Historical archive

NATO Response Force — A modern and flexible force

Historical archive

Published under: Bondevik's 2nd Government

Publisher: Ministry of Defence

(2 September 2004) One year ago, on 15 October 2003, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was formally inaugurated as an active force. The capabilities of the NRF will be built up gradually through contributions from the land, sea and air forces of member nations, the aim being to reach full operational capability by October 2006. By as early as October this year, the NRF will have a limited operational capability sufficient to allow it to carry out all but the most demanding missions.

NATO Response Force – A modern and flexible force

One year ago, on 15 October 2003, the NATO Response Force (NRF) was formally inaugurated as an active force. The capabilities of the NRF will be built up gradually through contributions from the land, sea and air forces of member nations, the aim being to reach full operational capability by October 2006. By as early as October this year, the NRF will have a limited operational capability sufficient to allow it to carry out all but the most demanding missions.

The decision to set up the NATO Response Force (NRF) was taken during the NATO Summit in Prague in November 2002. The NRF is a far more modern and flexible force than NATO’s earlier rapid reaction forces such as the Allied Mobile Force/Land – AMF/L. The development of the multinational NRF is, at the same time, a catalyst for the transformation of NATO’s capabilities. The NRF is intended as a contribution to NATO’s ability to carry out missions across the whole operational spectrum at very short notice. Norway will participate in the NRF through the contribution of relevant capabilities from all three of the armed services, while the makeup of these force contributions will vary for each six-monthly “stand-by” period for which an NRF contingent will serve.

Flexibility When fully developed, the NRF will have up to 24,000 officers and other ranks drawn from all branches of the armed forces. The force will be multinational in all branches and at all levels and will consist of specially appointed command elements together with land, sea and air force elements from most of the NATO nations. These multinational forces are committed, on a rotating basis, to a six months’ period of joint training and exercising prior to the start of an operational stand-by period. Joint training continues through the stand-by period. This ensures that NATO has a highly flexible, interoperable force which can undertake a range of missions at very short notice.

Missions and rapid response The NRF must be able to participate in all kinds of NATO operations and must be capable of rapid deployment and insertion even in areas where there are hostile forces. At the same time it must be borne in mind that the NRF is a force of limited size. This means that the NRF on its own can only undertake missions of correspondingly limited extent. For more extensive operations, the NRF will serve as an initial entry force that prepares the theatre for follow-on forces. Since every operation is unique, calling for a particular mix of military capabilities, the composition of the NRF will be tailored to match the mission requirements. At the same time, the NRF must be capable of operating alone as an independent force for 30 days without re-supply. In the event of operations of longer duration, the intention is that the NRF will be relieved by larger follow-on forces.

Firstly, the NRF must be capable of performing a wide range of missions on a stand-alone basis. These include:

  • Non-combatant Evacuation Operations involving the evacuation of civil personnel from crisis areas.
  • Support for Consequence Management, for example following an incident involving the use of weapons of mass destruction or in the event of a humanitarian crisis situation.
  • Crisis Response Operations , including peacekeeping.
  • Support for Counter-Terrorism operations.
  • Embargo operations.

Secondly, the NRF must be capable of operations to establish a beachhead, so-called “initial entry” operations, for follow-on forces even in a hostile environment.

Thirdly, the NRF must be capable of deployment and use as a force package to demonstrate the resolve and military capability of member nations in support of diplomacy in the handling of crisis situations.

The NRF will be capable of deployment to carry out such missions both within and outside the NATO area. This means that the NRF will also be available for a rapid response to any crisis situation that might arise in Norway or its surrounding areas.

Rapid reaction The NRF is based on the principle of six-monthly rotation periods and fundamental assumption that member nations will periodically commit themselves to make the force contributions required. Many of the tasks envisaged for the NRF demand a rapid response, which in turn necessitates speedy and effective decision making. The ability to take political decisions quickly will be essential to the maintenance of NATO’s military and political relevance and to the Alliance’s ability to deal effectively with a broad range of crises and conflicts. Each deployment of the NRF requires a consensus among the Alliance’s member nations. This means political endorsement by the governments of all the NATO countries. For Norway, decisions regarding the commitment of force contributions to the NRF are taken by the Government in consultation with the Storting.

The NATO nations are thus under a strong obligation to be able to reach speedy political decisions so that their national contributions can be made available to NATO at short notice. The NRF’s ability to respond rapidly is thus dependent on the political will of the member nations to make this possible. This rapid reaction capability will, at the same time, demonstrate the decisiveness of the Alliance, so helping to pave the way for the timely resolution of what might otherwise be an escalating crisis. Speedy decisions regarding deployment of the NRF may therefore obviate the need to commit larger forces at a later time.

Norwegian contributions
NRF rotations are designated on a continuous basis ahead of each six-monthly period. In the contingents NRF 1 and NRF 2, covering the period from mid-October to the end of 2003 and the first half of 2004, Norway has contributed units from each of the armed services. These include a Military Police squad from the Army, 2 F-16 combat aircraft and one DA-20 electronic surveillance aircraft from the Air Force and those naval vessels currently forming part of NATO’s standing naval forces. In addition, Norway made available a Special Forces unit together with a Ro/Ro ship on national contract.

NRF 3 has completed its initial joint training and is on stand-by during the period from 1 July 2004 to mid-January 2005. Our force contribution to NRF 3 comes largely from the Air Force and consists of one DA-20 and six F-16s. The combat aircraft are operationally integrated with F-16s from four other nations within a framework of European cooperation. The Navy is again committing its warships currently forming part of NATO’s standing naval forces. Norway is also contributing a Special Forces unit.

Norwegian contributions to NRF 4, which will be on stand-by during the first half of 2005, consist mainly of the Army’s rapid reaction force – the Telemark Battalion. The Telemark Battalion will form part of a Netherlands brigade under the command of the 1st German/Netherlands Corps. In addition, the Navy will commit 2-3 ships which will form part of NATO’s standing naval forces during this stand-by period. The Air Force will be contributing one P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft as well as a C-130 Hercules transport.

Essential preparations for NRF 4, including training and exercises, are being conducted during the current half-year in parallel with the stand-by activities for NRF 3. These preparations are required by NATO in order to ensure that national contingents are as well prepared as possible for an eventual deployment at short notice at some point during the stand-by period. Over the six months’ training period and the subsequent period at stand-by, our NRF force contributions will maintain a very high level of activity focused wholly on their participation in the NRF.

The importance of the NRF NATO is currently in the process of putting together force packages for NRF 5 and NRF 6. These two six‑month rotations will together cover the year from summer 2005 to summer 2006. The majority of the NATO nations will contribute elements from their armed forces so that the principle of multinationality can be maintained as far as possible. The development of the NRF concept is also a catalyst for the continuing process of transformation in NATO. This covers both military capabilities and NATO’s decision making processes. The Alliance is undergoing far-reaching restructuring and makes use of the NRF as an important element in its organisational development and experimentation. The rotation pattern for the NRF will itself help to ensure that all the NATO nations play a part in this restructuring.

Norway plans to contribute to each rotation by committing force elements of varying sizes for each six-month period. This contributions will be considered in the context of the other forces that we may at any time be planning to deploy for participation in ongoing operations abroad. Similarly, our contribution of military capabilities to these international operations abroad must take account of our participation in the NRF. Both these activities represent significant contributions to collective security.

If NATO, thus including Norway, decides that the NRF, either in whole or in part, should be used in an operation, we will in practice be obliged to participate with our NRF force contributions. If the allied nations were not to honour their respective NRF commitments, this would seriously compromise NATO’s ability to react quickly if a crisis should arise and, in the worst case, could render the NRF incapable of performing some of its missions. Since the NRF is intended primarily as a crisis management force, and since it is not possible to foresee when or where such crises may arise, special provision must be made for supplementary funding to cover the cost of Norwegian participation in any NRF deployment.