Historical archive

Norway, NATO and North Europe

Historical archive

Published under: Bondevik's 1st Government

Publisher: Forsvarsdepartementet

Minister of Defence Dag Jostein Fjærvoll

Norway, NATO and North Europe

Opening statement at the Leankollen Conferece, 1 February 1999

Mr Chairman, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure to address such a distinguished audience. The theme of my remarks this morning is “Norway, NATO and North Europe”.

1999 is a special year in many ways. The era of the twentieth century is about to end and we are entering a new millenium. This gives us ample opportunities to look back, but also to look forward. For NATO, 1999 represent a milestone with the upcoming Summit and the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary. The Summit will not just be a celebration of a successful past, it will also be an occasion for NATO to take a number of important decisions for the future. I will come back to that in a minute. But may I first quote one of the greatest political leaders of this century.

“War is too foolish, too fantastic to be thought of in the twentieth Century... . Civilization has climbed above such perils. The interdependence of nations...the sense of public law...have rendered such nightmares impossible”.

This was said by Winston Churchill before the first world war. In retrospect, it shows more than anything how difficult it is to predict the future, regardless of how much we know about the past. I believe there are many reasons for us to be optimistic about the future and the next century we are about to enter. But there are also ample reasons to be prudent. We must continue to work for peace, stability and prosperity. At the same time, we must maintain our prepardeness against new and unknown threats. This is, in my opinion, what the future of NATO is all about.

NATO’s Strategic Concept

Many of the current activities in NATO are directed to the upcoming Washington Summit in April. A key part of these activities is the revision of the NATO’s Strategic Concept. The revised Concept will provide both the overall political basis for NATO in a new age, and at the same time provide the overall guidance for our military planners.

A key question is the balance to be struck between NATO’s traditional tasks related to collective defence, trans-atlantic solidarity and consultations, and the new missions related in particular to peace operations and partnership cooperation. From a Norwegian point of view it is important that NATO’s core functions remains those related to collective defence, allied consultations and transatlantic solidarity. We believe there are good reasons for this. A solid defence capability is a precondition for NATO’s ability to develop further its security cooperation with partner countries, and project stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Collective defence is also a necessary condition for the continued internal cohesion of the Alliance.

Having said this, there is of course also general agreement that NATO’s new tasks associated with peace operations and partnership activities must be given much more prominence in the revised Concept. This is, after all, the field where NATO is currently involved, seen most vividly with NATO’s engagement in the former Yugoslavia.

Defence Capabilities Initiative

Much of the focus in international affairs has been directed to crises areas such as the Balkans and the Gulf area. The focus in NATO has of course also been directed towards the application of force, and to NATO’s role in international crises management. This will of course continue.

But it is also necessary to give attention to NATO’s defence capabilities. These must be adopted to new security challenges. We need a more integrated NATO, more multinational cooperation in order to develop capabilities which each country cannot afford alone.

We welcome the US-initiative to improve NATO’s collective defence capabilities. The aim is to improve mobility, survivability, sustainability and effective military engagement. In order to achieve this, we must build on our technological advantage, and improve interoperability and logistics. The improved capabilities will be needed for the whole range of tasks, for collective defence and for international peace operations. No NATO-country can afford to modernize the full force structure, but we can provide selected capabilities which count in the larger NATO context. This initiative should be used to further improve the European contribution to NATO’s overall capabilities.

Common funding and joint projects will be necessary in order to improve NATO’s collective defence. This is particularly important for the smaller countries in the Alliance, and for the three new members. I believe Norway can implement this initiative in a way which is consistent with our total defence concept based on conscription and mobilization. But we will have to continue to adjust our force arrangements in a flexible manner.

New NATO Command Structure

Another important decision to be taken by NATO in the run-up to the Summit is the final implementation of the new NATO Command Structure. For Norway, NATO’s new Command Structure constitute both opportunities and challenges. Our forces will be linked more directly with the NATO-forces in Central Europe. At the same time the new Regional Command north of the Alps will be larger both in terms of size and span of control, resulting in an increased competition for attention and resources.

For Norway, it is essential that the new command structure is also able to cater for the particular needs of the Northern region. This includes, apart from the reinforcement aspects, supervision of the vast maritime areas, security aspects of the energy supply from this area, and capabilities for crisis management in the High North. The new Command Structure must be able to plan and conduct joint operations, including naval and combined naval/air operations in northern waters. The new Command Structure must also ensure the continuation of the reinforcement plans for Norway, including the role of allied countries having a key part in these plans, like the US, UK and the Netherlands. It is also essential for us that the Joint Headquarters North in Stavanger continues to function as an effective, multinational, joint headquarters, with a significant role both in peace, crisis and war.

European Security and Defence Identity

Another topic which gained momentum last autumn with the UK-French declaration in St Malo, is the development of European security cooperation. Here we must all strive for the best possible coordination and distribution of responsibilities between the various bodies concerned with European security. Whatever will be the institutional solution for European security cooperation, the primary military capabilities for ESDI must be realized within NATO, where the European countries can draw on NATO-resources if necessary. I want to underline the need for US and Canadian participation in crises management and the whole range of new missions. “European only”-operations must be the exception, not the rule.

If the events should move in the direction of the development of a common European foreign and security policy, and the development of a common defence within the EU, Norway will face considerable challenges. From the Norwegian point of view, we want to contribute to the realization of ESDI in a way which gives equal rights to all European members of the Alliance. We cannot afford any duplication of efforts, and ESDI has to be developed as a contribution to improved burdensharing in NATO, and not in competition to NATO.

Developments in Russia

For a Norwegian Minister of Defence some words on Russia is inevitable. Russia remains a key dimension for NATO in general, and Norway in particular. European security and stability is impossible without a good relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation. But this is a shared responsibility. The relative weight and importance of Russia will also be a function of her ability to contribute to common solutions.

We have witnessed with concern the troubled economic and social development in Russia. Clearly, the origin of, and the solution to, the economic crisis lie in the hands of Russia itself. For Russia to succeed in the long run, the only viable policy is to stay the present main course of political and economic reform.

Despite the economic crisis and the subsequent reductions in the military structures over the past few years, Russia still continues to be a strong military power. She has retained a considerable conventional, and not least a large nuclear military potential. Arms control and disarmament will hopefully lead to a controlled and substantial reduction in the nuclear forces in the North. It is equally important that the Russian military leadership maintains effective command, control, safety and security for these forces. This will clearly be a challenge in times of economic crises. Today, Russia does not pose a military threat to her Nordic neighbours, but the High North is still very important in a strategic geopolitical context.

Norway wishes to play an active part in fostering links between Russia and the Western countries, including collaboration in defence-related areas. Although there are positive signs, this effort is today complicated by several factors on the Russian side. This years’ Norwegian sponsored PfP-exercise “Barents Peace” in Finnmark will be attended by several allied and partner countries. Russia, however, has so far declined to participate, and has generally expressed critisism of multilateral exercises being conducted close to its borders in the North. Another difficult area is the renegotiation of the CFE Treaty, where Norway and Russia have diverging views.

One major risk emanating from North-Western Russia today lies within the environmental sector. There is, within this area, a serious and acute need for clean-up of nuclear waste and for preventive action in the environmental field in general. The tasks are large and complex, and requires a broad international effort.

Nordic dimension in European Security

In the 90s, Nordic cooperation in the security and defence field has experienced a dynamic unparallelled in the last forty years. In addition to the traditional pure Nordic and UN peacekeeping dimension, it has today two new important dimensions. One is the NATO/PfP framework, where Sweden and Finland take an increasingly active part. The other dimension is the potentially increasing role of the EU in the security field.

The best example of how far we have already come is the Nordic-Polish Brigade in Bosnia, where Nordic battalions work side by side in a brigade structure, under US divisional command, all within the NATO framework. Another good example of Nordic defence cooperation is the recent establishment of a joint Nordic force pool for international operations - NORDCAPS, which will significantly increase the Nordic countries combined ability to participate in peace operations.

Over recent years Norway has also significantly increased its involvement with the Baltic countries, as a contribution towards assisting the development of stable and democratic conditions in this area. Although Norway is not a Baltic country, the development in this region could have immediate security implications also for us. Norway and the other Nordic countries have a particular interest in contributing to a stable and peaceful development in this region.

The new initiatives coming out of the NATO Summit could also strengthen the security and cooperation in Northern Europe. We have to make sure that NATO retains its relevance and importance also in the North. More substantial cooperation with Partners will improve the potential for cooperation with Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states. In particular, we have to improve interoperability with these countries. The improvement of ESDI should be implemented in a way which ties us even closer to Sweden and Finland because of their membership in the EU. Last but not least, NATO must build on, and improve what has been achieved in the Permanent Joint Council. Cooperation between NATO and Russia is and will be a precondition for stability and security in Europe. This provides a framework which makes it possible for Norway to actively engage in close dialogue and cooperation with Russia. Hence, the new NATO has a large potential for improved cooperation and security also in North Europe.

Overall development of the Norwegian Armed Forces

The main challenge of defence planning today is the uncertainty in international development, and the consequent need for flexibility and continous adjustment. This is complicated by the fact that within the defence sector the planning horison is very long. An effective and credible defence is not something that can be realised in the course of a few years. The decisions we make today in terms of procurement and professional skills, will determine our ability to handle the variety of crises situations ten to fifteen years from now. In the choice between the need for flexibility and a predictable long term policy, therefore, the answer today must be - “ both”.

The last White Paper on development of the Armed Forces was presented to the Storting almost a year ago. Throughout the White Paper and the more recent “Supplementary Report to the Storting on the Investment Profile for the Armed Forces” - the Government has proposed a balanced development of the Norwegian Forces in the future. This means balance between the need for flexibility and the need for predictability. In more concrete terms, this means balance between running costs and investment. In addition, there must also be a balance between the resources available, and the tasks and structure of the Armed Forces. In order to maintain our ability to meet the new challenges, the defence organisation must continue to adjust and develop its range of activities. Boundaries between the Services must not be allowed to stand in the way of achieving cost effective solutions. Units must be evaluated in the light of their contribution to the overall achievement of our defence aims.

Finally, let me say a few words about Norway’s contributions to peace operations. This has for many years been kept on a relatively high level, and international peace operations form an increasingly important part of the activities of the Armed Forces. Due to recruting problems last year, we decided to discontinue the engagement of the Norwegian battalion to UNIFIL in Lebanon, after 20 years engagement. There is broad political agreement that Norway will maintain a substantial contribution to international peace operations in the future.

The Ministry of Defence will submit a Report to the Storting this year on international operations. The Report will address the question of how we can best organise and develop our resources, including personnel, in order to improve our contribution to international peace operations. We attach great importance to ensuring that the future arrangements for the generation of forces for international operations are closely integrated into our regular defence structures.

Mr Chairman, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

In the execution of security and defence policy it is important to be able to handle the problems and crisis of today, and at the same time to plan and to invest for the future. Defence structures are easily reduced, but difficult and time-consuming to rebuild. The future is uncertain, and will probably at some time surprise us all again, for better or for worse. Let us all work to be prepared for the challenges we will face in 21st Century. Thank you for your attention.

This page was last updated February 5 1999 by the editors