State Secretary Kim Traavik

Wilton Park Conference

Oslo, 12 May 2003

A European Agenda for the Western Balkans

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by welcoming all of you to Oslo and this Wilton Park Conference on "The Western Balkans and the New Europe", which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is delighted to sponsor. I am particularly pleased to see so many eminent representatives of the countries of South-eastern Europe in attendance.

This conference provides follow-up to the one held at Wilton Park last October and a timely opportunity to focus attention on the Western Balkans.

Of late, the region has to some extent been the subject of "benign neglect", to steal a phrase from the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. International attention has shifted, from the Western Balkans to Afghanistan and other frontlines of the fight against terrorism, and more recently to Iraq.

This is not necessarily an entirely bad thing. The lack of interest can also be seen as a measure of progress. The Western Balkans is no longer perceived as a primary concern. Had it been, international attention would not have strayed.

Yet recent developments, within the region and beyond, have shown that now is not the time to lose interest in the region.

Real gains have indisputably been made. There are democratically elected governments in all the countries of the region. Respect for human and minority rights is improving. Refugees continue to return in significant numbers. Relations between neighbouring states on the whole are better than ever.

But the job is not yet done. The progress that has been made is real but precarious. Major political issues remain unsolved. There is still ethnic tension and weak institutions. There is organised crime and trafficking - in human beings, drugs, and arms. There is economic stagnation and decline. In parts of the region, security is tenuous at best.

The disaffection and lack of trust in the political systems that can be seen in the outcomes of several elections across the region last year is a sobering indication that the body politic of the societies concerned is not yet a healthy one.

So we in the international community must continue to support reform across the region. We must continue to support the consolidation of the rule of law. We must continue to support the building of robust democratic institutions. And we must continue to support the sort of economic development that can give men and women the hope of a better future .

But the role of the international community is limited. We can only support and provide incentives for necessary reform. At the end of the day, the future destiny of the countries of the region obviously rests with their own leaders, and with the peoples themselves.

In spite of the weakened international attention, the Western Balkans continue to receive considerable outside assistance. But economic aid, too, is clearly tapering off. That is understandable.

The international community is facing pressing political and financial challenges elsewhere. Against this backdrop, and in light of the undeniable political and economic progress in the region, international engagement in the Western Balkans is being scaled down. In the long term, financial assistance of the magnitude that has been flowing to the region in recent years is neither sustainable nor desirable.

In short, policies are being adapted to changing political realities. This is as it should be. Yet the international community must not scale down too fast. The process of scaling down financial support must be gradual and predictable. There must be no sudden disruptions that risk undermining the political and economic gains that have been made. Getting this balance right is a fundamental challenge at the present juncture.

For all their differences, the countries of the Western Balkans share one overriding political goal. They all aspire to integration in the Euro-Atlantic community. And they all recognise that if this aspiration is to be turned into reality, comprehensive, far-reaching and often painful reform will be required. There is a wide-spread perception – both inside and outside the region - that the pace of reform is too slow. There is much truth to that.

Let us not forget, however, the magnitude and complexity of the task facing the countries of the region. Moving from one-party, socialist command economies to pluralist market economies is in itself an enormous challenge. And added to this there are the disruptions and devastation caused by a decade of armed conflict and civil strife.

As a result, the region is struggling to both redefine and reassert the role and integrity of the state.

A vital aspect of that struggle is the reform of governmental and judicial structures, including the reassertion of law and order. These are tasks that can only be achieved through political perseverance and broad public support. Reform cannot be imposed from outside. It must come from within the societies of each country.

The pain of reform naturally carries political risks. The leaders of the region must convince their electorates of both the responsiveness and the responsibility of the democratic political process.

But in addition, the Euro-Atlantic community must , through political and financial support, help provide a perspective of hope and improvement for the future. There must be a feeling on the part of the peoples of the region that they are not left to their own devices. The Western Balkans are part of Europe, geographically and psychologically.

While the pace of reform may vary from country to country, they are on the same track. Each country must be considered on its own terms and within the context of its particular circumstances. Obviously, regional cooperation is essential, but it is up to the individual countries to implement the reforms necessary for closer cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic community.

The necessity - as well as the dangers - of reform were dramatically and tragically illustrated by the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic.

The purpose of this cowardly act clearly was derailing the transition of Serbia to the mainstream of political, social and economic cooperation in Europe. It was a last-ditch attempt on the part of the shadowy network of criminals, security forces, businessmen and reactionary politicians that had been the backbone of the Milosevic regime to roll back the process of democratic reform.

If so, it was a failure and a miscalculation. The widespread revulsion and anger that the assassination of Zoran Djindjic caused in Serbia and in other countries of the region clearly has buttressed support for the reform agenda. This tragic event has made it clearer for the man and woman in the street what is at stake. And it has unmasked the anti-reformist, reactionary forces and demonstrated the extremes to which they are prepared to go to further their objectives.

This tragic event should be a wake-up call for the international community as well. We must remain engaged. We must continue to pay attention. And, it seems to me, we must above all pay attention to the inter-linked problems of security sector reform and the fight against organised crime.

Deep and comprehensive reform of the armed forces, police, and security services is a sine qua non if we are to secure stability and prosperity, not only in the case of Serbia. Prime Minister Zivkovic, Defence Minister Tadic and others are clearly fully committed to this. They need our support.

We for our part are working closely with the Serbian authorities on police reform. And we are currently looking into how we can support reform of the armed forces. So are others. But we need to step up our efforts, in Serbia and Montenegro and elsewhere in the region. Clearly, NATO has a key role to play in this regard.

The Partnership for Peace – PfP – will be an essential instrument in this regard. The various partnership programs have contributed in fundamental ways to the democratic transition of countries aspiring to closer ties with the Alliance, in the process providing the citizens of the countries with an entirely new sense of security. Above all these programs are predicated on the basic principle of democratic control of armed forces.

We for our part will continue to argue in favour of bringing the countries of the Western Balkans as close as possible to NATO, as quickly as possible, by way of the PfP and the EAPC. Hence we are pleased that the Alliance has decided to strengthen its cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro in the area of security sector reform , as a crucial step on the way to PfP membership. The Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe, too, could be useful in the area of security sector reform.

The need to shore up the rule of law is equally pressing. The advance of organised crime must be stopped. It has a corrosive effect not only on the countries of the region, but eventually also on the societies of Western Europe. Stemming the flow of drugs and small arms and providing a secure environment is a precondition for a positive development in other sectors. The unholy alliances between the crime networks and security services must be broken up. Drying out the swamp of terrorism will not be possible unless we manage to control the organised crime that provides its life-blood.

In these as in so many other areas, there are shared interests between the Euro-Atlantic community and the countries of the Western Balkans. Hence, it is essential that the latter are brought closer to and eventually are integrated into in our co-operative structures.

Inclusiveness and active engagement should be our guiding principles in this regard. Naturally, there can be no question of a "free ride". The reform agenda must be pushed forward with determination.

The enlargement of the European Union and the parallel enlargement of NATO are changing the political map of Europe. Next spring Slovenia, itself a former republic in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, will join the Alliance as well as the EU.

And enlargement is not a closed book. At last year’s Copenhagen Summit, the EU confirmed its willingness to admit Romania and Bulgaria around 2007. At the same time the Union reaffirmed the European destiny of the countries of the Western Balkans. Croatia, of course, has already lodged its application and could conceivably join in four or five years.

Clearly, enlargement will further strengthen and deepen the engagement of the Union in the Western Balkans. Indeed, we see this happening almost as we speak. Earlier this year the EU took responsibility for international police operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Last month, the Union accepted responsibility for the international military operation in Macedonia. This is clear testimony to the willingness of the EU and co-operating countries, including Norway, to remain engaged in the region.

Norway welcomes this development, as well as the expressed willingness of the EU to take over responsibility for the international military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, there should remain a discernible footprint on the part of the Alliance, too. It is mainly through the Alliance, of course, that the US will continue to play a role in the Western Balkans.

The EU’s Stabilisation and Association process provides a much-needed roadmap for the reform process in each participating country. The road to European standards will be a difficult and rocky one. But there is no other way. The countries of the region and their peoples realise this.

Membership in the various frameworks for cooperation is not an end in itself. Rather, it is part of a continuing process of adaptation to political, social and economic realities in Europe as a whole. As such, membership and active participation serve to bolster and support the reform process in the countries of the Western Balkans.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Sustainable reforms must be firmly rooted in the countries involved. The reform process in the Western Balkans can only succeed if there is a strong and sustained commitment on the part of the political leaders and peoples of the region.

But the Euro-Atlantic community can facilitate this process in various ways. The time for sanctions should be drawing to a close. At the present juncture there is more to be gained through active engagement and judicious use of incentives.

We need more cooperation, and we need to develop a sense of partnership among equals. Dependencies and subordination will hamper the reform process and will prevent it from developing in accordance with the domestic political, social and economic specificities of each individual country.

Few regions have received as much intense international attention and support as have the Western Balkans. There have been good reasons for that. The question now before us is how long this should continue.

In the long term, it would seem to me, it is questionable whether massive financial assistance is necessary or indeed healthy for the political and economic development of the region.

It risks creating and perpetuating a culture of dependence. And that is in the interest of neither the countries of the region nor of their international partners.

It would seem to me, therefore, that outside financial support must be clearly seen and understood as transitional and short-term. It should by no means be construed as long-term development assistance.

The pitfall of "aid dependency" must be avoided. The countries of the Western Balkans are not developing countries in the usual sense of the term. These are countries that not too long ago enjoyed a standard of living comparable to that of Western Europe. They have well educated populations. These countries have lost ten years due to political and economic mismanagement as well as armed conflict.

But given the necessary political foresight and will, and in partnership with the Euro-Atlantic community of which they are a part, there is no reason why the countries of the Western Balkans should not be capable of regaining the prosperity and stability they once enjoyed.

Thank you for your attention.