Ladies and gentlemen,

The last decade of the twentieth century brought a definitive shift in the political climate in world politics.

Co-operation replaced confrontation. The potential of a massive military conflict gave way to the promise of an era of stability and peaceful progress. The new situation that emerged put the focus on common future challenges rather than common threats.

Not surprisingly, this has prompted a new discussion regarding the future of Euro-Atlantic relations.

The renewed attention Norway is paying to the transatlantic relationship must also be seen in part as a result of our renewed interest in Europe. This could seem like a paradox at first glance until one realises how outmoded the old ways of separating foreign policy arenas have become.

We used to discuss trade policy with the EU, security policy in NATO and peacekeeping in the UN. Today, anyone ignoring the EU’s foreign and security policy agenda does so at his own peril, while NATO has taken on a leading role in keeping the peace, not just in the alliance area but also elsewhere within the Euro-Atlantic area. The UN works in partnership with both.

The wider choice of foreign and security policy tools available to us, and the ever-closer ties between the institutions concerned, offer new possibilities. But developments within the EU and in NATO also bring challenges of their own.

In my brief introduction today, I will focus on the broad transatlantic issues, including the development of a common European Security and Defence Policy, its consequences for the EU-NATO relationship, as well as the challenges we are facing in the Balkans – a region where both the United States and Europe have vested interests.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me start by stating the obvious: the transatlantic dimension lies at the very core of Norwegian foreign policy.

There are at least three reasons for this.

First of all, the United States was and is our most important military ally. NATO and the United States served as the guarantors of Norwegian security through decades of cold war.

Norway rebuilt its armed forces after the Second World War largely with American assistance. In addition to the collective security afforded by NATO, our defence and security co-operation resulted in a number of bilateral agreements between Norway and the United States on the reinforcement of Norway’s defence during times of tension and crisis, as well as the pre-positioning of American equipment in peacetime.

Norway - for its part - contributed to the security of the Alliance and the US by defending NATO’s northern flank, by gathering intelligence and by being available for allied and bilateral training and exercises.

Secondly, the United States is the world’s unchallenged superpower, and not merely on account of its military and economic resources. But the values we share - democracy, respect for human rights, a market economy, and the rule of law - have never in history been as widely held in the world as they are today. The United States and Europe may have differing interests at times, and diverging points of view. But we have the same point of departure. We share the same values, and to a broad extent the same cultural and historical roots.

Thirdly, for Norway, maintaining the role of the United States as a European power is of vital importance, and NATO is the indispensable organisation to achieve this aim.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Norway strongly supports the development of a common European Security and Defence Policy, including the building of military and civilian crisis management capabilities within the EU. This we do as a non-member of the EU.

Why do we do this?

First of all, we sincerely believe that the ESDP is the best way to strengthen our ties across the Atlantic. The ESDP should serve as a good example of the close partnership between NATO and the EU. A partnership characterised by the transparency of each organisation’s decision-making processes, close consultations between the two, as well as the two organisations’ openness to each other’s members.

Secondly, the ESDP is an answer to the call for new sharing of burdens on the European continent. This is a lesson learned from the peace operations in the Balkans, where everybody could see that the US was expected to carry an unacceptably large part of the responsibility for resolving what is basically an internal European conflict.

Thirdly, the ESDP is also a response to the fact that co-operation within the EU is evolving. There is a strong sense of urgency within the EU to develop a military dimension in addition to the political and economic ones. The response is strong on political resolve and sense of purpose, even if it will evidently take time and great effort to develop the military capabilities of the European Union.

Fourthly, the capacity of the EU countries to act as one in international affairs benefits the entire continent. The EU’s unity of purpose and action also challenges our traditional views and priorities on transatlantic co-operation.

Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that the fundamentals of the transatlantic relationship remain the same as before. The US presence on European soil and in European affairs is a stabilising feature in European politics. The strong Atlantic orientation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe aspiring to NATO membership gives clear evidence of this.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The United States has a long tradition of supporting European integration, backed by the clear perception that this is in its own national interest.

Despite the rhetoric of the recent presidential campaign, it should come as no surprise that both President Bush and Secretary of State Powell have confirmed their support for the development of a common European Security and Defence Policy, provided it brings new crisis management capabilities and added value to NATO, and that it is closely co-ordinated with the security co-operation already taking place in the Alliance. And last but not least, it must be implemented in a manner all allies are comfortable with.

To a large degree, Norway shares these basic assumptions. We believe that effective European crisis management can only succeed if it is carried out in close co-operation between the EU and NATO - with the explicit support of the United States - and without affecting NATO’s predominant role.

There were those who predicted that NATO would fall apart when the enemy the Alliance was set up to defend us against, was no longer there. This did not happen. Indeed, the Alliance is as vital as ever.

The reason is simple. It was more than a common enemy; it was a common sense of purpose and values that kept us together all those years.

NATO is and should remain the foundation of European security and will continue to play a predominant role in European crisis management, as well as provide for the collective defence of its member countries. But the ability of the EU to engage in operations on its own where NATO as a whole is not engaged will be a welcome addition to our repertoire of crisis management tools. Norway supports this process.

We have therefore recently embarked on a process of transforming our national armed forces.

Our ability to contribute troops to international crisis response operations will be given high priority. In particular, Norway has established an Armed Forces Task Force for International Operations consisting of military units that will be tailored to the operation at hand.

While our participation in NATO’s operations will continue to be its primary objective, we have made it clear that the Task Force also will be available for EU-led operations.

It will also improve our ability to contribute to UN-led peace operations as well. At the same time, the strengthening of our ability to make an international contribution will add to, not detract from, the defence of Norwegian territory.

Ladies and gentlemen,

At present, many speak of the ESDP process as being deadlocked. Given that the process involves finding difficult compromises, this is not entirely surprising. Vital national interests are no doubt at stake. But it is not a situation that can endure.

Therefore, we need a creative and ambitious approach to the question of how to involve non-EU European allies in the ESDP on the basis of the decisions taken at the EU Summit in Nice, and non-NATO EU members in the work of the Alliance.

At the same time, we need a political commitment to complete the NATO Washington Summit agenda on EU access to NATO resources and capabilities. We must ensure that NATO and EU crisis management capabilities are linked together in a closely-knit structure. We cannot afford duplication of structures and efforts. The task is huge and complex, and it is urgent. Our goal must be to reach an agreement this spring.

Finding a common framework for co-operation between NATO and the EU in such a short time is surely possible, but it will require a willingness to compromise and a measure of give and take from all of us. Sometimes the events outpace the debate.

If we manage ESDP correctly, it will strengthen transatlantic relations for years to come and help provide an updated answer to the old question of whether the United States should remain a European power. This question has surfaced time and again since the Alliance was established in 1949, not least in response to changing administrations in Washington.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The ESDP/ESDI debate is the first of the main items on NATO’s agenda. As soon as this is sorted out, however, we can move on to the other main issue confronting NATO - the issue of enlargement.

The issue of NATO enlargement will increasingly come to the fore in the run-up to NATO’s Summit meeting in Prague next year.

This will certainly be an appropriate time to give the Alliance’s enlargement policy a clear direction. The main message from the Prague Summit should be that the Alliance will continue to follow the path of integration it embarked on as early as the London Summit in 1990 - immediately following the fall of the Berlin wall.

NATO’s enlargement process must continue. It must be transparent, gradual and balanced, avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. And we must see to it that the end result is the strengthening of European peace and security.

The first post-Cold War round of enlargement, involving Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, has been a great success. The new Membership Action Plan (MAP) will help future members assume the burdens and responsibilities of membership. But NATO membership will not come automatically to any country. The ultimate decision will be for NATO to make, and it will be a political one.

For Norway it is important to emphasise that all candidates must be measured by the same yardstick. There should be no artificial distinctions defined by geography or history. On these general principles there is no disagreement across the Atlantic. Norway has a particular concern for the Baltic countries on this point, however. But when the time comes, I am sure we will be able to reach broad agreement.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Throughout the past decade, events on the Balkans have posed a significant challenge to our common security and to the building of a Europe whole and free.

Our experiences in this area have shaped both our crisis management policies and our views on transatlantic interdependence.

The Balkans have clearly demonstrated how interdependent the military and civilian elements are in post-Cold War peace operations. Without a strong civilian effort to build stable self-sustaining societies, the military operation will never be more than a peaceful interlude in an on-going conflict. But equally, without a stabilising military presence, the long-term efforts to build civilian society have every chance of failing. This again highlights the need for an intimate partnership between NATO and the EU.

Today, the US and Europe clearly see eye to eye on the general political developments in the region.

Over the past few weeks, a practical working relationship between NATO and the EU has developed, not least over the handling of the crisis in Macedonia. Here the EU has taken the lead in the political and diplomatic efforts while NATO has been very supportive as a military guarantor. Javier Solana and Lord Robertson have visited Skopje together with the EU Presidency, and Lord Robertson has for the first time ever participated in an EU General Affairs Council Meeting. This shows again how events move quicker than the debate in Brussels.

Over the past few months, President Kostunica and his colleagues have largely succeeded in normalising relations with neighbouring countries, and in reintegrating Yugoslavia into European and international co-operation structures.

The new government in Belgrade has adopted a pragmatic and co-operative approach to NATO and KFOR. This relationship has been taken a step further by the Covic plan and the reintroduction of Yugoslav forces in parts of the Ground Safety Zone along the Kosovo border. However, the situation in Kosovo is far from resolved. The gap between local aspirations and the international community’s stated intentions are making the search for solutions more complicated.

Norway is ready to do its part, both as a NATO ally and as a European nation.

A Norwegian general will assume command of KFOR on Friday. The Norwegian personnel now arriving to serve at the KFOR 5 headquarters will bring our total manpower contribution to KFOR to more than 1400. That is substantial by any measure, and particularly in relation to our population and the size of our armed forces. It shows that we are willing and able to do our share in taking responsibility for European security.

In order to meet the diversity of the challenges facing us in the Balkans, the entire international community, including the UN and the OSCE, has important roles to play. As a member of the Security Council, Norway is particularly pleased with the close relationship that has developed between the UN and NATO over the past decade.

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson was invited a few weeks ago to address the members of the Security Council on the Alliance’s approach to stabilising the region. This was the first time this has happened. It was a testimony of a practical and political relationship between the UN and NATO that will continue to develop in the years to come.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The threats stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is an issue that has been high on the agenda for the last few months.

The US plans for establishing a missile defence system have been followed closely and with some concern by many European countries. The idea of a weapons system to defend against the threat of ballistic missiles from terrorist groups or irresponsible regimes clearly has much support among the American public.

President Bush has made it clear that the development and eventual deployment of such a system has high priority. While the National Missile Defence system envisaged by the Clinton Administration was designed to defend the US against a small number of missiles, President Bush has indicated that he wants a more robust and wide-ranging defence system which also covers friends and allies.

The entire Missile Defence Concept is currently under extensive review, and we do not yet know what form the plans will eventually take.

At this stage, the Bush administration’s expressed intention to consult closely with NATO allies as the plans evolve is very much appreciated. In so doing we can discuss the nature of the threat, which potentially involves Europe as well as the United States. Allied views can be taken into account. Unilateralism can be avoided.

In sum, close consultations are essential in order to reduce the potential for transatlantic discord. My impression is that the time has also come for more active and constructive talks between the US and Russia on this issue. We will continue to follow it closely.

Norway’s greatest concern with respect to US missile defences has been the possible effect on arms control and disarmament in general, including the future of the ABM treaty.

Nuclear disarmament remains a priority issue for us. We will follow with great interest the new Administration’s ongoing review of US strategic policy. We have noted with satisfaction that this review might lead to considerable further reductions in US strategic arms.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Global and regional interests also meet in the far north. Throughout the Alliance’s history, NATO’s northern flank has obviously been Norway’s particular concern. Today, Russia is no longer an adversary. Indeed, co-operation is the key word in our relations with Russia. However, US and EU interest and engagement are still more than welcome. The support of the US is important in the efforts to integrate Russia into Euro-Atlantic co-operation, as can be seen in the Barents and the Baltic Sea Co-operation. Priority areas are the strengthening of civil society, retraining of decommissioned military personnel, improved resource management and nuclear safety, and the handling of a very serious environmental situation.

We strongly welcome both the EU and the US involvement in trying to find solutions to some of the vast and critical problems regarding nuclear waste and the environment in north-western Russia.

There are compelling reasons, both from an environmental perspective and from a nuclear proliferation perspective, for broad international collaboration on these issues.

We hope that the negotiations on the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation as well as the trilateral AMEC process, which includes the military of Russia, the USA, and Norway, will soon be brought to a successful conclusion.

Finally, ladies and gentlemen,

The challenges of the post cold war world are complex. The security threats are less clear, less predictable and not as easily defined.

There will certainly also be differences of views across the Atlantic in the future. As the European Union develops further in political cohesion and capacity to act, conflicts of ambition and interest are bound to emerge. This will put political skills on both sides of the Atlantic to the test, as will occasionally the progression of events in Washington and the new proposals of a new American administration. But I think we will pass the test.

It is my firm conviction that the United States will remain a European power and that the European countries will maintain their Atlantic orientation. This is an issue you will be discussing in more detail today. However, we should not shy away from confronting difficult issues. My belief is that working out the modalities of the NATO-EU relationship will vitalise the Alliance and protect it against future strain. Open minds and bold visions, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, will help NATO remain a strong and viable organisation in the future.