Minister of Defence Eldbjørg Løwer

"Our defence in an international perspective"

Oslo Military Society, 10. January 2000

Honoured guests and members,

Let me begin by wishing you all a happy and prosperous New Year. To be able to greet you in this way at the dawn of not only a new century but also a new millennium is indeed a very special privilege. I would like to express the wish that, for our part of the world, this will prove to be a more peaceful that the one we leave behind. To wish that the new century, not to mention the new millennium, will be more peaceful is perhaps a little ambitious, but at least one may hope. When it comes to defence planning, however, we must make provision for the unexpected. In 1910 a book was published that became a world best-seller. The name of the author was Norman Angell and the title of the book was "The Great Illusion". The book's popular message was that the great powers now had so many interests in common, and their mutual economic dependency was so great, that war had become unthinkable. In the year 1900 no-one could imagine that the 20th Century would come to be marked by war and great power confrontation. It is no more possible for us to know how the 21st Century will turn out to be. Sadly there are no guarantees that new conflicts will not arise even if we cannot at present foresee them. It is our awareness of this that forms the basis of all our defence planning.

1999 was a special year and an eventful one in many ways, and I feel that I should attempt to sum up the experience that we have been left with, and the challenges for Norwegian Defence that follow from this experience. There are three things in particular that I should like to stress:

1. Firstly I should like to try to describe the international situation with which we are faced today, and how this may be expected to develop in the time to come.
2. Then I would like to say something about the way in which the new international situation has forced new aims, strategies and plans to be developed by the international organisations of which Norway is a member or by which Norway's interests are strongly affected.
3. Last but not least, I should like to look more closely at how these changes pose new requirements for Norway's defences, and how we can respond to meet these requirements.

My main point is that it remains critically important that we should maintain an effective defence capability, but also that this capability should be adapted to a radically altered international situation.

Before I look in more detail at the situation as it is today, I would remind you that the international perspective in Norwegian defence is nothing new. We have had an Alliance-based defence policy since 1949 and Norwegian defence planning has formed part of NATO's strategy for creating peace and security in the Western world. During the Cold War, Norway's role was primarily associated with the Northern region, an area both close to our own borders and very much in focus due to its strategic importance both to the Soviet Union and to NATO.

The end of the Cold War has not meant that this part of our Defence has lost its international perspective. In fact the international perspective is still just as relevant for every aspect of Norwegian defence. The tasks performed on Norwegian soil remain a part of an integrated Alliance-based defence. The maintenance of a sufficiently strong defensive capability in the North is something that our allies take for granted and this must continue to form one of the central planks in the shaping of our Defence organisation here at home. But even if the international perspective is not new, we are now faced with an international dynamic quite different to that existing during the Cold War. We can no longer set a particular course and expect to be able to follow it for many years. Instead we must be prepared for developments to take dramatically different directions and we must be capable of adjusting our course accordingly.

In the 1990s we have said that Norway no longer faces a military threat but that developments in the security situation continue to bear the marks of considerable uncertainty. Today the future course of development of the broad security picture is unpredictable but it may, however, turn out to be just as "dangerous" as the great power confrontation that marked the Cold War period. Society at large has also become more vulnerable. The Norwegian economy is, for example, dependent on oil and gas production in the North Sea, a resource that can be put out of action relatively easily. The total dependency on information technology also brings with it increased vulnerability to sabotage. The new international security scene therefore needs to be viewed in context with the increased vulnerability of modern Western society. Here at home we currently have two parallel studies engaged in the analysis of these challenges: the Defence Policy Committee and the so-called Vulnerability Committee. Both will submit their recommendations in the course of the summer. The Government regards it as very important that these recommendations should be considered in the context of the continuing work on the White Paper for the Armed Forces and the White Paper on Future Civil Emergency Planning.

Despite the absence today of any concrete threat to Norway or to Western Europe, it is quite evident that military force continues to be employed, even in Europe. The extensive arsenals of nuclear weapons close to Norway's borders remain in existence and they still have consequences for Norway's strategic situation.

In the Balkans the warfare has been brought to an end but the situation in large parts of Yugoslavia remains highly unstable. NATO is conducting major operations both inside and on the borders of Yugoslavia. At the overall level, both in Bosnia and in Kosovo, the situation may now be under control but the fundamental problems of security in the Balkans remain far from any satisfactory resolution.

So to another turbulent corner of the North Caucasus. The fighting in Chechnya has already lasted many months and even though the Russian-Norwegian border is far removed from the Caucasus, it is always a serious matter when a neighbouring country is involved in war. Wars have a habit of developing their own dynamics which will always make it possible for them to have a destabilising effect beyond the region actually involved in the hostilities. The brutal way in which the Russians are waging this war, which does not pay sufficient regard to the civilian population in Chechnya, also places a strain on Russia's relations with the Western countries as well as posing a threat to the internal stability of Russia itself.

Contact between Norway and Russia, and between NATO and Russia, in the field of defence policy has unfortunately been at a lower ebb in 1999 than it has been for many years. Russia chose to break off its cooperation with the Alliance in connection with NATO air operations in Kosovo. Cooperation has still not been resumed to any real degree in spite of the fact that Russian and NATO troops have worked together very well in Kosovo for several months now. This has created fresh uncertainty about an important part of the security policy related cooperation in Europe. Naturally enough, Norway too feels the consequences of this.

In the northern regions, a positive feature of the situation is that both the level of tension and the force levels have reduced appreciably since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, however, Russia's difficult economic and social situation poses new dangers and risks to security in the North. Environmental degradation, social need and organised crime are all factors which are affecting life on the Russian side of the border and which could lead to instability and the breakdown of society in an area which for us is close to home.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction also constitutes a growing danger. In 1999 both India and Pakistan carried out nuclear tests. This is further evidence of the steadily widening spread of nuclear weapons. A number of countries in the Middle East and other unstable regions will, within a few years, probably have developed or acquired missiles with sufficiently long range to threaten Europe. The increased vulnerability of Europe means that we could be exposed to very serious reprisals when we take part in international peace operations.

I would like now to look a little more closely at how the changed international situation has affected European cooperation in the field of security and defence policy. Close cooperation in matters of security and defence policy in Europe remains at least as necessary as it was before and this cooperation is now undergoing some major changes. The rapid and dynamic tempo of development within the EU could lead to a situation in which cooperation within NATO becomes less central than it is today. Constellations of powerful Western countries may take on increased significance at the expense of the international organisations in which the smaller countries too have enjoyed the full rights of membership. We may see Russia resume its role as a European great power, now, it is to be hoped, as a constructive player in the international arena. The sweeping changes brought about by the fall of the Berlin Wall are by no means ended. We must therefore expect new patterns of cooperation and far-reaching changes in the landscape of European security policy.

Such changes often bring uncertainty and danger in their wake but they also provide opportunities. I am afraid that Norway could all too easily find itself an outsider if the security policy dialogue were to be restricted to closed forums for the major powers. Active Norwegian participation in NATO, preferably in concert with other smaller nations, is necessary if the vitality of NATO cooperation is to be maintained. The NATO Summit held in April last year confirmed that transatlantic consultations on matters posing potential threats to security and stability remain a fundamental security task for the Alliance and one that is essential to the ability of member countries to navigate safely in waters where the security policy environment is in a state of constant change.

From a Norwegian point of view, it is in our interests that NATO should continue to constitute the primary forum for Western cooperation in the field of security and defence policy. NATO's fundamental vision, based on collective cooperation between the democratic countries of Europe and North America in matters of security and defence, remains eminently relevant and rational. It is difficult to imagine that other institutions could achieve a similar degree of potency and effectiveness both politically and militarily. Other international organisations will of course take care of important tasks with a bearing on international security policy. That in itself is nothing new. The EU, G8 and OSCE, with a whole range of other forums, are also likely to assume greater importance than in the past. The NATO Summit in Washington did, however, emphasise the way in which NATO is changing to adapt to a new international situation and to ensure that it remains relevant in relation to the challenges that we shall face in future years.

NATO's new Strategic Concept, which was agreed at last year's Washington Summit, defined the direction of the Alliance's future development. This new concept has subsequently been the subject of some debate here at home. And since questions of security and defence policy have not featured over widely in the news during the 1990s, this debate is something that we who work in Defence welcome with open arms. Lack of interest can often lead to apathy and a weakening of resolution where our long-term aims are concerned and we should be tolerant when a subject as thorny as NATO's new strategic concept becomes the subject of some controversy.

Since much of the debate has been centred on what the new concept entails, I would like to look a little more closely at just that point. I feel that the function and purpose of the Strategic Concept document is not really fully understood. The concept is not a recipe for the type of operations that NATO will conduct in future. It sets out the kind of instruments that are to be developed and placed at the disposal of the Alliance's political leadership. Use of military force is just one of a range of means in this context. Political consultation and the further development of democracy and stability throughout the whole of Europe through the Partnership for Peace are enshrined as key functions of the new Strategic Concept and I believe that such non-military instruments will prove in future to be every bit as important as their military counterparts. It will, moreover, still rest with the political leadership to decide whether – and, if so, how – military force is to be used, and any such decision will still have to be unanimous. That means that 19 democratically elected governments will be required to give their explicit support for any new NATO operations.

The Concept is thus not a recipe for a more aggressive NATO. My definite impression is that that there is a mutual understanding within the Alliance that NATO's threshold for the use of military force has been raised, rather than lowered, in the wake of the Kosovo operation. And my own personal view is that this is indeed the case.

It is difficult to foresee just what the future holds. But I believe that we will experience a more changeable and less firmly set situation characterised not only by new dangers but also by new opportunities. Norway's best interests will be served by associating itself as closely as possible with European cooperation in the field of security and defence policy and by offering our own resources for the furtherance of joint European endeavours. We shall then, as now, continue to be regarded as a serious partner willing to bear a rightful share of the burden that has to be carried in the interests of creating security and stability. Our intention will be to cooperate closely in a spirit of mutual commitment with our Nordic, European and North American partners..

This development will make great demands as regards the restructuring of our own defence resources, and this brings me to my last, and perhaps most important, message here this evening. How are we to meet these challenges? Let me say at once that the Defence Establishment is already well on the way in the work of adapting itself to the new security situation. Over the last decade Norway has broadened its international military involvement to a very considerable degree. Some of the areas in which we are engaged are, however, not always in the public spotlight. In the part of Europe closest to home, the most important development is probably the forging of close cooperative links in defence matters with our Nordic neighbours and with the Baltic States within the Partnership for Peace. A concrete example of this is the agreement which I and my Swedish colleague concluded last autumn relating to the development of closer collaboration in the training and exercising of Norwegian and Swedish Armed Forces. This arrangement will form one of the building blocks in a scheme of cooperation which could prove to be of great importance in the future. The Nordic countries have also come far in the development of multinational formations through the NORDCAPS initiative and experience in the Balkans has already shown this to function well. The next aim is to be able to deploy a joint Nordic peacekeeping force at up to brigade strength. It is my personal belief that this Nordic cooperation will become more and more important and that it is in our interest to support this development.

The Armed Forces are also playing an active part in the work of promoting stability in the former Eastern Europe through bilateral cooperation with a number of different countries. Sometimes I get the impression that this work is looked upon as something that we undertake in addition to what we do in support of Norwegian interests. But this is to misunderstand the position. I believe that a realistic expectation of close collaboration with NATO, or indeed membership of the Alliance, has had an incalculably stabilising effect on a continent that has undergone a revolutionary process of change since 1989. It is clearly in Norway's best interests to contribute to this. It is a question of helping to integrate these countries in a framework of international cooperation and mutual commitment in order to avoid situations arising that can only be resolved by the use of military force.

Norway has more than 1,400 men and women serving abroad on international operations and frequently receives praise for the contribution that they are making. Norwegian special forces were among the first to enter Kosovo following the conclusion of hostilities, something that has not gone unnoticed by our allies. We are also receiving compliments from within NATO for the quality of the contribution made by the Norwegian force elements and for the fact that, seen in relation to our modest population, we make a major contribution to international operations. When I visited Kosovo before Christmas, I heard the Norwegian troops described in glowing terms by KFOR's commanders. The commander of the Telemark Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mood, also told me that the Norwegian soldiers showed individual keenness and a responsible approach to the task. The foundations for this involvement have been laid here at home. I am extremely proud of the contribution being made by our forces in Kosovo and in Bosnia, as well as during the preparatory phases in Norway.

Even though the process of restructuring our Defence to match the challenges of the future is well under way, we still have a considerable way to go. Both the air and ground operations associated with Kosovo have shown that there are potential improvements to be made. The F-16 squadron which took part in the air operations is a unit which had been declared to NATO as a rapid reaction force element. It should therefore have been prepared for exactly that situation which arose in connection with Kosovo. As it turned out, however, we found that we did not have all the necessary elements in place when the activation order was issued in October 1998. Furthermore, it also took several months before we were finally in place on the ground in Kosovo. Some of this I believe we must accept, given the arrangements that we have for the establishment of forces for international operations. But it really is not good enough. For this reason the Government has prepared White Paper No. 38 which sets out proposals for how we can make improved arrangements, especially with regard to reaction time but also in terms of flexibility and endurance, for the establishment of forces for international operations.

The aim of the White Paper is to propose measures which will enable us to meet our international commitments in a better way than at present while at the same time strengthening our defence capability at home. To achieve this aim, it is necessary to develop forces capable of reacting more rapidly and more flexibly to a wider spectrum of different tasks than is the case today. This has to be combined with the ability to maintain an involvement abroad, at an appropriate level in terms of both quantity and quality, for extended periods. Furthermore, we have to achieve this within the framework of our existing force structure. Traditionally, the Norwegian contingents participating in international peace operations have demonstrated a considerable capacity for endurance over long periods but a lesser ability to react rapidly in an acute crisis situation. If we are to realise all these aims, our forces for international operations must be identified and prepared in advance. The Government has therefore recommended the establishment of an "Armed Forces Task Force for International Operations" which will give us a wider range of options in the event of a crisis situation arising while at the same time creating greater predictability in the planning of our involvement abroad. This does not exclude Norway's contribution, if circumstances should require it, of units which are not part of the Task Force – anything from military observers to minor support units. The White Paper does not, however, envisage any essential increase, compared with levels maintained in recent years, in the number of Norwegian personnel serving in operations abroad at any given time.

The White Paper recommends a restructuring that I believe will have to come whatever other changes we may make in the future. Our defence organisation already suffers from many of the shortcomings that the recommendations of the White Paper will help to alleviate, not least with regard to conditions of service and other personnel matters. Implementation of these recommendations is thus urgently needed.

It is also important to mention in this context another message being fed back by our allies, namely that the promotion of peace and stability in the Northern Region remains a vital task in which Norway is expected to pull its weight to the full. This is a message that often tends to recede into the background at times like the present when a lot of the attention is being focused on what NATO is doing in the Balkans. I believe that some of the criticism voiced against Norway in NATO circles last autumn has been based on the perception that we have set ourselves defence policy goals that are too ambitious. We wish both to take the main responsibility for the defence of our own territory and at the same time to try to improve the contribution we make to international operations. Aiming high in this way has meant that we have not always been able to realise our aims as rapidly as we might wish. Other countries have lowered their sights appreciably, often concentrating on only one task at a time. Paradoxically enough, this has a tendency to mute NATO's criticism.

The Washington Summit also agreed a plan for the development of the military capacity that would be needed to enable the aims set out in the Strategic Concept to be achieved, the so-called "Defence Capabilities Initiative". Norway has declared its support for this initiative and this will have an important bearing on the further restructuring of our Armed Forces. The purpose of the initiative is to improve NATO's collective defence capability in a range of key areas. Norway cannot, of course, position itself outside the influence of this development. The ability to operate jointly with the forces of other NATO countries, however, applies not only when Norwegian forces are deployed abroad but also in cases where we might need reinforcement of our own national defences. The traditional Allied exercises and training activities in Norway have been reduced in recent years. This is due to a number of factors, not least the large number of Allied troops deployed in the Balkans. But it is also due to cuts in the forces of Allied countries, tighter financial constraints and an appreciable increase in the number of exercises conducted with new partner countries. For the first time in several decades the British Ministry of Defence has decided that the Royal Marines will not be conducting their annual winter warfare training in Norway. This is most regrettable and the new Defence Minister, Geoffrey Hoon, has assured me that this will be an isolated case. The presence of the Royal Marines on their winter warfare training has great value, both politically and militarily, and has in many ways become a symbol of the close collaboration between the United Kingdom and Norway in the field of security and defence policy. I attach great importance to the continuation of this arrangement. Stronger integration of the Norwegian elements of multinational forces will to some extent compensate for the reduced level of Allied presence in Norway.

The recommendations contained in White Paper No. 38 also provide a concrete answer as to how we can improve the ability of our forces to operate jointly with allies and partners. In the longer term we shall also need to achieve closer integration of our force elements with the multinational forces of which they form part. I envisage that the future trend will be towards a greater degree of joint procurement, operations and training for the various forces concerned. It is not rational, either militarily or politically, to deploy just a few aircraft, helicopters, ships or army units unless they already form part of larger multinational forces. A number of other nations find themselves in a similar position. We should therefore find partners with whom we can enter into long-term strategic cooperative arrangements in a range of different areas. Only in this way shall we be able to make a cost-effective contribution in an international context. It will also enable us at the same time to make a worthwhile contribution with advanced weapon systems of a kind that it would not be feasible for us to procure and operate on our own. This will be in full accord with the NATO Summit agreement to establish forces capable of being deployed on all types of missions. It is a major but important challenge that we shall face in preparing the way for the adaptation of the Defence Establishment towards a more Alliance-oriented structure.

The development of a common European security and defence policy may well also have very definite consequences for Norwegian Defence and this is something that has occupied my mind greatly during the past year. The EU has, in the course of last year, set itself ambitious targets with regard to its future capability. By 2003 the EU aims to be able to deploy a force intended for peace operations at Army Corps level, that is to say with a strength of some 50-60,000. Even though the extent to which the member countries manage to achieve this aim remains to be seen, we must, for Norway’s part, plan for the possibility that the EU may, in the medium term, assume a more prominent role in the field of European security.

This will have certain consequences where defence policy is concerned. The development of multinational force formations is a theme that is becoming increasingly prominent. Norway will in the future have to contribute a number of components towards larger international units and the countries of the EU are our natural partners here. This applies in particular to the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany. We ought, therefore, to contribute to the build-up of these units, including those formed under the auspices of the EU. However, Norwegian participation in this collaborative work will require a satisfactory framework to be devised.

This faces me, as Defence Minister, with an important constitutional question: to what extent can Norway contribute forces towards an EU led operation without any assurance of full participation in the planning of the operation. To send Norwegian troops out to take part in operations in which, in the worst case, lives may be lost, is such a serious matter that I would consider such participation to be vitally necessary. The seriousness of taking such decisions makes it essential that we should be able to bring our influence to bear. And here I should like to make it quite plain that consultation after decisions have been taken will not be acceptable to Norway in this respect. It cannot be assumed, therefore, that Norwegian forces declared to the WEU’s force register will automatically be transferred across to the EU force register. It is always the case, as we would do well to remember, that one’s available resources determine, when all is said and done, what one is capable of doing by way of joint action. New political structures and high-flown political ambitions cannot alter this fact.

Adaptation to the changing international situation also affects defence procurement. Improvements in NATO’s military capability are to be achieved by making use of the Alliance’s superiority in the field of information, its leading edge technology and its integrated military structure. In practical terms this means a trend towards strategic, highly mobile multinational forces maintained at a high state of readiness, equipped with modern weapon systems and advanced technology and supported by an effective logistic apparatus. The requirements for interoperability will increase and will mean an even stronger need for cooperation, both technological and industrial, within the Alliance. A prerequisite for success in meeting these objectives is the existence of a defence industry capable of competing and providing the necessary materiel.

The easing of political tensions in our part of the world has reduced the demand for defence equipment and stimulated competition between defence contractors. At the same time, however, the development costs for new military systems continue to increase. This has led to wide-ranging rationalisation of the defence industry. The rationalisation and restructuring has been particularly comprehensive in the United States where, in the course of the last few years, the whole structure of the defence sector has altered radically. In our own part of the world as well, this trend is making itself felt very strongly, even though the European market for defence equipment is smaller and more fragmented than in the United States.

The Norwegian defence industry on its own has neither the breadth of technological expertise nor sufficient production capacity to supply all the materiel needs of the Armed Forces. Norway’s defence contractors tend to supply niche products and developments in defence technology, as in the civil sector, are driven by the demands of an interactive international market. Norway therefore plays an active part in international collaboration in the defence equipment sector. The primary objective in engaging in such collaboration is to make it possible for the Armed Forces to acquire sufficiently good equipment at the lowest possible cost but the aim is also to ensure that the Norwegian defence industry has the expertise and resources to be able to hold its own in the environment of a restructured European defence industry.

The major procurement projects for new frigates and combat aircraft are of central importance in this context. Both projects are being conducted against a background of intense competition between some the world’s largest and most advanced suppliers of defence materiel. In both these projects the choice of solution will be made on the basis of an overall assessment of performance and through-life costs measured against the specified requirements of the Armed Forces. We will, however, also attach weight to the ability of the contractor finally chosen to propose suitable and binding arrangements – if necessary in conjunction with his national authorities – for collaboration with Norwegian defence companies. The arrangements proposed must be such that they will ensure that we are in a position to preserve and develop further the core capabilities that we need in the Norwegian defence industry in order that it may in future, in consultation with our own procurement authorities, retain its ability to take shape and to supply products that meet the requirements of the Armed Forces at a competitive price.

With regard to the status of the plans to procure new frigates and combat aircraft, I should add a comment in the light of the current defence funding and budgetary situation. The situation regarding defence funding is strained. It causes me concern that uncertainty has arisen as to our ability to achieve the targets of the investment programme, partly as a result of operating costs being substantially higher than forecast. I have made no secret of my concern in the budget proposals for the current year. Discussion of the budget proposals in the Storting has done little to alleviate this concern. On the other hand, I would not assess the discrepancy in relation to the predictions in the Long-Term Report as being of dramatic proportions when viewed against resources overall. However, in view of the way in which operating costs are turning out, a lower level of overall funding than originally envisaged, increased emphasis on international operations and the guidance issued by the Storting in connection with the MTB programme, I have said that it will be necessary, sometime during the spring, to look more closely at the investment profile on which our planning is at present based.

How, then, can I best sum up my status report on the work of adapting Norway’s Defence to a new international situation at the dawn of the year 2000?

I believe that the whole of the Defence Establishment must become more adept at seeing its activities not just in a national context but against a wider backdrop. Finding a new, correct balance between an increase in joint working with our allies, participation in international operations, as well as our national defence tasks, will be one of the main challenges facing our defence planners. Many important pieces of the jigsaw of adapting to a changed international situation have been put in place over the past year. Norway and NATO have defined the aims for further development in the new Strategic Concept and the recipe for achieving these aims is to be found in NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative. This has been followed up at national level in White Paper No. 38. The course has been marked out but there remain many important priorities that have to be decided and difficult decisions that have to be taken if we are to be able to realise these aims. The recommendations of the Defence Policy Committee and Defence Review 2000 will play an important part in the further work to be done this summer.

At the same time I must say that all praise is due to the Armed Forces for what is already being done. In the former Yugoslavia, Norway is today providing a sizeable contingent which is making an extremely important contribution to both Norwegian and European security. I am especially proud of the quality of the Norwegian personnel troops, reflected not least in their general approach and dedication to the job that they are doing.

The foundations for this are laid in the work that is being done here at home. Norway is a small country with limited resources, not least in terms of manpower. That is why it is so essential to see all we embark on in a unified international perspective if we are to make a truly effective contribution in areas close to home and in conflict situations further afield in Europe.

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