Challenges for Norwegian defence into year 2000

Address by Mr Dag Jostein Fjærevoll, Norwegian Minister of Defence, Oslo Military Society, 5 January 1998

Introduction

Chief of Defence, Ladies and Gentlemen:

The current international security and defence challenges are both numerous and diverse. Our security surroundings are still marked by considerable uncertainty which differs from previous times. The potential for cooperation, but also conflict, has changed fundamentally. The disappearance of a block-division has strongly reduced the likelihood of a major war, but also removed some of the hurdles against minor armed conflicts. On a short term basis, we cannot anticipate to enter into a new period of stability and predictability. Quite to the contrary, uncertainty seems to be a sustaining characteristic of future security.

Given a situation in which the challenges are numerous, diverse and continously subject to change, it becomes particularly difficult to plan for the future. The solutions that are chosen must be flexible and enable us to manage a variety of challenges, while maintaining the overall view. Norway has traditionally approached security issues in a broad manner. Still, the purely military means, as a deterrent and as a capability to maintain collective defence, were given particular consideration during the Cold War. Today the political aspects of security and defence policy have increased their significance. The development has also resulted in an increased role of the use of armed forces for crisis management and peace operations. At the same time, cooperation between military and civilian personnel has become an essential precondition for meeting the challenges. Within this framework, between new and old, the future Norwegian security and defence policy must be spelled out. The decisions cannot be made once and for all. Our approach to security and defence policy must rather constitute a continous process where experiences are linked to challenges.

As we are currently wrapping up the effort to produce a new white paper for the Armed Forces, the situation above, constitutes the general pattern of our work. This results in significant challenges for our planning efforts. The new white paper is based on comprehensive examinations carried out by the Headquarters Defence Command and the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment over the last three years. Given the political basis of the new coalition Governement, the white paper will spell out the main characteristics of the Government’s security and defence policy covering 1999-2002 and give political guidelines for the development of the Armed Forces in a twenty year perspective. I do plan to present the white paper to Parliament by the end of February.

This address has been given the title “Challenges for Norwegian defence into year 2000.” Thus, I find it appropriate to begin with what appears, in my view, to be the major challenges within security and defence. Then I would like to focus on the question which in this regard must be paramount; What do the challenges mean for the framing of modern Norwegian Armed Forces, and how should we prepare to meet the challenges in a best possible way?

Cooperation within NATO

The most central dimension of Norwegian security and defence policy is our membership in NATO. NATO will also remain a cornerstone in Norwegian security and defence policy in the future. 1997 has been a very important year for NATO and European security. In recent years, NATO has found itself in the midst of a comprehensive restructuring process; internally as well as externally. The enlargement of the alliance, combined with the establishment of a deepened and broadened partnership in which NATO also elaborates its relationship to Russia. NATO’s internal adaptation is no less ambitious, with the establishment of a new command structure, and the development of a European security and defence identity within the alliance. The restructuring process in NATO affects our interests directly. It is of great significance to Norway that NATO remains a credible and powerful political and military instrument. At same time, it should be an objective for Norway to contribute to the restructuring of NATO, in order to prepare the alliance for new challenges. In this context, it is important to seek the right balance, to ensure that the restructuring of the alliance does not proceed at the expense of NATO’s core functions. It appears necessary to underscore that it is long-term integrated cooperation within NATO which has made it possible for the alliance to effectively manage new tasks. Despite these facts, the future may bring increased political and financial pressure against NATO’s core functions, and less attention to the issues considered important to Norway.

ESDI

Both NATO and WEU have recently made efforts to develop further the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the alliance. Several preconditions for a European crisis management capability are already in place. In a long term perspective, it is thus likely that the European dimension will increase its significance within the framework of NATO. The institutional framework of European cooperation within NATO, to an increasing degree, will be managed by the WEU and EU. It will bring particular challenges to Norway because of our associate membership in the WEU and our position outside the EU. These facts should be considered in framing Norwegian attitudes towards the development of a European security and defence identity.

In general, Norway has considered the idea of increased European responsibility for security and defence policy favourably. In particular, we have advocated that ESDI evolves within the alliance. Nevertheless, it is instrumental that the development of ESDI proceeds with American blessing. The war in former Yugoslavia has demonstrated that transatlantic solidarity and cooperation are preconditions for resolving crises of some magnitude at the European continent.

The transatlantic dimension

The political relationship between the European allies and the US has become more unpredictable. Despite numerous common interests, there is also potential for opposing views. In light of the US global involvement, we must expect that Washington will weigh its commitments in other parts of the world up against the US interest in Europe. There is already domestic pressure in the US to reduce the American military presence in Europe. This pressure may increase, and is illustrated through the ongoing dialogue regarding US participation in Bosnia, and prepositioning of US materiel in Norway. Still, it is likely that Europe will remain at the core of US foreign policy, and that US commitments will be upheld. As a precondition for upholding its military involvement in Europe, however, the US could demand a substantial European contribution to maintaining the common western security interests; both within an enlarged NATO and outside Europe.

It is of crucial importance to Norway that the transatlantic dimension of the alliance is upheld. Major reductions in the US military involvement in Europe may jeopardize NATO’s efficiency and credibility. As a result of our particular geostrategic situation and dependence on reinforcements in a time of crisis, such a development may have severe consequences. This applies, in particular, if Norway were to confront a situation in which it had to choose between European allies and the US. As a supplement to institutionalized cooperation within NATO, it is thus imperative to intensify bilateral relations with all of our major allies. This fact becomes particularly important in order to convey knowledge about the challenges we face in the North, to discuss the development of NATO cooperation, and also to seek support for Norwegian interests. The significance of bilateral contacts to Norway will likely increase in the years ahead. This also applies to the relationship with countries outside NATO, both in the Nordic area as well as in Europe at large.

The relationship with the Nordic and Baltic countries

Nordic cooperation within the security and defence arena is steadily becoming more comprehensive while, at same time, changing in character. In the time ahead, priority will be given to reinforce and elaborate the security dialogue with our Nordic neighbours. In the wake of the Cold War, the security policy of Sweden and Finland has reached new dimensions. Both countries are now more strongly involved in European security through their memberships in EU, their observer status in WEU and their partnership agreements with NATO. Against this background, it seems clear that the Nordic dimension will be given increased attention also in Norwegian security and defence policy.

A development of Nordic security and defence cooperation will in years to come be linked to international peace operations. The NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support) will consititute an important component. On a basic level, the aim is to restructure and to give the Nordic security and defence identity a new content in line with the international development. Within the larger framework, cooperation regarding peace operations may serve as a vehicle to stimulate additional cooperation within other areas.

Another important element of Nordic cooperation is the support to the Baltic states. In recent years, Norway’s political involvement in the Baltic states has been considerably intensified through a number of different projects. The effort to establish a Baltic battalion, BALTBAT, represents the most comprehensive Nordic/Western project. Although Norway geographically does not belong to the Baltic area, it is in our interests to contribute to stable and democratic development by linking the Baltic States to Western cooperation by implementing practical measures. Nordic cooperation with the three Baltic states also adds a broader regional hold on the Nordic dimension, and thus more leverage to the effort to establish a new European security structure, where also relations with Russia will be given special attention.

Relationship to Russia

The development in Russia will still be a major dimension in Norwegian security and defence policy. Russia is evolving in a democratic direction. The development, however, is still marked by considerable uncertainty. In recent years, the country has undergone an enormous and costly social restruction. Despite certain signs of improvement, the economic situation is still weak and unstable. In recent years, Russia’s military position has been strongly reduced, and the Russian defence budget drastically cut. Despite these trends, Russia has retained a nuclear and conventional military potential which must be taken seriously. Reductions in Russian forces have also added greater significance to strategic nuclear arms in Russian defence planning. It must be expected that the strategic submarine base at the Kola peninsula will become even more important to Russia in the future.

It is difficult to predict the content of the renegotiated CFE-Treaty, nevertheless, it appears that the treaty will call for additional reductions in the arms level in Europe. An important question is linked to Russia’s flexibility in deploying forces on own territory. The current CFE-Treaty limits this flexibility, but does not deprive Russia of regional concentration of forces. Thus, it is a Norwegian objective to further increase the predictability of the conditions that affect our own defence planning. At the same time, Norway must secure its right to receive allied reinforcements in times of crisis and war. Lastly, future national ceilings must be adapted to the structure being put forth in the next white paper.

In parallell with the the development of increased defence dialogue and cooperation with Russia, Russian military dispositions in the North will continue to affect the political dialogue between Norway and Russia. It is important to Norway that Russia participates in multilateral cooperation which also includes our allies and other Nordic countries. Norway’s security policy is based on the assumption that European stability cannot be achieved without Russian participation. At the same time, we do underscore that the development in the North is not purely a Russian-Norwegian concern; it also affects the international community.

Russia does not pose a military threat to Norway. Presently, there is no bilateral issue suggesting that Russia will implement military measures against us. Still, in exercising our security policy, we cannot ignore the strategic geopolitical location of Norway. Any country bordering a major power with a substantial military potential, cannot avoid taking this into account when policy is being formulated. Hence, the relationship to Russia will continue to be an important element in future Norwegian security and defence policy. The potential for confrontation and the danger of a military attack have largely been replaced by cooperation. There is, however, a military potential and a large degree of uncertainty which makes itself evident. This suggests that the development of cooperation with Russia must be measured against the danger of permanent or temporary set backs.

Other challenges in Norway’s surrounding areas

Norway also faces other important security challenges in its surrounding areas. Increased internationalization and the fact that Norway has become a strategic supplier of oil and gas to Europe, have gradually increased the need to secure and protect petroleum installations. Stable and secure delivery of oil is vital to the recipient countries. It suggests that Norwegian energy production must be considered within a broader context. In the future, we must thus be prepared to allocate more resources and capabilities to the protection of vital facilities. Close cooperation within NATO, in addition to bilateral agreements, will be necessary measures.

The Armed Forces also confront important challenges linked to the vindication of sovereignty, the management of resources, and the environment. Vindication of Norwegian sovereignty and rights in waters under our jurisdiction, has increasingly become a central task for Norwegian authorities. The Armed Forces play a decisive role in this effort. The enforcement of Norwegian jurisdiction in a predictable and efficient manner adds credibility to our will to uphold vital Norwegian interests. The Government emphasizes the development of international cooperation in order to secure best possible control over maritime resources. In this regard, I would like to commend the role of the Coast Guard.

Management and control over resources must be seen in context with environmental challenges. Environmental disasters in our surrounding areas could have severe consequences for life and health in our own country. Cooperation with defence authorities of other countries is necessary in order to reduce the likelihood of future environmental threats to Norway. This applies in particular to the management of nuclear and conventional pollutants caused by Russian defence activities. These problems must be seen in both a bilateral and a broader international perspective. The trilateral agreement, AMEC (Arctic Military Environmental Agreement) between the defence ministries of Russia, the US, and Norway is a good example of the latter. Within the framework of AMEC, six projects are emphasized. Four of these involve measures against the danger of nuclear radiation in the North. During the Russian defence minister’s visit to Oslo last November, a bilateral implementation plan was signed for 1998. Among other things, the plan introduces bilateral talks on a ministerial and military staff level in addition to bilateral environmental defence contacts between Norway and Russia.

It is important to underscore the relationship between environmental and military concerns. On the one hand, credible defence is a central instrument to create peace and stability and to contribute to a secure environment. On the other, the development of such a defence must not destroy the environment. The Government thus emphasizes an environmental agenda as an integral part of the Armed Forces.

Challenges in a global perspective

It seems appropriate to consider the latter challenges in light of a broader understanding of security. National security has traditionally been linked to the survival of the state as a sovereign and independent unity. The possibility of military attacks from other states has thus been the principal threat to a state’s security. This is still the case because there are no types of supra-national powers which may decide to put an end to conflicts if one or several adversaries choose to go to war. A long list of other challenges, however, also has significance for international security. These challenges have taken on a relatively larger role in the wake of the Cold War. A well defined bipolar line of conflict has practically been replaced by several undefined lines; in which there are more fragmented conflicts, and more emphasis on non-military aspects. These include terrorism, environmental degradation, exploitation and competition over resources, organized crime, poverty and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In this context, the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes a serious challenge. The general technological development has enabled more states to produce, or in other ways acquire, such weaponry. The effectivity of international agreements and regimes which regulate or ban production, export and possession of such weapons vary because control mechanisms are inadequate or non-existing, and because individual states refuse to support or comply with such regimes. This is also the case with states in the outskirts of Europe. The ongoing conflict between Iraq and the UN exemplifies this tendency. So does the danger of weapons of mass destruction and the long ranging missiles. A particular risk is the inadequate control over large numbers of nuclear warheads in Russia and the weak control mechanisms in its civilian nuclear industry.

In sum, it could be argued that the end of the Cold War gave way to uneven consequences for global security and for traditional instruments seeking to manage security. While the disappearance of a super power conflict reduced the likelihood of global conflicts and formed a basis for improved international cooperation, it also gave way to new and more fragmented challenges. This has resulted in a comprehensive restructuring process and new complicated tasks for those who handle international security. In this regard, members of the international media raise particular issues and concerns which call for adequate resources and preparedness among our own press and information staff.

Participation in international operations

International peace operations have received growing attention as a tool for conflict-management in the post-Cold War era. Within NATO, peace operations have become a major areaof activity, and now constitute an integral part of the defence planning of the alliance. International involvement has become more important in order to maintain Norway’s security interests. Emphasis is placed on the fact that military involvement abroad also is relevant for tasks at home.

Norwegian participation in international peace operations contributes to fulfilling our national security and defence policy by taking a responsibility to provide security outside our immediate surroundings. It is of crucial importance to a small country that international norms and legal principles are upheld. Norwegian international participation clearly visualizes our contribution. A major international military involvement has also become necessary for Norway to compensate for the reduced attention and interest in and around our near abroad. The international situation, marked by regional and ethnic conflicts, is characterized by reciprocity between national and international security. If we contribute actively to maintaining international peace and security, we may feel more confident if Norway in the future should need military assistance from others. This is particularly important for a country which has traditionally imported security. To Norway it becomes instrumental to see the participation in peace operations through NATO, UN, OSCE and other organizations as a continuation of the purely national effort to secure our own security. Against this background, the Government seeks to maintain a considerable military involvement abroad. Norwegian contribution to international military operations has too often been marked by ad-hoc solutions seeking to adapt to a given operation. It is thus necessary that future involvement is organized within a more comprehensive participatory concept based on a well defined structure.

Norwegian security in the future - general summary

I have now spelled out a list of security challenges we in my view will face in years ahead. In sum, these constitute the security landscape within which we must operate in order to achieve the objectives of Norwegian security policy. These objectives fixed, and are prevent war, to seek to achieve stability and peaceful development, to protect Norwegian freedom of action and secure Norwegian sovereignty. More than anything else, the principal security challenges illustrate the complexity with which we are dealing. Hence, the Government renders it necessary to ensure the ability to confront the entire spectrum of challenges, which may vary with regard to time and place, likelihood and consequence. It means that a long list of tasks must be maintained with the resources available. This is not to say that everything will carry equal weight, but it does require that the security policy is being shaped in a long-term and comprehensive manner.

In sum, the security policy of the Government must be based on two fundamental dimensions; a risk dimension and an alliance dimension. Within these we find the essence of the security challenges already being spelled out. In this context, the risk dimension involves everything from infringements of Norwegian sovereignty to crises, military actions or attacks, and dangers such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and environmental disasters. Norway will still be heavily dependent on NATO in order to manage major crises and military attacks. Our defence planning must also reflect this fact. A major challenge in this regard is to secure that the alliance dimension, to a largest possible degree, develops in line with Norwegian interests and our view of the risk dimension. In this context, however, our ability to exercise influence will depend on our national contribution to the resolution of new international security challenges.

Defence policy and the tasks of the Armed Forces

Though it will be necessary to draw upon a broad spectrum of means in order to confront the complex security challenges we face, and even if the Armed Forces may not or should not always play the principal role, the Armed Forces remain the most essential tool in the effort to achieve national security objectives. The defence policy must thus constitute an integral part of our comprehensive security policy. In contrast to the security objectives, the defence objectives indicate how the Armed Forces may constitute an important tool in the security policy. The most crucial goals of the Armed Forces will be to maintain military presence and visibility, ability to provide and exchange risk assessments and secure early warning through an effective intelligence service, manage different episodes and crises, defend Norwegian land, sea, and air territory against military attack, to sustain military cooperation with allies and participation in NATO operations, and to develop defence cooperation with other countries within international organizational frameworks.

The next question will then be: How are we to shape the Armed Forces in order to achieve the different objectives? In this regard, Norwegian defence policy rests on four reinforcing principles. These are: the national balanced defence, allied cooperation, the total defence concept, and conscription. Jointly these constitute the basic principles of our defence concept. This concept represents the main framework of the development and activities of our military. Since the changes in our surroundings have and still affect the main elements of our defence concept, it has been necessary to review these fundamental choices. The Government thinks that there is an enduring need to develop defence policy within a continously changing framework, In the current situation, however, it has not found basis to consider alternative defence concepts.

Adequate defence, which also has the capability to deter, cannot be built over a short period of time. The acquisition of a new generation of fighter aircraft and submarines along with professional skills to utilize these advanced systems call for ten to fifteen years. Materiel procurement and competence-building today will thus constitute main componenets of our defence forces in ten to fifteen years. Though the likelihood of an attack against Norway currently is minute, the consequences could be disastrous if we are unable to confront a potential challenge in the future. If so, we would totally rely on others. The continuation of a national balanced defence with a time-limited capability to meet a major military attack against one part of the country, is in my view the only responsible and realistic alternative. Credible defence of Norway, however, requires resources far beyond what is currently being allocated over the defence budget. Hence, the upholding of a national balanced defence will be closely linked to the other pillars of the defence concept. Support from our allies remains a decisive deterrent in order to resolve security challenges over time. A surprise attack must not result in the immediate collapse of the Armed Forces while awaiting allied reinforcements. A national balanced defence must thus be based on conscription and the mobilization of society’s total resources within the framework of the total defence concept, in which also the civil defence is a vital component.

Given the political objectives and the basic principles in the defence concept, it is possible to divide the tasks of the Armed Forces into the main categories: Anti-invasion defence, territorial defence, vindication of sovereignty, ntelligence services, Security services, international military involvement, search and rescue services and other peace time activities.

In the future, the Armed Forces must be capable of resolving this entire spectrum of tasks simultaneously. It calls for sufficient capability, flexibility and preparedness to confront a variety of different challenges in war, crisis and peace; nationally as well as internationally. The anti-invasion defence will still be the most demanding task of the Armed Forces, and to a large extent, guide the main structural elements and activities.

Conditions for the Armed Forces

I began this address by describing the security challenges we are likely to face in years ahead. These constitute the security landscape through which we must maneouvre in order to achieve our security objectives. I have also spelled out the defence objectives which should be contemplated with regard to how the Armed Forces, as our most important security tool, should be applied in the effort to reach the main security objectives. In view of the defence objectives and the basic principles of our defence concept, I then addressed the more concrete tasks and demands that will rest on the Armed Forces in the future. Jointly, these constitute the basis for exercising our security and defence policy, and thus the activity for the Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces, however, cannot be separated from the rest of society. They do not have a life of their own regardless of changing processes taking place nationally as well as internationally. In this context, security and defence policy is a part of the overall national policy. The general economic tendencies are central elements of the broader conditions under which the Armed Forces must operate. Even if macro-economic estimates are uncertain, especially in a long term perspective, a substantial increase in expenditures cannot be expected in future national budgets. A responsible long-term economic policy will thus place stringent demands within strict budgetary frames. Hence, the main guidelines within security and defence policy must be drawn from a modest, yet sufficient budgetary level. The Government will, for the period at large, propose a small growth in the defence budget. At the same time, it finds it necessary that additional costs for deploying Norwegian forces in international peace operations and parts of the investments should be financed in addition to the regular defence budget.

The Armed Forces also carry considerable significance in business and regional communities. It is a goal that industrial output gained from the procurement of the Armed Forces is benefitted domestically. Norwegian defence industry, however, has neither technological know-how nor sufficient capacity for production to singlehandedly supply the Armed Forces with all necessary materiel. Hence, Norway participates in international defence cooperation. In cases in which Norwegian industry lacks the means to cover the need of the Armed Forces, the Norwegian industry seeks to benefit from procurements through reciprocal regimes and agreements. It will be a major challenge for Norwegian defence industry to adjust to the changes internationally. The industry itself is indeed responsible for its strategic choices. Nevertheless, the authorities also play a vital role by providing the terms for the restructuring of the industry.

Important goals of the Government’s policy is to maintain the main principles of residential patterns and develop sustainable regions throughout the country. Recent development has shown that the residential patterns in several remote municipalities over time could be threatened. In order to gradually turn the flow, the Government emphasizes a more profitable and sustainable business community in areas with few industries.

The need for an effective organization which can resolve its tasks in a credible way will be a guiding principle for the restructuring of the Armed Forces. Military presence, however, does have a value in itself. Hence, the Government will emphazise to maintain military presence in all parts of the country. Given this principle, the Government, as far as official policy allows, will seek to limit the negative consequences of restruction.

The need for continued restructuring of the Armed Forces, however, will involve new reductions and closures which may have consequences for the local communities. The Government will seek to make the restruction as smooth as possible for the personnel of the Armed Forces as well as for the municipalities. Despite comprehensive restruction in recent years, the national activities of the Armed Forces will still have great significance for residency, employment and other activities in counties and municipalities, especially in Northern Norway.

Other general trends in society are also of importance to the formulation of security and defence policy. Security and effective military defence depend on civilian society in times of peace, crisis, and war. The development is gradually creating a more complex society with increased national and international interdependence. This results in both new opportunities and challenges for the Armed Forces. Increased complexity and vulnerability can be exploited and bring severe consequences if sufficient security mechanisms are not in place. This should also be seen in context with the general technological development.

Our force structure and modes of operation must also be adapted to this technological development. The development takes place on a broad platform, and challenges the Armed Forces considerably. It requires major resources to maintain a modern technological defence. The consequences of not adapting to the technological development, however, may be higher expenditures, not the least in terms of lives lost in conflict situations. The level of technology and quality of our national defence must thus be good enough to resolve future tasks credibly and effectively. In order to stay on top of the development, we will simultaneously be dependent on broader international cooperation, primarily with our allies in NATO.

Personnel policy

At the end, I would like to address some of our challenges with regard to personnel policy. The Armed Forces must have a personnel structure adjusted to both organization and tasks. In recent years, we have focused our efforts, perhaps too heavily, on how to achieve personnel reductions. To some extent this process has been going on at the expense of an adequate personnel structure. It has been the intention that conditions are right for redundant personnel. We will still be mindful of those, but we must also, to a larger degree, be concerned about the ones who are staying and those we are recruiting into our organization. Recently, we have been reminded that there is increased competition in the market to attract employees with special skills. We have taken this challenge seriously by implementing different measures. It is, nevetheless, important that the personnel policy is not characterized by ad-hoc solutions, but rather by the developing of a sound and comprehensive personnel policy which does not make us vulnerable when there are shifts in the marketplace. In my view we are now in the process of succeeding in this effort.

The recent focus on personnel leaving the Armed Forces, has resulted in too much emphasis on negative trends. This focus along with the strains following the restruction process, can easily give the impression that the Armed Forces appear as a less attractive work place. To reverse this trend, which in my view does not do the Armed Forces justice, is a challenge to all of us. Surveys which have been made, such as the Bjønness II-Report, concluded to the contrary that civilian and military personnel value the Armed Forces as a nice and safe work place.

The number of accidental resignations in the Armed Forces is increasing. Unless we manage to contain this tendency, the situation may become critical for certain categories. I do hope and think that the measures that are being implemented will have a positive effect and signalize the will of the Armed Forces to resolve personnel problems. This issue also applies to international operations where recruitment in recent times has been difficult.

One of the most important measures of our personnel policy has been the effort to implement a new wage policy. This calls for agreement between the employer and the employee’s organization. The wage policy must be applied ambitiously in the effort to recruit and keep qualified personnel. It will include larger individual gaps in payment; arrangements with which we have little experience. In order to ensure that these arrangements are perceived favourably, permanent criteria of evaluation should be introduced. I am concerned about the wages of the employees in the Armed Forces. It involves all categories, but we must simultaneously acknowledge that certain types of personnel are more attractive in the private sector than others. In order to keep these, we must, to a large extent, offer competitive salaries.

In my view the time has also come to delegate local negotiation authority. The current system in which local negotiations are literally carried out at a central level, is not in line with the intentions of our wage policy.

I am also worried about the fact that a growing number of military personnel chooses to commute rather than bring their family when moving. It is undesirable to commute; for the Armed Forces as well as for the family. Hence, we must emphasize the family policy and seek measures, which to a larger extent, encourage families to move together.

Among other challenges facing us, I would like to emphasize the development of alternative career choices for military personnel and better leadership training for our civilian personnel. It can be carried out by creating more executive positions that can be filled by both civilian and military personnel. In turn this could also lead to the employment of more women.

The unions have contributed to the restructuring process in a constructive way. In my opinion, their efforts are preconditions for success by bringing forward meaningful dialogue between the different parties.

Conclusion

International developments have resulted in substantial changes in Norway’s security surroundings. These changes take place in our near abroad on a regional as well as on a global level. The changes will likely continue into the future, though most likely with less speed. Given an international situation in which keywords are uncertainty and dynamics, great demands are placed on the formulation of Norwegian security and defence policy and the Armed Forces themselves. The Armed Forces must adapt to new and shifting circumstances based on the capability to resolve the most pertinent tasks; even if these currently appear as the least likely ones. This calls for flexibility while we seek to see different measures and tasks in context; credible national defence along with international involvement. In order to achieve this, I see no alternatives to our defence concept involving a national balanced defence, allied cooperation, the total defence concept, and mobilization based on conscription. Several European countries have abandoned conscription. Currently, I see no alternative in our country. If we are to further the anti invasion defence and maintain the ability to defend the country against limited attacks, we are too sparsely populated to have professional armed forces. Conscriptive service also enables us to pick out the best personnel for the most demanding tasks. The fact that the principle of conscription remains in effect, does not mean that conscription may not be subject to change. In this context, it is necessary to contemplate more efficient and affordable ways to implement initial and revision services. The upholding of the main elements in our defence concept, at the end of the day, is a question about preserving the people’s will to defend based on principles of equality and justice.

The continuation of the main elements of the defence concept, along with necessary restruction to enable the carrying out of all the tasks we are expected to perform, will in my view, serve as the best guarantee for Norway to prepare for the uncertain security challenges of the next millennium.