Translation from the Norwegian

Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Petersen
Oslo Military Society
13 October 2003

Security policy co-operation in Europe or across the Atlantic? Two sides of the same coin

Ladies and gentlemen,

A wise man once said that if you try to have a community without conflict, you destroy the community. In other words, disagreement between close allies is not unusual – in fact it is inevitable.

The Iraq issue put considerable strains on relations between the members of the most successful military alliance in modern history, NATO. The European allies were divided. But it was the differences across the Atlantic that attracted the most attention and caused the greatest concern.

Transatlantic tensions are nothing new. We’ve seen them before. Kyoto, the International Criminal Court and the Test Ban Treaty are just a few of the most recent examples.

Today’s situation, however, is cause for greater concern. The differences of opinion across the Atlantic are greater in number than before, and they go deeper. And they reflect very divergent attitudes to international co-operation.

Much of the extreme bitterness that characterised transatlantic relations over Iraq last spring has now apparently gone. But I think we must assume that the underlying problems have not evaporated.

The Atlantic community has been and will continue to be a mainstay of Norwegian foreign and security policy. Norway’s defence and security will continue to be firmly anchored in NATO, which in Norway’s view should continue to be the foundation of European security and stability.

As regards our fundamental security interests, it is an illusion to believe that any individual country or group of countries could be a substitute for a NATO with the active participation of the USA. Now, at the beginning of the 21 ^st >century, the USA is more than ever "the irreplaceable power".

We want NATO to continue to be relevant. We want NATO to continue to safeguard the security of all its members. We want NATO to continue to be the most important forum for transatlantic dialogue on security issues.

I believe this is possible. But then we will have to examine within NATO what we can do to bring the European and the American view of the world and possible course of action closer together. We must also be willing to make concrete contributions to resolving the problems we are facing, both by providing military resources and by showing the political will to take responsibility in an emergency. This responsibility no longer applies only to Europe. Global threats are accompanied by a global responsibility, also for us.

At the same time, with the forthcoming EU enlargement, the new Constitutional Treaty and the development of a EU security strategy, the EU is becoming more confident and assertive in its foreign and security policy. We therefore give high priority to further developing our relations with the EU countries, including in the field of security and defence policy.

Our status as a member of the Alliance, but not of the EU, also poses new challenges. It is clear that the task of safeguarding fundamental Norwegian interests will become even more demanding in the years ahead.

There are a number of factors underlying the challenges we are facing. First of all, those of us living on this side of the Atlantic haven’t fully grasped how traumatic 9/11 was for the Americans, and how deeply this trauma has marked, and will continue to mark, US foreign policy thinking and behaviour. And this applies to the whole American population, not just to the Administration and the Republican Party.

The USA’s vulnerability was suddenly apparent to the entire world. Today most Americans are feeling extremely vulnerable, probably much more so than us Europeans.

In addition to this, the American approach is often more direct. The USA frequently exerts more pressure to obtain quick results. The European attitude is often characterised by dialogue and greater patience. We sometimes experience the Americans as confrontational. They sometimes see us as too evasive. We must seek to reconcile these differences through dialogue and co-operation. We must avoid situations where the USA presents Europe with predetermined conclusions and choices on key strategic issues, without previous consultations.

The Americans have gradually developed a more insistent, less flexible attitude in international issues.

They’ve been more impatient in multilateral fora. On several occasions the Americans have preferred coalitions of the willing rather than permanent alliances. This gives the USA greater room for manoeuvre, simpler decision-making mechanisms and lines of command under American control.

Here we are facing a major challenge. The Americans have to realise that they need Europe, the EU and NATO. And I believe they are becoming more aware of this, probably to some extent in view of the recent deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tasks are so formidable that not even the USA can solve them alone.

But we should be aware the Americans have great expectations as regards both economic and military assistance, expectations that are so great that it may be difficult for the Europeans to meet them.

It is a major problem for the Western countries that the demand for top quality military resources is far greater than what we are jointly able to muster. We must remember that it is the same forces we’re drawing on, whether for NATO operations in Bosnia or Kosovo, EU operations in Macedonia or Congo, or US operations in Afghanistan or Iraq.

This makes it even more necessary for us to continually and carefully assess where to deploy our limited resources, both military and civilian. The economic realities mean that involvement in one arena limits our possibility of being involved in others.

Generally speaking, Norway should give priority to UN, NATO and EU operations. Nonetheless we will be faced with dilemmas. We will still want to take part in important operations. But we mustn’t spread ourselves too thin.

US foreign policy has a distinctly global orientation. This is nothing new. But what is new is that the USA is now also choosing its partners in a global arena.

There is a clear difference between "us" as allies, and "them", the participants in coalitions of the willing. Unlike NATO members, the latter are not bound by a treaty to show solidarity over time. Nor can they provide forces that through common exercises have become so closely co-ordinated with the Americans as our forces are.

However, for the USA this distinction is now less important. Their priority is to get the job done. They ask for and accept help where they can get it. Nonetheless, I think it’s quite clear that the European allies have a special place in the American consciousness, both politically and as co-operation partners in the field. For even though there may be disagreement on a particular issue, such as the necessity of the war in Iraq, we share the same values and the same political and democratic traditions.

This sense of community is stronger than many people realise. I believe it will survive our different approaches and divergent views on the Iraq issue. But it will require an effort – also on our part. This is why a strengthened transatlantic dialogue is so important. And here NATO has a key role. We must show the Americans that it is in their interests to deal with the new security threats within the framework of NATO.

If we are to succeed in the fight against international terrorism we must adopt a number of military and non-military measures. The overall framework for this fight is the UN, but also other organisations, such as NATO and the EU. Norway is taking an active part in these efforts. We also welcome new initiatives like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which includes carrying out inspections of ships in international waters. As one of the world’s major shipping nations, it is only natural for us to be part of this work. We have therefore requested the current PSI countries to include us in this initiative.

Ladies and gentlemen,

On this side of the Atlantic, many EU countries have concluded that the EU’s common foreign and security policy must be strengthened in order to maximise its ability to influence developments in general and American thinking and policies in particular.

Admittedly, the EU’s military resources are small compared with those of the USA. But the EU is in the process of strengthening its crisis-management capability by using a wide range of instruments in a co-ordinated manner.

The draft security strategy for the EU, which I view as a good starting point, is an indication of this. The EU threat assessment depicted in this strategy is more in line with that of both the USA and NATO. We are also pleased that it emphasises the need for transatlantic partnership. Furthermore it reflects a more realistic attitude to the use of military force.

This security strategy shows that there is increasing agreement across the Atlantic that the threat of international terrorism is the greatest challenge to international peace and security. The fact that the EU’s global threat assessment is beginning to coincide more closely with that of the Americans is an essential prerequisite for an effective campaign against this deadly menace.

The strategy also shows, however, that the EU’s approach differs from that of the USA on several important points. This applies especially to the importance the EU attaches to the prevention of conflicts by non-military means and to binding international co-operation.

It is positive that the EU is developing such a strategy. But it is important that the EU establish a close dialogue with the USA and NATO when the strategy is to be further elaborated. This would be a useful contribution to improving the transatlantic ties.

It is also positive that the EU is considering taking on a wider variety of crisis management tasks. There are enough missions here for everyone. And I believe that the EU can by playing an active role help strengthen the crisis management capability of the European countries.

We have always maintained that the EU’s security and defence policy goals can best be achieved in close co-operation with NATO. We are therefore pleased that NATO and the EU concluded an agreement on this last spring. The Berlin Plus package allows the EU to draw on NATO’s resources.

In the new draft EU constitution, the Convent proposes closer and more binding defence co-operation between those EU countries that so wish and that satisfy certain capacity requirements. A number of key EU countries also wish to strengthen the EU’s ability to plan and implement independent operations. A number of different proposals are being discussed in the EU, including the establishment of a European military headquarters.

However, we must not regard the ESDP, the European security and defence policy, as a counterweight to the USA and NATO. Most of the EU countries are, after all, our European allies. And like a large majority of our European allies, we are seeking to ensure that the development of military resources in NATO and the EU is complementary. A good case in point is the two Rapid Reaction Forces, one established by NATO, and one by the EU.

We must avoid as far as possible building parallel structures and capabilities. What we need is military forces that can be deployed. More headquarters would be a waste of resources and in the long term they could undermine NATO. At the same time we must be realistic and acknowledge the fact that the EU will carry out operations independently of NATO, as shown by its military operation in DR Congo. It is important that in such cases the EU is as open as possible and assesses such operations on an individual basis, not only with regard to NATO but also with regard to individual NATO countries that are not part of the EU.

Being flexible and pragmatic is in the EU’s own interest since it will enable countries like Norway to continue to provide relevant contributions to EU operations. Norway has a good record as regards police training and reform of the justice and home affairs sector, and this is something we can build on.

Our attitude to the EU will in many ways influence the EU’s attitude to us. Above all, it is important the Norway is aware of the direction in which the EU is moving. The EU will play an increasingly important role in the field of security and defence policy in the years ahead.

But for us the main thing is that NATO’s role is not weakened. Collective defence must continue to be the exclusive province of NATO. NATO’s role as a forum for consultation must be maintained. We do not want a situation where the real discussions across the Atlantic are taking place directly between the EU and the USA rather than in NATO. This would make it much more difficult for Norway, which is not a member of the EU, to make its views heard.

Close co-operation between the EU and NATO is absolutely essential if we are to meet the threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction effectively. We can complement each other. But the burden must be shared more equally. We cannot expect the Americans to carry the military burden on its own while we simply come along later on. Both sides must be willing to give a hand when necessary. Both sides must learn from each other.

There is absolutely no reason why closer transatlantic co-operation should be incompatible with a stronger Europe. On the contrary, the two will reinforce each other if we let them.

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is very encouraging that in the last few months the allies have been willing to take on this responsibility. This has been shown by NATO’s support for Poland’s involvement in Iraq and its assuming command of the International Stabilisation Force in Afghanistan, ISAF. These decisions reflect a willingness to look ahead and to use the Alliance to solve new problems.

The way the Iraq conflict was handled resulted in divisions and differences of opinion between close allies, both across the Atlantic and within Europe. Norway was unable to support the war in the absence of a clear UN mandate. But we do not wish to turn our backs on the Iraqi people at this point. There is only one way forward. We must ensure that a civil Iraqi government is in place as soon as possible. And we can only do this by bringing the security situation under control and stabilising the country.

The international community must therefore help to bring under control the forces that are opposing such a development by carrying out new bomb attacks almost daily, often against civilian targets.

We support the efforts to build a democratic, stable and peaceful Iraq. Norway has made a choice, hence:

• We are taking part in the stabilisation force.
• The framework for our participation is humanitarian tasks.

Our efforts in Iraq are deeply appreciated. Norwegian soldiers have so far neutralised over 6000 explosives, thus saving many lives. They have repaired the electricity network. They have built bridges. All to the benefit of the civilian population in Iraq.

As I said, it is imperative to improve the security situation in Iraq. The continual attacks on the coalition forces and the civilian population are delaying the work of reconstruction, and have meant that the UN and NGOs have had to reduce their presence considerably. This is extremely unfortunate.

We are in danger of being caught up in a vicious circle, in which the lack of progress and results for the Iraqi people is increasing the opposition to the Iraqi authorities and the coalition forces and making the security situation even worse. We have to keep this from happening.

We must therefore intensify our efforts, in the security sector, but also in building up Iraqi institutions, such as the police, border controls and the judiciary. And we must involve the Iraqis themselves in these efforts, because this is absolutely necessary in order for democracy to take root.

What is needed is a carefully thought out timeframe. But it is equally important to define where we are going. Experience in other countries characterised by totalitarian misrule has shown that a too rapid transfer of full sovereignty can reinforce the worst aspects of the old regime instead of eliminating them.

A new Security Council resolution that gives the UN a more prominent place would make it easier for more countries to contribute. But even with a new resolution, I think it will be difficult to increase international participation in Iraq, especially as regards stabilisation forces. The most recent signals from several potential contributing countries are not particularly positive.

The success of this endeavour is vital for ensuring security in Iraq and laying the foundation for stable political and economic development. The task is huge, and calls for a concerted international effort. Norway will take its share of the responsibility.

It is important that the international community succeeds in its efforts in Iraq. But we must not forget that we are still facing an enormous task in Afghanistan. There is no question but that NATO has taken on a very difficult task here. We have to deliver. In many ways NATO’s future depends on how successful it is in solving the problems in Afghanistan.

Only by creating a stable Afghanistan can we prevent terrorists from again planning attacks from that country.

In order to succeed in Afghanistan, there are five elements that must be in place:

• Firstly, the NATO member countries must show the necessary political will to contribute. This applies both to military contributions and to assistance with reconstruction and development.
• Secondly, the Afghans themselves must have ownership of the process. This calls for close co-operation between NATO and other actors, and a plan for the transfer of responsibility to the Afghan authorities.
• Thirdly, NATO must extend its efforts beyond Kabul. It is positive that the allies have agreed in principle that ISAF’s mandate should be extended beyond the capital. But the relationship with the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom must also be clarified.
• Fourthly, we must define more closely which tasks are to be performed by NATO and which by other actors. We must examine what role NATO should play, for example in voter registration and election monitoring, security sector reform and reconstruction.
• Fifthly, we must involve neighbouring countries. They must be encouraged to play a constructive role. Relations with Pakistan are particularly important, but also those with Iran, Russia and the countries of Central Asia. We in NATO must examine the possibility of making better use of the partnership co-operation with these countries. We must support projects and co-operation that will promote development in Afghanistan. I am thinking particularly of co-operation on border security, which is especially important in view of the steep rise in drug trafficking.

Norway has made a substantial contribution to Afghanistan, both in military and in humanitarian terms, and we will continue to do so. From next year Afghanistan will be one of our designated partner countries in development co-operation, which means an increase in long-term development assistance to the country.

On the military side, we will give priority to our contribution to ISAF now that it is a NATO-led operation. We are also looking at the possibility of contributing to the provincial reconstruction teams.

We must also be open to similar operations in other areas. I am thinking primarily of the possibility of NATO playing a greater role in Iraq, but this, as I have mentioned, will require clarification of the basis in international law.

I have previously suggested that we should also be receptive to the possibility of NATO having a function in connection with a peaceful solution to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Sadly, the prospects of a peaceful solution are not very bright at the moment. But NATO must be prepared for this eventuality.

If the Alliance is to meet the challenges of tomorrow, the forces at its disposal must be able to operate outside their home country. Norway is in the process of preparing its contribution to the NATO reaction force, which is scheduled to be ready in 2006. We intend to make the Telemark Batallion available for this force.

The NATO Rapid Reaction Force will play a key role in NATO’s efforts to meet the new threats posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It is therefore important that we decide exactly how this force is to be used. Political control over the use of this force is fundamental.

These issues will have a central place at the NATO summit in Istanbul next year. Other issues that Norway considers particularly important are:

• Continuing the open door policy. We will continue to advocate that countries should be allowed to join the Alliance if they meet the requirements.
• Involving the Balkan countries more closely. Both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro must be offered the opportunity to co-operate more closely with NATO. We must support their reform processes.
• Strengthening NATO’s political and military co-operation with the partner countries. We want NATO to give more priority to the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia.
• Further developing NATO’s co-operation with Russia, including that on nuclear safety.
• Promoting closer co-operation between NATO and the EU.

Ladies and gentlemen,

A small country like Norway can only safeguard its security and its national interests through multilateral co-operation. We therefore seek multilateral solutions wherever possible. This evening I have concentrated on the transatlantic and the European perspectives in our security policy. But I would like to underline that our security policy also has a global dimension, as represented by the UN.

We must adapt the UN to the challenges of today, and we must ensure that it serves all its member countries. We must clarify what the UN can and what it can’t do. The case of Iraq , where Norway wants the UN to play a more central role, illustrates the challenge we are facing. We must ensure that the tasks given to the UN in Iraq are realistic and achievable.

The UN must also be made relevant for those who might be tempted to act outside the world organisation. We must make sure that the UN is in a position to act when action is called for. And we must make sure that the UN receives the resources it needs to perform the tasks it is given.

The UN will not be effective unless the member countries do their share. The UN will not be effective unless the great powers are involved. This applies not least to the USA. I am convinced that the USA has a lot more to gain if it uses the UN, and works within the organisation, than if it goes its own way.

We are living in interesting and exciting times. The changes that are taking place around us in many ways signal the beginning of a new era. An era when the fundamental questions about threats, national interests, global responsibility and international co-operation are being asked anew. More than ever, we need to have a vigorous debate with all sectors of society, not least the military.

Norway will continue to provide ideas, military and civilian resources, and humanitarian and economic support. We will seek to ensure the peaceful settlement of conflicts where possible. At the same time we will provide military resources when this is called for.

The tasks we are facing are large and they are difficult. Therefore it is vital that our security policy approach is anchored in co-operation both in Europe and across the Atlantic. For us this is "two sides of the same coin". Not because we are demanding or naïve. But because it is the best protection we have against the security threats of our time.