Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Traavik

Managing Nuclear Stockpiles in the 21st Century

Opening Statement at a Seminar in Oslo 3rd March 2005

I am grateful to the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority for convening this timely seminar.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons clearly is one of the most urgent security challenges facing the international community.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the first line of defense against the spread of these ultimate weapons of mass destruction. But today, the Treaty is being severely tested, against the backdrop of a radically altered security landscape.

Three phenomena are particularly important in this regard.

First, the emergence of a nuclear black market. The uncovering of Dr. Kahn’s network was a wake-up call to anyone who may have doubted the urgency of the threat.

Second, the determined efforts by additional countries to aquire the technology to produce the fissile materials needed to manufacture nuclear weapons.

North Korea is of course the principal case in point. But there are grounds for concern also with regard to Iran’s nuclear programme.

And third, the well-documented efforts of terrorists to acquire nuclear, radiological and other weapons of mass destruction.

Clearly, the NPT is at risk from within and from without. In the words of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Risks:

”We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation”.

Stopping that erosion and shoring up the the non-proliferation regime is an urgent objective. To that end, the upcoming NPT Review Conference will be exceptionally important.

Yet the international community is struggling to arrive at a common view of the way ahead, as regards both the NPT and the broader non-proliferation efforts.

Instead, States parties to the NPT are at odds about whether the focus should be, respectively, on nuclear disarmament or on nuclear non-proliferation.

But this is not an either-or situation. The NPT itself was of course founded upon the twin pillars of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non- proliferation. The two are inseparable and mutually reinforcing.

A succesful outcome of the Review Conference will depend upon our ability to address equally, equitably, and in a balanced manner, both of these two dimensions.

The nuclear weapon states must lead the way, by honoring their commitments under the Treaty to carry out irreversible cuts in their nuclear arsenals, and by diminishing the role of these weapons in their security policies.

But we also need to take concrete steps to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. For example, the universalisation of the IAEA Additional Protocol is urgently needed.

Management of nuclear stockpiles is an important part of the challenge before us. Hence, we welcome the efforts of Hans Blix and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission on this crucial issue.

To halt the spread of nuclear weapons, it is obviously of crucial importance to tighten controls on nuclear weapons material and end the production of such material.

The nighmare vision of nuclear terrorism has given fissile material stockpiles a new and unwelcome importance. There is an urgent need to bring this material under international control.

Fissile material is the key ingredient in developing nuclear weapons. Today, there is sufficient fissile material in existence to produce tens of thousands of weapons.

Hence, we will only be able to curb the development of nuclear weapons if we address the challenges relating both to existing stockpiles and to future production of fissile material.

To prevent the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons, it is essential to ensure that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty enters into force.

Timely negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty is another crucial step. Norway has always considered it vital to achieve a multilateral and verifiable agreement banning future production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

If we are to reach that goal, the logjam at the Conference on Disamament must be broken. We are convinced that the CD could play an important role. It is high time that we cut through the Gordian knot with which the CD has been bound in recent years.

It is becoming increasingly important to include civilian fissile material in our non-proliferation efforts. Civilian enrichment and reprocessing capabilities can be misused to develop clandestine nuclear programmes.

A cut-off treaty should therefore ideally include civilian fuel cycles. The recent report of the IAEA experts is a useful contribution in this regard.

Norway would have preferred that the scope of the fissile material treaty negotiations also addressed existing stocks. However, we recognise that it would be difficult to achieve consensus on this issue.

In the meantime, all nuclear weapons states should place fissile material that is no longer required for military purposes under the IAEA verification regime.

And the IAEA must be given the opportunity to verify existing stockpiles of fissile material. Verification obviously is an essential component in any arms control agreement.

In addition to curbing production and control of excess stocks, the physical protection of fissile material must be addressed. We firmly support the efforts of the IAEA in this field, inter alia through the Nuclear Security Fund.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Multilateral treaties can and should be supplemented by less formalized non-proliferation initiatives and partnerships.

The G8 Global Partnership against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction is a case in point. There can be no doubt that this partnership is a crucial contribution to making the world safer.

Norway was the first non-G8 country to join the Partnership. The Kola Peninsula, just across our border with Russia in the North, has the world’s largest concentration of nuclear installations, as well as vast amounts of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

Many of these substances and materials represent a very real proliferation hazard. For example, there have been many attempted thefts of highly radioactive strontium batteries used to power lighthouses along the Russian coastline.

This is why, ten years ago, we initiated comprehensive nuclear safety cooperation with our neighbour Russia. We are committed to continuing this cooperation.

And we are gratified that nuclear safety has become an integral part of the broader international efforts to counter the new security threats; international terrorism and the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

Ladies and gentlemen,

By way of conclusion, let me return to where I started.

This conference is one of many events leading up to the NPT Review Conference later this year. I hope that in the course of your deliberations you will come up with ideas and recommendations that may facilitate the work of the Review Conference.

That is a tall order, but the effort is needed. A successful, balanced outcome of the Review Conference is indispensible if we are to stave off the erosion of the non-proliferation regime to which the UN Secretary-General’s High-level panel referred.