Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges

Background

The seminar on integrated and multidimensional peace operations in Brussels on October 5, 2007, was organized by the Department for Security Policy of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MoD), in close collaboration with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The seminar fell within the framework of a comprehensive project initiated by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Integrated Missions in a UN context.

Participants on the program included UN, EU, and NATO officials, high-level national representatives, NGOs and other experts in the field. This seminar contributed to the other seminars by adding a particular institutional focus on the approaches to integrated operations by the UN, EU and NATO, respectively.

When the Brussels seminar was held, the Norwegian MFA had already organised several seminars on multidimensional and integrated peace operations, in Beijing, Addis Ababa, New York, Geneva, and Johannesburg, with a planned concluding high-level conference in Oslo at the end of October, 2007.

Panel 1
Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Strategic and Operational Trends and Challenges

The Norwegian Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr. Espen Barth Eide opened the seminar by reminding the audience that multidimensional and integrated peace operations involve elements such as development, security, civilian efforts as well as a military component, in areas of severe crisis and often humanitarian catastrophe. While Afghanistan is frequently used as an example of an integrated operation, Mr. Eide stressed that Afghanistan is not the only example and perhaps not even a good example. Mr. Eide further underlined that the UN does not operate in a vacuum. On the contrary, there is a great need for close cooperation with other actors, and there is a particular need for coordinated efforts and a strong civilian leadership, both at the theatre and strategic levels. Regional organisations like the African Union, European Union and NATO are crucial partners for the UN in that respect.
In conclusion, Mr. Eide highlighted the enormous future potential of the EU with the European Security Strategy (ESS) and with all the different tools and instruments at its disposal. At the same time, he acknowledged that there is some way to go before the EU’s internal problems are resolved.

The European Community Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO) is mainly a donor organization providing emergency assistance and relief during humanitarian and man-made disasters. ECHO currently spends more than €700 million annually on financing humanitarian projects. According to ECHO, integrated missions equal crisis management operations, while humanitarian operations – which ECHO is involved in –  is separate and distinct from crisis management and thus from integrated missions. Humanitarian operations should not be part of integrated operations.
Furthermore, humanitarian actors are to be neutral and impartial, and should not have a political objective beyond saving lives. If you decide to engage, you are automatically part of the political game. Afghanistan with its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) was used as one example of an unsuccessful integrated operation in which different roles are mixed. Consequently, ECHO’s role is first and foremost to coordinate with other actors, and not be a part of a bigger integrated mission.
The EU’s Military Staff emphasized the emergence of new challenges posed by climate change, globalization, non-state actors and an overall changed security concept, which together creates a demand for combining the use of various types of instruments, including military. On an operational level, emphasis was put on ESDP operations that follow a “Comprehensive Approach” and that are ultimately effect-based in the sense that they focus on the “output”.
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), on the other hand, focuses on establishing an early planning process of integrated missions at the strategic level, as a precondition for the future success of humanitarian missions. Emphasis was also put on the importance of making an initial strategic assessment of both root causes of the conflict and the strategic objective of the potential mission. Somalia and Darfur were two examples in which incomplete initial assessments had been made. On the basis of such a broad assessment, one will ultimately be better able to decide whether an integrated mission is to be launched or not.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is the entity within the UN currently tasked to develop a new doctrine for peacekeeping operations. The goal is to coordinate all initial missions planning at HQ- and/or strategic level, and with a clear objective for strong UN leadership and guidance. The speakers also pointed to the challenges concerning coordination within the six humanitarian agencies of the UN, and even more so, between external organizations such as NATO, EU, AU, and with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Additionally, inclusion early on in the planning phase is important as all these actors are also often the implementers at the operational and tactical levels.
There was broad agreement about the UN taking the lead in the planning process and that the new UN doctrine for peacekeeping operations would function as a model for integrated mission planning in the future.
However, several participants made remarks about humanitarian agencies and especially NGOs posing a particular challenge as they will oftentimes not exclusively be engaged in humanitarian work, but will be pursuing separate agendas. So-called multi-mandated integrated mission pose a particular challenge for many NGOs with the end-result that some decide not to be part of an integrated mission – neither at the strategic planning phase nor at the operational or tactical level. In light of these concerns, some suggested that one should demarcate what is a military and what is a humanitarian mission, while others pointed out that such a separation does not in itself necessarily achieve a higher level of security or other goals for the humanitarian participants. The issue of security in particular was used as a major rationale by NGOs for not taking part in integrated missions. Following this line of argumentation, emphasis was then put on the importance of keeping impartiality and objectivity due to perceptions – particularly within the general population in the mission areas but also in reference to the popular opinion in contributing countries – so that both security and access could be assured at the operational and tactical levels.
Based on this, three strategic approaches to peace operations were offered by OCHA:

• one foot in, one foot out (for example OCHA outside, but still linked to the mission)
• full integration
• complete separation (rare – mostly during political operations).

Panel 2
The United Nation’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Concepts and Challenges

Broad agreement in the panel that the UN’s integrated approach is the right response to today’s complex peace operations, which require a more flexible and multidimensional response that goes well beyond establishing a secure environment. The UN is uniquely placed to provide the right tools and mandate and has, through its operational experiences, proved that a “shock and awe” approach is not a workable response to security challenges and threats facing the international community or other actors involved in peace operations. The UN has a unique capacity and ability to apply a wide spectrum of instruments – economic, political, developmental and humanitarian – in an integrated and coordinated manner. If peace operations are to lay the foundations for sustainable peace, focus should be on providing a coherent and well-coordinated structure in the field.  
The UN today is a leading player in the management of armed conflicts, and undertakes a considerable number of peace operations on a global level. At the same time, there are still several challenges in terms of improving the UN’s integrated missions concept and the implementation of it in the field.
Some of the key challenges facing the UN when conducting multidimensional peace operations were identified as:

• Integration gives contradiction. On the one hand, there is a need to maintain a clear distinction between the role and functions of humanitarian actors from that of the military or political. On the other hand, today’s integrated missions involve coordination of efforts between the UN and other actors, including humanitarian actors, presenting a challenge for humanitarian actors’ claim for neutrality and impartiality.
• The role and presence of humanitarian actors is not necessarily neutral or impartial as they impose “Western values”. For instance, building schools for girls in Afghanistan is a (Western) political effort.
• Force flexibility. This is limited by the UN’s lack of sufficient capabilities in the area of planning, and command and control, as well as an inflexible force generation system.
• A fragmented and inflexible UN system (i.e., bureaucracy), including dysfunctional financial mechanisms. Particularly, the UN’s lack of a common funding system and the fact that the organization is not sufficiently able to adapt its financial mechanisms in a way that ensures a flexible and responsive reaction to needs on the ground. This often prevents a timely availability of financial and other resources.
The conclusion therefore, is that the UN has to get its priorities right.

Panel 3
The European Union’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Concepts and Challenges

The presentation given by the key speaker at this panel, Mr. Pieter Feith, Deputy Director-General for Politico-Military Affairs, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, is published separately on these web pages.
The main message from the EU was that cooperation with the UN is vital and that resolutions in the UN Security Council are the preferable legal base for EU operations.
The EU has within a very short time built a crisis management capability and is currently running a total of 15 operations (11 civilian ops/4 military ops), totaling about 10 000 personnel under EU flag on several continents. Since the beginning of the EU’s participation in international operations in 1999, the goal has been integrated solutions. The EU is a global actor in crisis management and covers the whole specter from military to civilian operations, security sector reform, police reform etc.
The EU’s focus on effective multilateralism is provided through the European Security Strategy (2003). Complex challenges require solutions that focus on getting in at an early stage, referred to as “preventive engagement”. Inherent in this is a plan for an end stage, a roadmap, an exit strategy and cooperation with other international actors.
Civilian-military coordination implies from the EU point of view that all military operations should be part of a larger civilian effort to be successful. Many civilian missions need military support and protection. The EU’s military capacities will play an important role in that regard and its main efforts will be directed towards reconstruction, security sector reform, economic support, security and development, and long-term stabilization. However, development has also a security element and ESDP operations may create security in order to facilitate development.
The Aceh-operation was pointed out as a model for a successful integrated mission with participation from the EU Council, the Commission, the Parliament and other EU institutions.
According to the EU perspective, the organization’s potential for integrated missions has not yet been exhausted, but is hindered by internal EU politics. However, the impending EU Reform Treaty will likely make coordination within the EU better and facilitate even more integrated solutions. As a part of the Council Secretariat, two new bodies have been established: a civilian/military cell in the EU Military Staff and an Operations Centre.
A common concern during this session was challenges linked to the fragmentation of the instruments and actors available for integrated operations. Although operations are different, the organizations face similar challenges. There is much to gain by more cooperation in the field between NATO, the EU and the UN. And such cooperation is possible due to overlapping and compatible capabilities. This, however, would work even better if properly planned in advance. Better advance planning calls for a more institutionalized process to get the most out of available resources. The primary challenge is that the security environment is very fragmented and that there are too many actors on the scene.
Another major challenge on the civilian side is how to finance operations. Should means for operations be kept in a stabilization fund or a trust fund? That is the case for AU operations in Africa. What about security sector reform that requires increased cooperation between different organizations? The EU underlined the good internal cooperation between the different EU bodies in this field and emphasized that the EU should be more eager to promote its successes in promoting security sector reform.
It is important to improve the cooperation between the international organizations to prevent an increase in the number of international conflicts. The world is as complex to the EU as it is to NATO and the UN. Today, the EU is increasingly taking on tasks that used to be handled by the UN. In sum, all institutions meet the same challenges and the only way to handle them is to improve the bureaucracy and make things simpler.
The audience posed a most pertinent question: when do crisis management end and development start? The answer given was that in order to succeed, development should start as early as possible in light of the security situation.

Panel 4
NATO’s Approach to Multidimensional and Integrated Pace Operations: Concepts and Challenges

The presentation given by the key speaker at this panel, Mr. John Colston, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Policy and Planning, NATO HQ, is published separately on these web pages.
NATO’s Strategic Concept (1999) provides the overall guidance for the development of detailed policies and military plans for NATO. While security primarily used to be defined in military terms, this document also includes political, environmental, economic and social aspects in addition to the military element. NATO has a strong focus on developing its own concept for integrated missions, the “Comprehensive Approach”, to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction, realizing that today’s challenges requires a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments. However, NATO has no intentions to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes. The primary challenge for NATO all along has been that they only have military tools at their disposal, which means NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach has to be seen within a larger framework – preferably the UN – in which all available tools and instruments are applied, including diplomatic, political, economic and military. NATO’s efforts so far have been fairly ad-hoc and there is a need for a standardized approach, but without threatening the independence and autonomy of each participating organization – including NATO’s decision-making autonomy.
The concrete driver for a comprehensive approach in NATO can largely be traced to the tactical and operational levels. During operations such as in Afghanistan, people in the field have found pragmatic ways to work together in order to solve problems and to achieve the desirable goals and effects set forth in the mandates.
One notable and enduring challenge is the scepticism expressed by many NGOs in working together with the military, both in the Afghan theatre and elsewhere. Playing into this is also the sheer number of NGOs in Afghanistan – an estimated 2 000 NGOs currently operate within Afghanistan – making it impossible and even undesirable to coordinate all these humanitarian efforts. Adding to the complexity is that many NGOs were already engaged in Afghanistan prior to NATO’s arrival.
The ongoing dialog in NATO today about the comprehensive approach is basically stuck at the strategic level. The challenge – as expressed by several of the participants – is largely related to the lack of political resolve, leading to a less than clear political guidance at the lower echelons. One of the possible root causes for this – which there seemed to be a wide consensus about – was the lack of cooperation and coordination within the various capitals in so far as agreeing to a coherent and consistent national policy, but also a lack of coordination as such within and between organizations themselves, ultimately leading to confusion and inconsistency. While establishing concise and clearly defined comprehensive political objectives was important, it was equally important to have these objectives understood and shared by all the actors in the field, i.e., “be on the same page”. There is, however, a wide recognition that NATO’s comprehensive approach effort is, and should be, a part of a broader integrated mission concept and in practice based on a UN mandate.
A unique strength offered by NATO – as pointed out by one of the participants – is their expertise and experiences in mission planning at all levels, including the strategic, operative and tactical levels. This strength should be utilized more vigorously during integrated missions planning processes, especially at the UN. Today, coordinated planning is partially done through having military liaisons at the UN, but this capacity seems to be underutilized and clearly insufficient.
In conclusion, a recommendation was made about five guiding principles that could steer NATO towards a successful comprehensive approach:

• local ownership
• coordination with other actors
• strengthened capabilities for civil-military interface
• political direction and guidance from the North Atlantic Council
• pragmatism and flexibility.

Based on these principles four areas needed to be improved:
• better civilian and military assessment on the ground
• a more thorough and systematic approach to lessons learned
• enhanced cooperation with other actors at all levels
• a comprehensive approach to public information.

Panel 5
Achieving Integrated Operations

The political discussions within the UN, EU and NATO basically raise similar concerns and questions. The realization is clearly that integrated planning is the solution, and the need for a holistic approach in dealing with humanitarian crises. Without security, no development, and without development no security.
On the bright side, there seems to be indications that the international community is getting better at integrated operations, something that has been confirmed through a decrease in the number of conflicts and killed people around the world.
Integrated missions are, however, an evolving instrument. One problem has been to achieve coherence at the member state level, realizing working together is very demanding both within countries and between international organizations. The EU, for example, has been engaged in an internal debate about the feasibility and desirability of integrated missions, and still has a long way to go before a consensus is reached. 
There seemed to be broad consensus about the importance of establishing and agreeing upon top-level objectives early on, and subsequently have them cascade down in the system. Effective multilateralism is the way forward. This is what the new UN doctrine under development by the DPKO will be attempting to achieve. While a lot of decisions can be made in the field, many can and should be decided in advance at the strategic level. A comprehensive approach should be implemented at the planning stage to promote responsibility and accountability.
Active use of media/information has also been in focus as a tool that should be used in order to avoid giving false perceptions and expectations. It is clear that an integrated mission has limitations and can not do everything.
The final take-away from the seminar was that while integrated operations are clearly the model to follow, the role of NGOs, the military presence, and the breadth of the mission mandates pose serious challenges. The result is frequently long-lasting disagreement and friction between the participants in an area of operation.