29 June 2000


THE NORWEGIAN DEFENCE POLICY COMMISSION: MAIN POINTS

The Defence Policy Commission was appointed by the Norwegian government in the summer of 1999. The Commission was mandated to assess the future tasks of the Norwegian armed forces, and to give its recommendations for the future development of the Norwegian defence by 1 July 2000. The Commission has consisted of members appointed by the political parties, a representative from the Chief of Defence, and experts in security and defence policy issues. The Commission presents its report to the Minister of Defence today.

The Commission recommends significant changes in Norwegian defence policy. The changes include the tasks of the armed forces, international military co-operation, national military service, and the total defence concept.

The Norwegian armed forces are in deep crisis. The idea of nationally balanced forces exists only in rhetoric. The adjustments made during the 1990s have to a considerable extent failed, despite good intentions and high ambitions. The infrastructure and organisation of the forces are too large.

Radical changes will be needed to counteract the ever-increasing unbalances and develop armed forces adapted to today’s reality and to the challenges of the future. The Commission has considered its main challenge to be to outline the aims and framework for this vitally important process.

Norway will face more complex risks and potential challenges in the future. The military challenges are no longer necessarily associated with one particular counterpart or a certain type of conflict. An invasion threat against Norwegian territory, in the traditional sense, is very unlikely in the short and medium term. However, a number of potential risks and threats of more limited forms are likely to remain lasting traits in the security and defence policy picture.

The Commission recommends a continued turn away from the singular focus on traditional invasion defence towards a broader and more balanced structuring of the forces. The future forces must be flexible, i.e. able to meet the challenges that may arise in the short and medium term, and able to adapt to a fundamentally different situation in the longer term. The implication of the latter is the importance of ensuring flexibility rather than setting fixed goals and making detailed plans.

The Commission emphasises the importance of meeting challenges against Norwegian security in close co-operation with others. The overall aim must be to adapt the links between Norway and her allies to a new situation, while maintaining the likelihood of allied reinforcement in crisis or war.

Norwegian participation in military activities outside Norway will become more important. This will be a requirement for Norway in order to be considered a credible co-operation partner. It will also be a measure of Norway’s effort in a burden-sharing perspective, and an important arena for exerting influence, building competence, and developing interoperability.

Even in the future, comprehensive and co-ordinated utilisation of civilian and military resources will be vital for Norway’s ability to meet challenges against her security. The Total Defence Concept must be revitalised and reinforced in line with altered conditions. An extended civil-military co-operation may be an important contribution in countering the negative effects of internationalisation, globalisation, and privatisation.

The Commission has not described a detailed structure for the Norwegian armed forces. Generally, the Commission’s assessments coincide with the structure presented in the Chief of Defence’s "Defence Study 2000". However, the Commission considers the proposed structure not to be fully suited to meet the tasks described by the Commission.

The present peacetime organisation of the Norwegian armed forces is too large, and not well suited to produce the future force structure in an efficient manner. Thus, the peacetime organisation must be adjusted to the new tasks of the forces, and it must be cut significantly.

Changed conditions have spurred a requirement for reforms in the command structure of the armed forces. The present system is based on a separation of the political/civilian and military leadership structures. The Commission has considered several arrangements, and finally focused on two models – an integrated model, and a separated one. The members of the Commission are divided in their views on whether the present separation of the Ministry of Defence and the national military headquarters should be continued, or an integrated model should be considered further.

The Commission assesses that a number of factors suggest a continuation of the principle of national military service. However, the Commission also has pointed out considerable weaknesses in the present practice, and recommends significant changes based on three main considerations: To satisfy the requirements of the armed forces, to offer a meaningful service, and to ensure equitable burden-sharing and broad public support.

The Commission recommends an arrangement for the national military service with two significant changes compared to the present arrangement: Firstly, considerably reduced time in the military call-up rolls for mobilisation – from the present 44 years of age to 34 years for territorial defence, and 27 years for the services. Secondly, a far more differentiated initial service and refresher training. For the territorial defence, the Commission recommends a short initial service of 4 months, with short, annual periods of refresher training. For the services, a long initial service of 12 months is recommended, with one period of refresher training as a maximum.

The Commission has emphasised five general guidelines for the restructuring of the armed forces. Firstly, a predictable framework – financially and regarding other conditions – from beginning to end. Secondly, the restructuring process must be strictly limited in time. Thirdly, the changes must be executed with vigour. Fourthly, new instruments for change must be used. Fifthly, the forces in the future must be located in considerably fewer places than today.

The Commission recommends the following guidelines for the annual defence budgets in the period 2002–2005 (all amounts in NOK 2000-value):

a flat, ordinary budget of NOK 25 bn

an additional restructuring contribution of totally NOK 5 bn

revenue from sales of military property and buildings can be used in full the defence budget; a gross revenue of 2 bn NOK from these sales is assumed over the 4-year period

surpluses and deficits can be transferred between the individual years the period 2002–2005

the condition of additional funding of the frigate acquisition is continued

the principle of additional funding of extra expenditure on international peace operations is continued.

In addition, the Commission presupposes that investment in equipment is reduced by a total of NOK 2.5 bn compared to an alternative without a restructuring of the forces. In total, this gives a restructuring package of about NOK 9 bn. This will create sufficient freedom of action for the restructuring. The restructuring will create overall savings in cost for operations and maintenance of NOK 4.5 bn in the timeframe 2003–2005, and subsequent annual savings of NOK 2.6 bn after the restructuring has been completed in 2005.

The financial framework facilitates an overall downsizing of the manpower of the forces by up to 6.000 military and civilian employees. The Commission considers that redundancy payment, in the order of 2^2 yearly wages, will be by far the best, and a highly necessary, instrument in the downsizing process.

In a future where the potential threats are complex, where developments over time are uncertain, and where the armed forces are required to perform several different and demanding tasks concurrently, competence is a critical resource. Therefore, the Commission recommends considerable changes to priorities on the operations side to reinforce competence and quality even from the first year of the restructuring process.

It is a prerequisite for this challenging restructuring process to have a predictable and reliable framework from beginning to end. This can only be established through a broad and binding political commitment. The Commission recommends that this commitment be ensured through a broad defence policy agreement between the political parties. The agreement should be based on the recommendations of the Commission, but must be shaped through new political processes.

A broad defence policy agreement today would be a logical continuation of the nation-wide consensus characterising Norwegian security and defence policy. It is also the firm opinion of the Commission that its recommendations must be implemented as quickly as possible, and that the restructuring process must be decided and accomplished as a single comprehensive reform package so that the overall advantages and disadvantages will be clearly visible. Unless this procedure is adopted, there is a major risk that the processes will be too lengthy and vulnerable to an infinite number of detailed political reassessments.