Nuclear Capabilities in a Changing Security Environment

NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL SEMINAR

NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY

Oslo, 8-10 November 2009

Nuclear Capabilities in a Changing Security Environment – a Norwegian Perspective

by

State Secretary of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Espen Barth Eide.

 

 

Your Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a pleasure to welcome you all to Oslo for the seminar of the NATO-Russia Council on nuclear doctrine and strategy. It is the second time such an event takes place, and we are pleased to be able to host such an important activity within the framework of the NRC-cooperation.

I would also like to thank the NATO International Staff for organising the seminar and Mr. Guy Roberts for his leadership and his efforts in making this event take place.

For the Norwegian Government, the NATO-Russia Council is a vital channel of dialogue in the Euro-Atlantic Area and an important arena for practical cooperation in a multinational framework.

We are meeting on a truly historic day. 20 years ago on this day, the Berlin Wall cracked – a momentous element in the chain of events that led to fundamental changes in Europe’s security landscape. Many of the events that followed should be understood in that light, including, of course, the establishment of the NATO-Russia council (NRC) itself.

This meeting was originally intended to be held one year ago. The temporary halt in NATO-Russia relations following the Georgia war made that impossible. Hence, I think it is a very good sign in itself that we can pick up where we left and actually hold this seminar here today. We are back on track, and that’s clearly in our mutual interest. 

The NRC is a forum for broad and open discussions on the whole spectrum of issues related to security and defence issues of mutual interest. The large gathering for this seminar demonstrates in a clear manner the relevance and strengths of the NRC. The presentations by the four nuclear weapon states of the NRC on strategy and doctrine and the subsequent discussions illustrates our joint effort to bringing dialogue and cooperation further. To us, the main goal of the seminar is to strengthen the openness, transparency and dialogue in the field of nuclear policy among this group of partners, containing both non-nuclear and nuclear weapons states.

A number of factors are currently converging and making the topic of this seminar particular relevant. All the nuclear powers represented in this seminar have recently made important decisions on the future of their nuclear deterrent, or are in the process of defining their future policies. In NATO it was agreed by Heads and State of Governments at the Summit in Strasbourg/Kehl to initiate work on a new Alliance Strategic Concept, where the future deterrent policies will be addressed. Bilaterally, the US and Russia are in the process of negotiating a new START-agreement, and multilaterally the preparations for the 2010 NPT RevCon are well on their way.

With this as the background, I would like to address some points of substance that should be reflected in the development of future policies of deterrence, and the balance that has to be struck with regard to our parallel disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Achieving the right balance between these concerns will in my mind be the main political challenge in the coming years if we are to make progress in improving our common security and halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and capabilities.

Firstly, I think it is fair to say as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, nuclear states will seek effective deterrence policies to secure nuclear stability and predictability. In my mind, effective deterrence policies are political in nature, and the ultimate goal should be to preserve peace and to avoid war.

Secondly, we should not forget what deterrence policies are actually all about – namely to keep the peace and avoid aggression. We were acutely aware about this back in the Cold War days. In the new setting, and as a result of the increasing number of ongoing operational engagements, our day to day focus has shifted from deterrence to the actual use of military power in deployed operations. In the Alliance, we sometimes hear the argument that military resources are only useful to the extent that they are actually deployed or at least deployable. But is it that simple? This is actually a marked change from the Cold War days were the lesson was that military capacity is at its very best when it is not being used.  With this in mind, when we contemplate new deterrence policies our focus should be on preventing nuclear attack and nuclear blackmail and not on designing weapons for use during conflict. The threshold for use should be kept on a very high level.

Thirdly, a key point in any deterrence policy and posture is that the nuclear capabilities are credible, and even as important, perceived as credible by potential adversaries. We must make sure that in the mind of today’s potential adversaries, aggression is not a rational option. Fundamental in this respect will be that we retain the right deterrence posture. It should be based on effective capabilities, tailored for the perceived threats and challenges we are facing now and those we anticipate will be present in the future.

In today’s strategic context, the balance between the nuclear and conventional components of deterrence have changed fundamentally. Since the height of the cold war, the numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe have been reduced dramatically, while the strength of our conventional forces - although numerically downsized - have increased in relative terms. Many of today’s potential adversaries, be they so-called rogue states or non-state actors - therefore seek asymmetric strategies to counterbalance our conventional strength, some even attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

In comparison to the Cold War days we need to have the ability to conduct effective crisis management based on generic and flexible procedures. Even if our relative conventional strength has improved, the multifaceted nature of the threats and risks still makes it necessary to retain an ability to effectively manage a crisis with a potential nuclear dimension. In this respect we should remember that the nuclear deterrent is not necessarily well suited to meet the challenges posed by non-state actors. It could be argued, however, that it may work indirectly by influencing decision-makers of any state contemplating the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to non-state actors.

Our posture and the size of our nuclear capabilities will affect the strategies of our adversaries and the potential for increased proliferation. Proliferation would be detrimental to our common security and make disarmament more difficult. Therefore, for as long as nuclear weapons exist, our policies of deterrence should be based on a minimum level of nuclear forces and a readiness level that matches the perceived threats.

Lastly, for the foreseeable future the current nuclear states will maintain a mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities, and in order to prepare the ground for a real zero option in the long run, we need a serious, balanced approach to verifiable disarmament of existing stocks. Furthermore, we need to put in place a watertight international verification regime with credible sanctions. This is a noble goal, but clearly a very long-term goal too. In the meantime we need to strive to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international security to an absolute minimum. Further reductions require a multilateral commitment, and should take place in a wider disarmament context, in a balanced and verifiable manner encompassing all other nuclear powers. Also, the non-nuclear states have an important role to play in this context, by adhering to the political principles and legal obligations laid down in the NPT, and in this vein refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The constructive relationship that is emerging between the US and Russia is positive and very much welcomed from our side. After all,  95% of the nuclear weapons in the world are in the inventories of these two states. We should continue the process to reduce the relevance of nuclear weapons in line with President Obama’s and President Medvedev’s vision of a nuclear weapons free world, while at the same time ensuring continued strategic stability and the future credibility of our deterrent capability. To achieve the right balance here is in my mind essential if we are to make progress in improving our common security and halt the proliferation of nuclear capabilities.

In this regard our stance on nuclear disarmament is important as we move closer to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. To make it possible to move effectively towards a zero solution, all nations must agree to participate in the process. Moreover, it will be essential to put in place a comprehensive and credible multilateral verification regime to oversee the disarmament effort and to prevent further proliferation. But our ability to win support for this agenda depends to a large extent on the perception of our nuclear disarmament record and our perceived continued reliance on nuclear weapons. We must work across regional groups and political divides to foster a new common understanding on how to address the nuclear danger as a collective challenge. President Obama’s initiative to host a Summit on Nuclear Security next year is an important contribution to these efforts.

However, the most significant contribution to the final goal of moving towards a zero solution would be if the US-Russia START-negotiations resulted in substantial cuts in their strategic arsenals. We hope that this will be possible and that these negotiations can be followed by further initiatives that also entail sub-strategic weapons and might include additional nuclear powers. I believe by reducing the number of sub-strategic weapons in the world we at the same time contribute to raise further the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.

To sum up, a deterrence concept must be credible, relevant and useful. We must adapt our doctrines to the security realities of today. We must strive to reduce the salience of nuclear arms in our doctrines, which in turn means that we need a capable and credible conventional capacity, and a shared commitment to our common security. To improve security for all we all have a responsibility for making an effort to achieve reductions in the number of nuclear weapons and to halt the further proliferation of such technologies and capabilities.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I wish you the best of luck with the seminar and I am looking forward to hearing your presentations and taking part in the discussions. On behalf of the Norwegian Government, we hope that the seminar will be a success, so that we can convene at a later time for a third seminar on nuclear doctrine and strategy.

I hope you will have a pleasant stay here in Oslo and that you will have the possibility to enjoy some of what our capital may offer you.

Thank you!