What Europe Wants from NATO

Kristin Krohn Devold

Minister of Defence

Norway

Speech given at the conference Prague 2002: Challenge and Change for NATO. Brussels, 3 October 2002

Conference organized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and hosted by the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund of the United States

Ladies and gentlemen,

The Prague Summit will be a defining moment for the Alliance. It must succeed. And in order to succeed we need an open discussion of all issues – even the controversial ones. Only if we now discuss freely will we in Prague be able to act decisively.

I am grateful to the hosts of this conference, NATO and the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall fund of the United States, for bringing us all together. Let us use this occasion to take another step towards a successful Summit meeting.

What Europe wants from NATO – that is the title I have been given. And I will try to give an answer. It will not be a comprehensive one, since there is no single European approach to some of the key questions we have to face.

My preference would be to avoid altogether setting out European views as opposed to North American – or U.S. – thinking. My basic instinct tells me that the Alliance can only remain effective when we hammer out shared objectives across the Atlantic.

There are – and will no doubt be – policy differences on specific problems and conflicts – across the Atlantic and on both sides of the Atlantic for that matter. But the basic purpose remains; the Alliance is there to maintain peace and stability – to protect the democratic institutions of our societies and the rights of our citizens.

The record of the Alliance is impressive. It has served us well – all of us. To declare it irrelevant at this critical juncture would be a tremendous mistake. To neglect the urgent needs for reform would be equally dangerous.

The dramatic events of September 11 ^th> last year confirmed how important our shared values are. And they underscored a new kind of shared vulnerability.

For half a century we faced the threat of the communist block and its military might. It was a threat we shared, although some of us were closer to the "wall" and to the "front -line" than others. Some even felt more vulnerable than others.

Today, there is no "wall". There are no "front lines". We work and live in a truly global century. The opportunities are unprecedented. But so are the risks. Oceans, borders or walls are no protection in a global world. We share the sense of vulnerability perhaps even more than before.

And it is more than a sense, more than a general unease. The "unthinkable" has happened and the danger that it could happen again has become part of our everyday lives. The security of our citizens, society, and institutions has once more come to the forefront. And it needs clear political answers.

"Homeland security" is one term for this, "societal security" is another. In short, we must make use of many and different political, diplomatic, legal, economic, and military means to protect ourselves.

We do possess many of the tools we need. Our collective security, however, must be protected together, through joint, co-ordinated and decisive action. In this respect, nothing even comes close to the usefulness of this Alliance. But it needs to be modernised and adapted.

To modernise and adapt has never been easy. In that respect we carry some hard-won lessons with us from the past.

We were horrified when the wall came up – and surprised when it came down. We were shocked when our vision of a new peace in Europe was shattered in the Balkans. And we were terrified when the collapse of the twin towers told us that we had all entered an era in which we are facing different and more obscure dangers.

Non-state actors, even when they are supported by governments behind the scene, tend to be invisible before they hit. And even if terrorists hide in caves in distant mountain areas, they have learned to make use of the technologies of a globalised society.

To respond and defend ourselves, we need new tools and capabilities. We need new operational concepts and new patterns of co-operation.

Some years ago, Paul Kennedy wrote about The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. He could have added "great alliances" to the title. We must make sure that NATO does not become a topic for a revised version of his book. The challenge is clear: the relevance of NATO cannot be taken for granted.

The problem lies in the ultimate dilemma that all our experience is about the past and all our decisions about the future. But we must succeed in doing what is necessary to underpin NATO’s continued relevance.

Let me revert to the title: What does Europe want from NATO? Obviously a lot, as the applications for membership illustrate.

Soon a majority of European states may be members of NATO. They will want reassurance that their security has been strengthened. They will want a clear sense of ownership and participation. And the Alliance has to deliver.

At the same time, we will all suffer if we do not maintain the resilience of the Alliance, in political consultations and in military capabilities and structures. We are about to enlarge at the same time as we are facing fundamentally new threats.

That is a tremendous challenge. We must speed up the transformation of the Alliance at the same time as we bring new countries on board. The new members must "hit the ground running" and contribute to maintaining the Alliance from the very outset.

It is, therefore, extremely important that we now fully support your efforts, Mr. Secretary General, to streamline our working methods and to modernise our military capabilities. You have presented us with a roadmap, which reflects the new and evolving security landscape surrounding us.

We need this roadmap. As Mark Twain put it: "If you don’t know where to go, history will take you there".

In this context, Lord Robertson’s efforts to improve NATO’s decision-making and to modernise its headquarters are not trivial issues. These are much-needed reforms and a major building block in our search for a more effective and enlarged Alliance. And in contrast to other reforms, the costs are low.

To address the European perspective of the Alliance is not simply a question of what Europe wants. It is just as much a question of what Europe can offer. Our input will largely determine which output we can expect – politically and militarily. And here we are at a crucial juncture.

Clearly, we – the Europeans – should do more. The current military capability and technology gaps across the Atlantic may shred the very fabric of transatlantic relations unless they are rectified. There is no question about it: Europe lags seriously behind in military modernisation and transformation.

As Minister of Defence I can therefore only agree with the Secretary General’s insistence on the urgent need to improve our military capabilities and to modernise our forces and command structures.

We need deployable forces that are committed to and available to NATO on short notice. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s proposal for a NATO Response Force is very constructive in that respect. I support this proposal. It is important to integrate a capability of this kind within the multinational framework of the Alliance. Concrete decisions should be made in Prague.

But combat capability in itself is not enough. We need the means to ensure that our forces can be deployed where and when needed and that they can be sustained. Consequently, strategic transport, air-to-air refuelling, and logistics are critical shortcomings to be covered.

Yet another important shortfall is linked to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence of all deployable forces committed to NATO.

Without the required military capabilities, the relevance of the Alliance will suffer in every respect. We must acquire much needed military assets and capabilities we do not currently possess. Keywords for this required transformation are readiness, deployability, flexibility, and interoperability. And the capabilities we acquire must be fully up to date.

Such change imposes the need for a genuine two-way street across the Atlantic. Military modernisation and transformation in Europe cannot take place in the short term unless the United States is prepared to share information, technology, experimental concepts, and other know-how with the Europeans.

Furthermore, European willingness to buy American technology and products must be reciprocated by an American willingness to buy military products in Europe, in fields where the Europeans are competitive. A multilateral approach from the United States in this field may, in my opinion, be conducive to improved burden-sharing across the board.

There are two basic ways in which Europe may be able to make a stronger contribution to the Alliance. The first relates to defence budgets and the need to re-direct the current use of resources, away from the defence structures inherited from the Cold War and towards investments in modernisation and transformation.

The second relates to the potentials for increased cost-efficiency through multilateral co-operation and joint or common funding. Both tracks are needed. They complement each other.

The current economic prospects do not invite great optimism as far as increased defence budgets are concerned. On the other hand, what would be the economic prospects if our security were seriously at stake? Our first experience from the 21 ^st> century confirms that security will not be for free.

Europe cannot ignore the need for stable defence spending, at a level which allows us to acquire capabilities that we do not currently possess.

I realise that convincing our publics may not be easy. Today, the threat cannot be measured in such concrete terms as tanks, bombers, missiles and divisions. For example, the need to establish a proper cyber-defence is obvious and urgent. Nevertheless, it is harder to sell.

Increased multilateral co-operation represents a very relevant and promising strategy to get more defence for the same amount of money. Such co-operation has increased in Europe in recent years, and rightly so. However, transatlantic co-operation in this field should have a prominent role as well.

A major objective behind all multilateral co-operation, regardless of the number of participants or the political framework, should be to acquire military capabilities that NATO needs and asks for. This reflects the prime role of our common defence planning.

Within Europe, there is no reason why EU and NATO military shortfalls and priorities should be handled separately. On the contrary, they should be harmonised and rectified simultaneously.

I sincerely hope that the EU will agree on the Nice Implementation Package without further delay and that close and continuous co-operation and co-ordination between NATO and the EU will take place as soon as possible.

Reinforced multilateral co-operation is a must if we are to meet the challenges of advances in technology, rising costs of defence equipment, added requirements for the full range of Alliance operations, and the military capability gap between the United States and the European Allies. This means more Alliance defence co-operation and more joint or common funding.

There is, however, a need to go even further. A larger degree of specialisation and division of labour may be necessary, especially in order to accommodate the constraints of smaller and new members that are linked to size.

For example, Norway as a nation of 4.5 million inhabitants is unable to provide large-scale military capabilities. Instead, the focus will be on smaller high-quality capacities that may be integrated into larger multinational structures in a meaningful way.

NATO should facilitate the establishment of specialised military capabilities which smaller and new members may offer to the Alliance, each one on the basis of own expertise and established comparative advantages. Specialised military capabilities may cover all types of forces.

For the Alliance, the aim should be to identify the various specialised military capabilities needed, as part of flexible multinational force-packages for different kinds of operations. Such pre-planned force-packages should also provide the framework for training and exercises, operational planning, and procedures to ensure sufficient operational readiness and interoperability.

Another track that smaller and new Allies may pursue is linking up with one or more bigger strategic partners. This may make it possible for them to plug their forces into larger military units in a more integrated way than force pooling.

In addition to the tracks that I have just outlined, common funding and commonly owned and operated systems such as the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System should all be pursued, where they make military and economic sense.

The military forces of the Alliance should to some degree resemble a palette, from which the North Atlantic Council and NATO’s Military Authorities may mix colours according to the picture they want to paint.

Directly linked to the need for modern and adequate military capabilities, is the importance of an efficient and streamlined integrated military structure, including a militarily and politically viable command structure. Together with our common defence planning, NATO’s integrated military structure provides the glue that keeps the Alliance together as a collective military actor.

To sustain and modernise this structure we must be willing to finance it, through sufficient common funding. In terms of cost-efficiency, we hardly can make any better investment. The alternative is the re-nationalisation of defence policies and a reduced collective capacity to act.

The need to streamline NATO’s command arrangements in order to make them more suitable for tomorrow’s security challenges and tasks is crucial in that respect. I am pleased to note that this important work is already under way.

We have to keep up the momentum. But as important as speed is getting it right. The future NATO Command structure must reflect the whole spectrum of NATO priorities and missions, including both operational and non-operational tasks.

The new command structure must respond to new threats, including terrorism, preserve the transatlantic link, and ensure the cohesion of the Alliance. Focus should not only be on reducing the number of headquarters, but rather on the total number of personnel and resources. I believe that much fat can be trimmed from the current large headquarters in Europe.

Our new command structure should also focus on transformation and interoperability. The Joint Forces Command must be a catalyst for transformation also in Europe.

I believe a decentralised solution with smaller, more streamlined and focussed joint headquarters will be more cost-effective than large headquarters with too many tasks. This further serves to retain NATO’s geographical expertise and focus and ultimately serves as a guarantee against a re-nationalisation of defence policies.

We must demonstrate a readiness to make active use of the Alliance and its assets. Obviously, NATO is not the answer to all problems under all circumstances. For example, the fact that NATO is not running Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is not in itself a sign of NATO’s reduced relevance.

On the contrary, without the military interoperability that NATO has established among a great number of nations, a multinational military operation like Enduring Freedom would hardly be feasible. That said, NATO could and should be put to more direct use in our common war against international terrorism – even if limited to a supporting role.

Finally, Europe must act and be perceived as a crediblepartner for the United States in the field of security. There must be an equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities.

To a large extent, that will depend on our ability to modernise and adapt our capabilities and force structures. But sharing the risks and burdens will also depend on an open and inclusive decision-making process.

Consulting with Allies may sometimes be perceived as a burden. But short-term frustrations – however important they may seem – must not risk to jeopardise long-term partnerships. As Winston Churchill is supposed to have said: " The only thing that is worse than having to deal with Allies, is having no Allies to deal with".

Of course, we are – as allies – different in so many ways, in size, population, financial resources, and – not least – military power. Nevertheless, NATO is an Alliance of equals. It is on this basis that our decision-making process and our concept of mutual solidarity rest.

The Alliance is a means for new members to become part of a growing area of stability in Europe and to assume their share of the responsibility to promote international peace and security.

In a sense, this is no different than it has always been for the smaller member states, even those smaller Allies who where – in the words of Dean Acheson – " Present at the Creation" in 1949. The overall objective is to improve one’s own security and the Alliance’s overall security while, at the same time, promoting international peace and security in general.

The achievements of the past few years are impressive. Through enlargement and partnership, through dialogue, co-operation, and peace support operations, NATO has extended its stabilising role in and beyond Europe.

Through NATO, smaller countries have been able to give their invaluable contributions within a flexible pattern of co-operation, based on Alliance structures. NATO has taken the lead in protecting human rights and enforcing respect for international law.

We must now build on this success. Our efforts must be widened, to include a more vigorous fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

For obvious reasons, smaller states cannot muster the same amount of resources or military capabilities that the larger states can bring on the line. And there is no question about it: this makes a huge difference.

But it is easy to be blinded by big numbers. They do not tell the entire story. Smaller states frequently carry a proportionally larger share of the burden than larger countries do. NATO’s operations on the Balkans illustrate this fact.

Here, the contributions of smaller states have made and continue to make a real difference on the ground. But such contributions depend on a sense of political involvement – as members of the Alliance or as partners.

This brings me back to the decision-making process. It must be inclusive. It must be transparent. If there is insufficient inclusiveness and transparency, then our ability to contribute – to reach agreements among ourselves, to convince our parliaments and publics – will inevitably suffer.

To sum up, in the Alliance political resilience must go hand in hand with military ability.

I feel compelled to stress this point very clearly. None can be taken for granted. If smaller Allies are left out they may decide to stay out. The result could easily be lower international legitimacy and reduced political solidarity.

Consensus remains at the core of NATO’s decisions and forms part of its strength. However, it requires both flexibility and pragmatism.

Short-term frustrations and disagreements – regardless of how important the topic may be – must not overshadow the tremendous long-term benefits of keeping our Alliance together and in good shape.

This year has seen the establishment of another historic forum, the NATO-Russia Council. The first months of work have been promising. In Warsaw we also had an opportunity for a broad and informal discussion with the Russian Defence Minister, Sergej Ivanov. To me, that discussion confirmed the usefulness and value of the NRC. We face an important challenge in keeping up the momentum.

In parallel, work within the EAPC and Partnership for Peace program continues. With a number of partners soon joining the Alliance as members, we face new challenges also within these frameworks.

We must demonstrate the imagination and courage required to ensure that these forums remain useful and preferably are seen as even more relevant than before – to the remaining partners as well as to the Alliance. We must make additional efforts to address the specific concerns of each partner.

But – and this is important to me, strengthening our ties with Russia and with partners must not lead us to loosen the ties within the Alliance. If that were to be the result, then our ability to maintain and enhance our usefulness – in situations where the Alliance is needed – would suffer. And the transatlantic ties would become weaker.

So all these processes must go hand in hand – improving the ability of the Alliance to meet new risks, strengthening our ties with Russia and reinforcing our relationship with partners.

There is a new and stronger sense of togetherness – especially after the tragic events of September 11 ^th> last year. I cannot underline strongly enough how important it is to maintain this togetherness, to expand it, make it more solid.

Ad hoc coalitions must – whenever possible – be turned into lasting partnerships. That will require a lot – in time, energy and understanding of our mutual and individual concerns.

We must use the present possibilities to galvanise the international community so that we can address new risks together. If we do not have the stamina and wisdom required to do that job, then we risk creating frustration, disappointment, unfinished work and, consequently, a fertile ground for more trouble.

To sum up, I need not repeat that without the Alliance, European security would suffer tremendously. Europe must proceed in its own efforts. That makes perfect sense. But for as far as we can see today, this transatlantic partnership is an indispensable part of our security policy. Yes, the Cold War is behind us. Yes, we are developing a new strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. But the Alliance remains a vital tool if we are to address new risks successfully.

Equally important, the security of the United States and North America is well served by a firm and strong transatlantic Alliance. Winston Churchill’s observation remains valid. Having to deal with Allies is far better than the alternative.

Even for the greatest, most powerful country, conventional concepts of sovereignty are dangerous and self-deluding. This is a particular challenge to the United States. The U.S. has felt the erosion of traditional concepts of sovereignty less than any other state. At the same time, the U.S. remains indispensable for the maintenance of existing alliances – and for the construction of new ones.

Some on the other side of the Atlantic are tempted to consider unilateral action or case-by-case coalitions as more useful than a well-established alliance. Some in Europe are tempted to see transatlantic initiatives as potentially harmful to European ambitions.

Both are wrong. It would be quite a paradox if such tendencies were to prevail and make the Atlantic wider, at a time when acts of terrorism have demonstrated that geographic distances have become almost irrelevant. To make sure that we do not drift apart, we must address a number of urgent requirements now.

Nor can there be security in Europe and North America without a sufficient level of security and stability in the Middle East, Central Asia, Africa and the Far East. Security is not a precious pearl that may be kept untainted from external forces.

We must be ready to provide our contribution to building international peace and security, and to restore it in case of need. NATO cannot respond automatically, of course. The Alliance will make its decisions on a case by case basis – in close co-operation with other international organisations.

We must all resist the temptation of declaring the Alliance irrelevant. It is dangerous and serves no useful purpose. What we need is the opposite – reassurance that the Alliance remains vital to all of us. The United States carries a special responsibility when it comes to giving this message, loud and clear.

But we must also act to ensure that the Alliance does not become irrelevant. And in that respect the most crucial issue is what Europe can contribute to the transatlantic partnership, what relevant assets we are able to produce.

We all have an important job to do. We must reassure each other. There are reasons for concern but not for despair. As Mark Twain once said: "Fortunately, most of my worries never came true".

I am confident that after Prague we will say the same. Of course, at the Prague Summit we must all be eloquent. But the best eloquence is the one that gets things done. And that is the eloquence we need.

Thank you for your attention.