Deputy Minister Kim Traavik

NATO/EAPC Conference on Guidelines and Minimum Standards for the Protection of the Civilian Population against CBRN Risks

Trondheim, 29 January 2004

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Ladies and Gentlemen,

We all have vivid memories of September 11, 2001. The images that flickered across our television screens on that terrible day have become ineradicably imbedded in our minds. The attacks on the Twin Towers forced upon each and everyone of us the realization that all nations, even the most powerful among them, are vulnerable to the scourge of terrorism.

Clearly, the world changed on that day. International terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have become the defining security challenges of the 21 ^st> century.

We know that some states are actively seeking to obtain chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. We know that rogue and failed states are providing safe havens for terrorists and those who traffic in illicit substances, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents.

And we know that terrorist groups, too, are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. No pains must be spared to prevent this from happening. Recent attacks on civilian targets in various parts of the world – in Bali, in Casablanca, in Jerusalem, in Istanbul, and in Baghdad - have shown that the terrorists are prepared to go to extreme lengths to inflict maximum damage and suffering.

Even so, we must refrain from dramatization and scare-mongering. While the threat of terrorism is a real one, and while no nation is immune to it, the likelihood of anybody in this room ever becoming a victim of a terrorist attack is remote, at least in statistical terms. The same applies to major accidents involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents or substances.

Yet we must be vigilant and as well prepared for CBRN-related emergencies as we possibly can. When and if they occur, such emergencies can, as everybody in this room knows, be exceptionally destructive and create wide-spread suffering and fatalities.

Hence, making civilian populations less vulnerable and less exposed, and upgrading our ability to deal with emergencies whenever and wherever they arise, is a high priority of all the governments represented here today, and rightly so. And that is why the present conference is an important one.

The involvement of NATO in counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of course dates back to well before 9.11. The Alliance identified terrorism as a key threat as early as in the strategic concept which was adopted at the 1999 Washington Summit. And preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was defined as a principal goal of the Alliance a decade ago.

But the New York and Washington attacks of course added a new urgency to this work. They raised the specter of extremist groups unleashing weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate terror. As a result, the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction moved to the top of NATO’s agenda.

In order to deal effectively with these challenges, the Alliance has embarked upon a pervasive process of adaptation. The clearest reflection of this is the military transformation decided upon at Prague in late 2002: A new command structure; a new rapid reaction force, the NATO Response Force; new or upgraded capabilities in key areas such as sea and air transport; and a new CBRN Battalion.

All of these are major ingredients of NATO’s efforts to become more relevant in a changed and changing security environment.

Since NATO is primarily a military organisation, it should come as no surprise that much of its work has concentrated on the protection of deployed troops. These efforts are very important, and they have the full support of my government.

But if there is one single thing that recent terrorist outrages have taught us, it surely is that military personnel are not the primary targets of terrorists. Civilian populations often are. It is by putting innocent bystanders in harm’s way that terrorists hope to achieve their murky political objectives, or simply make their enemies suffer.

Even the means of the terrorists are some times civilian, the civilian airliners used on 9/11 being a case in point. These were not advanced weapons of mass destruction, but civilian assets, necessary for the working of modern, open societies. Even more unberable prospects open up if the terrorists should gain hold of weapons of mass destruction.

And they could. The UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, last week pointed to disturbing evidence of increased trafficking in weapons and materials of mass destruction. Mr. Annan expressed particular concern about indications of enhanced cooperation and an emerging division of labor between those involved.

And the extremists could create chaos, panic and suffering without having access to advanced or sophisticated weapons or agents. Simple devices such as the rudimentary radiological weapons known as "dirty bombs" could suffice.

We were starkly reminded of this hazard last fall, when thieves tampered with and tried to steal precious metal from two nuclear-powered lighthouse on the coast of the Kola Peninsula in Northestern Russia.

There are about a thousand such lighthouses scattered along the Russian coastline. They are powered by highly radioactive strontium 90 batteries that could be used to manufacture "dirty bombs". The lighthouses are very accessible and hence represent a very real proliferation hazard.

For this reason, removing the strontium 90 batteries and replacing them with environment-friendly solar batteries have become a top priority in Norway’s comprehensive nuclear safety cooperation with Russia, which dates back to the mid-nineties, and which also aims to clean up contaminated storage sites and dismantle nuclear-driven submarines.

Nuclear safety in our view is a crucial part of the efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction and thus prevent the ultimate act of terror. We are encouraged to see the increased international recognition of the urgency attached to this work. This is clearly reflected in the mobilisation, under the G8 Global Partnership, of some 20 billion dollars, to be spent between 2002 and 2012 on efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Significant funds have been set aside also in the context of the EU Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership. We for our part have actively associated ourselves with the efforts of the G8 as well as the EU.

Nuclear safety is a perfect illustration of the composite nature of the challenges facing us in our efforts to upgrade preparedness and provide protection for civilian populations. Unsafe storage of spent nuclear fuel and various kinds of radioactive waste represent on the one hand a formidable threat to the environment.

But equally it represents a proliferation risk of the highest order, as seen in last fall’s episode involving the Russian lighthouses. Hence, it is vitally important to push forward energetically in the area of nuclear safety, with a view to lessening the risks to civilian populations, protecting the environment, and preventing fissile and radioactive materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or other criminals.

And the Chernobyl catastrophe showed us the devastation that could ensue at nuclear power plants if sub-standard technology is combined with lax safety. Several nuclear power plants of essentially the same type as the on in Chernoby still are on line.

We will of course never be able to protect ourselves one hundred percent against these or other CBRN-related risks. Apart from the risk of a terrorist attack, there is the risk of natural disasters, new viruses such as the Asian bird flu come to mind, or human error causing emergencies. That is why it is so important that we, while hoping for the best, prepare ourselves for the worst.

Civil emergency planning is a national responsibility. And it should continue to be so. But we do also have an obligation to our populations to work together. We have an obligation to ensure that best practices are shared within the Alliance and with partners. We have an obligation to ensure that if the worst were to happen, our police, our firefighters and our health services – our first line of defence, - have recourse to the the best procedures, the best training, and the best equipment we can possibly provide.

And it is in our common interest that the first responders are capable of receiving or giving assistance across national borders, quickly and without loss of efficiency.

It was against this background that the joint initiative by Finland, Sweden and Norway was born. We recognised that guidelines and voluntary minimum standards for the protection against CBRN risks would be of value to all countries, Alliance members and EAPC partners alike.

I find it particularly important that partner countries are playing a crucial role in this initiative. This conference and its follow-up would not have been possible were it not for the efforts of Finland and Sweden. And most other partner countries is to have enthusiastically embraced the cause of civil emergency protection against CBRN-related risks. Hence this is a very concrete way of bringing substance to the EAPC, while at the same time enhancing the value of this work to NATO. This, it seems to me, is what this partnership is all about.

With the interest and commitment shown by all the governments represented here today, I am confident that this Conference will result in concrete and constructive recommendations for how this important work should be taken forward both in NATO and in all member and partner countries.

And I would be particularly interested to see specific recommendations for closer co-operation between NATO and other international organisations, particularly the EU. This work should also be taken forward within the NATO-Russia Council. Russia is an important partner, in this as in so many other areas.

In conclusion, I would encourage you to keep in sharp focus the need for increased interoperability. There is no other word more popular on the military side of the house. But our colleagues in uniform have a point. From experience, I know and understand the value of interoperability when we act together. Guidelines and voluntary minimum standards are an important step on the way towards a greater degree of interoperability also when it comes to protecting our civilian populations.

Thank you for your attention.