State Secretary Siri Bjerke

The Environment and Security in the North Atlantic Region

Reykjavik, 7 September 1995

Thank you for the invitation to address this interesting conference.

Europe is still in the throes of one of the greatest upheavals of this century. We have witnessed political, economic and societal changes that bear with them a new potential for stability, security and peace in Europe - on a much more solid basis than before. At the same time, these transformations pose and will continue to pose new and much more serious challenges in the formulation as well as the implemention of policy.

The major security challenge facing Europe is how to integrate the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe into a general European framework of cooperation. This is no longer simply a military issue. Strengthening the political and economic ties between European countries is the best way of creating a more stable political climate in Europe.

We have seen significant changes in the very concepts of security and security policy over the last few years. The concept of extended security has gained broad acceptance. In addition to military security, this encompasses the relationship between democracy, state and society, social stability, and environmental concerns. And in the North Atlantic region as well as other areas, these newer elements play a much larger role today than they used to.

These changes in security and our interpretation of it mean that policy in many areas is still exploratory and still being formed. We are only just beginning to appreciate how dependent security is on other, related factors, including environmental concerns, resource management and sustainable development.

Two preliminary conclusions emerge from this. The first is that security, in the extended sense, cannot be ensured by military means alone. A more complex and multi-faceted security challenge requires that a much broader set of policy instruments and institutions is brought to bear on the situation. I shall return to this in more detail below.

A second conclusion is that it is not possible for any one country to safeguard its security unilaterally. In a traditional sense, this has long been a basic tenet of Icelandic as well as Norwegian security policy. It underpins our strong long-standing attachment to the Atlantic Alliance and the Atlantic community. However, the inherent impossibility of unilateral security also holds true for the extended concept of security. This may seem quite obvious, but, as we know, it is a more complicated matter to accept it and put it into practice as a guideline for national policy.

The best way to develop a stable European security architecture is to support the broad process of reform in the east, thereby ensuring that the peoples of these countries see real benefits from the fundamental changes which are taking place. This will in turn lead to enhanced political, economic and social stability in Central and Eastern Europe. Such stability is one of the prerequisites for our own security.

In order to promote a positive development along these lines, we must take action at a number of different levels. Parallel and mutually supportive efforts are essential to deal with the new challenges, and a wide range of foreign policy instruments are called for. Achieving stability and security in Europe will require the combined efforts of all European and transatlantic institutions and cooperative arrangements. An appropriate division of labour and responsibilities must be found in order to utilise limited resources in the best possible way. The adaption of existing institutions to new tasks reflects the new approach to new challenges.

Norway's position.

Norwegian foreign and security policy has taken account of the changes in the Euro-Atlantic security agenda. What we now see emerging is a policy which is a blend of older factors which remain relevant, and elements which have emerged in response to the new challenges.

Our basic goal is unchanged. It is still to ensure Norwegian security and economic growth within a stable European framework. However, we must carefully review the means at our disposal in the light of the fundamental changes that have been taking place in Euro-Atlantic area, and the new solutions the situation demands.

A basic parameter for Norwegian policy is our geographic location. Norway is located at the cross-roads between Europe, North America, and Russia. In order to safeguard our interests as regards the environment, resources and security, we are dependent on cooperation with all countries and institutions in the North Atlantic region. We are the only NATO country to share a common border with Russia, which will continue to be the largest military power in Europe.

Russia's position and the nature of our relationship with Russia are essential factors in European security. Without Russian participation in the broad Euro-Atlantic network of cooperation, there can be no long-term stability in Europe. Thus establishing a legitimate role for Russia is another prerequisite for our security. From a Norwegian point of view, it is essential that Russia's relations with its neighbours are based on cooperation, openness and mutual trust. NATO, the EU, the OSCE as well as regional arrangements all have roles to play in this connection.

Let me make it clear that we do not view Russia as a military threat. But the Northern areas will continue to have strategic significance, for Russia as well as the West. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the implementation of the START agreements have resulted in a concentration of Russian submarine-based nuclear weapons on the Kola Peninsula. The military complex on the Kola Peninsula therefore plays a pivotal role in the Russian defence, and will retain its strategic importance.

In the wake of the Cold War, however, we have seen a shift of emphasis in our relationship with Russia. Despite the importance of the Kola complex, purely military issues do not carry the same weight. Instead we have come to realize that the Kola Peninsula is the graveyard of the Cold War. The area is the site of a pollution problem related to military activities of truly amazing dimensions, which neither Norway nor Russia can tackle on its own.

We must be patient and flexible in our efforts to develop relations with Russia. The Russians are in the process of carrying out far-reaching reforms in all sectors of society. This is far from a painless process, and we must be prepared for setbacks along the way. But at the same time we must make certain demands on Russia. Cooperation based on openness and mutual trust can only be successful if Russia accepts certain basic principles, and abides by and implements the agreements it has entered into, such as the CFE Agreement and the CSCE Final Act.

Transatlantic Cooperation

In our search for new solutions, it is important that we have a bed-rock of common views and stable patterns of cooperation. Here, the transatlantic links are indispensable. In the fifty years since the end of the Second World War, Europe and the countries of North America have developed a common set of values that encompass far more than security policy: we have a common approach to democracy, human rights, and economic development, and a common interest in European stability. We therefore expect the USA to continue its active involvement in our part of the world. But in the future, the transatlantic agenda will reflect the fact that traditional security policy issues carry less weight than they did during the Cold War.

We should therefore elaborate and expand our dialogue and cooperation with the USA. The transatlantic dialogue may also eventually include economic cooperation and political issues of a more general nature as well as environmental issues. We see a great potential for cooperation on environmental issues with the USA. In our view such cooperation is important, both in order to widen our network of contacts and in order to benefit from American expertise and political weight in solving problems of mutual interest. This has the added benefit of ensuring continued American involvement in the Northern areas.

The role and tasks of the EU

The European Union has become the major institution for European cooperation. It will play a key role in the further development of democracy and prosperity, and therefore of peace, on our continent. Its enlargement towards the east and south will make an invaluable contribution to the stability and security of Europe. More than any other single institution, the EU has the resources needed to deal with the challenges posed by the new security issues.

The fact that three of our Nordic neighbours are now members of the EU also gives Nordic cooperation a new dimension. The Nordic countries have different forms of association with the EU, NATO and the WEU, and therefore different degrees of influence in these crucial institutions. Close Nordic cooperation therefore benefits all. If we cooperate and coordinate our policies on the overriding issues of security and cooperation, economic development, resources and preservation of the environment, the Nordic countries will make an important contribution to the debate in the various European and Atlantic fora, and be able to influence the way we respond to the many challenges.

NATO

One of the characteristics of the restructuring of European security is the adaption of existing institutions to meet new conditions. In many ways, the changes in NATO reflect the immense transformation that has taken place. During the past five or six years, the Alliance has embarked on a radical process of change. This process has not yet come to an end, but is gradually turning the Alliance into a more political and relatively less military organisation.

In response to the changes in Europe, the Alliance has declared its willingness to assume new tasks. These include providing assistance in peacekeeping operations conducted under the auspices of the UN and the OSCE, and providing assistance in the restructuring of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO is thus playing a key role in the efforts to strengthen European stability and security. Through this process of transformation, the Alliance has maintained its relevance and reinforced its position as the most effective security policy instrument in our part of the world. The future success of NATO will depend on its ability to continue the transformation process.

A number of Central and East European countries have made it clear that their security needs can only be met by NATO membership. In response, NATO has embarked on a process of preparation for an expanded Alliance. Norway is in favour of NATO enlargement, provided that it does not create new divisions in Europe.

At present, the instruments for NATO's support of the reform processes in the Central and Eastern Europe are the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The PFP provides practical assistance with regard to the military aspects of the reform process, while the NACC focuses on regular consultations and civilian aspects of the reform process, including the conversion of arms industries. Of particular value to Norway is the NACC's potential as a forum for the management of environmental problems related to military activity.

Norway has taken active part in the efforts to tackle these problems. We are chairing a NATO/NACC pilot study on cross-border environmental problems emanating from defence-related installations and activities. Phase one of this study, which encompasses 23 countries, including Iceland, has resulted in comprehensive reports on radioactive and chemical pollution. The second phase of this study, which will include the environmental risks related to the decommissioning of nuclear submarines, has now been started. The first meeting will be held in Oslo next week.

Regional cooperation and the Barents Euro-Arctic Region

One of the main aims of Norway's relations with Russia is to integrate the positive bilateral ties that have been established into broader forms of cooperation - regional, European and international. The Barents Cooperation, which is now well established, represents our most important contribution to these efforts.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Region is a unique example of cooperation between East and West in post-Cold War Europe. The region comprises the northern counties of Norway, Sweden and Finland, the oblasts of Murmansk and Archangel and the Republic of Karelia in Russia.

The Barents Cooperation does not encompass security issues in the traditional, military definition. Nevertheless, it does have fundamental implications for security in a broader sense. It should be emphasised that even during the Cold War, the High North was a region of great stability and low tension, and we are making every effort to keep it so. In spite of this, the border was for all practical purposes completely closed for more than 70 years.

Our main task today is to normalise the situation, open up new fields of cooperation and build mutual trust. In this way we hope to enhance the security of the region in a fundamental and lasting way. In the Barents Region, we have the opportunity to bridge the former divide by creating more openness and trust. As an arena for contact between individuals, organisations and local government in northwestern Russia and the northern parts of the Nordic countries, the Barents Cooperation has already made an impact on the lives of ordinary people in the region.

The unique character of the Barents Cooperation lies not so much in the fact that it involves cooperation between parts of Russia and parts of Western European countries, as in the way it is organised. Much of the initiative and momentum is in the hands of the Regional Council, which is now a well-established political institution consisting of the political leaders of the region. This ensures that much of the responsibility is concentrated at the local level and that local priorities are the focus of attention. One of the main challenges in the near future is to consider ways of broadening the political representation of the peoples of the Barents Region, in order to strengthen the democratic element and attract new sections of the population.

The Barents Cooperation also has a broader European security dimension. We believe that this kind of regional cooperation between Russia and countries in Western Europe is an important means of integrating Russia into the new European architecture. The Barents Cooperation also has links with the European Union, both because Sweden and Finland became members of the Union in January this year, and because the Commission itself is a full member of the Barents Council. Thus, both the European Union and Russia meet in the Barents Region. Norway would welcome an even closer involvement of the Union in the Barents Cooperation.

Environmental issues are of major importance to the security of people in the High North, particularly as regards nuclear safety and the handling of military and civilian nuclear waste. Consequently, the environment is also one of the most important fields of cooperation in the Barents Region.

The environment in the Northern areas

Russia and Norway have established a programme of close cooperation to protect and restore the environment in the north. There is a bilateral agreement between the two countries, and the Norwegian efforts are predominantly financed through the Norwegian Action Programme for Eastern Europe. It encompasses co-operation on all the most important environmental areas, with particular focus on developing know-how and solving cross-border environmental problems.

The single most important project - apart from the problems related to nuclear activities - is the modernisation of the Pechenganikel Combine smelters. The emission of sulphur dioxide is approximately six times that of Norway's entire industry.

As for nuclear issues, Norwegian efforts in 1995 will primarily be focused on north-western Russia and will include measures which address unsatisfactory safety standards at nuclear installations, unsatisfactory management and storage of spent uranium fuel and radioactive waste, dumping of radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas and inputs into the sea via Russian rivers, and arms-related environmental hazards. We have allocated a total of NOK 130 million to finance the Plan of Action in 1995.

One of the most important projects under the Plan of Action comprises the Norwegian measures regarding the nuclear power plant on the Kola Peninsula. In addition to the funds channelled through EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account, Norway allocated NOK 25 million - approximately USD 4 million - to the safety upgrading of the power plant from 1992 to 1994. This work will continue in 1995 with emphasis on technical assistance, training, and supplying equipment.

Another very important issue is the environmental implications of military activities. The situation in Russia as regards safe handling and storage of nuclear waste is worrying. A large number of nuclear-powered strategic submarines and attack submarines are being decommissioned, partly as a result of the disarmament agreements. This means that the need for the safe dismantling, transport and storage of nuclear material is increasing dramatically. The Russian authorities have recently displayed a constructive, open attitude towards these issues. Substantial financial resources and expertise will be required to solve these problems, but we must also demand that the Russian defence authorities adopt a responsible attitude towards the risks involved in handling nuclear waste.

In our view, environmental challenges in the north are not merely a regional problem. They have an impact on the entire Euro-Atlantic area and solving them will require more resources than are available locally or regionally. The Norwegian authorities are therefore making active efforts to initiate international cooperation to deal with the environmental challenges in the north. In this context it is particularly promising that the issue has been placed on the agenda of the G-7.

I would also like to mention the trilateral cooperation between Russia, the United States, and Norway on a project for expanding the capacity of the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet's effluent treatment facility in Murmansk. The project is now in the design phase. The construction phase is scheduled to start later this year. This facility, when completed, will help Russia adhere to the London Convention which prohibits dumping at sea. Norwegian-Russian-US collaboration also comprises consultations on the prevention of radioactive contamination from defence-related activities and installations.

The European Union's involvement in securing the vessel "Lepse", which is used as a storage facility for radioactive waste in the harbour of Murmansk, is another positive development. We also attach great importance to the Russian proposal to convene a summit on nuclear safety in 1996 and we are ready to contribute to this effort. I also note with satisfaction that European countries outside the region, as well as international financing institutions are giving these issues high priority.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

I would now like to turn to an issue that cannot easily be kept within geographical limits and that in many ways transcends the constraints of institutional structures, namely the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. No longer related to superpower rivalry, the dangers now derive from the threat that nuclear weapons technology and expertise may spread to areas of conflict or to irresponsible countries or groups.

A wide range of measures is required to deal with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The danger of proliferation will be reduced if regional conflicts are resolved and efforts made to counteract instability. But regional measures do not exclude the need for a global solution. We applaud the decision to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) indefinitely and unconditionally. The current broad support for the NPT is an indication of its significance as the foundation of international efforts for non-proliferation and disarmament.

Norway successfully won support for proposals relating to the management of nuclear waste resulting from military activities and to the environmentally sound and safe handling of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. This was an important breakthrough since it was the first time that attention had been focused on nuclear waste from military activities in connection with the NPT. The NPT is therefore of direct relevance to the environmental situation in the High North.

The NPT does not, however, regulate all aspects of non-proliferation. Nor is it very likely that we will be able to deal with the entire problem by means of a single treaty or political agreement. Thus, efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation will have to be continued in other fora as well. The most important means of promoting continued disarmament and preventing environmental degradation is a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is particularly important for Norway as the closest neighbour to Russia's only remaining nuclear test site.

Nuclear testing is currently at the forefront of the international agenda. We do, of course, welcome growing opposition to nuclear testing. It is, however, regrettable that the reason for this rising awareness is the announcement by one of our allies of its intention to resume testing. In our view, nuclear testing constitutes a grave threat to human health and the environment. Norway therefore strongly deplores the French decision to resume nuclear testing and the continuation of testing conducted by China, which will put a strain on the ongoing negotiations in Geneva on a CTBT. These events represent a setback in relation to the progress that has been made in disarmament efforts in recent years. We have on several occasions urged France and China to refrain from conducting further nuclear test explosions and to join other nuclear weapons states in declaring a moratorium on all nuclear testing.

The NPT Conference brought a renewed pledge by the nuclear weapons states to promote the global reduction of nuclear arms, with the ultimate aim of eliminating these weapons, and to prepare a CTBT at the latest by 1996. Our task now is to build on the achievements made in New York.

Conclusion

The challenges facing us today are far more complex than previously, and we need a wide range of instruments at our disposal in order to meet them. Eliminating the old divisions is still our most important task. This is also the best way of solving the most pressing problems on our agenda. We must commit ourselves to resolving economic and social differences and problems concerning resources and the environment. It is in Norway's and Iceland's interests to join forces with other European countries and institutions in an effort to promote environmental protection, the responsible management of resources and sustainable development, and to prevent conflict and instability.

International organisations, regional institutions and national authorities all have important tasks in a changing landscape. Many issues are so complex that they cannot be divided up or defined geographically or be dealt with by a single institution. It is a matter of striking the right balance between political, economic and military measures. We must respond to the new challenges facing us, while at the same time safeguarding the traditional security measures that are still applicable.

Institutions such as the UN, the OSCE, NATO, the WEU and the EU all depend on one another in their efforts to deal with such problems. This network of interlocking institutions will ensure that the best possible use is made of national and institutional resources.