President Putin came to the Bundestag last September and expressed his clear will both to join the international anti-terrorism effort and to cooperate more closely with the West. This historic visit to Germany underlined the importance he attaches to the special relationship between Russia and Germany. This fall president Putin will also visit Norway. That could be seen as recognition of the special nature of the relationship between Russia and Norway, too.

Norway and Germany share a special awareness of the importance of working actively to integrate Russia into Euro-Atlantic structures. Hence, it is important for us Norwegians to exchange views and compare notes on our respective Russia policies, which are broadly similar and pursue the same basic objectives.

Russia’s historic realignment with the US and the West in general, of course did not begin on 11 September. But that fateful day certainly created new opportunities for accelerating and consolidating the process of realignment. Clearly, president Putin has seen that broad co-operation with the West is the best way for Russia to attain stability and prosperity. And from the point of view of the West, Russia is an indispensable partner in the development of a new global security regime. Russia’s new strategic partnership with US and NATO has far-reaching implications, particularly in the context of the fight against international terrorism and efforts at halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The establishment of the NATO-Russia council represents quantum leap forward in the relations between Russia and the West. But merely setting up the Council is the easy part of the challenge. The hard part is making it work. It is imperative that we see tangible results as quickly as possible. From our perspective, areas such as search and rescue at sea, civil emergency and military-to-military co-operation, as well as nuclear safety and non-proliferation, seem particularly promising.

Clearly there remains significant pockets of deep skepticism towards this policy realignment on the part of traditional-minded elements in Russian officialdom and political circles.

Hence, the achievement of quick results is crucial for at least two reasons. First, in order to ensure that NCR does not suffer the same fate as its predecessor. The Partnership Joint Council quickly ran out of steam because of a lack of political support and drive, on the part of Allies as well as Russia. Second, quick results are needed in order to convince those opposed to or sceptical about President Putin’s western-oriented policies that there is something in it for Russia. And of course, quick results in areas of significance could also serve as a counter-balance to lingering resentments as regards NATO enlargement.

Making the NRC work is of course a joint responsibility of NATO member states and Russia.

The EU will continue to play a key role in future development of Russia. The Union has at its disposal a broad set of instruments for engaging Russia. Norway supports the EU’s Northern Dimension. There are significant synergies to be derived from programs and projects pursued, respectively, in the context of the Northern Dimension and the Barents and Baltic frameworks for co-operation. We hope that the awareness of the importance of the Northern Dimension will grow inside the EU. It should not remain a priority of the Nordic members only.

The bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia is generally good. But it is a complex, at times uneasy and awkward relationship which has undergone significant change over the last ten years. During the Cold War the border was essentially closed and contacts limited to the official level. Now there are rapidly expanding contacts at all levels. The rise in people-to-people contacts has been particularly impressive.

The strengthened ties between Russia and NATO and the US have created opportunities for Norway and Russia to further develop and consolidate their bilateral relationship. The Norwegian Government is determined to seize these opportunities. It is not necessarily a simple or straight forward task, however. Russia protects and promotes its national interests, of course. But what we on the Norwegian side see as win-win situations based on shared interests, the Russians often appear to see as zero-sum games.

And until recently the general improvement in Russia’s relationship with the US and other Western countries was not as clearly visible in the bilateral relationship with Norway. Russia appeared to pursue a more assertive policy towards Norway than towards other Western countries. Especially after 11 September there has been a notable change, particularly in contacts at political level. Even though the atmospherics have improved, however, on some issues positions and interests still diverge.

The archipelago of Svalbard is a case in point. According to the Svalbard treaty of 1925, the archipelago is under Norwegian sovereignty, subject to two conditions. First, that nationals of other parties to the Treaty are entitled to equal access to the archipelago and to carry out certain activities there. And second, that Norway may not use the islands for military purposes or establish military bases there. With these caveats, Norway has sole responsibility for administering the archipelago and for introducing legislation equally applicable to all treaty partners.

In order to preserve the unique, but extremely vulnerable Arctic environment, Norway recently introduced an Environmental Protection Act for Svalbard. This was met with objections from Moscow. The Act was apparently seen as directed against legitimate Russian mining interests. This, however, is a misperception. Norway welcomes Russian presence and activities on the archipelago, just as we welcome the presence and activities of other parties to the Treaty.

But preserving the environment is crucial to Norwegian authorities. To that end, the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act must be implemented. But there is no reason why that should be incompatible with environmentally friendly mining activities.

Yet another example of divergent points of view is the issue of Norwegian and allied military activities in our northern-most county of Finnmark.

During the cold war, Norway maintained self-imposed restrictions on military activities in the areas closest to the Russian border. In recent years, these restrictions have been relaxed to allow low-scale training activities, sometimes involving allied and other non-Norwegian forces.

These adjustments must be seen in the context of normalisation. Many of the training activities are conducted in the PfP framework, with Russia as a much wanted and welcome participant. The aim is to improve our ability to conduct joint peace operations such as those in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The Russian criticism of the relaxation of cold war restrictions is thus hard to understand. We hope co-operation in the context of the new NATO-Russia Council will help remove such misperceptions. Norway will pursue strengthened military-to-military co-operation with Russia within this framework as well as bilaterally.

A third example of diverging interests is the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Barents Seas, which Norway and Russia have been discussing for more than 30 years. The disputed area between the Russian and the Norwegian positions amounts to some 170 000 km ²>.

The Norwegian position is legally well founded, in the law of the sea and in international case law. The slow pace of negotiations is clearly related to the sensitivities and concerns of the Russian security establishment. Over these 30 years considerable progress has nonetheless been achieved. As of now provisional agreement on about 80% of the line of delimitation has been achieved. But the remaining portion is the most sensitive one to the Russian side. And nothing is of course agreed until everything is agreed. Progress, if not a final breakthrough, before president Putin’s November visit would obviously be welcome. But while early agreement would be good, the essential thing is to reach a good agreement. Artificial deadlines must be avoided.

On occasion there have been Russian suggestions of linking shelf delimitation to other issues, such as Svalbard and military issues. This is not a viable option from the Norwegian point of view. Artificial linkages to other bilateral issues will not further the search for a mutually agreed solution.

My fourth example of diverging positions is the issue of joint management of living marine resources. The Barents Sea is home to some of the most valuable and plentiful marine resources in the world. Fish stocks do not respect national boundaries. It is of the utmost importance to ensure long-term sustainability, through responsible management conducted jointly by Norway and Russia. Historically, and from an overall point of view, the bilateral co-operation in this sphere has worked quite well. However, in recent years it has become rather more difficult in some respects.

One aspect is the joint setting of catch quotas. Short-term economic interests can to some extent explain – but not justify – Russian pressure for quotas in excess of scientific recommendations. It sometimes seems to us that Norwegian argumentation based on long-term sustainability concerns is perceived as a camouflaged attempt to minimise the piece of the cake to be enjoyed by Russian actors.

This apparent suspiciousness is even more striking when it comes to co-operation on fisheries research, an activity which is vital for obtaining a reliable basis for the management of fish stocks. In the past few years, obstacles to Norwegian research expeditions in Russian waters have actually increased, with ever more restrictions and conditions introduced. Corresponding Russian activity in Norwegian waters is not subject to similar restrictions. In a sector where Norway and Russia in our view have substantial shared interests, this sort of situation is regrettable.

But problems such as these really are exceptions from the rule. As already noted, by and large the bilateral relationship is a sound one.

A fundamental achievement in itself is the proliferation of channels and contacts. From the exclusive capital-to-capital relationship of the cold war era, we have progressed to a situation where virtually every Norwegian ministry and scores of government agencies have established direct contacts with their Russian counterparts. The same trend can be seen in the world of business.

Perhaps even more remarkable is the network of contacts and co-operation that has been established at the regional and local levels, between neighbouring regions in the north – and between local government agencies, business enterprises, schools and NGOs. These are very much grassroots-level, people-to-people contacts. As a result, our Consulate General in Murmansk has become our no. 1 foreign mission in terms of the number of visas issued. Only ten years ago, this would have seemed unthinkable.

Next January we will be celebrating the 10 year anniversary of the Barents Co-operation, a concept launched by then Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. It was a pioneering endeavour. The aim was to engage the northernmost regions of Norway, Sweden and Finland in direct co-operation with their neighbours in north-western Russia on a wide range of issues – the environment, energy, health care, education, and indigenous peoples, to name a few. While the pace of progress has certainly varied from area to area, few would dispute that important results have indeed been achieved. We are determined to carry on this undertaking, with a distinct and continuing emphasis on people-to-people contacts.

Nuclear safety is a particular concern from the Norwegian point of view. The Cold War left us with the heaviest concentration of nuclear installations in the world right on our doorstep. More than 300 nuclear reactors are located in north-western Russia. The great bulk of them are in submarines. Together with the reactors of the Kola nuclear power plant, they represent a huge risk in terms of radioactive contamination. The same must be said of a number of facilities involved in the handling of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

The Nunn-Lugar programme for nuclear strategic submarine dismantlement has been very important to Norway, both from a security point of view and from an environmental perspective. It would be good if the programme could be extended to include general purpose submarines, including attack submarines and vessels on which cruise missiles have been deployed.

It should be emphasized that spent fuel from decommissioned naval vesels and other radioactive waste vessels could represent a proliferation hazard too. If it were to come into the hands of terrorists it could, for example, be used to produce crude but deadly radiation weapons such as "dirty bombs". Director-General Harbitz will say more about these issues in a moment.

Energy is one area in which Norway and Russia clearly have competing interests as suppliers to the European market. Yet on certain issues also in this area our interests converge, for example in regards EU liberalization of energy markets. We anticipate an intensified dialogue on energy with Russia in the future. Professor Austvik will offer a closer assessment of the oil and gas sector in a few moments.

In conclusion, let me go back to where I started. While the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia is complex and at times uneasy, on the whole it is a good and strong relationship. The areas of shared interest by far outnumber those where interests differ and problems occur. But there is a certain dualism in the Russian policy towards Norway. On the one hand there is cooperation and forthcomingness. On the other hand there is still suspicion and assertiveness. Old thinking clearly co-exists with new thinking. This is the challenge. We must respond to it with firmness, openness, and predictability.

Thank you for your attention. I’m sure the presentations of Mr. Harbitz and professor Austvik will stimulate our discussion over dinner.