the DOA/CAO to support integrated efforts, and to look beyond the interest of a single UN entity and towards the best way to fulfill the mandate. The Controller’s office also plays a critical role in allowing for integration efforts.

¹⁹ Report of the Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, 21 March 2005, A/59/2005, para. 115. “A Peacebuilding Commission could perform the following functions:… periodically review progress towards medium-term recovery goals…”

Participants agreed that some of the barriers outlined above could be overcome, while others could not. Nonetheless, they agreed, acknowledgment of all of these barriers and exploration of options to address them is essential for the creation of more efficient and effective integrated peace operations.

VII. PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Principles

Participants agreed on several principles that should govern integration reforms and efforts:

- *While improved guidance is essential, templates are not.* To the extent possible, the form of the integrated UN system should be determined by the functions required to achieve the desired impact: *form should follow function.*
- The desired *impact should determine* the degree and level (i.e. form) of integration.
- Integration should be viewed as an *opportunity to supply good political analysis* to all UN post-conflict efforts.
- The degree of integration and the lead agency should *vary with the stages the peace process* and the changing dynamics on the ground.
- *Incentives must be created* within each UN Agency to encourage integration.
- *All other levels of integration flow from strategic integration.* Strategic integration is the most crucial level of integration – all parts of the UN system must agree on a common strategic plan and develop a shared understanding of priorities.
- Inter-governmental, governmental, and non-governmental *partners should be included* in integration efforts to ensure ownership at the appropriate level and degree.
- *Reform of administrative, budgetary, and procedural practices is essential* for improved efficiency and effectiveness of integrated peace operations.
- The *ultimate purpose of integration is to improve internal and external partnerships* – to improve the capacity of UN entities to work together and of the entire UN System to work more effectively with national and international partners.

Recommendations

In addition to the above principles, participants outlined a series of recommendations. Participants emphasized that UN Member States bear responsibility for moving many of these recommendations forward. Member States are the decision-makers in all UN policy-making bodies, including the Fifth Committee and the ACABQ.

Administrative and systemic reforms

- Revise administrative regulations so that the systems of UN departments, offices, agencies, funds, and programs are more compatible and permit staff to share resources and reduce the number of parallel systems.
- Establish inter-agency procedures to manage common services.
- Hire an external consultant to assess the efficiency of peace operations and make recommendations on streamlining systems.

Funding reforms

- Continue to expand the use of assessed contributions so that they comprehensively cover security-related programs, such as DDR.
- Develop assessed budgets that respond to the real needs, and are based on achievable milestones. Budgets are currently developed according to templates, which wastes a significant amount of resources.
- Involve donors and other intergovernmental organizations in the integrated planning process so that they have ownership of the plans and are able provide a clear indication of which voluntary contributions will be provided for which purposes.
- Link integrated strategies to funding. Common and/or guaranteed funding creates incentives to implement common strategies.
- Use common funding and common strategy development as a venue for the UN System and its partners to dialogue about what can and cannot be achieved given the available resources and other constraints.
- Strengthen the core funding of agencies, funds, and programs.
- Improve the distribution mechanisms for pooled funds, in both the humanitarian and development areas.
- Improve the guidelines for Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). QIPs can have an important impact, but only if they are well designed and implemented. QIPs allow the mission to deliver an immediate peace dividend to the population. Nonetheless, when poorly designed and implemented, QIPs can duplicate activities already underway or waste resources. QIPs should be careful not to cross over too much into humanitarian territory. They should only address areas where the mission has a comparative advantage.
- Assess the success of the World Bank rapid disbursement mechanism in DRC, and make recommendations regarding its replication.

Structural reforms

- The two-pillar model (two DSRSGs within a mission) should be reconsidered and only the necessary posts given to each mission.
- Improve the cross-sectoral integration and communication between the pillars and sections of the mission.
- Integrated decision-making structures are crucial. To the extent possible, the World Bank and other donors need to be integrated into these structures.
- The existing restrictions on agency service agreements should be revisited with the Fifth Committee. Agency service agreements enabled BINUB to achieve partial integration (programmatic integration with separate reporting lines) throughout most of the mission. BINUB was permitted to negotiate agency service agreements, while MONUC was not.
- Keep the OCHA outside of the integrated UN mission so that it can fulfill its mandate of coordinating humanitarian NGOs, which are wary of being integrated into the peace operation.
- The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) should remain inside of the UN integrated mission through the DSRSG/RC/HC role. The combined role provides the HC with the political leverage necessary for humanitarian protection.
- Improve integration at headquarters, which is necessary to facilitate better integration at the field level.

Reform strategic planning and assessment capacity

- Improve strategic planning within all agencies. This is essential for increased efficiency and effectiveness of integrated peace operations. According to one participant, “Plans are nothing. Planning is everything. Planning is a creative, interactive, dynamic process and through repeating it you create a pattern of recognition, and through that you handle the unknown.”
- Reform working procedures within the Secretariat to move away from traditional, sequential planning toward an approach that focuses on the simultaneous effort of the components of the UN System (humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, diplomatic, human rights, etc.).
- The IMPP must be much more inclusive of national actors and international partners and must be based on a field-driven assessment of need.
- Use unifying goals, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to support integrated planning. This will force UN entities to look beyond their own mandate and focus on shared objectives.
- Participatory processes, such as the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA), may raise expectations that cannot easily be

met. While these participatory assessments are important, they are not rapid or flexible enough to address the immediate post-conflict requirements. Therefore, it is important that participatory assessments are accompanied by parallel processes that enable the immediate provision of peace dividends.

Human resource reforms

- Give integrated missions' staff with the expertise appropriate to implement the missions. Expertise should also be attained by collaborating with other UN entities and partners, rather than only by recruiting new staff into the DPKO-run mission.
- Make it administratively possible for UN entities to exchange staff at the field level.
- Make recruitment much more efficient and timely.
- Improve merit-based promotion and appointment.
- Develop inter-agency training programs, where UN staff receive training about other UN entities and about a common UN approach. Inter-agency training will also help to create relationships between UN entities, which will facilitate collaboration at both headquarters and in the field.

Leadership reforms

- The SRSG and DSRSGs should be given more authority over the UN system. Currently they have the responsibility for ensuring coherence in the system, but no real financial or management authority, unless the DSRSG/RC/HC is empowered by a common fund.
- Build the DSRSG/RC/HC's capacity to fulfill his/her coordination mandate by increasing the number of coordination staff supporting him/her.
- The SRSG or ERSG should be involved in the mission planning so that s/he has ownership of the plan that s/he will supervise.
- Continue to improve the SRSG selection process to ensure that the most qualified people are chosen for this crucial position.

Capacity to scale up to respond to particular post-conflict needs and opportunities

- All UN entities, including the UNCT, must be able to scale up for the period of a peace operation. Scaling up is required in terms of planning capacity, capacity to deliver effective post-conflict programming, collaborative capacity, institutional change, and political analysis.
- Because of the potential political impact of all post-conflict interventions, all engaged in international intervention, even humanitarian NGOs, should have access to good political analysis. Better information-sharing between the

peacekeeping mission and the UNCT can help to provide humanitarian and development agencies with the political analysis necessary to carry out programs that provide incentives, rather than disincentives, for peace.

Improved internal and external partnerships

- Realign international intervention to align with national programming and absorptive capacity.
- Improve understanding of the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, relief and development, and conflict and post-conflict intervention. Develop guidelines explaining what organizational structures will support which types of interfaces.
- In post conflict environments, the international community must assess the most urgent needs, both in terms of short and long-term deliverables, and transparently communicate which resources they will provide.

Improved Guidance

- Develop a set of standards and principles for integration, rather than a strict template or structure. Circulate best practice on integration.
- Develop guidelines for the Security Council on the types of mandates necessary to support different post-conflict programs and interventions. The model for this is the guidance provided to the Security Council for protection mandates.
- Develop doctrine for partnerships with regional organizations.
- Focus the IMPP on common inter-agency principles, strategies, and language so that the planning process is both flexible and based on a common understanding. This would be facilitated by an inter-agency course that educated UN staff in the cultures and procedures of other UN entities.

Improved mandate and mission review

- Develop a mission and mandate review process.

Incentives for integration and collective action

- Reward staff for collaborative work and coordination, often considered to be outside of their assessed scope of work.
- The governing boards of each UN agency should reward collaborative action and coordination. This would reward integrated action rather than only rewarding actions that fulfill an agency's specific mandate.
- Develop methods to evaluate the impact of peace operations. This will provide incentives to staff and organizations to improve their *impact* and move away from their current focus on output.