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Ladies and gentlemen,

It is honor for me to address such a distinguished audience. The Norwegian Atlantic Committee plays an essential role in informing the security policy community, as well as the general public, on NATO issues. It also contributes greatly to the research and debate on security policy issues in Norway, most visibly at the annual Leangkollen conference, which is traditionally opened by a public meeting here at the Nobel Institute.

I have been asked to speak on the topic of Norway’s strategic challenges.

This task was clearly summarized by one of my predecessors, Knut Frydenlund, who gave his book on Norwegian foreign policy the title Little Country – What Now? His conclusion was that a country in Norway’s position must seek to strengthen international cooperation and work together with other nations to safeguard its national interests.

The world has undergone fundamental changes since Knut Frydenlund published his reflections twenty years ago. But some things have not changed. Norway is still a small country. Norway is still facing the Atlantic Ocean. Norway is still a neighbor of Russia. Norway still has the United States as its closest ally, and international cooperation as its primary foreign policy strategy.

Our position in the world no doubt influences our point of view as we look at the tasks and challenges ahead.

Norway strongly supports the transformation of NATO, which will ensure that the Alliance remains the guarantor of our security in the future.

Norway strongly supports the development of a common European security and defense policy, which will enable Europe to take greater responsibility for peace and security on its own continent in the future.

At the same time, we will continue to further develop and expand our bilateral relations with Russia, and to contribute actively to peace and security in the entire Euro-Atlantic region.

For more than half a century, NATO has been the cornerstone of Norwegian and European security.

For several decades, the tasks involved were obvious: to deter and if necessary defend Western Europe against possible aggression from the East. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Warsaw Pact, there were those who predicted that the cornerstone would turn into a rolling stone. But without stretching the geological metaphor too far, NATO – at the beginning of a new century – still upholds our common security. NATO remains a vital instrument for political consultations and military cooperation.

This is so because the Alliance has not hesitated to embark on the difficult path of change and adaptation to a post-cold war security environment. The NATO anniversary summit in Washington D.C. two years ago, was a milestone in this process. The new Strategic Concept defined the changes that had taken place, including in NATO’s external role. And the Kosovo crisis made us fully understand that this was not a theoretical exercise.

Kosovo helped us recognize that our national security could no longer be defended only at our borders. It helped us see that this must also be done in more distant places – by confronting direct and indirect threats to our common security. It helped us see that we must always act to stop ethnic cleansing and extreme nationalism. It helped us see that together we must do our utmost to prevent new conflicts from erupting, and existing conflicts from spreading.

Changing NATO’s conceptual thinking in such a radical way is no trivial matter. It involves a deeply felt historical legacy, and it involves broad-based restructuring and change. Several reports were issued last year that analyzed the tasks ahead and the resources available to the Norwegian armed forces of tomorrow, and their conclusion was clear: sweeping changes are necessary.

The Norwegian Government will present its conclusions this month. I know we will propose changes in our defense structure that will be painful. But we will come out of this process with a more capable and deployable force structure than we have ever had – one that is fully adapted to the security challenges of a post-cold war world.

We will retain our basic ability to defend Norwegian territory, but our ability to participate in international crisis operations will be greatly enhanced. As a consequence, Norway will remain a trustworthy ally and an active and contributing partner in safeguarding our common security.

Ladies and gentlemen,

NATO’s next summit will take place in Prague. At this meeting, we want to help give NATO’s enlargement policy a clear direction. We want the process to be transparent, gradual and balanced – avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. The goal – as stated in the Washington summit declaration – is "to build a Europe whole and free".

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is important to help the countries aspiring to membership to prepare thoroughly and implement needed reform. This process has so far been a success, but no NATO membership comes automatically. We must see to it that the inclusion of a given country will enhance European security and stability, and serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance.

Norwegian assistance to the MAP process is directed towards the Baltic countries in particular, although not exclusively so. We strongly support the membership aspirations of the Baltic countries. The ultimate decision will be for NATO to take, but the process must not run its course in isolation. Before we launch ourselves into the next "who and when" debate, we need to discuss what we want the process to achieve. Experience has shown that a premature "who and when" discussion risks introducing a bitter note into what is a NATO success story.

The Bush administration took office two weeks ago. Early official statements have signaled certain shifts in emphasis regarding US engagement in Europe, the development of a European security and defense policy, relations with Russia, and the plans for a National Missile Defense (NMD).

However, the main impression is continuity in the basic elements of US foreign policy. I do not in any way see the United States turning away from its role in Europe. Indeed, Colin Powell has strongly emphasized the firm US commitment to NATO and to Europe.

It is my firm conviction that Norwegian national interests are best served through international cooperation. In this we have much in common with the EU countries, which makes it all the more important for us to link up with the political processes taking place in Europe.

The effort to develop a common European security and defense policy is one of the most dynamic political processes to take place within the European Union over the last few years.

As I see it, there are three basic reasons for this.

First of all, the EU countries wish to back up their growing foreign policy cooperation with the means to carry it out in a more than nominal sense.

Secondly, there is a clear expectation that Europeans must to a larger degree than before be ready to take care of crisis situations in their own backyard by developing efficient crisis management tools–- both civilian and military.

Thirdly, a Europe that takes greater responsibility for its own security will ensure the maintenance of a strong and vital transatlantic relationship in the future as well.

Norway strongly supports the development of a common European security and defense policy. We are convinced that it will serve our own security interests in the broadest sense. That is why we have made clear that our planned Armed Forces Task Force for International Operations, totaling some 3500 personnel, will be available for EU-led operations. We will make active use of the structures established for third-party cooperation at the Nice Summit in December, as well as actively pursuing our bilateral contacts.

It will take time to develop the military capabilities of the European Union, but the momentum is there. Most of all, our common responsibility for peace and security in Europe demands a transparent relationship between NATO and the European Union based on confidence. Effective European crisis management can only succeed if it is carried out in close cooperation between the EU and NATO, and with the explicit support of the USA.

Few wish to see NATO as purely a provider of military resources. NATO has taken on crisis management as a new core task, and it is difficult to conceive of a future where NATO only becomes involved when a member’s territorial integrity is threatened, while the EU takes on all the other aspects of crisis management. Such a division of labor would run counter to the developments we have seen in the Alliance over the last decade, and could be detrimental to the efforts of all European countries to carry out comprehensive and integrated defense reform. Thus the objective is not to split the tasks, but to achieve burden sharing based on close consultations and practical cooperation, and EU involvement when NATO as such is not engaged.

Maintaining NATO as a dynamic security and defense organization, capable of dealing with the challenges of a new security environment, also seems to be a priority for the new administration in Washington. US support for the ESDP can probably be expected, provided that the EU is able to deliver on its ambitious agenda. Referring to the multiple Cs in military language ("command, control and consultations"), an observer remarked that "there is only one C that counts – capability".

The NATO ministerial meetings in December last year did not reach consensus in regard to the generous offer to make NATO resources available for EU-led operations. We were very close, but we did not quite make it. The efforts to find a solution to this issue will probably take some time. This is regrettable, but it is not the end of the story. Nor is it the whole story of EU-NATO relations.

I would like to take this opportunity to point out the positive outcome of the December ministerial meetings with regard to the setting up of appropriate consultative arrangements between the EU and NATO. Letters have already been exchanged outlining the modalities for ensuring that the two organizations will talk frequently and at all levels. The European Union will also continue to draw on NATO military experts for advice.

At the same time, we were also very close to agreement on other issues. NATO undoubtedly has the means and resources to provide the European Union with necessary planning capabilities. The EU’s access to these resources should be assured – as stated in Washington – not decided on a case-by-case basis. This will also make it easier to avoid parallel structures in the EU.

In broad terms, NATO and the European Union should be complementary organizations – not competitors. I would also like to underline that the legitimate concerns of all Allies, including Turkey, should be taken seriously. I believe a broad process of confidence-building is required. At the end of the day, finding a solution to the current difficulties is a challenge for both NATO and the EU, as well as the 23 member countries.

Norway’s strong commitment to European crisis management will be particularly visible as we assume a lead role in KFOR V in April. Most of all, it is a military challenge. We are determined to contribute the resources necessary to make this mission a success. However, a successful mission must also be based on a thorough understanding of the political situation in the region.

Over the last few months, the peaceful democratic revolution in Yugoslavia has brought new hope. President Kostunica and his colleagues are moving quickly to normalize relations with neighboring countries and to re-integrate Yugoslavia into European and international cooperation structures. An important element in this process, however, will be the question of the Yugoslav Government’s cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia. At the same time, due account must be taken of the political realities that affect the consolidation of democracy in present-day Yugoslavia.

The impressive progress made by the Croatian Government in implementing its reform program could serve as a catalyst and a model for political and economic reform throughout the region. A number of other countries in the region are also working hard to establish sustainable democracies. They deserve our full support. A regional approach is the only way to meet the challenges in southeastern Europe. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is crucial in this regard.

The new government in Belgrade has adopted a pragmatic and cooperative approach to NATO and KFOR, which we should further encourage by improving practical relations on the ground.

However, there is a risk that the Kosovars will view KFOR as an adversary in their struggle for an independent Kosovo. The gap between local aspirations and the international community’s stated intentions in Security Council Resolution 1244 is complicating the search for solutions.

Adding to KFOR’s problems are the operations by ethnic Albanian armed groups in the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia, which are threatening to upset developments inside Kosovo and in the entire region.

Both KFOR and UNMIK must continue to take preventive action to improve control of the boundary along the "Ground Safety Zone" and carry out investigations inside Kosovo. Kosovo Albanian leaders must halt the activities of extremist elements. The Belgrade Government has shown responsibility and restraint. However, the pressure on the central authorities for stronger action is likely to increase, thus fuelling an already dangerous situation.

Modern peace operations take place in close contact with the civilian population, and call for integration of the civilian and military measures employed. Both KFOR in Kosovo and SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina must continue to support the civilian agencies in strengthening internal security and institution-building. KFOR and SFOR must above all focus on the protection of minorities – they must deal with organized crime and counter the security threats posed by various disgruntled elements.

Russia is unique among NATO’s partners. The dialogue with Russia in the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) has no exact parallel, and this is understood by both NATO and Russia, as well as by all NATO countries. And yet NATO’s relations with Russia have run into fewer problems on the ground in Kosovo than in the political cooperation structures in Brussels. This may seem like a paradox. But there is a fundamental indecisiveness underlying Russia’s attitude towards NATO. Russia accepts, but at the same time dislikes, NATO’s central role in European and Euro-Atlantic security. At the same time, Russia wants to be part of operations like those in Bosnia and Kosovo – even if this means participating in NATO-led operations.

In other words, practical cooperation between peacekeepers on the ground is seen as one issue, working for a close partnership with NATO as such, as another. Perhaps this should not surprise us. Perceptions reinforced over decades are not transformed overnight. This is a challenge that we as well as our Russian partners will have to continue working on in the years to come. Thus, the opening of the NATO information bureau in Moscow will be most welcome.

Russian skepticism towards NATO may also reflect the debate on Russia’s future role in European security. What relationship with NATO will best serve Russian national interests? This debate is governed by internal Russian dynamics. NATO and the West probably have limited influence on its direction and outcome. But let us be quite clear: lasting security and stability in Europe can only be built in cooperation with Russia.

A general trend we have seen in Russian foreign policy is one of growing assertiveness. The bilateral relationship with Norway is no exception. A standard set of grievances is brought up time and again – concerns about environmental regulations on the Svalbard archipelago, claims that the Globus II radar is somehow linked to the US plans for national missile defense, claims that military activity in northern Norway has increased. We have repeatedly pointed out why these concerns are unfounded. We will continue to do so. But the question is wider. How can we move on towards a more constructive dialogue?

A key challenge is to overcome the ingrained Russian habit of thinking in zero-sum terms. Once again, this is about changing perceptions. It will take time. But it is vital that we continue to push in the right direction, through openness, through extensive contacts at various levels, through practical cooperation in the field like that in SFOR and KFOR, and in many other ways.

The Kursk accident demonstrated the importance of personal contacts between military commanders. We will continue to promote the development of such relations. Military-to-military contacts are indeed the best way of building confidence and eliminating skepticism and fear.

Our dialogue with Russia must be underpinned by practical cooperation. There is no shortage of issues which we already address jointly, and which must be further developed: military-related environmental problems, retraining of discharged military personnel, maritime rescue, civil emergency preparedness, humanitarian and peace operations, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

We will continue to encourage Russian participation in Partnership-for-Peace-related activities in Norway. The exercise "Nordic Peace" is a good example. While we regret that Russia has not responded positively to the invitation to participate with forces or staff officers in "Nordic Peace 2001", we welcome the possibility of having Russian observers present this year as part of our bilateral defense cooperation program.

In general, Russia has been reluctant to engage in PfP-related exercises. We therefore consider it positive that Russia will be participating in the three "In-the-spirit-of PfP" exercises in Ukraine this year. Whether or not this represents a trend, Norway will continue promoting activities that foster cooperation, openness and transparency, which in turn – hopefully – will lead to increased confidence.

Finally, ladies and gentlemen,

Norway’s strategic position in Europe confronts us with the double challenge of supporting efforts to build a common European security and defense policy, while at the same time maintaining close transatlantic ties and strengthening NATO.

It is important that we move forward together with determination on both of these tracks. European security cannot be safeguarded without strong transatlantic ties. At the same time I believe it is in the interests of our North American allies to support the development of a Europe that is willing and able to take greater responsibility for its own security.

Norway is ready to contribute –in terms of both personnel and resources. Robust and efficient national defense structures well prepared for the tasks assigned to them are essential in order to safeguard our own national security as well as in regard to our participation in international crisis operations.

The issues you will be discussing over the next couple of days are of great interest and relevance. I am sure we will all benefit from your deliberations.