Deputy Minister Kim Traavik

Opening statement on the NPT

Holmenkollen Park Hotel, Oslo,
1 March 2005

I take great pleasure in welcoming all of you to this workshop on the upcoming NPT Review Conference. And I am pleased to note the presence of so many eminent participants from all regions. Surely that must be seen as an expression of a shared concern about the future viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general and the NPT in particular.

Although there may be diverging views on certain issues on our disarmament agenda, there is near unanimity that the NPT is a cornerstone of our collective security. The Treaty was negotiated during the Cold War, but it remains as relevant and as needed as ever.

Hence, the international community must give and of course does give high priority to preserving and further strengthening the integrity of this vital treaty. And we must secure full compliance with the NPT by all States Parties.

That, of course, is a daunting challenge. Today, the non-proliferation regime is at risk because of lack of compliance with existing commitments; withdrawal or threats of withdrawal from the NPT to escape those commitments; and a changing international security environment, including well-documented efforts on the part of terrorist networks to gain access to nuclear and radiological as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

As the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change put it in its report: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation”.

Stopping that erosion and shoring up the NPT Treaty clearly is a vital concern. The stakes are high, for present as well as future generations. Yet we, the States Parties, are still struggling to formulate a common view of how to move the NPT process forward.

The last meeting of the Preparatory Committee even failed to agree on the agenda for the Conference. On the other hand the designation of Ambassador Sergio Duarte as President of the Review Conference was a welcome development.

Let me pay tribute to Ambassador Duarte’s great efforts to mobilise consensus on outstanding procedural as well as substantive issues. It is a great pleasure to have Ambassador Duarte with us here this morning.

During this workshop we should address substantive issues. Most of them are complex and difficult. There are strong and divergent views on many of them among the States Parties represented here today.

But it is vitally important that we start addressing these difficult questions as soon as possible. Otherwise we run the risk that four weeks in New York will not suffice. The previous consultations in Bali and Tokyo have made important contributions, which we can use in the task ahead of us.

You have all received a non-paper that we have put together for this workshop. Let me stress that it is meant to be a discussion paper. It is intended as the proverbial food for thought, and does not necessarily represent Norwegian positions. We hope, however, that the non-paper will facilitate a substantive exchange with a view to broadening common ground.

Given the necessary political will on the part of all concerned, we believe a successful outcome of the Review Conference is achievable. But that also depends on our ability to address equally and in a balanced manner every aspect of the Treaty.

As already noted, the report of the UN High-level Panel emphasises the dangers posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But equally the report reminds us that the NPT contains clear disarmament obligations.

Hence, it seems to us, a successful outcome of the Review Conference should include a balanced strengthening of commitments regarding nuclear non-proliferation as well as nuclear disarmament.

After all, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are two sides of the same coin. They are mutually reinforcing. Effective and credible non-proliferation leads to increased confidence between states. This is an essential condition for obtaining further reductions in nuclear weapons.

And in order to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the wrong hands, including the hands of terrorists, a combination of effective non-proliferation measures and a continuing process of irreversible nuclear disarmament is required.

We need to take the necessary steps to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The universalisation of the IAEA Additional Protocol is urgently needed, irrespective of the pace of progress on other parts of the NPT agenda. We should also look into the issue of the nuclear fuel cycle and consider in that regard recommendations from IAEA experts.

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is evident that we are lagging behind in implementing obligations set forth by the 2000 Review Conference. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has yet to enter into force. The stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament has prevented us from delivering on our obligation to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. While we welcome the Moscow Treaty on reductions in strategic arms, we need further cuts in the nuclear arsenals.

And we need to focus on how to put in place a set of legally binding negative security assurances.

Our task in New York in May is to bridge the differences and achieve consensus on the effective functioning of the NPT, no less, no more.

Clearly, a grand bargain of this kind will be possible only on the basis of a spirit of compromise and mutual accomodation on the part of all States Parties. Let us go the extra mile to ensure a positive and balanced outcome of the Review Conference.

I hope this workshop will make a contribution to that end, and wish you every success in your discussions.