State Secretary Mr Kim Traavik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Statement to the Conference on Disarmament

Geneva, 2 September 2003

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Madam President,

It is a privilege to be addressing this conference under your presidency. You are serving the cause of arms control and non-proliferation with dedication and distinction. The skilful manner in which you guided the First Biennial Meeting on the Status of the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons to a successful conclusion was particularly impressive.

Madam President,

The security environment has changed profoundly in recent years. International terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are major threats to international peace and security. We know that certain states are seeking to obtain these deadly weapons.

There is also evidence that certain terrorist groups are actively working to acquire weapons of mass destruction. No pains must be spared to prevent this from happening. The recent tragedies and attacks against civilian targets in various parts of the world have clearly proved that terrorists are trying to cause maximum damage and suffering.

Fighting international terrorism and pursuing even more vigorously the goal of non-proliferation are therefore essential to our common security. Much has already been done through the United Nations Security Council and the broad-based coalition against terrorism. Norway is actively contributing to this coalition and we will continue to do so.

Existing multilateral instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation are vital to meet the new threats to our security. Universal adherence to these instruments is crucial if we are to succeed. Multilateralism must remain a core principle. We must continue to ensure that these instruments function well.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a cornerstone of these efforts. We are concerned that the Treaty is facing serious challenges.

We deeply deplore the announcement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty. We reiterate our call to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to reverse its course of action, to comply with its obligations under the NPT and to co-operate fully and unconditionally with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

We welcome the initiative that led to the recent six-country meeting in Beijing. Although the meeting was not as productive as we would have hoped, this process should and must continue. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has a special responsibility in this regard. The Korean peninsula needs a new start leading towards stability, reconciliation and a lasting settlement on all aspects of nuclear issues. A solution must be found through dialogue.

Madam President,

All allegations of non-compliance with the NPT regime must be dealt with in a transparent manner. In any well-documented case the IAEA must be given access to investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary action in accordance with its mandate.

It is in the self-interest of any country suspected of non-compliance to co-operate fully with the IAEA. This also applies to Iran. The Agency must be allowed to continue and finalise its work as tasked by the Board of Governors.

The urgent and unconditional conclusion, entry into force and implementation of an IAEA Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreements is of the greatest importance. We would regard this as an important sign of Iran’s commitment to non-proliferation and of its desire to restore international confidence in its peaceful intentions.

The recent visits to Iran by the IAEA’s director general, Mr El Baradei, and his talks with Iranian officials are steps in the right direction. We have taken due note of the IAEA’s latest report to the Board of Governors and are particularly pleased that Iran seems to be prepared to work more closely with the IAEA. Norway looks forward to further strengthening of this positive development. At the same time there is an urgent need for continued investigations to fully verify the Iranian nuclear programme.

Our aim should be to preserve and strengthen the integrity and authority of the Non-proliferation Treaty. The Review Conference will be decisive for the future of the Treaty.

Prior to the 2005 Review Conference we will have to negotiate common recommendations. Next year we will reach a critical stage in this regard. We must all contribute in a positive spirit and make the necessary compromises.

To Norway it is of the utmost importance that the 2005 conference results in a strengthened non-proliferation regime. This should primarily be achieved through improved IAEA safeguards. These must be applied universally. The norm should be that any country seeking nuclear technology for a peaceful programme must fully implement comprehensive IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol. This should be a major message from the 2005 conference.

The NPT contains clear disarmament obligations. Disarmament and non-proliferation must mutually reinforce each other.

Significant progress in nuclear disarmament has been achieved since the end of the Cold War. The 2000 NPT Review Conference adopted a practical road map for further nuclear disarmament. Norway attaches great importance to the implementation of these decisions in the run-up to the 2005 conference.

Norway welcomes the recent ratification of the Moscow agreement between the US and Russia on further reductions in strategic nuclear warheads. We consider these reductions to be an important contribution to the implementation of the decisions from the 2000 Review Conference. It is important that these reductions are carried out in a verifiable, transparent and irreversible manner.

We also see a need for further reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. The NATO allies have come a long way in this respect.

Irreversibility is important for achieving the long-term objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. This principle is also the best guarantee that de-commissioned nuclear weapons do not end up in the hands of terrorist groups.

Madam President,

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is essential for the promotion of both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. It is crucial that all the nuclear powers ratify the Treaty.

Pending the Treaty’s entry into force, self-imposed moratoria on nuclear testing are very welcome. Yet moratoria cannot replace the legally binding commitment represented by the signing and ratification of the CTBT.

The verification system is at the core of the Treaty. Financial and diplomatic support for the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation must therefore continue unabated. Norway will continue to make an active contribution in this respect.

It is of the greatest importance that the integrity of the norms set by the CTBT is respected. We are worried that the development of new weapons may result in the resumption of tests. Likewise it is vital to retain the current nuclear threshold.

We consider the fissile material cut-off treaty to be the next logical step in nuclear disarmament. Such a treaty would also be an essential instrument for preventing the proliferation of such weapons. We deplore the fact that it has not been possible to move forward on this priority area.

Madam President,

Nuclear safety has become an integral part of the fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It is vitally important to prevent fissile materials and nuclear waste from falling into the hands of terrorists or other criminals.

Since 1995, Norway has spent more than USD 100 million on nuclear safety measures in co-operation with Russia. At the outset, back in 1995, we regarded the nuclear safety challenges in northwestern Russia primarily in an environmental perspective. But in the current security landscape nuclear safety has taken on a new urgency.

Through our long-standing co-operation with Russia on nuclear safety we have accumulated extensive experience. Norway’s primary focus will remain on support for co-operative projects in northwestern Russia. The sinking of a decommissioned Russian submarine off the Kola Peninsula over the weekend was a tragic reminder of the urgency of the task. Our thoughts are with the bereaved families.

The Global Partnership launched by the G8 countries in 2002 will be crucial for building a broad international coalition against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This partnership will renew and intensify the goals of sustained nuclear safety and security.

The Proliferation Security Initiative that is now being developed is yet another valuable measure for halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and fighting terrorism. Norway would like to take actively part in this initiative.

The Hague Code of Conduct is also essential in our overall efforts to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We must seek to secure universal adherence to the Code. Norway’s long-term objective is that the Code should be translated into a legally binding and globally accepted agreement.

Madam President,

In the history of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation the Chemical Weapons Convention is a major achievement.

The recent Review Conference was encouraging. We are particularly pleased that it set the stage for a further strengthening of the Convention’s verification regime, including inspections. The conference also allowed substantive discussions on matters related to compliance. We hope these deliberations will yield concrete results.

Having said this, more efforts are needed to further strengthen the Convention. We have to achieve full universalisation and further progress in the destruction and eventual elimination of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons.

There is also an urgent need to deal with biological weapons. Fortunately at the last Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention we were able to reach a compromise that allows us to continue strengthening the Convention. Together we must seize this opportunity to promote robust and effective national measures for the full implementation of the convention.

With respect to multilateral co-operation on conventional weapons, there are encouraging trends. Small arms, landmines and munitions are technically not weapons of mass destruction. Yet they kill or seriously injure more than half a million people every year. In terms of the number of lives they take, small arms clearly are weapons of mass destruction. This represents a challenge to human security. Norway will continue to play its part in meeting this challenge.

We attach great importance to the on-going negotiations on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. We consider it essential to arrive at a legally binding protocol that addresses the humanitarian concerns in a credible manner.

A new ERW protocol must make a real difference in this field. We also strongly advocate a legally binding protocol mitigating the humanitarian risks of Anti-Vehicle Mines.

Madam President,

Norway is convinced that multilateral approaches to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament are essential for our collective security.

Multilateral, legally binding, verifiable arms control treaties are important means of enhancing our security. The impasse in this conference is therefore contrary to our common security interests.

Norway’s position on the CD’s Programme of Work is well known. Over the last few years we have supported a number of proposals that could have put the CD on a more constructive track. We have also signalled our readiness to discuss other important topics in the CD.

Norway has furthermore supported efforts to improve the functioning of the CD. While we acknowledge that the reasons for the current impasse are to be found outside the CD, it is obvious that the Conference needs reform. Since the new threats are of a global nature, any country seeking to contribute to the Conference should be allowed to do so.

Madam President,

Reform of the international negotiating bodies is essential if multilateralism is to serve our needs in a changing security environment. The international community must work better together to meet the new threats.

We agree with those who call for a critical look at the functioning of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The current format of the First Committee’s general debate prevents us from exchanging views and forming common perspectives on how to deal with new security challenges. It does not serve our security interests to adopt over 50 resolutions and decisions in a way that is often mechanical and repetitive.

We welcome US ideas on making multilateral co-operation in disarmament and non-proliferation more effective. These suggestions are an excellent point of departure for discussing reform of the First Committee, the CD and the Disarmament Commission. While many would agree with the diagnosis, the task now at hand is to come up with specific ideas on how to proceed. We for our part wish to contribute to that.

Madam President,

I just stated that, from our perspective, multilateralism is a core principle. But multilateralism must adopt and respond to new security threats. Over the last fifty years multilateralism has delivered results. It can continue to do so by being more efficient and solution-oriented.

The challenges are there. It is up to us, the member states of the CD, to make full use of the Conference to resolve them.

Continued failure to do so will mean that we turn our backs on important opportunities for creating a safer and more secure future.