Ladies and gentlemen

Introduction

I am grateful for the invitation from the Defence College and the Principal Course no. 46 to say a few words about the future of Norwegian defence. I place great value upon maintaining an open and good dialogue with all the sectors that are concerned with defence matters, and therefore set great store by this opportunity to discuss the conditions relevant to a reorganisation of our defence forces with such a committed and expert gathering. It is always stimulating for me to meet course delegates at the Defence College. What affords it a special edge on this occasion is the fact that we are in the midst of a political process that has major and multi-faceted consequences – not just for our defences, but also for regions and local communities across the length and breadth of our country.

In mid-February this year the Government tabled the new long-term Defence Bill. With this we are preparing the way for a comprehensive – and necessary – reorganisation of our defence forces during the period 2002–05. Our defences need to be more modern and flexible and better suited to future challenges in terms of security policy. But, before I embark upon the proposed long-term Bill in detail, allow me to give a brief outline of some of the more salient factors that are associated with our external framework conditions. I shall then deal with the way in which our future defences are to be arranged, before making more specific observations about the reorganisation process that confronts us.

The security policy situation

Before this knowledgeable gathering it is not necessary for me to explain in any detail the reasons why the security policy situation has altered so radically since the end of the Cold War. We are today faced by a wider and more compound risk scenario. The challenges and the potential threats are more diffuse than before. The situation is characterised by gradual shifts from the national to the international perspective, and between peace, crisis and war. Increasing mutual dependence colours the relationships between countries and continents alike. This helps to blur the distinctions between national and international security. Unfortunately, many of the areas bordering on Europe are characterised by underlying conflicts or opposing differences that have already expressed themselves physically in the form of instability and conflict. The causes may be associated with ethnic dividing lines, unresolved historical arguments between states, absence of freedom and lack of democracy, poverty, fights for resources, and so on. Opposing views can often give rise to conditions that are akin to civil war, with elements of terrorism or armed rebellion. Nor can armed conflict between states be ruled out, often because state frontiers and ethnic/national borders do not necessarily always coincide. Such local or regional conflicts have repercussions for the security of the surrounding states, and may have negative effects upon the stability and security of Europe as a whole.

I mention this because certain people appear to believe that Norwegian security is affected only by what happens in our immediately adjacent areas, and that our defence forces should limit themselves to defending our own territory. On this basis there arises a disparity between Norway’s own security and our international military commitment. This is a misunderstanding and a rationale with which I disagree strongly. It is more sensible to contribute towards preventing regional crises – which are initially to be found at a distance – from developing into something far bigger and more dangerous, than to wait for the effects to spill over across our own frontiers. Viewed in this way, our military presence in the Balkans represents a kind of forward defence line for Norway itself. Had the situation in what used to be Yugoslavia got out of control and led to serious confrontations between Russia and the major Western powers, Norway would probably have been among the countries in Europe to have felt the effects both first and most directly.

Our relationship with Russia has also, for very natural reasons, been sharply to the fore in the debate over the last few months, and then primarily in respect of the question of defence against invasion. Let me reiterate: today’s Russia does not constitute any military threat to Norway. A military threat involves both an offensive military capacity and a possible political intention to employ it. There are many misconceptions involved here. Russia, of course, remains a major military power, albeit not on the same offensive level as that of the Soviet Union. But today’s Russian regime has nothing to gain and everything to lose through a military confrontation with the rest of Europe and North America, and thus has no intentions in that direction. There is no disagreement regarding this conclusion within NATO.

Quite a different matter is the fact that the relationship between Russia and Norway will continue to constitute an asymmetrical juxtaposition between a small state and a major power. Moreover, the two countries’ interests coincide in an area of considerable strategic importance. Our Government strives to maintain the best possible relations with the authorities in Moscow and places great stress upon contributing towards security and stability in our adjacent areas. We have certain duties, interests and rights, however, that we wish to pursue, not least of all in connection with the assertion of sovereignty and the administration and preservation of vulnerable resources. We wish to sustain our predictable defence and security policy in the north and, in that context, promote openness and reduce suspicion associated with military activities on both sides of the border. We naturally expect our Russian neighbours to adopt the same attitude. But when all is said and done, there is no cause to conceal the fact that Russian policy continues to be coloured by inner tensions and limited predictability. There is little cause to expect any change in this fundamental situation. We take this into consideration. The covering of our backs that ensues from membership of the Alliance, both politically and militarily, thus continues to be necessary. A NATO that can be relied upon, and reliable collective security guarantees, afford us, as a small nation, the freedom of action to protect our legitimate interests and rights should they ever be subjected to pressure, as well as the freedom of action to enter into more direct cooperation with Russia. In parallel with this we shall sustain the expertise and ability required to regenerate major military forces in the event of the international situation and developments in Russia taking a wrong turn in the longer term. I consider this to be a wise strategy. The perspective I have sketched out here is entirely different from a postulation that "there is not a cloud to be seen in the international sky", to say nothing of "peace in our time". To refer to such facile historical comparisons is to belittle what constitutes the actual situation today, and the future perspectives that the Government espouses. I would remind ourselves here of the risk scenario that the long-term Bill presents as a basis for an assessment of our defences as a means of security policy. The Bill makes it clear that the possibility of Norway being drawn into conflicts at the lower end of the crisis spectrum may be increasing. There is also an increasing probability that several minor conflicts may occur simultaneously, that differences between states or various groups may spread out in new and unexpected directions and give rise to new conflicts, and that Norway may be drawn into conflicts in an indirect manner. The threats that confront us as part of a more globalised world have thus not disappeared – they are more numerous and more unquantifiable.

This has consequences for the shaping of Norwegian defence – for the type of forces we need, their availability, equipment, training level and mobility. We cannot focus so unilaterally upon a fairly improbable future threat, because that in itself would be so serious that we should not be in a position to deal with the security policy challenges that we can expect with greater certainty to encounter. A national military defence continues to be of vital importance and our most crucial security policy means. This applies across the entire spectrum of crisis management and, more generally, in peace, crisis and war alike. We must have a defence capability that is able to accomplish all its tasks in an acceptable manner. This presupposes a defence capability other than our traditional mobilisation and invasion defence.

The danger of the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the means of delivering them, constitutes a potentially acutely dangerous threat in the years ahead. Several countries in the Middle East and in other unstable regions will probably be able to gain access in a few years’ time to long-distance missiles that can also reach Europe. Against the type of threat we are concerned with here, the fear deterrent will probably be neither effective nor sufficient. Several of our Alliance partners are now considering the establishment of a limited defence against ballistic missiles. It is crucial that time is found for consultation and discussion of these problems within NATO, based upon the desire to preserve and strengthen Alliance solidarity.

Developments in NATO and the EU

At the NATO summit meeting in Washington in 1999, the heads of state and heads of government approved a revised strategic concept. This concept stresses the changes that have taken place in the security policy arena while, at the same time, the principle strands of the previous concept are continued

NATO’s principal task will continue to be that of preserving the collective defence of the member countries, including deterring any potential opponent from initiating a military attack against NATO or one or more of the Alliance’s member states. The focus of the collective defence has, nevertheless, changed from defence against a massive onslaught against the Alliance’s territory, to a joint ability to deal with regional conflicts. I find that there are grounds for emphasising that such regional conflicts may constitute both an Article 5 situation or a non-Article 5 situation. NATO’s new military structure is aimed at being able to deal with both of these. In the long-term Bill we have a corresponding perspective: our defence active service forces are to be just as well suited to national crisis management as to international crisis management.

The Washington summit also adopted a plan for reorganising and developing the military capacity of the member countries and the Alliance, under the soubriquet " Defence Capabilities Initiative" – DCI for short. By means of DCI, NATO will be able to improve its capacity within the five areas of mobility, endurance, flexibility, survivability and leadership. One important aspect is the principle of improved standardisation of procedures, materials and support functions, whereby multi-national operations and establishment of multi-national cooperation will become easier than before. For Norway, which, for reasons of resources – in keeping with other small NATO countries – will not have the capacity to achieve many of the DCI elements by itself, the multi-national solutions are particularly relevant for the development of the necessary capacities. And let me stress something that cannot be said too often: the quality requirements that DCI imposes are fundamental to the reorganisation of Norwegian defence.

Developments in Europe, and hence the framework conditions for the formulation of Norwegian defence as well, are also dominated by the process initiated by the EU aimed at developing a common European security and defence policy – ESDP. This has consequences for NATO, for transatlantic cooperation and for Norway’s security.

If further developments lead to a strengthened European pillar in NATO, and to the EU assuming a greater responsibility within a broad spectrum of tasks in those areas that are not naturally covered by NATO, this will be positive. In this way, the process can lead to a strengthening of Europe’s collective capacities. A stronger and more independent Europe is, in the Government’s view, both desirable and inevitable.

Irrespective of the question of Norwegian membership of the EU, it is nevertheless to Norway’s advantage for NATO to continue to be seen as the primary forum for Western security and defence policy cooperation. I believe that it is difficult to conceive of any other institutions having corresponding dynamism in the security and defence policy sector. Naturally other international organisations will also discharge important security tasks, and NATO will have to continue to adapt itself to the changes that are taking place in Europe. By no means least important is ensuring that the EU and NATO establish a close and mutually beneficial cooperation, without unnecessary duplication and without damaging rivalry. The Government’s aim is to contribute towards such solutions.

The development of ESDP may possibly have very specific consequences for Norwegian defence. The EU has as its target the development, by the end of 2003, of a multi-national response force for peacekeeping operations of up to 60 000 troops supported by naval and air forces. These forces will, to an overwhelming extent, also be entered in other force registers and that of NATO. This emphasises the importance of securing good and close cooperation between the EU and NATO. This applies not least to force planning. The Government wishes to conduct an active European policy and welcomes the development of a more efficient European crisis-management capacity in the EU. The best possible association for Norway with ESDP is important in this context. Norway has offered to contribute military resources towards a stronger European ability to deal with crises through the EU. We place great stress upon the importance of achieving satisfactory arrangements for Norwegian participation with regard to the development of ESDP in general, and crisis management in particular. Such arrangements will contribute towards ensuring that the Norwegian input will be relevant, and towards enabling decisions regarding possible participation in EU-led action to be taken quickly on the part of Norway.

The defence of the future

The security policy framework conditions are what form the basis for the arrangement of our future defence. Where size and structure are concerned, our economic ability must also be taken into consideration. The quality of the forces we have and sufficient flexibility, mobility and accessibility are, within certain parameters, more important than the total volume. It is this that forms the basis of the long-term Bill that was submitted to the Norwegian Parliament [Storting] in February.

We must take a fundamental and wholesale step in modernising and reorganising Norwegian defence in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The objective is not to reduce the defence estimates – on the contrary, the Government is planning a measure of increase in the budget allocations. We must create a new and better defence that is able to discharge purely national tasks by itself and, together with our NATO allies, to meet the challenges of the future. NATO is, and remains, the cornerstone of Norwegian defence and security policy. Nothing has changed in this respect. Much of the discussion surrounding a national anti-invasion defence appears to ignore this. Today’s defence is, to a large extent, planned on the basis of yesterday’s threat of a massive attack on Norway. We must now apply the resources where current and future needs indicate them to be required.

Nationally, we must secure Norwegian frontiers, assert our sovereignty, exercise our authority, prevent limited attacks and terrorism and, together with our allies, be prepared to meet more serious threats to Norwegian security. Internationally, we must contribute towards the Alliance’s efforts aimed at security in Europe and to the UN’s efforts for international peace and stability in general.

At the same time, we must create a defence structure where our resources are used more efficiently. At present we employ great sums of money on a hugely excessive peacetime organisation, while far too often aircraft are grounded, vessels are laid up and we have to make inroads into our contingency reserves. It is my view that the Government Bill constitutes the best possible approach to the future development of our defence, given the security policy, military technology and economic parameters within which we must operate. The Government therefore proposes that the defence forces be reorganised and renewed, whereby we achieve a modern and flexible defence capability with shorter response times, greater mobility, improved accessibility, and ability to operate together with our allies, nationally and internationally.

Developments in the risk scenario that faces us, and trends in our international surroundings, especially in NATO, make a renewal and modernisation of our defence imperative. Our defence must, quite simply, be qualitatively much better in order to be able to discharge the tasks we expect it to undertake. This also applies to the ability to defend Norway, together with our allies. There is nothing new in our being completely dependent upon our allies to defend us against a major attack – that is the way it has been for the last 50 years. A defence reform would, in other words, have been necessary even if there were no economic considerations to bear in mind. But there are, however. For a number of years our defences have been afforded more meagre resources than they have needed. Partly as a result of this, the armed forces are the course of becoming a hollow organisation, inasmuch as many of the forces we claim to have at our disposal only really exist on paper. This situation will deteriorate further in the years to come, unless some dramatic steps are taken. If we had both operated and renewed the defence structure that we claim to have at our disposal, as intended, then our defence budget would have needed to be increased by around 40%. That is something that no political party would wish to be associated with in any way.

The Government’s recommendations follow on naturally from this – a significant reduction in the size of our armed forces is recommended, accompanied by a qualitative enhancement of our remaining forces. The reductions in the scope of our defence would seem to be very considerable. We go, for example, from six brigades at present, down to two brigades plus a rapid response force organised as a brigade. At the same time I would emphasise that the reductions are only illusory – we are very far from having six operational brigades at present. Because the forces under the new structure will be operational, or practically operational, at any given time, the real reductions will – in other words – be less than they appear to be. (The army’s composition upon mobilisation will be about 40 000 personnel, on the basis of current organisational plans, representing a reduction from about 90 000 personnel. The combined mobilisation strength of the armed forces will amount to around 125 000 personnel, a reduction from the current level of 225 000 personnel.)

The Government proposes reforms in the senior command of our defence forces. The defence command – the Ministry of Defence and the Headquarters Defence Command – consumes far too much in the way of resources when compared with the rest of the defence forces, nor did it adapt to the size of the military structure during the 1990s. At the same time the two entities are not sufficiently well organised to discharge their strategic tasks – such as long-term planning for the defence forces, crisis management and international cooperation. The Government therefore proposes that the Headquarters Defence Command be disbanded and that the Defence Chief be integrated within the Ministry of Defence. At the same time the Defence Chief is to be a highly visible departmental head of the armed forces. This initiative will bring about an overall reduction of about 40% in the size of the defence command, with potentially even greater reductions in the Oslo area. It will, at the same time, serve to strengthen the defence command’s strategic focus.

The Government also recommends an extensive thinning down and streamlining of the command structure. The recommended command structure will consist of the defence joint operational headquarters in Stavanger with two subordinate regional commands in Bodø and Trondheim. The command centre in Bodø will serve as the crisis management command for the northern areas, and will be able to serve as the advance command centre for the commanding officer of the headquarters in Stavanger. The territorial command structure will consist of eight defence districts and 14 home guard districts. The arrangement will afford a saving of around 40%, and the current 41 headquarters/staffs will be reduced to 17.

The defence support function is already in the process of streamlining through the establishment of the Defence Logistics Organisation (FLO, cf. Government Bill no. 55 (1999–2000) and Recommendation no. 25 (2000–2001)). This work will be continued during the restructuring period. The spring session of Parliament will also see the submission of a Government Bill that is aimed at increasing the efficiency of the administration of the defence properties, buildings and installations.

The Government wishes compulsory military service to continue. Military service represents an important social and cultural melting pot, and ensures that our armed forces enjoy a broad and secure foundation among the population. In addition it ensures a steady supply and appropriate distribution of personnel to our national defence and a broad recruitment base for international operations. Military service is also an important foundation for any build-up of larger forces, should this prove necessary. With a reduced forces structure, the requirement for fairness in the administration of military service may stand in contrast to our defence requirements. In weighing up these considerations, defence requirements and access to resources must be the deciding factors. The majority of conscripts will complete 12 months’ service without normally having to undergo refresher exercises, while the Home Guard’s needs will be covered by means of a four-month initial course and annual training sessions.

The activity of our defence is currently very diffuse. This involves disproportionately high costs. In order to achieve the requisite savings, many garrisons, stations and bases will have to be closed down. At the same time, the Government places great stress upon the need for the armed forces to have a presence in all parts of the country, with concentrations in North Norway, Trøndelag, the Bergen area and inner Østlandet. In particular, the defence forces must be heavily represented in North Norway.

Taken as a whole, the organisational measures that the Government has recommended will make it possible to operate and renew the structure in such a way that our future defence will be of a high quality and enjoy a high degree of availability. We take as a basis a reduction of 5 000 man-years and an annual operational reduction of NOK 2 billion, compared with an alternative that involves no reorganisation.

Many of those who have reacted against the extent of the reductions in scope of our defences, as currently proposed, have claimed that the reductions are due to an exaggerated concentration upon the international aspects, to the detriment of the national ones.

Restructuring

How do I know that it is going to work this time? The whole of the 1990s represents one long sad story with regard to defence reforms. The Government has this time elected to concentrate in particular upon the reorganisation of the defence forces during the period 2002–05.

One can never, of course, guarantee anything. However, the Government has taken note of the consequences of the unsuccessful reorganisation processes of the 1990s, in four ways. In the first place we are tabling a Bill, rather than a parliamentary report, which has been the usual procedure. We wish to create the conditions to enable the Storting to adopt an overall approach to the reorganisation of defence in such a manner that the policy to which it lends its support may be followed up by specific resolutions governing the restructuring of the organisation. In other words, we are presenting a package that – if implemented – will in itself constitute a reorganisation of defence. By proposing such a package, we hope to bring about a debate that focuses upon the entirety of the reorganisation, rather than the organisational constituent part.

Secondly, the Government recommends that the armed forces are afforded an adequate degree of economic predictability. The Government proposes that the armed forces should be managed in line with an allocation of some NOK 112 billion in total over the period 2002–05, representing an average of around NOK 28 billion a year. Of this, NOK 24 billion – or in excess of 20% – will be allocated to investments in new materiel. However, the actual reorganisation will take centre stage during the period, and NOK 10 billion is being earmarked for this purpose. Of this, NOK 6 billion will be used for critical investment in buildings and installations, NOK 3 billion for measures to assist readjustment to civilian life, and NOK 1 billion for other reorganisation measures.

Even though the Government, through its recommendations, seeks to limit and spread the consequences of the defence reductions as evenly as possible, certain local communities will be hit hard. The Government recommends that the local authorities in those districts that are hardest hit should be given support for readjustment. NOK 250 million will be allocated for this purpose during the period 2002–06. The experience of our Swedish neighbours shows that the transition from military to civilian activity can be managed with considerable success.

The third reason why we consider there to be good prospects of success is that the armed forces are being provided with new means of securing the departure of personnel, thus making it easier to achieve the actual savings. The personnel policy aspects of the reorganisation that were initiated in the mid-1990s were extended last autumn to include other measures as well. Even though these measures may appear expensive when viewed in isolation, it would be more expensive to have surplus officers on full pay in the composition of the forces, without having any need for their working capacity, or to disburse stand-by pay to civilians for several years. It is the Government’s objective to ensure that those who will have to leave the forces are motivated towards voluntary departure. The response to these measures to date indicates that they are attractive and will serve as important tools with which to reduce the organisation to the extent required.

The fourth reason why the Government believes it will be successful in reorganising our defence on this occasion, is that we are recommending fundamental changes to the whole structure and organisation of our defence. The absence of such wholesale changes was the greatest weakness of the attempts to reorganise in the 1990s: while the military structure was gradually and dramatically reduced, the running of the peacetime defence organisation became no more economical.

I consider that we have found the best possible balance with our recommendations. I believe that most people will, in principle, be able to support the principal elements of the reorganisation of our defence as proposed by the Government. There is no alternative to a drastic and wholesale restructuring of defence to the extent recommended by the Government.

Conclusion

In conclusion I should like to say that we now have a good opportunity to undertake the reorganisation of our defence that we failed to accomplish in the 1990s, to suit the tasks and the structure to our security policy challenges and economic ability. On 13 June the Storting is scheduled to debate and, I hope, adopt the necessary resolutions in respect of reorganising defence. The Bill is currently being subjected to detailed consideration in the Storting. I have a good "gut feeling" with regard to the principal elements of the Bill’s proposals and the need for restructuring. The Labour Party maintains an open stance regarding amendments to the Bill’s proposals, as long as we can be sure that the extent of the reorganisation equates with the ambitions we have set out, and that anything added to the structure, or taken away from it, is adequately quality assured – and, even more importantly, carries the right price tag.

The Storting debate will show whether there are also grounds for a defence policy compromise. This would then increase the prospects of affording defence the predictability and stability within the framework conditions that it will need.

Thank you for your attention.