Historical archive

Weu colloquy on the status of associate members

Historical archive

Published under: Bondevik's 1st Government

Publisher: Utenriksdepartementet

State Secretary Jarle Skjørestad

Weu colloquy on the status of associate members

7 february 2000

Distinguished parliamentarians, ladies and gentlemen,

Let me first thank the Norwegian delegation to the WEU Assembly for inviting me to address such a prominent group of parliamentarians. The topic of this colloquy – "The status of the associate members" – is of great importance for Norway, and for the other five non-EU European allies. I am confident that your discussions will provide important input into the debate on how we can best meet the challenges facing us as we strive to build European security and stability.

Let me begin by saying how important it is for us to be aware of the parliamentary aspects when we consider the future structures of European security and defence. In particular we must satisfy the need for democratic scrutiny. The Assembly of the Western European Union has to a large extent met this need. Norway’s participation in the Assembly is an important aspect of our relations with the WEU. Foreign Minister Vollebæk underlined the importance of the parliamentary dimension at the WEU Council of Ministers in Luxembourg last November. I can assure you that we will work to achieve the best possible solution for the parliamentary dimension in the arrangements for European security and defence that are now being developed.

The point of departure for my introductory remarks today is the fact that there is no longer a danger of a major war in Europe. But it has been replaced by a situation characterised by instability and unpredictability. Former Yugoslavia shows that new solutions are needed in order to meet this new situation.

The security and crisis management arrangements now being developed in the European Union should serve to meet part of this need. But the process puts us all in a new situation. New relationships and modalities for cooperation are being established, between institutions and between individual countries. We are now facing a restructuring of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

Beginning with the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU member states have made a series of important decisions designed to strengthen European security. Last year’s EU summits in Cologne and Helsinki brought this process several steps forward. The development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy entails a long-term expansion of the responsibilities of the EU, and a clear will to bear a substantial share of the burden of our common security.

Norway has welcomed this new momentum from the beginning. In our view it means a strengthening of our joint ability to meet the new security challenges. It also means that Europe has answered the US call for better burden sharing. We wish to be a full-time partner in this endeavour, and we are confident that we can make a substantial contribution.

It is important to bear in mind that we are not talking about a new departure in European security policy. Helsinki marked a stage, though undoubtedly a crucial one, in an effort that has been under way at least since the 1996 NATO ministerial in Berlin. Since that meeting we have had a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic process aimed at developing a European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance, combined with a strengthening of the European crisis management capability through the WEU. In this connection, we have developed in the past five years important and satisfactory arrangements for the participation of all European allies in the WEU.

The decisions taken in Cologne and Helsinki, as well as at the NATO Summit in Washington in April last year, will undoubtedly affect these arrangements. This could have profound implications for Norway, as well as for the other European allies that are not members of the EU. We are therefore pleased that there is broad agreement within NATO and the European Union on how to manage the process.

In the context of the enhanced European crisis management capability, it is important to bear in mind that the associated members of the WEU are in a special position. It is therefore crucial that we work together in order to ensure that our needs are taken into consideration.

In Norway’s view the arrangements being established on the basis of the Helsinki decisions should build on the established cooperation within the WEU. They should encompass all EU members and non-EU European allies. The development of the ESDI within the Alliance and the relations already established between NATO and the WEU, and between the WEU and the EU, will in my opinion facilitate this.

During the last year, Norway has had close and fruitful contacts with the other five non-EU European allies. We have consulted one another and exchanged views on the future arrangements for the six in the security and defence policy and crisis management structures to be developed within the EU. I am pleased that we are generally in agreement on these issues. We intend to stay in close contact with the other five in the crucial time ahead of us.

Turning to the Norwegian scene there is no doubt that the development of the ESDI/ESDP has been an important item on our foreign policy agenda ever since St. Malo. During the past two years we have had close and extensive contacts with EU member states and EU institutions in order to make our views known. As an initial contribution to the process, we presented our ideas to the EU last October. We have continued our dialogue with the EU as a follow-up to Helsinki. Our views can be described as follows:

At the Helsinki summit, the EU took important steps to strengthen European security and defence. Impressive progress has been made over the past few months. We are now witnessing a credible European effort to build a capability to prevent, contain and resolve crises.

Norway strongly supports this effort and stands ready to contribute with both military and non-military resources. Building on our experience of the WEU, we look forward to working closely with the EU member states in the weeks and months ahead in order to refine our contribution.

NATO’s December ministerial showed that there is transatlantic agreement on the need to build a viable ESDP. In our view the results of the Helsinki Summit and the NAC meeting in December illustrate that the two organisations have complementary agendas in pursuit of the same goal: increased security for all, improvement of our overall capability for crisis management and strengthening of transatlantic relations.

Norway has also underlined that Europe needs the effort now being spearheaded by the EU. Our common aim should be to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts before they reach the stage where military means are required. This means improving our joint ability to make rapid decisions and developing a broad set of political, military, humanitarian and economic crisis management measures. To that end we must make full use of all the instruments at our disposal. Close cooperation between the institutions involved and between individual countries is more than ever called for.

In our discussion with the EU we have underlined that Norway is concerned with three issues in this process. They can be summed up as

  • full participation and transparency;
  • maintaining NATO’s central position, including in European crisis management; and
  • improving our joint capability.

Let me begin with participation. All the non-EU European allies possess considerable resources for European crisis management. This should be taken advantage of. But cooperation must not be a one-way street. It is imperative that the six become full-fledged participants in a common process.

On this basis we have welcomed the EU’s decision to set up appropriate structures for dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the European non-EU allies on issues related to European security and defence policy and crisis management.

But, as the foreign ministers of the NATO countries pointed out at their December meeting, it is essential that the consultations are not limited to discussion of ongoing or imminent crises. If the cooperation is to be effective and relevant, the agenda must encompass the whole range of issues relating to European security and defence, including general security challenges, generic planning and preparations for crisis management, and planning and preparation for concrete operations. Norway has underlined that meetings should be held on a regular basis in order to ensure effectiveness and transparency.

An important part of our argument has been the need to ensure satisfactory interaction between the executive and the legislative branches of government. In Norway’s case inclusive and transparent consultation arrangements, as well as involvement in planning and decision-shaping, are needed to meet the constitutional and political requirements connected with deployment of our troops abroad, and to facilitate rapid and relevant decision-making by the national authorities.

Norway has therefore argued that separate structures should be established between the EU and the non-EU European NATO members. These structures should ensure that the views of all European allies are taken into consideration before decisions are taken by the EU member states. Meetings based on such a format should be institutionalised, and should supplement future EU-NATO structures, but be seen as part of the latter framework.

To sum up, in our view it is important that the cooperative structures to be established between the EU and the non-EU European NATO members should have the following features:


a) regular meetings,
b) inclusiveness and genuine dialogue on issues of common concern,
c) joint agenda-setting,

d) a broad security and defence agenda, including crisis management and consultations on general security issues, and
e) military cooperation and consultation that correspond to the political cooperation arrangements.

Norway has argued that these arrangements should be in place from the time when the European Union’s own interim arrangements are implemented. This is the phase in which the modalities for cooperation will be developed. We therefore want to make our voice heard from the beginning.

NATO-EU relations is the second crucial aspect of the process. We have expressed our satisfaction that the Heads of State and Government in Helsinki underlined the need for close links between the Alliance and the European Union. This means full consultation, cooperation and transparency, avoiding unnecessary duplication of resources, and contributing to better burden sharing between Europe and our American allies. Close and regular cooperation should be established at an early stage.

In the light of this, we have argued that the links between the EU and NATO should help to preserve NATO’s continued role in crisis management and an active US involvement in Europe. But through NATO-EU cooperation and through the Defence Capabilities Initiative, the Alliance should also ensure that it provides relevant support to European-led operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.

The NATO-EU arrangements should reinforce our overall capability for crisis management in a cost-effective manner. This means that Norway would like to see a generous NATO offer to the EU. The Union should have ready access to Alliance military resources. Existing Alliance defence planning capabilities and PfP planning capabilities should be adapted and made available to the EU on a regular basis. Modalities should also be developed so that the Alliance's collective assets and capabilities can be transferred to the EU for use in crisis management operations.

Ensuring a more complete integration of the four non-NATO EU members, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland, is a particular challenge. In Norway’s view the current PfP arrangements will not adequately meet their needs. We should therefore draw them more closely into the defence and operational planning in the Alliance. That would be in keeping with our overall aim of the closest possible integration between the two institutions and their individual member states, and ensure that the capabilities of the four are compatible with the crisis management needs we envisage.

An important point for us throughout our contacts with the EU has been that we do not want to participate just for the sake of participating. This brings me to our third main point: the capabilities issue. In our contacts with the EU we have argued that Norway and the other associated states are in a position to contribute substantially towards fulfilling the capability goals established by the EU.

As the Minister of Defence made clear in her intervention this morning, Norway has considerable military experience and resources that can be made available for European crisis management. We are determined to take further steps at the national level to strengthen our military capabilities. And we are committed to supporting European crisis management with the full range of our resources, provided basic political and constitutional requirements for deploying forces and other assets abroad are met.

President Clinton has said that the most expensive peace is far cheaper than the cheapest war. Here I would like to paraphrase him: the most expensive crisis management by non-military means is far cheaper than the cheapest military option. We therefore attach great importance to the non-military aspects of crisis management. Norway has indeed made this a priority issue. Through institutions like the UN and the OSCE, and through the humanitarian organisations, Norwegian men and women are helping to build peace and stability in a number of areas of conflict, including Former Yugoslavia. It is our aim to further develop this capability, and we see great potential in enhanced cooperation with the EU on such issues. We therefore welcome the decision by the Helsinki Summit to establish a coordination mechanism to strengthen the impact of the EU on non-military crisis management.

Police operations are in our view a particularly promising area. Provided we can establish a credible police presence in an area of conflict, we have an option that is far cheaper, more flexible, and potentially less controversial than the use of military assets. Beginning with Angola almost ten years ago, Norwegian police officers and military observers have participated in a number of UN operations. We have also paid particular attention to civilian police training activities and have participated in UN efforts in this regard, particularly in Africa, but also in Asia, Latin America and above all Kosovo.

We intend to develop this capability even further. As an illustration I would like to mention that 15 Norwegian police officers will be joining the armed UN Police Force in Kosovo this month. They will be joined by ten more in June. This is the very first time that Norwegian police officers have participated in armed operations.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about the process ahead. The Portuguese EU Presidency, together with High Representative Solana, is now rapidly proceeding with the work of strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. As you know the interim Political and Security Committee will be in place as of 1 March. Provided there is no need to amend the Amsterdam Treaty, the permanent arrangements could be in place by Christmas. This underscores our own need to stay actively involved.

To that end, we have engaged in a wide range of contacts with the EU, the Presidency and individual member states, beginning with Foreign Minister Vollebæk’s visit to Lisbon early last month. During Prime Minister Bondevik's visit to Lisbon last week, he was presented with the proposals that the Presidency has submitted to the EU Political Committee. I will not og into details about these proposals, but from what we can see both the arrangements for third countries and for EU-NATO relations are positive. I must add, however, that the member states have just started the drafting process. The final outcome remains uncertain. And it will still take time to achieve it.

To sum up:

  • Norway strongly supports the development of European security and defence and stands ready to contribute to the follow up of the Helsinki decisions;
  • We have considerable experience and resources that can be made available for crisis management and want to contribute both to the civil and to the military side of European crisis management, provided this does not violate basic political and constitutional principles;
  • The current participation and consultation arrangements within the WEU should form the point of departure for the process ahead; and
  • There is a need for close institutional links between NATO and the European Union that will avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and contribute to better burden sharing between Europe and our American allies.

Thank you for your attention.