Promoting cooperation and managing conflicts of interest

Introduction

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends: it gives me great pleasure to open this seminar on an issue that is both very timely and important, and which has gathered such a distinguished and competent group of participants.

The title for this seminar is most appropriate. The US, the EU and China today represent the primary global centres of gravity. All indications are this will be the case also in the foreseeable future. The future world order will to a large extent be determined by whatever happens within the US–EU–China triangle. This is not to say that they are the only relevant major actors. Russia and India are other examples of key actors to be reckoned with as major actors in this new world. As an example, I just came back from a very inspiring official visit to New Delhi, where we found a whole set of topics of common interest for future indo-Norwegian relations in the security and defence field. However, the US, the EU and China count as the most influential ones. Why is this so?

The reason is that in today’s world global influence is measured not only by military power, but by economic, political, military, demographic and cultural power combined. Economically, the US, the EU and China count as the three biggest and most dynamic economies of the world. In terms of overall influence the US is still number one, and without rival when it comes to military power. 

Military power, however, does not translate into political influence by a one-to-one ratio. Military power, even that of a superpower, has to be used wisely if it is to enhance global influence.

China, on the other hand, is the world’ most populous country, and with a potential to become a global power on par with – or even ahead of – the US.

The EU has expanded to become a 500 million people strong zone of stability throughout most of the European landmass, representing the world’s only true example of supra-national government with an increasing pull on her surroundings, both regionally and globally.

If the three joined forces, they could rule the world for the common good. It is doubtful if they ever will, however, even if we are not heading for confrontation. For all the similarities related to big capitalist economies operating in a global market, there are still fundamental asymmetries with respect to system of government, cultures, norms and perceptions, for instance, on the relationship between the individual and the collective. The US and the EU are stable western-liberal democracies based on shared principles we take for granted. China is still a state characterized by strong internal control, the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party but with a clear potential for internal instability.

At the same time, China is a country undergoing rapid internal transformation, gradually but steadily opening to the outside world as well as to competing voices internally. This is a development we have every reason to support and encourage through an active policy of engagement.

The heartbreaking events that has been unfolding over the very last days, following the earthquake in Western China, is – amidst the tragedy – also a testimony to a much more modern and open China than what we have seen only a few years ago. First, the authorities lost no time in openly recognising the dimensions of the drama. Prime Minister Wen Jibaos personal engagement in the disaster areas is the hallmark of a modern and effective political leader. Secondly, seasoned international experts in natural disaster management back here are actually suggesting that China may be among the countries in the world that are most able and up to speed in organizing a mass relief effort, surpassing the capacity even of leading Western countries. And thirdly, China has promptly moved to welcome the offers of international assistance in disaster management. This whole chain of events has presented a picture almost completely opposite of the situation in inward-looking and heavily autocratic Myanmar after the Cyclone disaster there.

In my last visit to China, in March, I opened a joint sino-norwegian seminar on Disaster Risk Reduction. The key public authorities in this area – as well as the respective Red Cross organizations – participated. There was no doubt amidst the Norwegian participants that we had a lot to learn from China – as well as our own experiences to share. This event was yet another recognition from China’s side that there are an emerging number of challenges that can not be met effectively by one state alone.

But back to the return of geopolitics:

Throughout most of the 19th and 20th centuries world dominance was held by “the West”, represented by European powers, and after 1945 by the US. China throughout this period suffered the consequences of disintegration and foreign intervention, and after 1945 independence but relative backwardness. The notion of the “West” as the predominant global actor remained relevant also in the first decade after the end of the cold war. This historical legacy is still with us, not least in the mind of the Chinese.

On the eve of the 21st century there are clear indications that the world is changing in fundamental ways. The ascendancy of China and India as well as the revitalization of Russia is clearly noticeable on the international landscape. The notion of a unipolar world under US leadership is no longer relevant. Over time it may be replaced by a new world order based on multipolarity – some have suggested non-polarity, a new form of bipolarity, - or even unipolarity under different leadership. The dynamics of geopolitical changes can pose serious challenges to stability. As shown by history, the consequence of an established power trying to maintain dominance in the face of an ascending power is always problematic, and potentially dangerous.

The challenge related to handling new geopolitical realities is exacerbated by the fact that the notion of the “the West” as a single actor is increasingly put into question, due first and foremost to the development within the EU.

The picture is made even more complicated by increasing globalization challenges related to climate change, environmental degradation, scarcity of food and raw materials, issues of global health like avian flu or HIV/AIDS, the spread of international terrorism and  proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, all represent issues that may fuel disagreement also at the inter-state level if not properly handled. At the same time, all these issues are in and by themselves strong arguments for strengthening the capacity for joint global handling.

These are all key factors which will ultimately determine the potential for cooperation, and conflict, in future US–EU–China relations.     

China–US – the decisive relationship

The China-US relationship is the most decisive for the future global order, for the simple reason that China is the only actor capable of posing a real challenge to US dominance. The current US engagement policy is based on a fundamental belief that China can become a “responsible stakeholder” in international affairs, a policy that was first formulated by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick. This policy, which is fully in line with Norway’s position on China, is based on the existence of a Chinese market economy and the recognition of economic interdependence. It is further based on the existence of a “responsible” Chinese foreign policy, characterized by non-confrontation, maintaining good relations with trading partners like the US and the EU, and preserving regional stability in Asia, and of Chinas support to key multilateral frameworks like the United Nations. The rapid growth in China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping, for instance, should not go unnoticed. Less than two decades ago the country was still sceptical to peacekeeping as a post-colonial practice. Today it is the main contributor to UN peacekeeping among the permanent five members of the Security Council.

At the same time the Sino-US relationship shows certain signs of rivalry. This is visible in the economic field, by increased global competition for strategic resources, Beijing’s reluctance to play by the rules of a global market economy, and fears that US industry will loose out to Chinese industry. It is visible also in the security field, particularly in the Pacific region. Chinese efforts to challenge the US as the dominant regional power in Asia – particularly on the maritime side – are likely to be interpreted as a change of the status quo from the US side, while China will insist that it is merely increasing its ability to look after the security interest of a growing economic power. China also shows willingness to challenge the US in strategic areas like space.

The future US–Sino relationship will to a large extent depend on the strategic choices made by China and the US reactions to Chinas asendancy. As China’s economic power grows, so will her overall political and military influence and obligations. China still comes across as largely a regional power, but with an increasing global outlook. This raises legitimate questions of what Beijing’s strategic objectives actually are?

The as yet unclear answer to this question is central to Washington’s China – policy, which is still being formed. Views range from those emphasizing dialogue and economic interchange, to those who view China as an increasing threat. The presidential race in the US has not given us much insight into the coming responses from the US side. In the short– and medium term the engagement policy stands firm.

China–Europe, – strategic partnership?

The EU–China summit in 2005 marked 30 years of diplomatic relations. Neither sees the other as an adversary, and both have expressed an interest in developing the current relationship into a strategic partnership. Logically, due to the sui generis nature of European politics, Beijing deals with the EU partly as an entity, partly with EU-countries individually. For a centralized state, dealing with the complex web of European decision-making structures will probably create both confusion and frustration – but on the other hand, the indisputable growing global influence of the EU is in no small way linked precisely to the nature of the integration process itself.

As “the most connected outsider” to the EU, Norway experiences the growing importance of the European Union in regional and global political affairs as something which is very much for real, although different from anything we have ever experienced before. The EU adds a new class of phenomena to international affairs – and this must be borne in mind when we analyze the EU-China relationship.

The EU–China relationship is to a large degree determined by the fact that they are important trading partners. China is today the EU’s second largest trading partner, while the EU China’s number one trading partner. A priority for the EU has been to integrate China into the world economic system. To some extent Beijing and Brussels share key foreign policy goals. Implicit in the EU’s emphasis on international law is a desire for a multipolar world and a rules-based international order. As such, Europe could play an important role in Beijing’s geopolitical objectives.

The Sino-European relationship is however also characterized by conflicting interests and perspectives, related i.a. to human rights. Dialogue has figured prominently, but the EU has also – at US insistence – maintained the arms embargo. Beijing underlines that cooperation must be combined with mutual respect for “historic and cultural differences”. This has had an effect on EU-policy, being pragmatic and with the intent of exerting influence over time.

Most factors point to a further deepening of the Sino-European relationship. China’s desire for an increasing global role depends on the country gaining increased status outside Asia, and here Europe fills an important role. Increased pressure on the EU to lift the arms embargo is to be expected. While the relationship will largely rest on trade-related issues, the growing importance of the EU is likely to broaden the agenda between China and the European Union in the years to come.

However, one interesting feature of the Sino-European relationship is the possibility for exerting influence through differences of “Weltanschauung”. As a great power, China tends looks at the world from a power perspective. Europe after 1945 has maximized her influence through a system of “soft power” and “good governance”, based on multilateralism and a revised perspective of sovereignty. Here is a possibility that Europe – more so than the US – could be a catalyst in transforming China into a state based on universal principles and values.
Transatlantic security cooperation – solid but changing in nature

North America and Europe as a community of interests and values is deeply rooted. The fact that NATO continued to exist after 1990 in spite of the fact that its original rationale seized to exist, was partly due to the emergence of new challenges in Europe’s own backyard. It was also based on common recognition that Europe and the US are vital to each others’ long term security.

Equally clear is that transatlantic security cooperation has changed in nature.  The main challenges to western security is no longer in Europe. This has forced the US to pay more attention to other parts of the world. It has also made it necessary – and possible – for the Europeans to assume a larger part of the responsibility for the security of their own continent. The absence of a monolithic threat has made it possible for the UK, France and Germany to resume part of their historical role as the “European great powers”, and thereby also made it possible for the EU to assume more of an independent security role. 

The most visible expression of this is the development within the EU-framework of a European security and defence policy (ESDP). The dynamic over the last 10 years is undisputable. This of course cannot overshadow the fact that the EU faces formidable internal challenges of her own, related i.a. to combining further enlargement with a deepened form of cooperation.

Taken together, the absence of a monolithic threat and continuation of the dynamic within the EU will inevitably influence Europe’s role in the world. We seem to be heading for a new kind of trans-atlantic relationship based on a larger degree of economic and political equality, combined with continued US military superiority. This will have consequences for the relationship of “the West” towards China. The EU’s China–policy will take place within a broader euro-atlantic framework, but formulated increasingly on the basis of the EU–countries own best interests.

 
Some scenarios for the future world order

What does all this mean for the future world order? There is reason to believe that the future global landscape will be dominated by 4-5 major powers, including the US, China and the EU, but also Russia and India. The US-China relationship will be the most decisive. The nature of this relationship will to a large extent also determine the nature of the future world order.

There is a distinct possibility of a multipolar system based on peaceful competition and cooperation between the US and China. The basis for such a system would be the large degree of economic interdependence and the absence of an expansionist Chinese foreign policy. The consequences would be largely positive, based on a common interest in maintaining global stability.

However, we cannot exclude a long-term trend towards a unipolar global system, – under Chinese leadership. US reactions to halt this could result in a long transition period characterized by increasing mutual suspicion, confrontation and latent conflict. We would likely witness a reorientation of US policy, where engagement is abandoned in favour of containment. The potential for conflict is increased by different forms of government, lack of openness and the absence of effective regional security arrangements in Asia.

Russia will also be part of the equation. Russia’s position will however be more of a regional than a global power. In the short term Russia has succeeded in maximizing her regional influence, both towards Europe and to the south. Sino-Russians relations are better than at any time, and should this evolve into a strategic partnership it would clearly have strategic implications. Russia as a strategic partner for China can be put into question however. Russia’s position as major international player is still vulnerable, and her overall role within the future world order is left with a question mark.

    
Consequences for the western security system

Depending on the outcome, the future world order will almost certainly also have consequences also for the western security system. As a general rule; the more we move towards an antagonistic US-Sino relationship, the more the US will strive to promote western cohesion.

At the same time, it seems clear that the transatlantic security system has changed in nature. European perceptions of the Chinese challenge will not necessarily be identical to those of the US, - not even in the face of an antagonistic China. The only thing that could cause a return to a western security system under firm US leadership would be the revival of a monolithic threat to Europe, – the least likely scenario.

A key observation is therefore that the western security system has limitations in handling the current geopolitical challenges, including China. Paradoxically, a global order based on US-Sino cooperation could, by allowing for further development of Europe’s independent security role, also increase the potential for trans–atlantic tension.

General characteristics of the future world order

The US–EU–China interrelationship will be decisive for the future world order. This order could span widely, from relative harmony and cooperation, to rivalry and confrontation. For all the disparities and uncertainties, the different trends contain certain common features:        

The notion of a US-led unipolar world based on liberal democracy and capitalism is being replaced by a new multipolar world, including the US, China, the EU, Russia and potentially also India.

Capitalism has no doubt expanded relentlessly since 1990. However, the rise of powers like China and Russia indicate that the trend of liberal democracy towards global dominance should not be taken for granted. The rise of these powers does not mean that we are heading for a non-democratic hegemony or great power conflict. After, all the ideological fault lines of the Cold War are gone, and the cost of war between major powers is all too familiar.

A fundamental difference between the world order we are entering and the Cold War is that the key players have no obvious interest in each other’s demise: China’s current success, for instance, has taken place within a capitalist economic order promoted by the US; and the current financial crisis in the US has already been felt in Shanghai and Beijing. China knows that the health of the US Dollar and the US economy is important also for itself.

Likewise, decision makers in the US are acutely aware that the current financial crisis in the US would be fundamentally worse if it wasn’t for the influx of investments from Asia in general and China in particular.

A geopolitical landscape dominated by a limited number of major powers – some of whom will be more or less authoritarian – could increase the risk of great power rivalry. In such a climate national interests will be pursued by nearly all available means, including economic, political and military. Classical state security, symmetric threats, realpolitik, and national pride will figure prominently. Military instruments could be expected to play a more central role in inter–state relations, – but without risking all-out war.      

Generally, the role of multilateralism and the UN has increased after 1990. In a world of great power rivalry multilateral organizations such as the UN could still play a moderating role, both in their own right and as instrument for the main actors. That said, the dominant feature of the future world order will be realpolitik - particularly if the vital interests of the great powers are at stake.

Depending on the outcome, the future world order could have potentially big consequences for the western security system, including NATO. In the days of the Cold War, an antagonistic world order served to underpin western cohesion. However, the western security system has changed in nature. Future perceptions of China may differ fundamentally on either side of the Atlantic. As a vehicle for handling new geopolitical realities, the western security system has clear limitations.

Future security challenges are not confined to the re-emergence of great powers. Globalization continues unabated, and asymmetric challenges carried over from the 90s have broadened to include international terrorism, proliferation, failed states and global environmental problems. From a security point of view, geopolitics and globalization are not necessarily contradictions. Both have a clear conflict potential. The two may also reinforce each other. Disagreement on globalization issues may easily spill over at the inter–state level. With China we see it in cases like Iran and missile defence. We may not be heading for anarchy, but we are confronted with a more complex security environment than ever.

The strategic answer of the western countries must have as its starting point that today’s security challenges are multi-dimensional in nature. Our policy has to be equally diverse, if it is to contribute to conflict–prevention and stability. It might be tempting – faced with the rise of authoritarian powers – to argue for a revival of containment. This however cannot be the answer. The global centre of gravity is shifting from the Euroatlantic area to Asia. Containment will not produce the desired result, and will more likely be counterproductive.

Today global influence is not just about military and economic power, but also about reputation. China will influence the rest of us, but it will also be influenced by us. The way China’s policies on Darfur, DPRK, Myanmar, an a myriad of other issues evolves bears clear testimony of this

The summer Olympics is testimony to that. We have every opportunity to make our influence felt – through engagement. Norway has been firm in rejecting the calls for a boycott of the Olympics, a position our Prime Minister has been very clear on throughout this debate. We believe that such an act would be completely counterproductive to the policy of constructive engagement and gradual opening of China that we are out to promote. A boycott will indeed influence China, but in exactly the opposite direction of what its proponents tend to believe.

Today’s changing geopolitical environment makes it necessary also for smaller western countries to engage in security dialogue with the emerging powers. Norway’s China–policy has been broadened to include a security and defence dimension. The bilateral cooperation between Norway and China in the security field includes regular contacts and visits at the political and military level, and with an impending deepening of bilateral cooperation in areas like peace operations. I have personally visited China twice only over the last one year, engaging in a constructive dialogue with the People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and key think-tanks and centres of learning including. The debates we have had with the Chinese leadership in these visits have been very rewarding indeed. 

Due to the increasing importance of our military and security relations, we recently decided to establish of a Norwegian military attaché in Beijing which I hope will take office by 1st January next year.

Norway is a small country, but we are globally engaged, as a large exporter of energy and fish, a leading shipping nation, a committed member both of the United Nations and of NATO, and with a broad foreign policy outlook. Fundamental changes in the geopolitical environment affect us directly and deeply, as well as it shapes our common ability to tackle shared challenges. Those days are long gone when our security focus could concentrate on the Washington to Moscow axis.

For this reason, the Ministry of Defence puts great emphasis on understanding these fundamental, ongoing transformations of the global order. To do so, we have to seek knowledge where we can find it, which is not the least among the people the Institute for Defences Studies have been able to gather here today. Therefore, I look forward to follow the presentations and discussions that will follow.

Thank you for your attention.