Minister of Defence Eldbjørg Løwer

Defence Policy Challenges

Oslo Military Society, 8 September 1999

Honoured guests and members. It is not without a certain reverence that I stand at this rostrum today. This is a platform that has been largely reserved for men and many important speeches on matters of defence policy have resounded round these walls. The very fact that I am standing here shows that much is changing in our society and it gives me great pleasure to be able to be a part of our proud defence traditions. To be allowed to stand here today and to put forward my views on the challenges now facing our Defence Establishment, gives me a strong sense of privilege both as a politician and as a woman.

Before I come to what I have in mind to say, I should like to dwell for a moment on why I have asked to be given this opportunity. I have now been in the Defence Minister’s chair for a little over 170 days. As many of you will remember, a Minister asked some years ago for 100 days grace to read himself into his particular field of responsibility. I did not ask for any such period of grace, nor did I get it. A week after I took over the war in Kosovo broke out. This has been an instructive and a very special time, not least because Norwegian forces have during this period been involved in acts of war on European soil. We live, sadly, at a time when international realities are not always characterised by tolerance and rationality. Time and time again we see how primitive man can be in both word and deed and how we may be driven, in the last resort, to the use of force.

Let me therefore state at once, there is no doubt that Norway must possess a solid and credible military defence capability. Nor is there any doubt that Norway’s Armed Forces must be capable both of defending our own sovereignty and of contributing to the resolution of international crises. On this we surely agree. Where we may possibly disagree is on how we can best organise ourselves to achieve this.

The Ministry of Defence is currently working on problems which will be of central importance to the next Long-Term Report and in the course of the coming year we shall be carrying out a number of studies of the kind of defence that we need for the future. The Chief of Defence is to make his professional recommendations to the Ministry of Defence next summer, at about the same time at which the newly appointed Defence Policy Committee submits its report. What makes this work so important is that we are now facing problems which in both nature and extent far exceed those challenges that we can solve in the course of our day-to-day business. It is no longer enough to make small course alterations. We must check that the right course has been set and, if not, we must take more decisive action.

Examples I might mention in that context include imbalances in the Armed Forces, our arrangements for compulsory military service, the concept of invasion defence, developments in technology, the way in which NATO is developing and so on. These represent challenges which require in part a new professional approach which requires both the political will and the necessary drive and, as a prerequisite, cooperation across both professional and political boundaries.

I believe that tough measures will be required in the time to come. I therefore want to prepare the ground for those decisions which will have to be taken in the course of a relatively short period. I am here to give a powerful signal to all our analysts and decision-makers that the sky should be the limit when it comes to our willingness to see old problems with new eyes and that openness should be a byword in this phase. We may perhaps have to put some of our hobby-horses out to grass before we can arrive at the defence that Norway must have. We must have the courage to do what is necessary in order to ensure that the Armed Forces will meet their objectives while playing a positive and essential part in Norwegian society and in the realisation of Norwegian policies.

Let me say something about the process itself. Many would assert that our long-term defence planning focuses on structure for structure's sake and not on the tasks that face us. Indeed, many would even say that long-term planning itself emerges as static and outdated. That it is not the most suitable way to manage an organisation unless it is to operate in an absolute vacuum, something that is certainly not the case where Norwegian defence is concerned.

On the contrary, the defence sector is probably one of the areas of our society most sensitive to economic and political factors, the course of international affairs and developments in technology. At the same time, the sector exhibits inertia where the possibility of change and the ability to achieve it are concerned. The question is thus: Do the Armed Forces occupy a special position in relation to other sectors of society when it comes to the need and ability to adapt?

Faced with such a question, I can really only answer both yes and no. I say yes because when procuring new military equipment and phasing it into service, it can take many years to realise the full benefit of the investment. Yet I have to say no because, in every sector of society, one must strive to make the best possible use of the means at one's disposal. We cannot achieve this with an organisation which is unable to adapt to the requirements of the day.

We are all familiar with the argument that it takes no time at all to dismantle defences but that it takes a long time to build them up again. Many will also point to examples in history in which we have failed to see the danger signals in time, and even when we did, we were not able to carry through the necessary defence measures.

My point is not that one cannot learn much from history but rather that one cannot navigate unless one looks well ahead and sets the appropriate course! We must continue to keep the far horizon in view in our defence planning but the planning must be flexible in character in order to accommodate the management of uncertainty! We must have defence arrangements which are capable of responding to so-called unpredictable conflicts but which can also be built up over time in order to meet the possible eventuality of a major threat arising.

I have already mentioned the studies that are already under way within the Armed Forces, as well the Government's Defence Policy Committee. With regard to the debate concerning the use of such a committee, I have heard some quote the old chestnut that when the Devil wanted nothing to happen, he set up a committee. Some would also maintain that the committee is duplicating some of the work that the Chief of Defence already has in hand and that its findings will therefore be of little practical significance.

None of this surprises me. What has surprised me is that these observations have come from centrally placed politicians. From politicians who should know very well that the essence of a democratic society’s relations with its armed forces is that these should be controlled and accepted by the people, which in practice means by the Storting and the Government. What military power is to be used for, and the principal missions with which the Armed Forces are to be entrusted, is and will remain a political matter.

These politicians know that it is not only purely military considerations that have to be taken into account when a nation is to choose the kind of defence that will best serve its interests. For me, therefore, the development of our defences is first and foremost a task anchored in democracy.

It is therefore my firm and absolute conviction, and in accord with our best ‘left-of-centre’ traditions, that democratically elected representatives, as well as representatives of other sections of society, should play an active part in the shaping of our defence policy. That they can feel a sense of ownership towards it, so to speak. Only in this way is it possible to arrive at a defence concept which has the necessary degree of political and financial support. It is for this reason that the Government has chosen to set up a committee to consider defence policy and I hope that we can now put the debate on this point behind us and give the Committee the latitude it needs to perform its task.

I touched on the aspect of finance. Unfortunately, these days, it seems impossible to discuss defence without at the same time bringing in the question of the imbalance in which the Armed Forces find themselves. Let me nevertheless emphasise in the strongest possible way that it is not only the financial realities which force us to adopt new thinking in the defence sector. Factors such as new developments in technology, developments regarding our Alliance partners and the new realities of the international security scene, are all factors which should, beyond any question, be given full weight in the debate. However, let me start with finance.

Much is said about the Armed Forces’ so-called double imbalance. This, as you know, implies firstly that the Armed Forces are underfunded in relation to the structure of the defence organisation and the missions with which it is entrusted, and secondly that we devote too much money to the running of the organisation itself so that we are then unable to carry through even essential investments.

There is discussion in financial circles as to whether the Armed Forces’ imbalance amounts to 10 billion or to 20 billion kroner. Whether the funding shortfall should be reckoned from the last Long-Term Report or whether it should be calculated on the basis of the situation as it is today. To me, as Defence Minister, it is in principle immaterial whether the figure should be 10 or 20. The imbalances have been, and are, too great. Too much energy has been devoted in the past to describing the imbalances and too little to remedying them. This is something which we must all accept and for which we must all share responsibility. On the one side the politicians who do not follow up their long-term plans, and on the other the Armed Forces who are not managing to carry through the planned cost-saving measures.

Now that we are looking forward with the intention of bringing the Armed Forces back into balance, there is thus one main question that must be addressed. It has been said many times before, but I will say it again; Our defence organisation is too large in relation to the funding allocated to it. So some will at once object, saying that we should stop focusing solely on the number of personnel employed and rather ensure that more money is allocated for the structure that already exists. I am afraid that this is not a realistic approach to the problem. As I understand it, the level of funding currently allocated to defence is roughly what one might reasonably expect it to be. There is no reason to expect large defence budget increases at the expense of other sectors of society. It is also worthy of mention that Norway has not suffered significant defence budget cuts during the 1990s, in contrast to the great majority of countries with which we might naturally be compared.

I will therefore make no bones about it, let us stop wasting our collective energy on promoting solutions which we shall not be able to realise. Let us introduce realism into the defence debate, also where finance is concerned, in fact above all where finance is concerned. Let us strive for solutions which will continue to be viable into the next decade and preferably the following decade as well.

Let me in this context say something about the Armed Forces with regard to the outlying districts. Of course Norway must have a good district policy. And we must have a defence policy that to a degree takes account of this. But it must not be our district policy that drives the development of Norway’s defence forces. The shaping of our defence forces must be carried through on the basis of requirements for effectiveness and productivity. To the extent that this can be achieved in a way that also benefits the outlying districts, there is a valuable advantage to be gained. But in cases where defence policy and district policy cannot sensibly be combined, the needs of defence must receive prime consideration.

Only in this way can we ensure that we get the best possible defence capability for our money. This is, and will continue to be, a major challenge for all of us in government as well as for members of the Storting.

When we draw up the balance sheet for the situation today, it is a fact that the restructuring of the Armed Forces has progressed too slowly and that the results have not been good enough. If we turn back to the last Long-Term Report for the Armed Forces, that is Report No. 16 to the Storting issued in 1993, we see a warning on exactly this point. At that time it was stated that if the planned savings could not be achieved, we would be forced to accept a defence structure quite different to that envisaged in the plan. And here we are today – 6 years later.

Now we have neither the time nor the available effort to waste on establishing who was right, how unrealistic the forecasts actually were and how much better everything would have been if the politicians had granted more money. We have to move on. And I am not addressing this to those who have worked so hard to bring about the changes and the improvements that have been achieved in spite of everything. Countless hours have been spent on the work of rationalising and improving the Armed Forces. All you men and women who have persevered to make this possible have my deepest respect and gratitude!

My appeal is primarily directed towards the analysts and decision-makers working on this today. The Armed Forces must adapt to the constraints of technical and economic reality. We must have the Armed Forces developing along a new track. The nation must have confidence that the Armed Forces will be capable of fulfilling its missions and that taxpayers’ money is being used in the most cost-effective way. This applies not least to the various departments and agencies involved in the administration of defence materiel which are collectively responsible for administering 60% of the defence budget and the employment of around 7,000 people. It goes without saying that here too, and perhaps especially here, we must look hard to see whether scarce resources can be used to better advantage and for the benefit of the Armed Forces in a broader perspective.

Let me now turn to what have long been regarded as cornerstones of Norwegian defence policy, namely invasion defence and compulsory military service. Let me take military service first. My starting assumption is that the principle of compulsory military service must stand. If I have to justify this assumption I would point to what I would call the individual citizen’s ownership of democracy. The Armed Forces must protect the core values of the Norwegian people, those values that make us proud to be a part of this nation. So the individual must feel a sense of responsibility for these common values and, in the last resort, the state must be prepared to call the individual to account. This is the balance between the citizen’s right and duty to participate in the defence of our country.

This does not mean, however, that I believe that the way in which the provisions of the Military Service Act are put into practice today is necessarily the best or the most cost-effective. In that context there are in particular two aspects of the problem that occupy my mind. On one side of the balance are the requirements of the Armed Forces while on the other side there is the principle of equality and justice. Let me begin with the requirements of the Armed Forces.

My first point, looking at the present arrangements, is that it is very costly to train so many for so long. Conscript training takes up a significant proportion of the resources that the Armed Forces have at their disposal. At the same time it is a fact that we have trained, and are probably now continuing to train, more servicemen than we strictly have use for. The Armed Forces have approached this problem in several ways. One of these has been to bring in more stringent requirements for those who are in fact called up for service. This ensures that as few recruits as possible fall by the wayside, clearly a good thing for all concerned. In addition to this, we also adopt a certain degree of differentiated service. That is to say the length of the period of service differs for different service branches and this is again reflected in subsequent refresher training.

In this way we have adapted the Military Service Act to make the best use of the resources at our disposal, but at the same time this means that fewer and fewer are actually called up for service. This appears to contrast with the desire for the system of military service to be seen as fair and equitable. In that context one might ask whether it is right that society should make such great demands on the time of some of the nation’s young people while others enjoy the advantage of embarking on their higher education or getting jobs. There is a clear connection here with what we actually offer the young when they are doing their military service. Unless this time spent in the Armed Forces is seen as being meaningful and a valuable part of an individual’s personal development, we cannot expect this period of service to be viewed with enthusiasm.

This is a problem that we must have the courage to face! Is the determining factor to be society’s regard for equality and justice or is it to be the requirements of our Armed Forces?

Is it to be our regard for our principles or our regard for the resources that should carry the day? This is a question that should be at the heart of the debate as to what kind of defence we should have.

In that connection, I have been following with interest the debate as to whether we should have an invasion defence capability or not, and whether it should be the defence of our homeland or our external commitments that should determine our defence in the future. My personal view is that this debate is too narrow and that the question has to some extent been turned on its head. When we spend 24 billion kroner on defence, of course the Armed Forces must be able to defend our country. Such forces as Norway may possess at any given time must of course have the defence of our own nation as their first priority. This does not conflict with the requirement for Norway to contribute to operations abroad under the auspices of the UN, OSCE, NATO or the WEU if Norwegian authorities so decide. What we may not agree on is how best to organise ourselves to make this possible.

We are all familiar with oversimplifications on the following lines: It is absurd that the defence of Norway should be so static as to be tied to a particular cross-roads in Troms. That is not exactly what I would call an adequate description of our defence concept. But is there nevertheless a grain of truth in this gross oversimplification? Are we still hampered by old ways of thinking and our defence traditions? Has the time come to look at other ways of solving these problems? I would be so bold as to answer yes! Now I can just imagine some of my listeners thinking that here is another prime example of kicking down a door that is already wide open, but I will take that chance.

There is no doubt that we must look at the solving of our defence problems through fresh eyes, and we must take an integrated view of the tasks involved if we are to arrive at the most rational solution. If we now consider our national defence requirements and our contribution to international operations as complementary parts of an integrated whole. How should we position ourselves in order to be able to fulfil these tasks as effectively as possible? Some of the answers are to be found in Report to the Storting No. 38 which the Government put before the Storting in June this year. Here we say that our contribution to operations abroad must be based on standing structures with forces ready to roll when required. A necessary precondition is that these forces should be well trained and well equipped and that parts of them should be available to intervene in a conflict very rapidly.

I know that some believe that this is putting the cart before the horse. That we should first put in place our own integrated national defence structure and then see how much we can afford to contribute to operations abroad. Critical voices have also claimed that this solution is too costly and that as a consequence there will be little left for the defence of Norway. In that case I would have to ask; does one then imagine that such a force would be capable only of operations outside our own borders? The point of having such a force is, of course, that it should also be capable of functioning as a central element in the defence of Norway whatever its precise role. That it should be capable of being deployed wherever the Norwegian authorities see fit, whether it be for protecting our national sovereignty, the direct defence of Norwegian territory or in support of international operations abroad.

The Armed Forces must, in other words, possess sufficient flexibility, mobility and operational preparedness to be able to meet widely differing challenges. This applies in war, in peacetime and in time of crisis, both nationally and internationally.

It is quite clear to me that our defences must be defined along two axes. On the one hand we must make arrangements to ensure that we can utilise to the full the potential of the whole population if a crisis should arise. This will require a longer build-up phase, and assumes, as is the case today, a relatively long period of advance warning. On the other hand, part of our defence forces must be trained and equipped to fit them for rapid deployment wherever the need might arise, whether nationally or internationally.

Is it possible to imagine an arrangement whereby as many as possible undergo basic training in the Armed Forces and that from this group of conscripts we recruit a certain number who wish to progress further? In this way as many as possible of the nation’s young men and women serve a period in the Armed Forces while a minority who are especially well motivated are recruited for full training prior to either signing on or entering into a contract arrangement. Could an arrangement of such a nature enable us both to meet the requirement that we have for being able to deploy suitable forces in a crisis situation and to provide a way of adapting our system of military service to match new realities? My point is that we must be open to new thinking.

Let me say a few words about developments in NATO and what consequences these should have for our own defence policy. One of the main challenges today stems from the technology gap within the Alliance. There can be no doubt that the Americans in particular possess technology and military strike power that is unique on world scale. Nor is there any doubt that Europe has a long way to catch up. By this I do not mean that there should be a further turn of the armament technology spiral. Rather I mean that the forces of the Alliance, including the Norwegian elements, must be jointly equipped and trained in order to enable them to operate side by side in any eventual conflict. These forces must be capable of functioning both as national units and as integrated multinational elements depending on the nature of the task to be carried out.

We cannot allow ourselves to fall behind either with regard to equipment or in the training of the service personnel who may be sent into combat. It is manifestly my duty as Defence Minister to ensure that Norwegian service personnel get the best possible training and equipment if they are to be asked to risk their lives. It is of course also in Norway’s interest that the Alliance should be perceived as capable, in times of crisis, of wielding modern and potent military power, a fact which itself will help to avoid this capability being put to the test.

If I may be permitted an aside, there is a point to reflect on here. In connection with our participation in the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, it has been suggested that there have been weaknesses in the Norwegian contributions. Some have claimed that these weaknesses would not have been there had these forces been used in Norway. But surely it cannot be the case that these forces would have faced less demanding challenges in a high-intensity action on Norwegian soil?

I am of course aware that the special demands of operations abroad often call for training other than that we consider necessary for operations in Norway but, as Defence Minister, I cannot rest content that this is the full and complete answer. In reality, is it the case that our participation in Bosnia and Kosovo has revealed weaknesses in our forces that are quite general in nature and that would apply equally in the event of a war in Norway? If this should prove to be correct, it also means that the requirements for forces which are to take part in international operations and those for forces to be used nationally, differ far less than has been supposed. This is a question that we need to take seriously.

This too I see as a further indication of the necessity of cutting down the size of our organisation, so enabling us to provide better equipment and training to the part that we retain. To concentrate on quality rather than quantity. By this I mean that all our service personnel must be equipped better and trained better, not only those who are to serve abroad.

Let us look at the possible consequences of increased requirements for modernisation. If we are to succeed in the necessary modernisation of our forces, we must at the same time look at the size of our own defence organisation. I would like to pose these questions; are we equal to the task of making the Norwegian Armed Forces good in every area? Can we manage to maintain the necessary professional skills and to carry through the required modernisation of materiel in all our service branches? Is it conceivable that we shall soon arrive at the stage when we shall have to give priority to certain areas because we simply cannot maintain the breadth of the organisation that we have today? Is it conceivable that investing in certain parts of the Armed Forces will result in synergy effects that will allow us to allocate lower priority to other parts?

The way I see it is that when we prepare to contribute more strongly to NATO’s organisation and military capability, we must also consider what possibilities there may be for the Alliance to contribute in areas where our need is greatest. Is it possible to imagine a defence structure for Norway which is better adapted to, and better coordinated with, the resources of our allies? In this context we must also look at the development of the Alliance in a European perspective. The starting point here could be more multilateral European forces with levels of capability approaching that of the American forces.

Allow me to attempt to summarise briefly. The events of the last decade have shown us that we still cannot ignore the possibility of having to resort to military force as a means of resolving or containing conflicts, and that such conflicts can arise even in Europe. This decade has also shown us that Norway can become involved in combat operations, even at short notice, and that it is absolutely essential that we should have forces that are equipped and trained for this contingency.

Seen in the light of what I have said, the crux of the matter is that the restructuring of the Armed Forces over the last ten years has not proved as effective as we all might have wished. There is today far too great a discrepancy between the size of the existing organisation and the funds that we have at our disposal. There should be no doubt, therefore, that we must think along new and different lines where the organisation of our Armed Forces, and the way our resources are put to use for defence purposes, are concerned.

The point that I have tried to make in this address is that there are certain fundamental assumptions which should have a bearing on this process. I am thinking here of the principle of universal military service, adaptation within NATO and our participation in international operations. The principal task now facing our planners is to come up with creative solutions within the framework of these basic assumptions.

In some of these areas we have already progressed a long way in the formulation of policy, for example in relation to participation in international operations. In other areas we have not progressed as far, and here I am thinking, for example, of the shape of our future arrangements for compulsory military service.

And this has been my intention here today. To invite an open, creative and comprehensive debate within this basic framework. We must be sure that our defence plans are realistic also in the longer term while being flexible enough to accommodate changes and uncertainties along the way. So we, as politicians, must promise to do our utmost to provide the Armed Forces with the firmest possible ground and the clearest possible framework of assumptions on which to base their plans for the future.

As Defence Minister I will fight to preserve the relevance of the Armed Forces and their focus on the tasks which society expects us to be able to discharge on their behalf. I want to see Armed Forces flexible enough and strong enough to meet the challenges of the future, whether they be national or international. A national defence capability rooted in, and supported by, the Norwegian people and, as it should be, a vital element of security policy. And last but not least, we shall continue to have Armed Forces made up of men and women who are proud of their chosen profession.

Thank you for your attention.