Deputy Minister, Mr. Kim Traavik

Opening statement at the Contact Expert Group Seminar on RTGs

Oslo, 16 February 2005

( Forklarende tekst på norsk)

Mr. Chairman,

Ladies and Gentlemen.

I take great pleasure in welcoming all of you to Oslo and this workshop on the challenges related to Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, or RTGs, that serve as power generators in hundreds of lighthouses along the Russian coastline.

We are extremely pleased to host this gathering of prominent experts, all the more so since it is held under the auspices of the Contact Expert Group of the IAEA.

As we see it, the CEG has become the most important forum for developing priorities and co-ordinating international projects aimed at assisting the Russian Federation in the field of nuclear safety and security.

The issue before us is an important one. RTGs are powered by highly radioactive strontium batteries. By and large they are unsecured and accessible. Hence, they represent a very real proliferation hazard.

Recently, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, as well as the high level panel on UN reform, have pointed to disturbing evidence of increased efforts on the part of terrorist networks to acquire weapons or materials of mass destruction.

Extremists could create chaos, panic, and suffering without having access to advanced or sophisticated weapons or agents. Rudimentary radiological weapons of the type known as “dirty bombs” would suffice.

If RTG batteries were to fall into the hands of terrorists, they could be used to put together such devices. And this is not a purely theoretical threat.

In the recent past, lighthouses have been tampered with and parts stolen on several occasions. To be sure, the purpose of the perpetrators appears to have been gaining access to valuable scrap metal. But the motive could equally have been linked to more sinister designs, including terrorism. Hence, these are ominous events about which there is every reason to be concerned.

Let me note in passing, furthermore, that there have also been other incidents involving RTGs. I understand this will be a topic for discussion later during this workshop.

Against this backdrop, the task before us is clearly urgent. And the way we deal with it is important, too. Co-ordination among donors and avoidance of overlap will be crucial if we are to produce optimal results in as limited a timeframe as possible.

Norway has been actively engaged in dealing with nuclear safety and security issues in Northwestern Russia for the past ten years. Over this period, we have spent more than 1 billion NOK (approximately 150 million USD).

In the beginning, there was hardly any experience to learn from, little knowledge about the volume and complexity of the challenges, and limited openness on the Russian side in many areas. Much has changed since then.

Step by step we have built an exceptionally close and productive cooperation with our Russian partners. Let me pay particular tribute in

this regard to my friend Sergey Antipov, who is with us this morning.

Along with the United States, Norway was the first of Russia’s international partners to become involved in nuclear safety cooperation. At the time, nuclear safety was perceived as primarily a regional environmental issue.

11 September 2001 shattered that perception, of course. Nuclear safety has become an integral part of our joint efforts to counter new security threats such as terrorism and the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

Much has been accomplished since that tragic day. The formation almost four years ago of the G-8 Global Partnership was a watershed event. If we follow through on the commitments we have made, there is a realistic hope that major parts of the job will be done by the end of the present decade or the beginning of the next.

If that is to happen, however, broad and concerted international action and sustained involvement on the part of individual donors will be required. We for our part are committed to continuing and further developing our nuclear safety cooperation with Russia

There is broad consensus in this country as to the importance of this work. Our guiding principles will continue to be the achievement of tangible results, value for money, and close cooperation with Russian authorities.

Our priority areas of cooperation are firstly rehabilitation of the Andreyev Bay storage site for nuclear waste, secondly, dismantling of multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarines, and thirdly removal of RTGs in Northwest Russia.

Norwegian-Russian cooperation on securing RTGs in Northwest Russia goes back to 1997. So far, we have provided funding for the removal of 60 RTGs, and the installation of environmentally friendly solar-cell panels in 37 lighthouses.

Norway very much appreciates the interest shown by a number of donor countries in the RTG project. As noted, the RTGs are threats to the environment and a real proliferation hazard.

But removing and replacing them is a very concrete and manageable task, which could be accomplished in the foreseeable future, provided efforts are well co-ordinated and labour efficiently divided.

Norway’s is ready to take the lead and a primary responsibility for ensuring the removal and replacement of all the 110 remaining RTGs along the northern coast of the Russian part of the Barents region, i.e. the regions of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Nenets, by the year 2008.

To this end, we are currently exploring the possibility of signing an agreement of intention with Rosatom, identifying this as a Norwegian responsibility.

However, there are one thousand RTGs mounted in lighthouses and navigation beacons along the northern and eastern coast of the Russian Federation – from Murmansk to Vladivostok.

My hope is that other donors will follow Norway’s example, and co-operate with Russia in removing RTGs from all parts of the Russian territory – in the Baltic Sea, along the northern sea route in Siberia and in the Russian Far East.

The United States and the IAEA are already involved and active in this work. Recovering RTGs and other orphan sources in the former Soviet Union was an important part of the “Trilateral Initiative” between the US, Russia, and the IAEA.

Last year’s US-led Global Threat Reduction Initiative also focused on the need to reduce the global radiological threat posed by vulnerable radioactive sources. We look forward to hearing more about these efforts later in the course of the workshop.

The responsibility for the co-ordination of international efforts lies, of course, with the government of Russia. My understanding is that some work still remains in order to have a full overview of all RTGs belonging to various Russian organisations, and their exact location and condition.

The objectives of this workshop are to increase awareness of the proliferation and environmental risks posed by RTGs, and to exchange information and experience from completed and ongoing projects. As a result of the workshop, we hope that donors may be able to define specific activities and co-ordinate their efforts.

This workshop is timely and highly valuable. Hence, in conclusion I would like to thank the Contact Expert Group for the initiative. I hope and trust the workshop will be a productive one, and that it will generate constructive recommendations leading to practical results.

Thank you for your attention.