Minister of Defence Jørgen Kosmo

«Defence and security:
perspectives and priorities»

Leangkollen seminaret, February 5th 1996

Introduction

Ladies and gentlemen,

My point of departure for this address seems at first clear-cut and distinct;
Defence and security are both familiar terms. However, over the last few years the European continent has been an area of historic and dramatic change, which has triggered a redefinition of important aspects of these terms.
Ten years ago we directed the main attention towards a substantial reduction of the numbers of strategic and tactical nuclear forces on a global scale.
Five years ago the Soviet Union collapsed, as did the Warsaw Pact.
Today Europe is characterised by rapid change, as the stable, fairly predictable, though very dangerous Cold War era has been replaced by a climate that is far less dangerous, but, nevertheless, characterised by instability and unpredictability.

The political, economic and social upheavals in Europe since 1989 have resulted in fundamental changes in the nature of European security policy. This process of change is likely to continue. The challenge of today includes utilising new opportunities to develop more stable patterns of security and co-operation. This new security structure must be flexible enough to accommodate the dynamics of current events in Europe. Nevertheless, we must maintain institutions and co-operation agreements that have provided the necessary stability throughout the post-war years, and adapt them to the new era. We will have to build on what we have. There is no starting from zero.

Not only the security landscape, but also the very substance of our security policy have undergone fundamental changes.
More than ever, we realise that our security rests on several pillars. The expanded security concept reflects an increased awareness of the significance of democracy, economic and social stability, environmental concerns, and ethnic and national issues . European security is not simply a question of state security, of territorial integrity and national independence; it includes a concern for a peaceful, just and secure social order for the individual, and for groups of citizens as well.

The current situation makes new and greater demands on our security policy. In some areas, we must be willing to explore new solutions in order to find the right balance between new and familiar instruments that continue to play an important role. We are well aware, for instance, that many international processes and problems are interconnected, but translating this awareness into action by wide diversity of international instruments requires time, creativity and patience.

In short, today's broader and more diversified range of security challenges calls for a wide and varied set of political and institutional instruments. National, regional and pan-European co-operation must be combined in a network of collaboration that has a mutually reinforcing effect.

For Norway, transatlantic and European co-operation provide the point of departure. Our contribution to a new European security structure is based on these two frameworks. Our geographical position at the intersection between the Atlantic, the European and the Russian dimensions of European security, demands a broad perspective. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, this position has enabled us to contribute to a completely new level of co-operation across the former dividing lines, particularly with Russia and the Baltic States. We have aimed at integrating these new co-operative efforts within the broader multilateral frameworks of European and Atlantic co-operation.

In this era of change and new challenges, Norway will continue its active role as a contributor to international peace and stability. Our broad international commitment to peacekeeping operations, exemplifies our ability and willingness to operate outside our borders, to contribute to international solutions and crisis management. We are a major participant in United Nations' peace operations, and we are also actively involved in the implementation force of Nato in Bosnia Herzegovina.

At the same time we are actively working towards increased co-operation in Northern Europe by making full use of the new opportunities offered within the framework of Partnership for Peace, and, more generally, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Let me underline, however, that the bedrock on which these new efforts are based, is a NATO capable of maintaining its core functions as the very key to stability in Europe. At the same time, Norway strongly supports NATO's new role in crisis management outside its area of responsibility, with an international mandate from the UN or OSCE.

N A T O

In recent years, NATO has undergone a major transformation. This should be no surprise. The Alliance has always adapted to new situations. No organisation can survive successfully for almost 50 years without adjusting to a changing environment. Today the scope of NATO's activities has been extended, and assisting the reform process in the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe has become a central task. Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) are the most important instruments at NATO's disposal. The PfP addresses the military aspects of the reform process in the new democracies, and one of its important tasks is to help ensure democratic civilian control of the armed forces. In addition, the PfP serves as a vehicle to prepare the accession of some of these countries into the Alliance. But, in my view of no less importance, PfP will be the bedrock for deepened relations between European nations in the field of defence - irrespective of future membership in NATO. As co-operation through the PfP is well on track, we must continue our support for this institutional framework and try to develop its full potentials. Thus, as several partners are currently making substantial contributions to NATO's implementation force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we must in due time evaluate the lessons learned from the IFOR-operation and consider how they may be used in future PfP activities.

Enlarging the Alliance is part of the effort to integrate Central and Eastern Europe into the Western structures. This process originated with the declaration adopted at the NATO summit in January 1994, which in principle established that the Alliance is open to new members. Again, I would like to stress that this neither represents a unique nor a new trend within NATO. New members have joined NATO since 1949, and new members will join again. The declaration at the NATO summit in 1994 expressed willingness to meet the security concerns of the new democracies and a way to contribute to stability and to consolidate their domestic reform process.

Last fall, NATO presented the results of its internal study on the political and practical aspects of an enlargement. This study is based on the fundamental principle that enlargement should promote stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, and that it must be compatible with a continued fulfillment of NATO's core functions.

The study was the first stage of a process aiming at enlarging the Alliance. However, NATO enlargement will take place on the basis of careful consideration. It is too early to say who the new members will be or when enlargement can take place. The process is going to take time. It must be carefully conducted to ensure that it does not conflict with the overall security policy objectives of NATO's members.

As we proceed with NATO's enlargement in 1996, it will be necessary to review a number of issues to which last year's study was only able to devote limited attention. These issues include the financing of an enlarged alliance, the need for infrastructure investments in the new member countries, changes in NATO's military forces and command structure, and the willingness and ability of new members to adapt to the consensus-based structure NATO has developed over the last 50 years. NATO must, and, I stress, will, take the time needed to address these issues.

From a Norwegian perspective I would like to emphasise that the goal of the enlargement process is primarily political and not military.
Enlargement will not target any particular country. We consider it essential that NATO's enlargement should contribute to the development of security structures that safeguard the interests of all the parties involved, whether they are included in the first stage of enlargement or not. The objective is greater security and stability in Europe as a whole.

The evolution of NATO's relations with Russia is a primary concern. Efforts must be made to strengthen co-operation between NATO and Russia, channeled through NACC and PfP. The individual partnership programme of Russia may, I hope, be instrumental in the restructuring of the Russian armed forces. Regular contacts between military representatives of NATO and Russia will promote a climate of trust and openness and reduce suspicion to NATO's continued vitality and mode of operation. Russia's participation in IFOR, which is substantial and important, may indeed serve a variety of functions. The experience as comrades-in-arms with NATO forces, in the ambitious effort to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina, will in my view undoubtedly be the most valuable practical contribution towards even deeper relations between Russia and NATO. Russian authorities today have an unlimited opportunity to consult with NATO on all issues regarding the IFOR-operation. This new partnership, 16+1 as it is called in NATO, may become a model for other issues of common concern in the future.
In conclusion, we must take advantage of this new co-operation, and it's political mechanism to create the basis for a solid foundation for a strategic relationship with Russia outside the framework of PfP.

As a major power on the European continent, Russia ought to have a central position in the new security policy order. Broad Russian participation and constructive Russian inputs are essential to the new European security structure. Without Russian participation and co-operation, security and stability to which all European states, including Russia, are entitled, will not be achieved.

The European Dimension

While NATO's efforts primarily relate to security and defence policy, the European Union has a broader focus in political and economic terms. Support for political and economic reforms and the integration of Central and Eastern European states into European and Euro-Atlantic structures are significant contributions in the enhancement of stability and security throughout Europe.

The future status of security and defence issues within EU will be a key topic at the Intergovernmental Conference, later this year. Thus, the future role and position of the Western European Union will be a major issue at the conference. We know that most of our European allies are prepared to strengthen the WEU, based on the organisation's dual role as EU's defence component and NATO's European pillar. Given the required shift in transatlantic burdensharing; and the necessity of implementing concrete measures to follow up the increased European responsibility for European and international security these steps seem necessary.

Norway seeks active participation in the development of European security and defence co-operation, as well as in the context of WEU. European security and defence co-operation should, therefore, develop in a way that ensures full participation of all European allies, and, at the same time, facilitate the participation of more European states.

However, let me add that in the European process we regard transatlantic harmony and active American participation in Europe to be vital and necessary. Without a broadly based US involvement, there will be less potential for successful resolution of regional conflicts, further disarmament and arms control, and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Without US involvement in Europe, the new security architecture will be less effective and credible.

Norway considers the transatlantic ties to be of fundamental importance.
We face a special challenge in maintaining and developing our close relations to indispensable North American and European partners. We regard close ties with the United States and the closest possible links with our European allies as two sides of the same coin. Therefore it is also in Norway's interest to strengthen the transatlantic dialogue. Norway considers it crucial that expanded ties across the Atlantic include all the European and North American allies. In other words, it is essential that the European voice in a renewed transatlantic dialogue is not limited to EU member states.

Let me linked to what I just said, take this opportunity to welcome the French announcing that Paris now is prepared to increase its participation in NATO's defence structures. Fullest possible French participation in NATO, including defence planning and integrated military structure, will be a major contribution to European security, and to transatlantic fortification.

Regional Aspects

During the Cold War, the situation in the North was characterised by the overall tension between East and West. In addition, the strategic importance of the Kola region was vital for the former Soviet Union. Norwegian security depended heavily on Allied reinforcements in the event of crisis or war.
At the same time, Norwegian security policy included several unilateral restrictions in order to promote stability and the lowest tensions possible in our immediate surroundings. During these years the Norwegian Government established certain regulations on Allied military activities in Norway - later referred to as our self-imposed restraints, a topic I will get back to later.

The geo-political changes in Europe over the past few years have changed the picture - almost entirely. Norway and NATO, do not face a direct military threat from the east any longer. To Norway, as for most other European countries, the new security environment represents a most welcome opportunity to establish and develop new political ties with the new democracies of Europe.

In contrast to two of our Nordic neighbours, Sweden and Denmark, Norway has not played a major historical role in the Baltic Sea region. In fact, Norway never became a regional power in that part of Northern Europe. The Norwegian orientation towards the Baltic Sea region, which today includes a variety of co-operation measures, is of rather new date. However, our efforts towards increased participation and co-operation in that region is a natural consequence of the historical transformations of the early nineties - which has given the Baltic Sea region a unique opportunity to change from an area of political confrontation into an area of co-operation and political and economic development. With the absence of a dividing line in Europe, Denmark's, Sweden's and Finland's membership of the EU, and with the Baltic countries and Poland strengthening their ties towards the West, a new and promising field of co-operation is apparent.

Norwegian security policy is directed towards securing our interests through international co-operative mechanisms and by seeking how these tools develop. Furthermore, given Norway's limited size and resources, the focus of our security policy in a regonal context is directed towards our neighbouring surroundings. By this I mean Northern Europe, which comprises the Baltic Sea region as well.
The Nordic and the Nordic-Baltic perspectives are by necessity two areas of active Norwegian international participation. Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, but of the EU and they are observers to the WEU. Denmark and Norway are members of NATO, but pursue different policies with regard to the WEU. Despite these differences, there is currently a great potential for further development of foreign and security policy co-operation in the region. In this context, the common platform of PfP provides a solid foundation for an extensive broadening of Nordic-Baltic security co-operation.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed changes as to how our allies look at security in the far north. This has positive, as well as negative consequences for Norway. In parallel with this development, the position of the Baltic region has been strengthened as a focal point for the EU's new Nordic dimension.
We have acknowledged this «rotation» in Northern European security policy. In spite of the fact that Norway is not a Baltic country, we currently contribute substantially to the Nordic-Baltic co-operative environment. Stability in the Baltic region is a prerequisite for stability in Northern Europe as a whole. I would like to stress that this is directly linked to stable and predictable relations between the Baltic countries and Russia.

As a natural consequence of our growing interests in the Baltic sea region, I signed bilateral agreements on defence-related co-operation with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during my official visits in August 1995.

The emphasis of these agreements are on various kinds of military and defence related education and training. Their aim is to regulate future co-operation, both bilaterally and within the framework of PfP. At present we are negotiating a similar agreement with Poland.

Furthermore, Nordic-Baltic Defence Ministers' Seminar is held once a year. In 1996 our meeting will take place in Lithuania. At these seminars, matters of common interest are discussed in an open and informal atmosphere. A variety of co-operation activities at different levels have been established between the Nordic countries and the Baltic states to assist them in their efforts towards democratisation and rebuilding of their national defences. In this respect, our contribution to the establishment of a Baltic peacekeeping battalion, known as the BALTBAT, represents the most comprehensive Norwegian defence related project in support of Central and Eastern Europe. The establishment of BALTBAT is a large-scale project and, as such, it is also our largest single project under the PfP-programme.
The Baltic states have expressed their desire to be able to contribute forces to peace operations under the auspices of the United Nations or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Extensive Norwegian experience as a frequent participant in peace operations, makes us particularly suited to contribute to the establishment of the Baltic peacekeeping battalion.

The Norwegian and Nordic involvement in the Baltic Sea region must, however, be seen in a wider European context. Other Western countries are engaged in various forms of support as well. The Scandinavian countries are not alone in having a clear responsibility to assist our Baltic friends. A broader European framework is the only realistic approach to this challenge.

Russia

Russia is currently undergoing a difficult transitional phase. The development of democracy and market economy demands enormous efforts. We must continue supporting the shift towards democracy and help promote economic and social advances.
The development of a broad political, military and economic co-operation with Russia is a crucial element in the new European security framework. The integration of Russia into an international co-operation structure will be an investment towards European peace.

Given our proximity to Russia, good relations with Moscow are especially important to Norway. Although Russia may not constitute a military threat today, we can not ignore the fact that considerable military forces are still stationed near our borders. The northern areas still hold great strategic importance to Russia.

Russia continues to be a significant dimension in Norwegian security policy. Norwegian defence planning and security policy are influenced significantly by existing uncertainty in Russian politics.
The military threat against Norway, on the other hand, is significantly reduced. Russian - Norwegian relations, in many areas, have improved considerably over the last few years.

Norway's position as Russia's neighbour in the north, gives us a opportunity to act in the forefront of co-operative relations between East and West. In this context, our link with Russia is being seen in a larger multilateral context, including our allies in NATO, other countries and Russia.

Norway's main aim is to continue to pursue good bilateral relations and engage in active dialogue with Russia, while drawing Moscow more closely into a regional European as well as broader international security context.

In the field of security and defence our relations with Russia have developed gradually. The PfP engages in multilateral co-operation with Russia. This network covers a variety of activities. Also, trilateral co-operation between Russia, the USA and Norway have been established in order to handle problems related to military pollution. Through these initiatives we hope to contribute in solving problems related to nuclear waste.

During my visit to Russia in December last year, my Russian colleague, Minister Grachev, and I signed two bilateral agreements. One on defence related co-operation between our two Ministries of Defence and our Armed Forces, the other on bilateral defence related environmental issues. We also agreed to establish closer contacts between regional military commanders in Northern Norway and the Murmansk area.
Although bilateral relations between Russia and Norway will broaden in years to come, our relationship - to some extent - will always be characterised by a degree of imbalance. From a Norwegian point of view our NATO-membership will compensate for a major part of this imbalance, and it has enabled Norway, as a small country, to actively participate and pursue a dialogue of co-operation.

The Norwegian Parliament's decision to adapt self-imposed restraints on Allied military activities in Norway, should be viewed in a larger context. Until now, these restraints have applied to Allied military activities only. In the new security environment, however, countries other than our Allies could carry out military activities in Norway as well; especially as a part of the PfP-programme. Thus, any new regulations must apply to all foreign military activity in Norway - as we must participate fully in exercises within the framework of the PfP. Agreements regarding disarmament and arms control, and on confidence and security-building measures have led to a comprehensive system of advance notification and observer arrangements for large-scale military exercises.
Today, data-exchange concerning forces and inspection arrangements have replaced the needs for predictability that our more detailed self-imposed restraints once provided.

Special arrangements for the county of Finnmark have been eased and routines simplified. Small allied and other military units will be permitted to conduct exercises and training in the area, particularly in the PfP-framework.
Large-scale allied exercises are not on the agenda. Allied aircraft will be allowed over Finnmark in connection with visits and inspections in Russia. However, I would like to stress that the adapting of our self-imposed restraints does not at all influence the main lines in Norwegian policy concerning foreign military activity on our territory. This is illustrated by the fact that our base and nuclear policy remain unaltered. Despite this, the restraints will not prevent Norway from participating fully in any multinational contingencies that are in the process of being established under the auspices of NATO and the WEU.

One of Norway's important contributions to the integration of Russia into the international environment followed an initiative taken by former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg. He proposed cross-border regional co-operation in the north to include both Russian and Scandinavian territory. In the Norwegian town of Kirkenes in January 1993 foreign ministers and representatives of the Nordic countries, the European Union and Russia signed a declaration on expanded co-operation in the Barents Region. The region itself covers the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and North-western Russia, including the counties of Murmansk and Archangel as well as the republic of Karelia. The Barents Cooperation has had two main strategic objectives; the establishment of normal neighbourly relations across the former East/West divide in the north, and, promotion of economic and social development in the Barents Region itself.

The overriding objective of the Norwegian Government's Barents Region initiative was, and still is related to security policy in the broadest sense of the word. Regional co-operation in the north may contribute to confidence-building, create interdependence and thus, enhance security - or to quote my predecessor Johan Jørgen Holst who once stated that «we intend to create a meeting place, a forum for dialogue and a framework that can be used as a basis for establishing new and lasting networks across national borders.........The Barents Cooperation is mainly concerned with building bridges across the gap created by three-quarters of a century of closed borders, broken ties and mutual distrust.»

There is a European dimension to the Barents Cooperation. This is underscored by the fact that the European Commission is a full member of the Barents Council. Indeed, the Barents Cooperation provides a forum for relations between the EU and Russia. Two new members of the EU, Sweden and Finland, are, along with Russia and Norway actively pursuing their interests in the Barents region. In addition, several European countries, including the United Kingdom and Germany, as well as Japan, the USA and Canada have observers status in the Barents Council.

The CFE Treaty: 1996 Review Conference

Above, I have given you a picture of what we have achieved in regard to improvements in security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. A lot is at stake if we fail in advancing the co-operative environment. A cornerstone in the shaping of a new European security architecture after the Cold War, is the CFE Treaty - which represents a landmark in the history of conventional arms control. The full and timely implementation of the Treaty will be the ultimate test of the political will to take this new architecture seriously.

It is in our common interest to secure long-term stability within the area the CFE-Treaty applies. A central objective of the Treaty is to achieve stability at lower force levels. The Treaty's subceilings were, as you know, designed to prevent regional concentrations of forces. You will recall also that the Treaty, in addition, represents a fundamental bedrock in NATO's adjustment process. It should suffice to mention NATO's Strategic Concept which, in paragraph seven, «assumes the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty.» It further reads that the «the implementation of the Strategic Concept will be kept under review» in the light of fulfilling this assumption. It goes without saying that national defence plans within NATO are based on the same fundamental presumption.

Most signatories complied with the Treaty provisions ahead of the November 1995 deadline. Russia did comply with the overall national ceilings, but has not fulfilled the obligations stemming from the zonal regime. We must now concentrate our efforts to encourage necessary Russian political will to do so.

A certain degree of predictability in our national defence planning, as well as in a NATO context, is still essential. Without a more co-operative Russian attitude, full implementation will be virtually impossible. A continuation of the present ambiguous situation is not in our interest. We should seek to find a solution that ensures the future integrity and effectiveness of the Treaty; both as an arms control regime and as a crisis management mechanism.

Conclusion

As you can see the challenges facing European security and stability are numerous and diverse. In order to achieve our common goals for a stable and secure Europe, we need to continue our vigorous work. Today forces from NATO countries and from Central and Eastern European partners are jointly undertaking a daring assignment in Bosnia-Herzegovina; to provide a lasting peace and a basis for economic and social reconstruction. The IFOR-operation has again brought the trans-Atlantic partners together in one mission.
The operation shows willingness and ability on the part of NATO and its partners to assist a war-tired people. That is - in my view - the very idea of being partners for peace.

I am sure the following days at Leangkollen will be of interest to you all and give you an opportunity to discuss several aspects of the international political agenda.

I thank you all for your attention.

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Lagt inn 5 februar 1996 av Statens forvaltningstjeneste, ODIN-redaksjonen