Senior defence group on proliferation (DGP) - The 2009 seminar in Oslo - Common threat – co-ordinated response

Senior defence group on proliferation (DGP) - The 2009 seminar in Oslo - Common threat – co-ordinated response.

Opening address by Norway’s Deputy Minister of Defence, Mr.  Espen Barth Eide.

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, 

Introduction
Let me first welcome you all to this seminar here in Oslo.  You have chosen a good time of the year for your visit, the city will be at its best.

The Senior Defence Group (DGP) is fifteen years now and has achieved several important goals, the latest being the NATO Comprehensive Strategic-level Policy for preventing the proliferation of WMD and defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, which was endorsed in Strasbourg/Kehl and referred to in the declaration from the summit.

I would like to take a broader view and not only look at non-proliferation alone, but look at the overall perspective and the general positive international trends. Non-proliferation and disarmament are closely interlinked. The current nuclear states will be unwilling to disarm as long as the numbers of new nuclear states are on the rise. That’s why it is imperative that we have strict non-proliferation regimes. At the same time countries interested in becoming nuclear powers will be unwilling to change their approach if the current nuclear powers are unwilling to disarm. We should keep in mind that 95 percent of the current nuclear arsenal belongs to Russia and the US. Unless these countries are willing to disarm there is little hope of progress.

We are at a pivotal time for international disarmament. During the last decade little progress has been made. However during the last months, we have seen a remarkable trend towards a renewed focus on international cooperation in general, and disarmament and non-proliferation in particular.

Let me point out just a few of these many encouraging new signals and initiatives.

First, we have President Obama’s expressed commitment to seek multilateral solutions to common threats and challenges. The new US administration clearly sets the stage for substantial achievements in disarmament and non-proliferation.  This emphasis was forcefully reconfirmed by vice president Joe Biden at the Security Conference in Munich, which I myself attended.  

I am particularly encouraged by signals the from the Obama administration concerning

• The commencement of multilateral negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), including verification;
• The stated intention to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT);
• And their willingness to resume negotiations with Russia on reductions of strategic weapons;
• Furthermore, the US administration is contemplating
• the possibility to take remaining nuclear weapons off alert status;
• Stopping the development of new nuclear weapons;
• Seeking agreement on anti satellite weapons;
• and ultimately to seek a world without nuclear weapons.
  

Secondly, we have President Medvedev’s announcement to suspend the announced deployments of the Iskander missile in Kaliningrad, and first deputy prime minister Ivanov’s pledge that Russia stands ready to work with the Obama administration to strengthen the WMD non-proliferation regime, and a successor treaty to START.

Thirdly, in key European states, not the least in the UK and Germany, high officials are speaking out in favour of a complete elimination of nuclear arsenals.  We welcome UK foreign secretary David Milliband’s six-step programme to create the conditions to rid the world of nuclear weapons, launched less than two weeks ago. 

All these developments have created an atmosphere of cooperation we haven’t had for many years. What we need now is to transform the visions’ at Presidential level into concrete action at lower levels.
 
The Strategic Context

Let us step back and take a broader look at the range of security challenges NATO and its members are faced with today.  I think there are two rather different sets of challenges facing us. 

The first is familiar, and characteristic of the transitional period of the 1990s as well as the post-9/11 period.  We are still faced with challenges stemming from intra-national, ethnic and religious conflicts.  The increasing pace of globalisation and its consequences, in terms of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are still highly relevant.  It also pertains to challenges such as pandemics. 

You will discuss these issues later in this seminar.  Thus the DGP’s work is an important part of the Alliance ability to meet these wider sets of security challenges.

These so-called asymmetrical threats also include challenges like cyber threats and organised crime.  In addition, environmental challenges with potential security implications, poverty and increased competition over strategic resources are becoming more apparent.  While the phenomenon is well recognized, we are still trying to come to grips with our collective responses to them.

At the same time we are witnessing new trends in the geopolitical landscape of the world.  China is emerging as an increasingly important global player, alongside a number of other great Asian powers.  Russia has re-emerged as a dominant regional power and an important player in world politics.  The steady rise of regional powers like India and Brazil is also an important part of this picture. 

From a global perspective, the relative economic and political power and influence of “the West” is declining in favour of Asia.  The geopolitical centre of gravity is shifting.  I think it is a fair assumption that the current global financial crisis is likely to further strengthen this trend, although most nations will be hit hard by its consequences.

In some ways the map of Eastern Europe (east of NATOs current membership) of today looks more like what we saw before World War One than the one after World War Two.  Europe now consists of many small states, some of which are vulnerable and some with unresolved border issues. Old empires are retracting and there are tensions over so-called spheres of influence. There is little left of the clarity of the Cold War stalemate.  At the same time, the “end of history” promises of eternal liberal peace seems unfounded, less than two decades after this optimistic perception of the future was heralded by the end of the cold war.

One consequence of this new emphasis on geopolitics and great power relations is the renewed possibility for inter-state conflict, also in Europe.  Indeed, this is more than a possibility.  We just saw one, in Georgia, less than a year ago.

We are facing an even more complex security environment than ever before.  Our work on transformation must be updated to counter both the asymmetric as well as the symmetric threats.  It is not any longer true that all potential conflicts NATO members can become involved in are asymmetric and far away from the home turf, as we to a large extent presupposed both in the 1990s and in the “9/11” paradigm.

The relevance of NATO 

In spite of all these demanding challenges, there are reasons to be optimistic on behalf of the Alliance and transatlantic relations. Indeed, if we did not have a transatlantic alliance already, we should invent one, as the fundamental reasons to stick together are still valid, not the least in the defence of common values and principles, but also shared interests. The new American administration has resulted in a new optimism in transatlantic relations.  President Obama’s administration has moved impressively fast to re-establish the pre-eminence of key universal values and norms as the basis of America’s foreign policy and has set the stage for substantial achievements in disarmament and non-proliferation. 

Russia seems to be ready to work with the US to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and a successor treaty to START.  Furthermore, key European states, like the UK and Germany have put non-proliferation and disarmament higher on the agenda.

All of these developments have created an atmosphere of cooperation we haven’t had for many years.  The threat posed by WMD drives us to seize this opportunity to seek multilateral solutions – and in line with the title of this seminar – this common threat impels a coordinated response.

This is a development we fundamentally applaud and which we are confident will strengthen the cohesion and strength of this transatlantic alliance. We should not, however, allow ourselves to believe that real change is this area is going to be easy or swift.

We also welcome the Obama administration’s stated willingness to engage in dialogue with all sides.  His recent speech in Egypt may have positive consequences for our engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq and is fully in line with Norway’s approach to international problem solving based on multilateralism. 

The Alliance must be more than just a “tool box” of military capabilities.  NATO has illustrated time and again that it is just as much a political organisation and I believe it should and will continue to be so in the 21st Century.

Over the last years we have seen NATO’s capacity to contribute to broader solutions to crises on several occasions.  In almost all foreseeable future crisis management situations, the Alliance is going to work with others, be it the UN, the EU or the African Union. Hence inter-institutional links should be further developed, so that every organisation can do what it does best without unnecessary duplication of effort.  Time is of the essence here, and it’s my hope that we will be able to move out of the stalemate that characterizes some of these relationships, capitalizing on the new mood of transatlantic unity that recent changes have accommodated.

The Alliance has a mission and a role to play “at home” as well as “away”. For a number of years, and for understandable reasons, the “away” mission has dominated the agenda, not least because it has been perceived as more urgent than the long-standing commitment to collective defence enshrined in Article V.  We think the time is ripe to readdress this balance.

Therefore, Norway initiated an important discussion in the Alliance last year, by highlighting the need for renewed focus on security challenges on NATO territory and in our immediate neighbourhood.  We believe that by responding to these concerns, public support for operations outside NATO territory will also increase.

The three main topics for this seminar, ‘’CBRN Policy Issues in the Future’’, ‘’CBRN Challenges at Sea’’ and ‘’Civil-Military Co-operation in the field of CBRN’’ are all depending on a better use of existing resources within NATO as well as improved co-operation with other agencies and institutions outside NATO. They are important both for operations outside NATO territory as well as for our collective defence.

Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation are essential tools to prevent the use of WMD.  The NATO Allies have made substantial reductions in both size and diversity in the nuclear area.  No member states have a biological or chemical weapons programme.  Allies are furthermore committed to destroy any stockpiles of chemical agents and we are supporting Partner countries as well. 

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are signed by the Allies.  Our leaders are also committed to reinforce the implementation of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) during the Review Conference, which takes place next year.  This will be a demanding task. 

The need for energy is another important factor.  Nuclear energy is however again gaining ground as a relevant option in Europe, and to balance this legitimate need with the non-proliferation work will be a demanding task.  I am aware that you will cover these issues tomorrow.

To help this process however, Norway has pledged 5 million USD towards the establishment of a fuel bank under IAEA auspices. We welcome the various initiatives from Germany, Russia and others with regard to the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank. Norway also appreciates the cooperation with the IAEA and a number of countries on the conversion of civilian reactors from running on highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium.

We must continue our work to improve the verification mechanisms of all aspects of nuclear activities, from dismantling of warheads, fissile material or nuclear plants.

The entry into force of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) is crucial.  We urge those other signatories, whose ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force to ratify urgently, and for others to accede.  Unilaterally declared nuclear test moratoria, can be no substitute for legal obligations under the CTBT.

The most efficient way to combat the spectre of nuclear terrorism would be the full implementation of an effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), combined with a CTBT with robust verification mechanisms, and irreversible, verifiable disarmament.  A non-discriminatory, verifiable FMCT will bolster both the disarmament and non-proliferation pillars of the NPT. 

The work of the DGP

The work of the DGP is important in meeting all these strategic challenges, as non-proliferation continues to be an alliance priority. 

The Terms of Reference states that ‘’The DGP will continue to serve as NATO’s senior defence group in matters concerning nuclear, biological and chemical defence policy, planning and necessary defence capabilities.’’

I have already mentioned NATO’s comprehensive strategic-level policy paper endorsed at the summit.  This paper is the result of a holistic approach, where the whole specter of challenges, including non-proliferation and use of WMD, as well as consequence management is included.  To succeed, political, economical as well as military and civilian options or solutions must be available and utilized.  Enhanced civil-military co-operation will be a requirement. 

Other products include the work to establish a robust Alliance disease surveillance system (DSS) and proposals for possible Alliance activities aiming to prevent trafficking by sea. 

To develop a useful Maritime Security Operation (MSO) Concept the work of the DGP is crucial.  It is a demanding area where old international legislation and practices faces new challenges, another area to explore for radical thinking to fight proliferation. 

In January this year you arranged a common plenary meeting with Senior Civil Emergency Committee (SCEPC) and the second annual International Partners Event took place in Namur, Belgium in April.  Here you had 31 countries and 2 international organizations present.   This just shows the complexity of this work and underlines the need for the improved co-operation and co-ordination we are striving to achieve.  I will look forward to learn more about the output of your discussions on these important questions.

I will however give some special attention to civil-military co-operation, where we like to think we have a good tradition.  Our Total Defence Concept during the Cold war was mainly planning how to use civil resources in support of military operations, now we are figuring out how military resources can be in support of the civil society.  This is necessary to avoid duplication and utilize existing resources. 

It is also required due to the fading border between military and civil actors. 

Proposals identified at this stage to be explored after your joint meeting with SCEPC includes more co-operation in operations, consequence management, training, exercises and media issues.  Other areas may be identified at a later stage. 

The Norwegian government is dedicated to strengthening civil-military cooperation.  We strive for a comprehensive security policy, to include a strengthened security for the whole society.  At the same time, we want to maintain an appropriate balance between military and civil preparedness. 

I believe most countries represented at this seminar organise their CBRN-preparedness for peacetime incidents primarily as a civil sector responsibility. Military capabilities in the defence against CBRN-threats will first and foremost be used in situations of severe crises.

However, it is important to remember that this is a two - way street.  The military can also learn from civilian authorities. 

Seeking a holistic approach to achieve greater security for the society as a whole is a priority nationally, but it also applies to international operations.  In Afghanistan NATO co-operate closely with UNAMA, and soldiers from NATO work together with the afghan army and the afghan police to achieve common goals.  We can learn from our experiences abroad, and vice versa.

The military forces in international operations work on a daily basis with civil police, public health- and fire services.  They also interact daily with the local civilian population.  This is an everyday experience for the military forces, often conducted under demanding and difficult circumstances. 

Even if there are differences between Afghanistan and Norway, experiences gained abroad are very valuable also for civil-military cooperation in Norway.  The operations in Afghanistan have underscored the need for an integrated civil-military approach in order to counter the new threats, and to solve the overall mission.  

Concluding remarks

The theme of this seminar is: Common threat – co-ordinated response.  This is required to make sure that the Alliance has the ability to stand by its obligations as stated in the Washington Treaty.

NATO must focus both on the challenges facing us at strategic distances and at those confronting us closer to home. 

Constructive relationships to other international organisations like the UN, AU and the EU will be important to NATO also in this field.  The co-operation must add value and avoid duplication of effort.

The main topics you are addressing in this seminar;
- the comprehensive policy,
- counter proliferation at sea,
- and civil-military co-operation
are vital in NATO’s efforts to meet current and future security challenges. 

You have proven that DGP is relevant and deliver.  The work you will do here is important.

I wish you a successful seminar and a pleasant stay in Oslo.

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention!