Minister of International Delvelopment Ms Hilde Frafjord Johnson

Making a difference - a strategic framework for peacebuilding. A development perspective

At an international seminar on poverty and conflict in co-operation with the Crown Prince and Crown Princess's Humanitarian Fund, Oslo 25 August 2004

Your Royal Highnesses

Ladies and gentlemen,

Dear friends,

I would like to begin by sharing with you a powerful encounter I had in South Sudan in 1998. Outside a food station called Bahr el Gazal, a small boy was waiting patiently for his food ration. His belly was bloated, his legs looked like sticks. But he didn’t seem despondent or pleading in any way. He looked at me and smiled, his eyes were alert, with quiet anticipation at the thought of the food he was about to receive. He sought eye contact with me as if we were somehow in the same situation, the same predicament, together. He -- ragged and dirty, constantly hungry; me – clean, well dressed, well fed, with a car waiting to take me out of there. There were thousands like him, thousands, but I felt intensely that this little boy, had to survive, had to go on. And now, we see the development in Darfur, how many more like him are there out there? How many more have to suffer?

The image of the little boy has gradually become a prism through which I reflect upon the challenges of poverty and conflict, hunger and strife. The boy was displaced because of hunger, he was hungry because of the war, he was poor because of the war, and why was there a war in the first place?

This little boy, and it could be any little boy, also embodies our obligation to act. In his face is mirrored the reason for us to act. We can talk about international solidarity –it is the right thing to promote. We can talk about our ethical obligation to intervene when we have been part of the origin of the problem, this is also the right thing to do. We can talk about the obligation to intervene when we can become part of the solution. We can talk about the Christian duty to love one another. But of all the reasons I am told for why we should intervene, I share with many others the intuition that it all starts with the face. It starts with the face of the other. A face that compels me to understand that his problem is my obligation. To me this is very simple. It is afterwards, when we take it from there, that it becomes more complicated.

We do not have the recipe for peace. The experience we have gained in the last few decades has led us to work more diligently to understand the practicalities of peace-building.

Efforts to prevent conflict, to contribute to peacemaking and peace-building are important elements of Norwegian foreign and development policy.

We have developed a number of useful and necessary capabilities to deal with different elements of peace-building. We are known as having the ability to act swiftly and to be flexible. We can improvise. We have a number of competent and risk-taking non-governmental organisations. We draw on competent experts from a broad range of state institutions and research communities. We are moving our development budgets upwards.

But we – like others – have been too reluctant to try to learn systematically from experience. Although each situation is different, we have been too slow to realise that we can use, and do need, a more systematic, more strategic, approach .

This is what we are attempting to change. I have the pleasure to present to you here today the government’s Strategic Framework for Norway’s contribution to peace-building. It is brand new and you are the first to see it.

The strategic framework will serve as our reference and guide in formulating Norway’s contributions to peace-building wherever we are engaged. We will use it in concrete peace-building situations, as well as in our general work related to multilateral organisations and bilateral donor co-operation. As non-governmental organisations are important partners for the government in peace-building, it will be a tool for organisations and government alike in the planning and implementation of their contributions.

Before I go into the contents of the strategic framework , I would like to say a few words about its history. When the government started preparations for Norwegian Security Council membership in 2001-2002, a review was undertaken of all the various instruments for peace-building. The government also engaged the research community; The Peace Research Institute and the CMI were both commissioned to produce reports and analyses. An analysis of contributions to peace-building commissioned by the Utstein countries revealed a number of weaknesses in the way these countries made their contributions to peace-building. One main conclusion was that a number of programmes that by themselves made sense were undertaken without reference to any strategy for the given situation. The government was advised to “Getting their act together” - among other things to develop a strategic framework for peace-building to serve as guidance for strategies for engagement in any given situation. Well, here it is:
Peacebuilding – from a development perspective. A strategic framework.

Now to the content:

In the strategic framework, We have defined "peace-building" in accordance with the UN document An Agenda for Peace (1992) anda range of subsequent UN documents and OECD guidelines.

We understand peace-building as a supplement to preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping. These are separate concepts, but they often are, or should be, closely linked in the field. Peace-building can

• help prevent violent conflict from breaking out,
• pave the way for and support peace-making processes, and
• help rebuild post-conflict societies.

In other words, peace-building is relevant in emerging, current and post-conflict situations.

In the Statement by the President of the Security Council at the end of the debate on peace-building in 2001 – a document I can wholeheartedly recommend – peace-building is clarified as follows:

“The Security Council reaffirms that the quest for peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach that addresses the root causes of conflicts, including their economic and social dimensions”.

From this we can extract the following:

• It is the concern of the political, security and development parts of the UN - and of member states.
• It requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach. Poorly co-ordinated, ad hoc, short-term engagements will not yield the desired results.
• It must address the root causes of conflicts.
• It is multidimensional.

Peace-building cannot be understood as a sequential process. That is much too simplistic, although we often talk about phases in peace-building in attempt to make reality more comprehensible. And in all the phases, we need the tools of development co-operation, in prevention, during negotiation and in the post conflict phase.

Peace-building is not a defined set of activities. It encompasses measures in the context of emerging, current or post-conflict situations for the explicit purpose of promoting lasting and sustainable peace. Peace-building is defined by its context and purpose. Each situation is different.

We cannot reasonably claim that whatever development activities we carry out in a conflict-prone society will qualify as peace-building. Traditionally, development actors have worked around conflicts rather than in or on conflicts. At times our interventions may actually exacerbate (or prolong) conflict. This is, of course, extremely difficult to accept. Normally we should have more ambitious goals than not to prolong or exacerbate conflict. Our general development co-operation must help prevent violent conflicts and promote peace as a basis for further development. But sometimes we are faced with very painful dilemmas.

Therefore, we must also draw on peace-building experience and knowledge in our general development efforts. Our partner countries in development are, unfortunately but not incidentally, often fraught with real or potential instability. We need to be more conflict-sensitive in our general work. This realisation also touches on the reasons behind the reorganisation of Norwegian development policy administration. We cannot have separate sets of thinking, separate methods of analysis. We must recognise that development deals with politics, and politics deals with development. They are interrelated.

But we must not view our work as one indistinguishable mass; peace-building differs from conventional development co-operation in that it is explicitly guided and motivated by a primary commitment to the prevention of violent conflict and the promotion of lasting and sustainable peace.

Three dimensions of peace-building:

In our strategic framework, we operate with three equally important and mutually reinforcing dimensions:

1. security,
2. political development, and
3. socio-economic development.

Peace-building interventions must encompass all three dimensions or pillars at the same time. A sequential approach is generally not to be recommended.

The 3 pillars:

The security dimension

The security dimension encompasses the security of the country and the personal security of its inhabitants. The four elements that we have to consider are:

• Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants into the local community. This may include special programmes for women and children.

• Humanitarian mine action. This includes mine clearance, stockpile destruction, support to victims of landmines, and awareness programmes.

• Improving control of small arms and light weapons. This includes measures to prevent misuse and illegal trade, providing incentives to hand in weapons, and dealing with the underlying causes of the demand for such weapons.

• Security system reform (SSR), emphasises the importance of civilian control, transparency and accountability as regards the military, the police, the justice sector and the penal services.

Security and development are inextricably linked – we need only mention Afghanistan and Iraq. Very little – if any - success can be expected as regards political and socio-economic development unless the security situation is manageable.

The political dimension

Some of the underlying or triggering causes of violent conflict are illegitimate or weak institutions, corruption, insufficient respect for human rights, a democratic deficit, and the perception that the administrative and political channels are not adequate or that they are inaccessible.

In order to promote peace, we have to address these underlying or triggering causes of conflict.

• Support for political and administrative authorities and structures may be necessary in a transitional period in order to help strengthen the position of state institutions. This may also include support for the transformation of guerrilla movements into political parties.

• Lasting and sustainable peace depends not only on the commitment of political leaders, but also on social acceptance of peace by the population. Peace-building requires reconciliation and the promotion of non-violent conflict resolution at all levels of society: the military, political, religious and business leadership, the middle level and the grass-roots level.

• Equally important is assistance to institutions and processes that promote good governance, democracy and human rights.
  
• Support to governments must be complemented by support for the peace-oriented elements of civil society, including the media.

• Although it is extremely sensitive, the issue of legal action and truth commissions must be addressed. An appropriate balance needs to be found between truth, justice, punishment, reconciliation and impunity.

Let me share with you a reflection on democracy and good governance. In transition situations, the donor community often stresses the value of early elections in order to establish a democratic government. Perhaps we have a tendency to be satisfied with too little – or to focus too much on certain aspects of a true democracy and ignore other elements? An election is not enough. Too often constitutional guarantees for the legal security of the population at large and minorities in particular are either absent or not enforced. Too often a sound balance of power between the judiciary, the executive and the legislative is lacking. The result: discontent, lack of legitimacy, lack of stability in the long term.

So, when enumerating the elements pertaining to the political aspects of peace-building, let us bear in mind that real democracy and rule of law, with security for the men and the women in the streets is not achieved merely by organising an election.

The social and economic dimension

Some of the underlying causes or triggers of conflict are increasing socio-economic differences, unequal distribution of benefits, marginalisation of vulnerable groups or geographical regions, and relative deprivation. Others are competition for limited natural resources for livelihoods, such as water and arable land, as well as environmental degradation. Conflicts may be fuelled by competition for valuable and easily tradable natural resources, such as diamonds, oil and metals. Efforts to build peace must address these fundamental or triggering causes of conflict.

• A pressing challenge in post-conflict situations is the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons.

• In post-conflict situations infrastructure and important government functions may have to be built or rebuilt. The population will recognise and appreciate the initial peace dividend when roads and buildings are repaired, when electricity and telecommunications are restored, when shelter is provided, and when schools and health clinics are available to all.

• However, efforts to promote lasting and sustainable peace must encompass not only quick impact projects, but also long-term development programmes for high-quality and accessible education and health services for everyone.

• Last but not least, peace-building also includes measures to stimulate productive sector development, employment, trade and investment. This includes legal and economic reforms, institutional co-operation and technical co-operation on resource management.

The three dimensions may not be sufficient ingredients for peace. But, they may well be necessary elements – all of them - together. We have learned that it is not only the elements that spring most readily to mind in any given situation that must be taken care of. And not only those where we can, with a few striking interventions, heal visible sores. We know that the less flashy needs and functions must also be in place.

We will not and should not do everything everywhere. But we should now be better equipped to identify what should be done and where our resources can be best employed, when we take into consideration the contributions from other donors.

This leads me to the other main element of the peace-building framework: not only must we do the right things – we must do the things right.

We must apply the “aid effectiveness” agenda to our participation in peace-building

I spend a lot of my time promoting aid efficiency and donor reform in general. Deliberations on aid effectiveness, harmonisation and alignment (modalities for co-operation with host government and donor partners), are as relevant to our involvement in countries affected by conflict as in any other country. It is extremely costly to ignore the need for aid efficiency and donor reform. Not only will we always have limited funds – we need to stretch them as far as we can to help as many people as possible. In addition, we know that the way we often operate in the field, is less than optimal – this is an understatement. We stumble over each other, we duplicate each other’s efforts while ignoring other pressing needs. And we all do things our own way, with our own procedures and criteria for reporting. This puts an unacceptable burden of administrative demands on recipients – I call it a “donor circus”. This is also relevant in conflict situations.

We need to address this problem, which is one of the most pressing agenda items in international development policy today. The aid effectiveness agenda is even more difficult to implement in emerging, current or post-conflict situations. And non-governmental organisations must be part of this effort. This is related to donor reform.

In the strategic framework we deal with six elements of good donor practices: ownership and co-ordination, gender issues and children, the role of multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations and resources. Let me comment briefly on them:

1. Ownership and common platforms.

Peace-building interventions by the international community should be based on the ownership of the national authorities, and on a common platform, where consideration is given to conflict analysis as well as assessment of needs. National governments may be in a position to provide a common platform – then they must take the lead. But more often than not – there is no such ability in an initial stage in conflict situations. The UN must, in such cases, through OCHA, provide necessary leadership and coordination authority until national authorities can take over.

All donors - multilateral organisations, bilateral donors, civil society and the private sector – must submit to this co-ordination of interventions and harmonisation of procedures.

2. The gender perspective.

Another aspect of good donor practices which I would like to mention here is the need to promote and support the effective participation of the right groups and people in important processes. The UN Security Council highlighted the importance of gender perspectives in conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building in resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

Gender perspectives must be addressed at all stages and all levels of planning, implementation and evaluation, in conflict prevention, and at every rung of the ladder to peace. Much more needs to be done here.

3. The role of the multilateral organisations.

The UN has a central role to play in the international efforts for peace-building - both in normative and policy development and through concerted and cross-cutting actions in the field. No other multilateral organisation is better positioned to promote conflict prevention and peace-building than the UN, in co-operation with the international finance institutions, regional organisations and NGOs.

The UN has the mandate, infrastructure, presence and legitimacy needed. Still, the UN faces a number of challenges regarding competence, organisation, operative capacity and resources. We need a better co-ordinated UN – we need a better coordinating UN on the ground. We want to help to move the UN forward in order to strengthen the organisation’s overall performance in conflict-prevention and peace-building. We support Kofi Annan’s reform agenda. Norway and other like-minded countries issued a paper with suggestions for reforming the development activities of the UN in June. We would also like to see the Bellamy report be given much more attention.

The UN and the World Bank and the regional development banks have mutually reinforcing strengths and roles in peace-building. I question the feasibility of a once-and-for-all global “division of labour” between the UN and the development banks – but we should move closer to a common understanding of shared responsibility than what we see today.

4. The NGOs

The Norwegian government channels a large share of its contributions to peace-building through Norwegian NGOs. The organisations have experience, they are competent, they often have a unique network of contacts.

NGOs must be part of the effort to forge a more strategic approach in peace- building and must be part of the donor reform.

In peace-building, the organisations must be part of the dialogue on what needs to be the priority in each situation, as well as timing, channels and division of responsibility in each case. We often see that the organisations have a flexibility that enables them to step in early with vital services. This role may decrease as state institutions improve their performance and reliability. Northern NGOs play a role in support of national NGOs on a more long-term basis as well.

5. Timing

Movie stars and actors often say that timing is everything. Timing may not be everything in peace-building – but it counts for a lot.

In too many cases too much assistance may come in too fast in post-conflict situations. This is often followed by a rapid decline in funds and a vacuum before long-term assistance is initiated. The “stayer capacity” is limited.

We know that the critical period is not the first year, it is the first ten years after conflict, with the greatest challenges surfacing some three to five years after the initial peace. Insufficient and inappropriate follow-up in post-conflict situations increases the likelihood that violence will recur. Assistance may fuel warring parties rather than promote stability and peace. This is a problem that we have to take much more seriously. A more strategic approach is needed.

6. Resources.

We are more concerned now with the question of how to bridge the gap between emergency and long term development cooperation, but much too little has been done internationally. My government established a budget allocation for transitional assistance in 2002. This budget line is mainly used for peace-building purposes, in particular to promote viable political and administrative structures, democracy and respect for human rights. We must continue to have a focus on this issue, in order to gain experience for improving this instrument.

Conclusion

Norway wants to be a competent, consistent and reliable partner: impatient for results, but persevering for the time it takes to reach a sustainable peace. We can act quickly and flexibly, but we must remember to maintain a long-term perspective. In order to be effective and efficient, we must be more strategic.

The strategic framework aims to be simple and accessible. It aims to make a complex world a little more orderly and understandable when decisions must be made. It aims to give us a tool to work more systematically. It aims to give us a tool to understand and respect the roles of various institutions and partners better, and thus make the right mix.

The strategic framework is the first of its kind in Norway. I am not aware of any similar strategic framework published in any other countries, but other countries are in the process of writing them. We will use it in co-operation with the NGOs and the research community. And we will revise it when necessary. But first it shall be implemented, which may prove to be difficult enough. Our first test will be the Sudan.

In conclusion, I would like to employ a tactic from the military: a preemptive strike. You may ask what is new about this strategic framework - most of the elements are familiar and rather well known. So - should we yawn? No, we should not.

The strategic framework represents precisely what war-makers too often have been too good at: strategy. In order to win the peace, we must be more strategic. The strategic framework is a compilation of what we know but have too often not implemented. We must take advantage of experience in order to focus on the goal. To contribute to lasting peace we must improve our performance. The strategic framework is our roadmap to do the right things the right way.

John F. Kennedy once said “Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.” In our time, in our corner of the world, we are much less dramatic in describing our own situation. But we must not be complacent. For a number of reasons. The little boy in Sudan is only one of them.

Thank you.

The Strategic Framework