Historical archive

Cluster munitions and the Oslo process

Historical archive

Published under: Stoltenberg's 2nd Government

Publisher: Ministry of Defence

Address at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Oslo 23 May 2009

Espen Barth Eide deltok på NATOs parlamentarikerforsamlings konferanse i Oslo 22. mai, hvor han holdt innlegg om klaseammunisjon og Oslo-prosessen.

Foto: Forsvarsdepartementet

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Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

 

The topic of this presentation will be the so-called “Oslo Process” on cluster munitions and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a process and a Convention Norway and I, myself, have been heavily involved with. Furthermore, I will try to address how the convention affects NATO, now that as many as 20 NATO members have signed the convention.

 

I will, in addition to the process and the Convention, also touch upon the humanitarian aspects of the Law of Armed Conflict in general and the ban on cluster munitions in particular. I will finally talk a little bit about the practical implications of the Convention.

 

“Determined to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended or when they are abandoned”. This is a quote from the second paragraph of the Preamble of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, marking the beginning of the end of a weapon which has killed or maimed thousands of civilians throughout the past 40 years.

 

I will come back to the Convention in more detail later on. I will, however, start with a brief presentation of the cluster munitions process.

 

At the outset I find it very important to underline that the cluster munitions process, and its end result - the Convention, is the outcome of an extensive and innovative cooperation between four main types of actors, namely States, NGOs with experience from clearance of cluster munitions remnants, the ICRC and the UN.

 

One of the strengths of this process has been the broad participation of states from all over the world. This includes not only most of the countries which have used, produced or stockpiled cluster munitions, but also most of the states that have been affected by them and a large number of states wanting to avoid becoming affected by this weapon in the future.

 

Like anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions are fundamentally different from most other weapons. Not only do they cause wide area damage when they are used, but they do produce a large number of duds – small, unstable, unexploded  ordinance – that can kill and mame people decades after the conflict is over, hence creating a direct impediment to the reconstruction effort that in many cases is the prerequisite for lasting peace.

 

Due to what we saw as a lack of progress in the traditional forum for such discussions (the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, CCW), Norway invited interested states to Oslo in February 2007 to establish an international process (to be known as the “Oslo Process” to address the humanitarian problems caused by cluster munitions. The aim was to conclude a new, legally binding instrument by the end of 2008 that would prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. Futhermore, we wanted the convention to call for adequate resources to assist survivors and affected communities and clear contaminated areas.

 

The number of participating states grew steadily from the 46 participating in the first Oslo meeting, as further international meetings in the Oslo Process were held in Peru in May 2007, in Austria in December 2007 and in New Zealand in February 2008. And then finally, on the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008, as many as 107 countries negotiated and adopted a new treaty. The result is a clear and categorical ban on all types of cluster munitions which cause unacceptable humanitarian consequences.  In practice, the detailed definition, involves all types of cluster munitions ever been used. The convention represents the first major international humanitarian law treaty of the decade – and indeed the first major international disarmament treaty in 11 years.

 

Truly a historical moment.

 

94 States signed the Convention as it was opened for signature in during a ceremony here in Oslo in December 2008. Another two have signed after this event, and a number of other States have also indicated that they plan to sign in the near future. I would like to stress that among these States, 20 out of 28 NATO member states have signed, so this is clearly the majority position within the alliance.

 

So far 7 States have ratified, Norway as the first state, the last one being Mexico on the 6 May. The Convention will enter into force 6 months after the 30th ratification, and many States (including many States present) are now working hard to complete their internal procedures for ratification, to ensure that the Convention may enter into force in 2010.

 

The Convention represents a categorical ban on all types of cluster munitions (as defined in the Convention). There are no exceptions. The Convention is, however not a total prohibition on all types of munitions containing more than one submunition, regardless of its effect, and it does not rule out the use of certain future weapon types which do not have the same characteristics and unacceptable humanitarian consequences.  This was important in order not to hamper the development of future solutions that could substitute cluster munitions as we know them today.

 

The Convention does not only prohibit the use of cluster munitions but also the production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions. The Convention further places important obligations on countries to clear affected areas and to assist victims as well as affected communities.

 

Finally the Convention contains clear and comprehensive rules concerning the destruction of cluster munitions. It sets deadlines for the destruction of existing stockpiles of cluster munitions to that of “as soon as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of the Convention for that State Party”.

 

The obligation to destroy national stocks is a very important one, both to avoid any misuse and to prevent further proliferation. Many States will have a significant challenge to destroy their stocks of cluster munitions within the deadlines and in a safe and environmentally-friendly manner. Actually, it has turned out that it is much harder – and even more dangerous - to get rid of this kind of munitions than to produce them. We are grateful to Germany who will, in cooperation with Norway, organise a conference on this issue in Berlin in June this year. I see this conference as an important first step in ensuring a rapid implementation of the Convention.

 

Norway itself started the destruction of our national stocks on the 30 April this year. I was myself present and it was with great satisfaction that I pushed the button that set off the detonation that destroyed the first batch of Norway’s stockpile of cluster munitions. The solution we found is to detonate the munitions in batches in a former mine, 910 meters below the ground. With 52000 grenades to go, this process will take about a year, since the air has to be filtered after each detonation in order to avoid contamination to the environment. The process is expected to be completed by the end of July 2010. The early start of the destruction process is a clear sign of Norway’s intention to follow up on our international efforts with practical action at home and in a safe and environmentally friendly way, as prescribed in the Convention. In Norway we have the necessary skills and the facilities to undertake the job of destroying these munitions. With so many states facing a similar task, this is an area of expertise that will be much in demand, both nationally and internationally. We choose the Norwegian munitions company NAMMO to do the job, as it turned out that this was the candidate that best suited our need in this case.

 

I also want to touch briefly upon the issue of interoperability, since this issue has discussed extensively in the alliance. During the cluster munitions process, some states raised concerns regarding this issue, claiming that the ban on the use of cluster munitions will pose a challenge to cooperation during for example deployment on international operations, between states which have signed the Convention and states which have not.

 

We took that concern seriously, and indeed Article 21 of the Convention meets this challenge and solves it in confirming that State parties, including their military personnel or other nationals, may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to the Convention, even if non-State parties should engage in activities prohibited to a State party.

 

This provision was important for many of the countries signing the convention; because they wanted to make clear that this convention was about prohibiting cluster munitions, and not about prohibiting or complicating cooperation between state parties and non-state parties on other issues. However, what remains unambiguously clear is that state parties can not themselves engage, directly or indirectly, in any use of such weapons.

 

While many felt that it was important to make this clear in the convention, I personally believe that this particular problematique is already overtaken by events. I simply find it quite unlikely that any country in this alliance, or with whom we choose to cooperate, would consider using cluster munitions ever again. History suggests that international conventions of this kind eventually establishes a norm that goes beyond the legal confines of the treaty itself. The stigma associated with further use will in itself most likely prevent countries that have not yet signed from using cluster munitions.

 

For example, both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention that banned anti-personnel mines from 1997 has largely been respected also by non-state parties. 

 

Let us have a closer look at some of the practical implications of the Convention. Although the Convention is obviously the result of a clear humanitarian commitment to address the grave and long-term problems caused by the use of cluster munitions, the strategic and military concerns connected to the use of cluster munitions should not be ignored.

 

It is important to remember that the use of military force is not a goal in itself but rather a means to achieve a political end state or goal. On this basis the very way in which one achieves this goal becomes important. With our increasing understanding of the so-called effects-based approach to operations, this is becoming an increasingly relevant issue. 

 

As we all know, all States in all conflicts and operations have an obligation under international humanitarian law to separate between civilians on the one hand and combatants on the other, the first being entitled to protection and respect in situations of armed conflict. This is one of the most fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict or International Humanitarian Law. The civilian population and the individual civilians however continue to bear the brunt of armed conflict, partly due to the use of indiscriminate weapons.

 

International humanitarian law states just as clearly that a State’s choice of weapons and means and methods of warfare is not unlimited. International humanitarian law consequently puts all States under the obligation to continuously consider whether the employment of certain weapons and means and methods of warfare would be in breach of international law.

 

Thus, the Convention on Cluster Munitions may very well be characterized as a logical specification of what is already an established principle of customary international humanitarian law.

 

Furthermore, cluster munitions represent a threat not only to civilians but also to the armed forces themselves. Recent research, including an important report by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, has established that cluster munitions are less effective against many types of military targets than previously expected. Furthermore, to the armed forces, the employment of cluster munitions to an area might actually turn into an impediment for their own advance through that same area, due to the high number of unexploded ordnance left on the ground. The threat the cluster munitions pose on the ground is not only a threat to civilians and military alike at the time of the employment but for many decades to come. Statistics from Vietnam show that even today, more than thirty years after the Vietnam War, more than 2000 civilians are killed or injured every year by remnants of weapons from the war.

 

In addition to the unacceptable effects cluster munitions have on civilians, cluster munitions have also created a huge economical and developmental problem in affected areas hindering effective use of cultivable soil and reconstruction. This again may lead to new tensions and conflicts, effectively undermining the political aim that the use of military force was intended to support.

 

Some argue that it is unfortunate that not all the world’s states have decided to sign or ratify the Convention as of today, and that the absence of certain important states is a detriment to the successful implementation of the convention. Of course we would have wanted all states on board, so to speak, with us from day one. But it is important to underline that we have, through this Convention, not only established a legally binding text for the states signing it, we have also made contributions to the development of a global norm.

 

A clear sign that this development is under way are the examples in the media of states not having signed nor ratified the Convention criticising each other for the use or alleged use of cluster munitions.

 

I also believe that we see at trend where more and more States, regardless whether they sign the CCM or not, realize that the use cluster munitions is highly counter-productive and problematic, that the wide-spread and long-term consequence to civilians undermines the political aim of the operation and that these weapons also constitute a significant risk to the security of one’s own soldiers.

 

This should be seen as a part of a broader quest by governments and armed forces around the world in developing weapons types, doctrines and tactics that maximises precision and military effect where an when force has to be used, while minimizing the degree of collateral damage to others. This long-term goal is important for us all, and NATO, as an alliance aiming at defending not only territory and interests, but also key principles and values, should become a key standard-setter in this regard.


Thank you for your attention.