Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk

Conference on Disarmament – Plenary Meeting

Geneva, Thursdag 9 March 2000

It is a pleasure to be here today to address the Conference on Disarmament and to be able to thank you, Ambassador Chowdhury, for all that you have done in assisting the Conference in its efforts to reach agreement on a programme of work.

During the last decade the world has undergone dramatic political, economic and social upheavals – in many ways the political map has been redrawn. However, during the last five years, progress in disarmament has been slow, although there have been some significant breakthroughs. On the threshold of this new millennium, what could be more worthwhile than to make a fresh commitment to substantial disarmament and arms control.

So what are our challenges?

First of all, I sincerely hope that Ambassador Chowdhury’s efforts will lead to an agreement on a programme of work which will enable this Conference to embark on real negotiations and discussions on important substantive issues.

We believe the CD must retain its role as a major disarmament forum. We have been disappointed by the lack of progress on many issues over the last couple of years. We need to avoid the impression that the CD is becoming sidelined. I hope therefore that we can now join forces to ensure the effective operation of this body with a view to achieving concrete results.

The current situation is making great demands on the non-proliferation regime. Our efforts to revitalize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must now be intensified and be incorporated into the foreign and security policy priorities of all countries.

At the forthcoming NPT Review Conference, the challenge will be to find ways and means to translate the agreed principles and objectives for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation into concrete action. Another challenge will be to develop new measures and initiatives that all parties can endorse. This Conference should spur us on to achieve concrete and lasting results in this regard.

The decision of the 1995 NPT Review Conference to extend the Non-proliferation Treaty indefinitely is a milestone in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And this decision was made contingent on two other, equally important decisions.

The parties committed themselves to pursuing several specific principles and objectives that will promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A crucial part of this commitment was the establishment of a strengthened review process. The review process was to be responsible for discussing how nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation can best be attained and what new measures and initiatives should be developed.

However, we must acknowledge that the review process for the NPT has not functioned as well as we had hoped. This is partly due to underlying political realities and disagreement on a number of issues. In my view, we have not been willing to take on the responsibility for finding viable solutions on which everyone could agree.

In order to maintain the credibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty, we must revitalize the review process. We must give new momentum to this work. Practicable arrangements must be developed. We must minimize the possibility of setbacks. At the same time we must promote the implementation of decisions adopted by the review conferences. A thorough assessment of the review process is called for. Initiatives that can help get such an assessment started should be tabled at the conference.

I would like to suggest three elements that could be incorporated into a strategy for revitalizing the review process.

Firstly, it is important to preserve the integrity of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review Conference. They are not up for renegotiation. Most of them have not yet been realized, with a few notable exceptions, such as the completion of the negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the IAEA’s additional protocol on full scope safeguards.

Secondly, the review process needs a mechanism that can help to transform principles and objectives into action by facilitating their implementation. A Programme of Action for the review process would serve such a purpose.

In addition to containing objectives that have not been realized, such a programme could include new measures and initiatives. Under a Programme of Action, the parties would be mandated to follow up and develop the decisions by the Review Conference for the period leading up to the next review conference.

To make this possible, each of the annual meetings of the review process should deal with a limited number of well-defined issues with a view to achieving results. The parties should undertake to deal with and further develop issues defined in a Programme of Action. Such a Programme of Action could include:

• negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes,
• the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,

- reviewing information on strategic nuclear arms reductions, including the

START process,

• transparency in relation to tactical nuclear weapons and the destruction of such weapons,
• the signing and ratification of the IAEA’s new additional protocol on full scope safeguards,
• negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the NPT.

In addition, a certain part of each annual meeting should be set aside for a focused review.

Thirdly, the review process should be extended from three to four sessions in order to combine implementation of decisions with preparations for subsequent review conferences. This would enhance the effectiveness of the process and the prospect of achieving concrete results.

If we are to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the scope of our efforts must be wide enough to include the underlying causes of conflict and war - the most important force driving proliferation.

Thus, it is important to address regional issues in the context of non-proliferation and disarmament. The nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 highlighted the connection between regional instability and the danger of nuclear proliferation.

The multilateral dialogue should be used to build confidence and underline that weapons of mass destruction neither protect nor promote national interests.

The security situation in the Middle East is the only regional issue addressed by the NPT so far. However, South Asia also gives cause for concern. It is important that India and Pakistan develop confidence-building measures, as provided for in the Lahore Declaration of 1999, in order to reduce tension and prevent further conflict escalation. Such measures could be followed up by consultations on elements that could be included in a separate arms control regime for the region. The nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan should serve as a strong reminder that these two countries cannot afford to allow their differences to get out of hand. Conventional conflict could contain the seeds of a larger conflagration.

We believe the NPT should deal with regional issues in a more balanced and comprehensive way. The forthcoming Review Conference could look at a package of regional issues to be dealt with at the annual meetings. In addition to the Middle East, such a package should include South Asia and the Far East, with an emphasis on North Korea. It should also include individual countries whose status is somewhat unclear, such as Iraq. In this way, a broader regional emphasis would contribute to a more coherent strategy that would enable us to deal more forcefully with existing challenges.

I would now like to comment briefly on some of the substantive NPT-related issues.

To reduce the role of nuclear weapons, Russia and the US must continue their efforts to further reduce their strategic arsenals. Negotiations on START III should begin as soon as possible. New strategic arms control initiatives should also be implemented. This includes the measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories, agreed on by Presidents Clinton and Jeltsin at the Summit in Helsinki in 1997. Such initiatives would be an important signal that the nuclear-weapon states take their responsibility for disarmament seriously.

The issue of tactical nuclear weapons should be given more focused attention. These weapons must not fall into the wrong hands and should therefore be subject to extensive safeguards and control. Such weapons can be rapidly redeployed and can play a destabilizing role in areas of conflict. The handling and reduction of such weapons should be part of a more comprehensive disarmament process.

Increased transparency with regard to tactical nuclear weapons could be a first step, and would be an important confidence-building measure.

The next step could be the development of a programme for warhead destruction underpinned by bilateral verification procedures. The US and Russian declaration of 1991 to withdraw and eliminate tactical nuclear weapons is important in this respect and should be reconfirmed and provided with a time frame for implementation.

Norway has always held the view that reductions in nuclear weapons, and ultimately their total elimination, cannot be negotiated in a multilateral forum. The nuclear-weapon states have a particular responsibility for nuclear disarmament. Given the devastating effect of these weapons, however, the international community has a legitimate interest in being kept informed of the progress achieved. We should also be informed of any difficulties and challenges encountered in the nuclear disarmament process.

Norway has on several occasions advocated that the CD should serve as an important forum on nuclear transparency in order to replace distrust with confidence and cooperation. A procedure for nuclear transparency in the CD could give the nuclear-weapon states an opportunity to inform others both of the results achieved through unilateral and bilateral initiatives and of their nuclear policies. This would demonstrate their commitment to nuclear disarmament.

In this spirit, we submitted together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands a proposal last year to establish an ad hoc working group to study ways and means of establishing an exchange of information and views on efforts towards nuclear disarmament. This proposal has been widely accepted by the members of this conference. My appeal to you today is that we now translate this support into action.

Today there are large amounts of weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium that pose a serious problem in terms of safe and secure handling. Because of inadequate arrangements for control and verification of such material, they represent a threat to global security. This state of affairs is having a negative impact on the nuclear disarmament process.

To ensure further and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals, international assurances should be given that weapon-grade fissile material is no longer being produced. Assurances should also be provided that existing stockpiles are being brought properly under control with a view to net reductions. We therefore need a coherent strategy to develop an international framework for dealing with fissile material. Such a strategy should include four elements.

Firstly, a ban on the future production of fissile material for weapons purposes is essential. Such a ban should be considered an integral and indispensable part of nuclear disarmament. I am very disappointed to see that the CD has still not started negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, although there has been consensus on the importance and high priority of this issue for a long time.

Secondly, the amount of weapons usable fissile material that is now surplus or in excess of military requirements is steadily increasing and represents a proliferation risk We need to establish an international norm for states to deal with stockpiles of such material in order to ensure that none of these stocks will be returned or diverted to weapon programmes. This norm would also ensure that the stocks are made secure from theft and sabotage and prevent harm to human health and the environment.

Thirdly, highly enriched uranium produced for non-explosive purposes, such as fuel for the propulsion of naval reactors, also involves a risk of proliferation. This issue should be addressed by the international community with a view to improving safety and the control of such material.

Fourthly, we believe in establishing voluntary measures that would increase transparency in relation to military inventories of fissile material. Norway has put forward a four-step proposal for increasing transparency and confidence-building measures for such holdings, through reporting, inspection and safeguard procedures. This would lead to agreed, monitored net reductions in these stockpiles.

The issues of stockpiles related to excess weapons material, highly enriched uranium for non-explosive purposes and military inventories should be included in an international process to be established in parallel with or independent of the FMCT negotiations in Geneva.

I would once again like to emphasize the success of the Mine Ban Convention. The process leading up to the Convention, and its implementation, is an example of the benefit to be gained from combining experience from practical work in the field with multilateral diplomacy. I am pleased to see that the Geneva communities have played a key part in this process. Geneva has, in consequence, become an international home for the Mine Ban Convention. The intersessional work of the Convention is taking place here, and the Second Meeting of States Parties will be held here in September.

As a result of the work on the Mine Ban Convention, more attention is being given to conventional weapons in general. Conventional disarmament is also important in safeguarding humanitarian and human rights concerns. Conventional weapons are the weapons that kill. More focus on these weapons reflects an increasing willingness to improve human security.

Last week the First Preparatory Meeting of the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms took place in New York. This Conference will supplement the efforts and initiatives being made at the national and regional levels. However, the first Preparatory Meeting was a disappointment. This may be an indication that the small arms issue is still not ripe for a global approach. This issue is a complex one and must be approached in a practical, pragmatic and realistic manner.

The Conference on Disarmament is in urgent need of reform. I am not suggesting that the present stalemate could have been prevented by a reform of the CD. No organizational or procedural operations can change underlying political realities.

Certain political requirements should be met if the CD is to play a crucial role in the years ahead. And the removal of certain procedural obstacles could help this forum operate more smoothly.

In our view, the further enlargement of the membership of the CD continues to be imperative. The admittance of Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and Tunisia as members last year was a most welcome, but still very small step forward.

We have long held the view that any country wishing to become a member should be admitted. We cannot exclude others from what is frequently referred to as the sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations. If we want to negotiate in the CD with a view to universal application and adherence, we have to open up for universal participation, as we do in other multilateral fora.

The current rules of procedure and working methods have become obstacles to the proper functioning of the conference. Any subsidiary body must be able to work until its task has been accomplished. It is equally difficult to see the justification for the consensus rule across the board. The removal of the consensus rule should be considered, at least for procedural matters. The adoption of the same agenda year after year following protracted negotiations adds to the image of the CD as an institution that is unable to adapt to new realities and matters of real concern.

The Conference is now in its fourth year without having done any substantive work. Multilateral institutions are faced with an increasing scarcity of resources. This is a development Norway regrets – our commitment to multilateralism is strong. Many problems can only be dealt with at the multilateral level, especially as globalisation proceeds.

But all countries will have to consider more and more carefully how resources are spent. This will also apply to the CD. Questions will be asked whether money can be spent more wisely and issues dealt with more efficiently elsewhere.

We are living in a world that is undergoing dramatic changes and where more and more importance is being attached to the way we deal with security issues. Future security will depend on a combination of carefully balanced regional and global initiatives and measures. It will also depend on our continuing international cooperation in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Today the non-proliferation regime is under pressure for several reasons. We must use the forthcoming NPT Review Conference to rededicate ourselves to the commitments of 1995 and to a concrete Programme of Action for the coming years.

We are determined to do our utmost to maintain what we have already achieved. We are looking forward to the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime also as a means towards eventual nuclear disarmament. We are equally committed to making the CD an effective instrument geared to achieving concrete results. To do this we need reforms. Together, we must take these necessary steps if we are to enhance international security and stability.