Minister of Defence Jørgen Kosmo

Long-term challenges for Norwegian defense

Oslo Militære Samfund, 8 January 1996

Your Majesty, Chief of Defence, Ladies and Gentlemen,

An analysis of the long-term challenges facing the Norwegian Defence Organization should estimate current security conditions and evaluate how these conditions may develop into the next millennium. The end of the Cold War has triggered new planning and development, and Norwegian defence, at a time of great uncertainty, is in the process of adjusting itself to the new international security climate. Given the continued uncertain and unpredictable international environment, we believe adjustment is the best suited method to confront the challenges ahead.

Recent years have been flavoured by a substantial, though necessary, restructuring of our defence forces. New efforts have been made to adapt to the requirements our memberships in international organizations call for. We cannot consider Norwegian defence to be separate from a larger security framework. We must contribute to security in Europe, while maintaining our ability to uphold our defence mechanisms. Norway cannot solely base its structure on imported security. We have, for a long time, been exporters of defence. Our international commitment has underscored our ability to operate outside our own territory, and we should be proud of that endeavour. However, most important of all: We have contributed to peace-keeping wherever it is rendered necessary. At the same time, our international participation pays off in security terms as we may become dependent on outside help. Thus, our international contribution in turn strengthens our defence capabilities. Anything short of participation would isolate us from NATO, WEU, and UN and likely result in serious consequences for our defense capability.

Our traditional defense and security policies remain unaltered. The same holds true for NATO's core functions. A long term challenge is seen in securing planning, financing and implementing of new tasks which strengthen rather than reduce traditional responsibilities. For Norway, this suggests that tasks abroad are relevant to tasks at home. Within NATO, the chief challenge will be to ensure that new initiatives will go hand in hand with the Alliance's core functions. Methods developed or acquired for peace operations, should also be applicable in a more traditional defense structure. Our international commitment must therefore derive from the strengths of our defence forces.

The international situation is still marked by considerable uncertainty. Last year we witnessed the tragic conflict in the former Yugoslavia largely dominating the security scene in Europe. Parts of the former Soviet Union still experience instability and unrest. The same applies to areas in North Africa and the Middle East, regions which once appeared to be of little significance to Norway, but now changes in these areas, may, over time, affect us directly.

On the other hand, 1995 has also been a year of progress and optimism. The work to create lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia is well underway. Efforts to include the Eastern and Central European states into the European security structures have also been made. The same holds true for the attempts to improve coordination between the various organizations dealing with security in post-Cold War Europe. Still, I would like to stress the following: A lot of the important work remains. There are no quick fixes to the challenges facing us. I am convinced that this acknowledgement goes beyond being important, and that it will be a necessary precondition for our country's security and defense policy well into the twenty-first century. The fact that we currently live in a world in which short term interests take precedence over long term needs, suggest that we should deal seriously with challenges at various levels. This is a responsibility which calls for earnest and conscious responses. Therefore it is unfortunate that the Norwegian defence and security dialogue triggers little participation.

IFOR and the situation in the former Yugoslavia

The decision to deploy a comprehensive multinational force under NATO-command in the former Yugoslavia was, perhaps, the most important global security decision in 1995. The deployment also exemplifies a starting point to shed some light over the current security realities Norway and the rest of Europe confront. In this context, the implementation force, IFOR, cannot exclusively be considered militarily. The employment of IFOR and the structure of the force, also underscore the new time in which we live and the changes that have taken place in European defence structures. The force is also, in many ways, an experiment in the work towards finding solutions to new problems. Against this background, the IFOR operation may also result in consequences for the continued development of NATO, the future enlargement process, Nordic military cooperation, and the relationship to Russia. These examples illustrate that IFOR goes beyond the traditional mandate.

The participation in IFOR is important to Norway for a number of reasons. The operation should be considered a natural extension of the comprehensive UN-operation in the area. We now have a historic opportunity to bring peace to a war-fatigued people. The securing of peace in the former Yugoslavia is crucial to pan-European stability. It is also important that Norway is an active player in the bringing about of the extended tasks NATO in recent years has undertaken. Given our long experience with peace-keeping contingencies, Norway contributes with valuable expertise to the IFOR-operation in the former Yugoslavia. Jointly with our Nordic partners, Norway has made a substantial contribution in terms of personnel as well as equipment.

That does not, however, suggest that the IFOR-operation will be smooth and unproblematic. A number of challenges will obviously dominate the military as well as the civilian dimension of the implementation of the peace agreement. In this context, I would like to underscore the close relationship existing between military and civilian means. The IFOR-operation is not an attempt to force the sides into a military solution of the conflict, it is rather a precondition and a basis for the responsibility they must jointly undertake with various civilian actors in order to establish future peace. Against this background, the IFOR-operation will only be an initial, though necessary, starting point for lasting peace in the region. The force is well armed for the assignment, both in regard to equipment and personnel, as well as to plans of operation. This is especially important for the security of the personnel serving in the force, an aspect being emphasized, not the least from a Norwegian and a Nordic perspective.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the Norwegian servicemen for their commendable effort for NATO and the UN. I would like to mention the very positive feedback I have received from other countries cooperating with Norwegian logistics and helicopter personnel in UNPROFOR. It shows a professional attitude on the part of Norwegian servicemen and it documents individuals' willingness to take responsibility under stressful conditions.

Development in NATO

Throughout 1995, NATO has continued its effort towards expansion and cooperation eastwards. The study examining how and why enlargement of NATO will happen is completed, and in 1996 the alliance will continue its dialogue with its partners. Cooperation through PfP has proved to be a successful initiative which has given NATO and its partners important practical experience. This process is of great significance to Norway and to the effort to avoid new dividing lines in Europe. The latter applies first and foremost to the relationship with Russia. This will most likely become a very difficult challenge.

Simultaneously, it is of great importance to Norway that the core functions of NATO and the trans-Atlantic relationship prevail. The bilateral links we seek to uphold and strengthen, not only with the United States, but also with other partners and allies, are crucial. Over the last two years, our two most important agreements with Washington, the COB-Agreement regarding supply support for airplanes, and the agreement prepositioning equipment for a US Marines brigade, have been renegotiated. These have contributed to the expectation that secure, stable and credible allied support will be present in Norway at a time of crisis.

The deployment of IFOR demonstrates NATO's ability to respond to the new challenges arising in the aftermath of the Cold War. At the same time, IFOR may be seen as an extension of PfP encouraging NATO countries to cooperate militarily with a number of different countries; such as Russia, Poland, Sweden, and Finland. I am convinced that the IFOR operation will contribute positively to NATO's ability to deal with future challenges, and in the effort of establishing a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. In this context, the consultation-model created between NATO and Russia, could also set a standard for other aspects of cooperation with Russia inside and outside of the Partnership for Peace framework.

The IFOR operation again exemplifies the United States' will to participate fully in European security. 1995 underscored the importance of jointly undertaking unambiguous and effective initiatives. This aspect is of tremendous importance to the NATO countries mindful of the value of the trans-Atlantic dialogue.

The development within NATO, however, raises significant economic questions. While NATO has undergone restructuring and adjustments to the new era, the members contribute less to the organization's expenditures. Growing imbalance between tasks and resources becomes evident when economic ambitions are lowered. I perceive it to be our principal task to reestablish the balance by rationalizing NATO's resources. Simultaneously, the use of resources must be considered while new initiatives are proposed, in order to avoid undesirable consequences in other fields. If these issues remain unresolved, the core functions of the alliance may, over time, be weakened. The economic backbone of an international institution is always decisive in the ability to resolve its tasks.

The relationship to Europe

Our security relationship to Europe must still be seen in light of our EU referendum of 1994. We cannot allow ourselves, however, to use this is a pretext to become an outside player in the establishing of European security. Given our membership in NATO and our associate status in the WEU, we have an opportunity to influence the debate. Over the last few years, legislation within NATO, EU, and the WEU have been passed creating basis for increased security and integration in Europe. Given the EU Intergovernmental Conference, 1996 will be an important year. The initiatives and commitments we make, in regard to WEU and elsewhere, will decide the degree to which we may influence the European defence and security identity. For that very reason, Norway participates actively in WEU's planning, and we allocate forces the way the full members do. In addition, as I already mentioned, we emphasize to maintain a comprehensive bilateral dialogue with our European allies. As Minister of Defence, I cannot avoid bringing to your attention that our absence at the IGC this year, may have consequences for our own security interests.

Norway's primary goal in this endeavour is to support the developing of a European pillar of NATO while ensuring to avoid any evolving at the expense of traditional NATO cooperation or trans-Atlantic ties. To some, these aims may appear as unbridgeable. I do, however, disagree. A realistic approach to increased defense cooperation in Europe could contribute to strengthened efficiency and cooperation within the alliance. The United States expects assertive allies fully willing to engage in the burdensharing of European security.

A positive signal in this context is the progress made in regard to the Combined Joint Task Force, CJTF, the multinational defense initiative drawing upon participation from various services. The implementation of CJTF has proved difficult given disagreement within NATO's integrated military structure. In recent time, however, progress has been made, and the prospects to reach a satisfactory outcome seem good. Practically speaking, this may indeed be reinforced by the multinational experience at the Balkans and the recent French approach towards closer military ties with NATO. From a Norwegian viewpoint, we welcome France's new attitude towards NATO. Not only because France is an important European ally, but also since it increases the likelihood of finding security consensus in Europe under the auspices of NATO. To Norway this is of vital significance.

Developments in Russia

The development in Russia is still of principal interest to Norwegian security. It is premature to determine where Moscow goes. This uncertainty will likely constitute an important dimension in Norwegian security policies in years to come. The parliamentary elections which took place last December, indicated that there still are strong nationalist and occassional reactionary forces in Russian politics. For this reason there is significant attention linked to the presidential election scheduled for this June.

It is important to underscore that stability in Europe cannot be achieved without Russian participation and that the development in the Arctic and sub-Arctic areas goes beyond Norwegian interests. The latter becomes especially clear within an extended security concept under which other conditions than solely military issues apply.

I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of our bilateral relationship with Russia. While visiting Moscow last December, I signed two agreements with Russia. An agreement between our two defence ministries and armed forces regarding defence and environmental concerns was brought forth. Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and I also agreed on the need to seek closer contacts between Norwegian and Russian officers.

As Norwegians we are quite concerned with the environmental problems in our immediate neighbourhood. This applies particularly to the uncertainty linked with nuclear pollution. In this context, the agreement covering defense related environmental cooperation seems to be a leap towards preventing nuclear pollution in the Arctic area. Our joint effort furthermore include meetings, conferences, exchanges, joint examinations, education, and so forth. From the Norwegian side, we would like to emphasize our efforts towards practical problems. The focus on the major problems should not make us ignore the minor challenges.

During my visit to Russia, we therefore agreed to engage in a joint effort to estimate sources of nuclear contamination in the Arctic area, and to propose a plan combatting pollution. The purpose of such a plan is to create a basis for bilateral and international measures to secure the environment in the Arctic area. Bilateral efforts between Norway and Russia is indeed meant to supplement, rather than replace regional and international cooperation. The wide range of activities going on within Barents cooperation, the work carried out within the EU, and the trilateral efforts established between Norway, Russia, and the United States regarding pollution in the Arctic region, all exemplify this trend. Given its small size, it is important for Norway that as many cooperative aspects with Russia as possible are secured within a multilateral framework.

Arms control and self-imposed retraints

During my visit to Russia, I got an opportunity to discuss the CFE-Treaty. It is of primary importance not to undermine this treaty. As a neighbour, we strongly need Russian military priorities to be understandable and predictable. The fact that Moscow does violate the CFE-Treaty regarding the zonal regime, contributes to uncertainty in our very neighbourhood. In our view, it is therefore important that this unclear situation is not transformed into permanence. Although Russia has deferred the due date for the implementation of the Treaty, I will emphasize that it is in our interests to exhaust dialogue in order to find a solution within the framework of the Treaty. Nobody will benefit from a comprehensive renegotiation or from a Russian withdrawal from the treaty. This underscores the significance of resolving, in close cooperation with our allies, the remaining problems of the CFE-Treaty avoiding the issue to become a bilateral affair between Norway and Russia.

The Russian violation of the «zonal-ceiling» represents a considerable challenge to Norway and NATO. Several countries, among them the United States, have, on a number of occassions argued that Russian inability to comply with the treaty, exemplifies Moscow's limited willingness to play a constructive role in the establishing of a new European security order. As we currently face substantial Russian excesses of the zonal ceilings, the continued enforcement will be decisive in determining the final effect the of CFE-Treaty on Norway. In this regard, Norway seeks to uphold a lasting pressure on Russian and allied officials in order to secure support and to work towards a solution along previous lines.

There has been little progress in the effort to secure Russian ratification of the Start II-Agreement regarding reduction of American and Russian strategic nuclear warheads. The justification for not ratifying the treaty is primarily economic. However, Russias nuclear weapons have an important symbolic value, and, to some extent, increased military importance following Moscow's reduced conventional capabilities. In certain Russian circles, a reduction of the nuclear capability is viewed as an attempt to undermine Russia's position as a great power. It is likely that the parliamentary elections last December contributed to strengthening these forces in Russian politics, and thus complicated the process towards ratification of START I and II. Although Norway does not participate in the START-process, our security will be affected by these agreements. A continued disarmament of Russian nuclear forces will definitely serve Norwegian interests. There are, nevertheless, two issues of which we should be well aware: The implementation of the START-Agreement will result in a relative increase in Russia's sea-based strategic nuclear force, especially that of the Northern Fleet. Also, we should be mindful of the increasing problems relating to storage of decommissioned nuclear warheads. Given its application to problems of nuclear-proliferation, it represents a massive environmental challenge linked to security. Both compliance and follow-up activities seem therefore to affect Norway.

Defence Minister Grachev's statement, linking disarmament to deployment of Russian tactical warheads, should be taken seriously. We may risk Russian compensation for tactical inferiority through deployment of tactical nuclear warheads. I fear that Grachev's comment not only is pre-election rhetoric, but a real military move responding to NATO-enlargement. This illustrates the difficulties in establishing new and comprehensive security structures in Europe. However, it does not suggest that progress is impossible.

In regard to our adjusted self-imposed restraints, I will, again, take this opportunity to emphasize that this effort includes a normalization of relations with Russia. The detailed self-imposed restraints will be replaced by political guidelines from all foreign military activity in Norway. The base and nuclear policy will remain unaltered. Allied military presence in or around Norway which may appear provocative to Russia, will not be considered. We will, however, allow minor military activity in Finnmark, especially in a PfP-context. Major military exercises in Finmark is out of the question, also because of the county's fragile environment. It was necessary to amend the self imposed restraints by making these coincide better with Russian priorities. I may mention, to illustrate that there was a need to change the old policy, that allied ships, while visiting the Kola-peninsula could not go to port in Finmark.

During my visit to Russia last December, my Russian colleague, Defence Minister Grachev, expressed understanding for the changes we have made. In this context, the Russians viewed the question of self-imposed restraints as resolved, and no longer an issue in the Russian-Norwegian dialogue. In my opinion, this should not become an issue in the future either. The amendments we have made are timely and practical adjustments in a new era.

The Nordic Dimension

The security relationship to our Nordic neighbors is in transition. After the end of the Cold War, Sweden and Finland's foreign- and security policies have undertaken new dimensions. This is caused by these countries' integration into the core of European security through their membership in the EU, their observer status in the WEU, as well as their partnership agreements with NATO. Against this background, it follows logically that the Nordic dimension, over time, will also play an increasingly important role in Norwegian defence- and foreign policy.

The Nordic Defense Ministers' seminars have developed into an important vehicle for discussion of common political interests. Our cooperation in the former Yugoslavia has strengthened Nordic foreign policy. With regard to IFOR, this is quite well illustrated with the current deployment of a Polish-Nordic brigade. Just recently, it would have been unthinkable for Finnish and Swedish forces serving under NATO command in a peace- keeping operation, even under the auspices of the UN Security Council. The notion of a Polish battallion participating side by side with Nordic countries in a military operation is also new. This trend may create a framework and a basis for similar cooperation between Nordic and European partners in the future. In the aftermath of the old era, Norway may freely pursue collaboration with various partners without hurdles.

Bilateral and regional Nordic cooperation has also evolved in recent years. At the Defence Ministers' Seminar at Skagen in the fall of 1995, we decided that joint Nordic military exercises should be carried out as a link in the larger PfP framework. An exercise will take place in the Ofoten-area in 1997. Other PfP countries, among them Russia, will be invited as observers. As an extension of this effort, it seems that operational cooperation within the Nordic coalition may bring forth joint participation in international peacekeeping operations. Increasing defense- and security activity also strengthen our bilateral contacts with other Nordic countries, especially Sweden and Finland. We would like to emphasize increased defense cooperation in the time to come.

It is important to underscore that multilateral agreements supplement rather than replace bilateral arrangements. In this context, Nordic defence agreements function as an extension of existing bilateral cooperation. The agreement includes coordination of military acquistions from Nordic as well as other countries, and joint efforts in regard to research, development, production, maintenance, and logistics of military equipment in the Nordic region. The purpose of this framework is to create economic, technical, and industrial advantages through effective cooperation. The agreement is meant to contribute to burdensharing among Nordic countries within these fields.

Material collaboration will become an increasingly important dimension of Nordic cooperation. If the defense industry is to succeed in a shrinking market, it is necessary to engage in joint Nordic and European industrial efforts. To what degree we are willing to involve ourselves in such cooperation, depends on the extent to which the benefits are shared between the countries. However, there is no reason to conceal that there is a long way to go. Swedish and Norwegian defense industry, to a larger extent, must exert openness to each other if we are to succeed internationally.

Restructuring of the Norwegian Defense Organization

The restructuring of our Defense Organization must be seen against economic and security changes that have taken place globally. The Norwegian Government's decision to bring forth the structure handed down by the Storting white paper remains in effect. The implementation of the restructuring proposed by the Government is on schedule.

Three main groups of initiatives in regard to the restructuring have been identifed . These are:

• operational and maintenance cutbacks
• adjustment of the «peace-organization» to a new «war structure», and
• organizational and managerial changes.

Operational reductions effectively give room for increased investment and thereby improved defence capabilities. In order to achieve our goals, it is necessary to carry through with our cutbacks. Although great demands have been placed upon us, we do not fear to act. The challenges we face are met positively and with impressive constructive readjustment. The conditions for further readjustment, however, must be realistic. This is achieved through motivated personnel who implement necessary adjustments.

«The war structure» is based on a post-World War II concept maintaining a balanced Defence Organization including all components of a modern defense force. It is imperative that Norway maintains strong anti-invasion defence mechanisms in at least one region of the country. The main part of the planned readjustments in the Defence Organization is under implementation. The various services have so far substantially reduced operational costs by adapting the old «war-structure» into a new «peace organization.» Additional reductions will originate from more selective measures, such as improved coordination beween the various services. Therefore, we will, to a larger degree, focus on readjustment of our support functions.

In addition to adapting the «peace organization,» we emphasize reducing operational costs through remodeling of management systems. Initiatives in this regard relate to more effective allocation of resources. The new systems are based on the philosophy of cost benefit analysis. We seek a closer link between level and usage of resources and results. Questions of responsibility are important in this work. Both the Ministry of Defence and the Head Defence command have clearly defined the guiding principles. These have been presented for the Storting in a proposition about guidance and management of the Defence Organization. The remodeling of the management systems will include:

• clearing of responsibilities and authority
• delegation of tasks and authority according to need
• emphasis on responsibility and authority continuation, and
• the importance of responsibility

In regard to the process of restructuring, we have now implemented the basic framework of the new management system. However, efforts at integrating the new system into the larger Defence Organization remains. At a time in which witchhunt-processes ocassionally are perceived as solutions to all problems, it seems appropriate for me to bring to your attention that responsibility cannot be claimed until it has been authorized. However, when management systems have been fully implemented, it must be perfectly clear that responsibility will be authorized.

Organizational Changes

In regard to organizational changes, the Defense Organization has thus far shown great ability and willingness to adjust. A number of our goals have been reached. Through documents adopted by the Storting in 1993 and 1994, the Government has been authorized to undergo a number of new organizational changes. In 1995, the Ministry of Defence followed up with various proposals for changes.

The proposition to the Storting regarding different army organizations, was presented last summer, and the Storting concluded that the main patterns of the proposition were satisfactory. The mechanic and supply organizations will be adapted to the actual needs of the army by closing down parts of the present capacity and by coordinating efforts with the other services. The Storting also supported the proposal restructuring the army's educational organization in inner Troms. As of this last January, the brigade in Northern Norway is no longer a standing force. The responsibility for educating conscripts in inner Troms county has been transferred to the 6th division's war-organization.

A proposition to the Storting addressing other organizational changes were debated in the spring of 1995. The proposition led to changes in the organizational structure of the construction services, reorganization of medical-units, and the establishing of a center for international affairs. This center is meant to respond to the challenges increasing Norwegian international participation calls for. The UN-operations have in recent years been based on an extended mandate going beyond previous peace-keeping operations. New operations frequently require that we respond in a more complex way than we used to. This development certainly asks our servicemen to perform more professionally. By establishing a center for international affairs, the Defence Organization may suit itself better to confront the challenges future international operations may require, contextualize the comprehensive knowledge already apparent in our Organization, and contribute to cooperation with national and international partners.

The purpose of the proposition to the Storting regarding reorganization of our National Guard, is to establish a common defence-staff and a comprehensive organization. This may, furthermore, contribute to the creation of a universal chain of command applicable to both peace and war. It has also been necessary to acquire a more effective and rational organization for our peace-time defence. The propositions suggest that the current National Guard staffs and the territorial army-regiments establish a joint staff. It does not propose changes for the National Guard's local units, or its educational and organizational activities.

New Long-Term White Paper

The preparation for the next long-term report has began, and the effort will stretch throughout 1996. The report is scheduled to be presented to the Storting in December 1997, and will likely be debated the following spring. In order to ensure proper evaluation, it is important that the proposed issues are cleared as early as possible. This work will be a major effort in the Defence Ministry this year.

The long-term report will primarily address the current and future security challenges facing us. Flexibility and responses with regard to minor and major crises will increasingly be emphazised and reflected in the report.

We confront considerable uncertainty regarding external factors' impact on our Defence Organization's development. This fact implies that political and military planning will still be subject to ambiguity calling for new approaches. An important aspect of the next long-term report is thus to clarify the basis of maintaining our anti-invasion capabilities. A committee ha been formed with a mandate to study the proposed expenditures and attempt to make some assessments. In making our analysis, we must seek to uphold the most critical components of our anti-invasion capabilities. Furthermore, the expenditures must be realistically assessed. Any investment should be applied directly to our defence-concept. However, even investments already made should be subject to critical evaluation in its application to our «war-structure».

We also need to re-evaluate our practice of conscription. Norway has a Defence Organization and a «war structure» drawing heavily upon conscripts. If we still want to utilize our «war structure» fully, we must preclude a purely professional army. That does not suggest, however, that we in given cases can rely on professional soldiers, in this context, those exceeding the 19 conscriptive months handed down by the Storting.

Conscription contributes to fortification of our Defence Organization. It expresses a sense of societal duty while being perceived as a right to defend our territory from attack. Against this background, it is still important to allocate all available personnel. In regard to last year's budgetary debate, the Storting expressed concern that our conscription was in the process of being weakened. I will underscore as strongly as I can, that our practice with conscription is completely being upheld.

In regard to the Defence Organization's new long-term white paper, it may be necessary to address conscription in the light of national and international development. Over-production of conscripts to our war-structure carries a considerable cost. Education of any surplus of conscripts will therefore likely be a major challenge in the framing of the next long-term white paper. In this context it is also necessary to consider Norwegian conscription and its application to Norwegian participation in international operations. It has been emphasized, in the latest long-term report, that the Norwegian Defence Organization should predominantly be concerned with the defence of Norwegian territory. That notion should endure, although defence of our own territory, cannot prevail without a global outlook. International defence standards apply to Norwegian standards. Therefore, national and international operations in Norway must seek to acquire international standards. Our forces should be able to operate professionally without jeopardizing personnel and equipment. Furthermore, it is important to stay on top of the technological development, both militarily as well as practically, in order to stay competitive. I agree with the Chief of Defence that there will have to be balance between the «war structure», the level of training, and the standard of equipment. Not until we get harmony between tasks, methods, and requirements can we claim that our Organization functions adequately.

These are all factors which need to be considered and determined as to what degree they affect our practice of conscription. Other countries have undergone substantial changes in their conscriptive practices. It will make sense to learn from other countries' experiences before we initiate changes ourselves.

Budgetary conditions

The 1996 budget, with its 1.6 percent increase from the previous budget, include additional allocations for Norwegian participation in the IFOR, and a departure from the recent trend of reduced budgets. The Ministry will seek to uphold this budgetary increase. The future budgetary development will be decisive as to how servicemen, in coming years, will be able to carry out their tasks. The same applies to the comprehensive restructuring now taking place in the Defence Organization at large.

The Norwegian expenditures linked to the IFOR-operation, amount to a little more than NOK 1 billion for twelve months participation. Given the uncertain mandate, it must be emphasized that these numbers are preliminary. Our contribution can therefore be more expensive than estimated. The Government will, after remodifying its budget, present new numbers.

Given great uncertainty, the IFOR budget so far amounts to NOK 879 millions. These numbers are divided between the 1995 and 1996 budgets. Of the 1996 amount, NOK 569 millions are allocated from the defence budget, while NOK 300 million come from material cutbacks. The latter, it should be underscored, are means we need from 1997, and should therefore, over time, be transferred back in order to secure future investments.

The Government emphasizes a relatively high training level. The Navy and the Coastal Artillery plan more exercises than the 1993 level. The Air Force will also increase its training. The Army, on the other hand, will reduce its activities from the 1993 level. This is primarily because 1996 will be a critical year in the Army's restructuring process. In order to secure effective implementation, it is necessary to place emphasis on the restructuring process. When these are completed, we will increase activity for reservists in the Army and the National Guard.

Conclusion

The Defense Organization faces great challenges in the coming years. These challenges derive from a continually changing security environment. The comprehensive restructuring process taking place, is both a consequence of these changes and a precondition for the creation of an effective Defence Organization.

The key-word for our planning ahead seems to be prevailing security uncertainty. Therefore, great demands are placed upon us in regard to national and international security cooperation. We must learn to think retroactively and adapt to different time-frames under which challenges and tasks are constantly changing. Furthermore, it is fundamental that Norwegian Defence no longer is synonomous with Norwegian territory. Norwegian and international security is closely interwoven and carry joint consequences for the Norwegian Defence Organization.

At the same time, it is important that we maintain the core functions and the fundamental dimensions of Norwegian defence- and security policy arising from the changing climate around us. This requires not only the ability to adapt to the current changes, but also the drawing upon previous experiences that over time have contributed to the development of a Norwegian defence identity. Within this framework, between new and old, the long-term challenges for the Norwegian Defence Organization are found. However, the solutions and the opportunities are to be found in the same environment. The basis for our organization must be, that young and old, and, tasks at home and abroad, are not considered contradictory, but rather dimensions drawing upon, as well as depending upon each other, jointly creating a modern Defence Organization.