State Secretary Siri Bjerke

European Security and defence cooperation and the future of the WEU

Intervention at a seminar in Oslo, 22. January 1996

Seminar Participants,

Let me add my welcome to this seminar, devoted to European security and the future of the Western European Union.

I am particularly pleased to see Minister of State Dr. Werner Hoyer from Bonn, State Secretary Michiel Patijn from The Hague, and Minister of State David Davis from London. We are honoured and grateful that you have found time to come to Oslo and be with us.

1. Security issues will be important at the Intergovernmental Conference. Expectations of a much stronger European ability to prevent and solve crises has been raised. It is against this strongly felt need, that the IGC will have to look hard at European security arrangements and how to develop the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The EU Reflection Group - of which our three distinguished guests were all members - presented its report to the EU Council in Madrid last December. A substantial report on the WEU Contribution to the IGC was adopted by the WEU in November.

Three main options have been set out:

• Retaining an autonomous WEU in a reinforced partnership with the EU,
• An intermediate option, of gradually subordinating the WEU to the EU, and thirdly,
• Subsuming the security and defence dossier into the EU and disbanding the WEU.

2. Leaving institutional alternatives aside, the fundamental question is: What arrangements will be the most suitable for managing the security challenges Europe will face in the coming years ? The answer must proceed from an assessment of what these security challenges are, and what is required to manage them.

European security continues to undergo fundamental transformations. More fundamental, perhaps, than force of habit allows us to see:

There is no danger of a major, Europe-wide military conflict. But a more diverse spread of external and internal factors influence European security much more directly than before:

• Conflicts rooted in minority and nationalist issues develop into full blown regional wars.
• Weapons proliferation constitutes a growing threat.
• Environmental degradation is potentially explosive.
• European security is more directly dependent on developments in states in the Middle East, in North Africa and in the Caucasus. This is one major reason for Norway's continued strong involvement in the Middle East peace process.
• Deepened democracy, and economic, social and human development, remains the best guarantee against destabilizing conflicts. Weak democracies and social and economic stagnation breeds instabilty, with consequences for other states and the whole region.We see this clearly in the newly independent states and in states on Europe's periphery. That is why policies extending the European integration process to the whole continent is an investment in security, and a very important task.

At present, the security challenge number one in Europe is bringing peace to the former Yugoslavia. The Dayton agreement gives hope that we will master that challenge. Full implementation is crucial, and puts responsibility both with the parties and with the international community. The approach to solving the conflict demonstrates a number of important principles for security cooperation in Europe.

• The need for continued transatlantic cooperation.
• The need to strengthen the European contribution.
• The need to include all European countries and Russia in non-exclusive security cooperation.

3. Let me develop on these three guiding principles for future European security:

• First, Europeans must increase their share of responsibility for European security and defence.

  This is a process well under way. A European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) received the full backing of NATO Heads of State in January 1994. The IGC is set to strengthen the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. WEU - EU inks will be strengthened.

  European responsibilities should be concentrated on the new security challenges. The WEU should give priority to crisis management, peace keeping and humanitarian operations. We welcome the UK WEU Presidency's focus on operational strengthening of the WEU for these tasks. The CJTF concept can provide the WEU with operational capabilities through NATO. The closest possible WEU-NATO relations are also a political necessity. European action must be able to draw on transatlantic backing.

  But we should be open-minded about the form the European responsibility should take. European political will and a European security and defence identity can articulate itself in more than one way. It can be served by NATO. This is what we today see in the former Yugoslavia. A European Security and Defence Identity can express itself through the Atlantic Alliance. The French government's wish to deepen French participation in NATO is important in this context. We welcome that decision. It bears witness to the vitality of the Alliance in the new Europe. And it will help in coordinating common efforts towards common aims.

• Second, Substantial US participation in European security will remain necessay.

  There is no contradiction between increased European responsibility and continued US involvement. Both are necessary, and the former will be insufficient without the latter.

  Also, the US contribution must extend to the new security challenges and not be limited to defence in the article V sense. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia demonstrate this very clearly. The political and military role played by the US in forging the peace agreement and in its implementation has been decisive. US participation is also essential if we are to succeed in consolidating democracy and projecting security and stability to Russia and Central and Eastern Europe.

  Europe and North America must work together, in transatlantic solidarity. NATO is the backbone of North American participation in European security. NATO should retain its fundamental role for European security and defence.

• Third, Future European security and defence arrangements should be inclusive, not exclusive. They must span the old East - West divide, and build all-European, cooperative security.

  The end of the cold war lifted away rigid structures and opened an unforeseen potential for building genuine common security across the old divide. This opportunity must not be left untaken.

  It carries a message also for the IGC. Developing European ability to act in the security sphere, will be high on the agenda. But drawing security and defence into the EU and confining the ESDI to the core of the EU/WEU-nations, would seem oddly out of step with historical opportunity. In 1991 the WEU consisted of nine member states. That determined visions at the time. Today there are 27 WEU nations. History has imposed itself, and modified any 1991 Maastricht blueprint.

  The effort should be made to develop European security arrangements so as to allow for the progressive involvement of the new EU-members which followed post-war policies of neutrality, and Central and Eastern European states.They have opted for diverse defence orientations. The European Security and Defence Identity should therefore develop in a gradual, flexible and pragmatic manner, taking this into account. The WEUs emphasis on extended or "soft" security makes this possible. With growing participation of CEE states, the WEU would contribute meaningfully to the overarching policy of integration pursued in the EU and in NATO/Partnership for Peace. At the same time, transparency and close relations must be pursued with Russia. European security must be built with Russian participation and resposnibility.

  IFOR is a blueprint. The NATO led Implementation Force in the former Yugoslavia attests to the unique contribution only NATO can provide. It also illustrates the extent of NATOs successfull post cold war transformation. But its greatest significance is that which points beyond the Balkans. IFOR is "real life" Partnership for Peace. The Russian participation, and the participation of units from traditionally neutral Nordic countries and Poland in the US division breaks new ground in practical security cooperation across the old divide. This is a vital perspective, worth keeping in mind also in the context of the IGC.

4. Let me conclude:

Although not a member of the European Union, Norway has a strong interest in the security aspects of the IGC-agenda. We will continue to take part in the discussion. And we will continue to play our role in the development of European security and defence cooperation, as we have done in the entire post- war period. Witness our major humanitarian, military and civilian contribution in former Yugoslavia. Our contribution will draw on our unique geopolitical location, at the interface between the Atlantic, the European and the Russian dimensions.

The development of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the increase in its responsibilities in the security sphere, must not have negative consequences for NATO and transatlantic solidarity. The European role must be developed in harmony with the transatlantic dimension. Nor must increased European responsibilities complicate the participation and contribution of Allies which are not EU-members.

First and foremost, any suggestion for new institutional arrangements must ensure what is needed as we move towards the new millennium:

• Increased European responsibilities,
• The strongest possible transatlantic links; and
• Building cooperative security across the old divide.

This is why we support the proposal to retain an autonomous WEU. Its links both with the EU and NATO should be strengthened. A strengthened WEU can become an instrument for European crisis management, on behalf of the UN, the OSCE or the EU.

The scope for associate member participation in the ESDI and the WEU should be maintained and further developed, whatever institutional course is followed. It goes without saying that institutional solutions must facilitate, not complicate or foreclose, contributions towards common tasks. We have appreciated the suggestion for an association with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. This idea should be explored, if the IGC opts for developing WEU-EU links. With political will, I am confident that satisfactory arrangements can be found.