Minister of International Development Erik Solheim

Approaches to Africa – ideas and implementation

NUPI-seminar on Military Force, Oslo 09.11.06

Good afternoon,

I always feel a little bit shy when I’m called upon to speak to an audience with much better knowledge of the topic I’m speaking about than what I have myself. Speaking to the military about military affairs is like going to the hospital to teach the doctors how to perform surgery or going to the farmers to teach them how to cultivate the soil. I seek comfort in what former Prime Minister Oddvar Nordli once answered when he was asked “What is an expert?” He answered; “An expert is a person very far from home”.

This will be my point of departure. Since the Deputy Minister of Defence is present I would like to underline that I’m not representing the Ministry of Defence and that I will try not to go into any specific military matter.

I would like to start with an article from the journal Foreign Affairs. It is one of the most interesting articles I’ve read over the last year. It is about what the Americans now know about the discussions taking place in the Iraqi leadership in the time leading up top the invasion. What is portrayed is a person that is absolutely, utterly confused. Saddam is totally confused because he is at the top of a system in which no one dear to tell him the truth. They may even not have told Saddam that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction. In a system where everyone is trying to placate the leadership, the leadership will simply not get any real knowledge. According to the article in Foreign Affairs, Saddam most likely believed was that there would most likely be no American attack on Iraq. Saddam was more concerned with a possible Shia-rebellion in the south than he was with the American preparation for war.

What the article in Foreign Affairs relates, may or may not be true. But when historians discuss war, they tend to portray it as if there were clarity, as if the generals and politician made their decisions on clear evidence of what was the reality on the ground. I believe that wars are normally one of the most confused endeavours human beings can take part in. Very often leaders make decisions contrary to their own interests, simply because they lack knowledge. Even in Norway, a relatively well functional state, it is difficult to ensure that accurate information is passed up through the chain of command. Imagine then how difficult, and dangerous, this must be in a system like the Iraqi. A Prussian general remarked after winning a major battle against Napoleon; “Our problem is to try to convince anyone that this victory was according to a plan”.

War is very often irrational and based on the lack of knowledge by the parties.

Let me now reflect on how we should approach wars in Africa, or anywhere else for that matter.

In thinking about the use of military force and conflict resolution- there are a number of challenges one has to keep in mind:

1. Military force should always be the last resort

Entering into war, peace keeping operations or any other form of military engagement should always be the last resort. We should do this only after having tried all other means.

I can only recall one war that was shorter than the architects believed initially. That was the first Gulf war in 1990. It was shorter and had fewer casualties than the Americans believed that it would have. Every other war has tended to be much longer, much bloodier and much more confused than those who made the decision to go to war thought. Hitler thought he could take Moscow without winter equipment for his forces. The Americans thought that the Vietnam War would be a relatively small and short adventure. When the Russians decided to invade Afghanistan, there were four persons involved in the decision, two of them suffering from senile dementia. Again, they thought the campaign would be short, successful and relatively unbloody and that it would establish Soviet influence in Afghanistan for decades to come. The driving force was Yuri Andropov, probably the most intelligent and decent person to reach that level of Soviet politics ever, before Gorbachov. (Keeping in mind that very few Mother Theresa-types reached that level of Soviet politics). They invaded around Christmas and Andropov thought the Russian forces would be out of Afghanistan by summer.

Today, 26 years later, the situation in Afghanistan is critical and there is no way that the Afghans left to themselves could have made such a mess out of their country. First by the Russians, so the Americans, the Saudi-Arabians, the Pakistanis and the Iranians and every one else who entered into Afghanistan with their specific interest in mind.

So number one is that war, military means, should be the last resort, when all other means have been tried and have failed.

2. Need for a comprehensive analysis of the conflict situation.

Every military intervention must be based on the best possible analysis of that particular situation. General Westmorland, for example, thought he was fighting the WWII over again when in Vietnam. There are many similar examples of lack of knowledge about the situation. It is evident what is lacking in the Iraq war. It is not that the Americans did not have the relevant information, but that those who had conflicting information was shut out of the decision making process.

Tolstoy says that; “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”

The saying is equally valid not only for conflicts within families- but all kinds of human conflicts, also the most lethal among them: Wars. Since every conflict is different – every conflict needs a different analysis.

That is equally relevant when the intentions are the very best. You can hardly think of a conflict where the intentions were as good as they were in the American military intervention in Somalia in 1993. There was no economical or strategic interest. The war on terror was not an issue at that time. It was done to save lives. It was based on the CNN’s reporting of the suffering of the Somalian people. This created a domestic pressure. Politicians all of a sudden saw it as important to be seen as “doing SOMETHING”. WHAT they actually did became less important – as long as it was SOMETHING and they could explain to their voters that they WERE ADDRESSING the situation”. It was a one hundred percent noble decision. It turned out a catastrophy, which in turn led to another catastrophy in Rwanda, because nobody dared to intervene, given the experience from Somalia.

Lesson learned from Somalia is that politicians have a responsibility to not only see to it that SOMETHING is being done, but also WHAT and HOW it is done.

3. Politics is always at the heart of the matter

Tip O’Neal said after 30 years in the US Congress that “All politics are local”. This is also my most important lesson learnt after working for many years in Sri Lanka. We thought that we could buy peace by holding up a huge carrot of development projects to the Tamils. But they were not for sale, simply because for them the local power was the deciding issue, not the development of the country.

Afghanistan is clearly demonstrating the same; that we always must start with politics and define an aim. I think in Afghanistan the aim should be to establish a stabile government which will not be a new Switzerland, nor will it be like Sweden or Norway, but based on some local structure, like the clans, maybe even based on war lords. The ambition should be to create sufficient peace and stability to start rebuilding the country. Everything we do must be aimed at this. To achieve this, you will have to work on the regional level. It is difficult to establish any stabile structure if it is undermined by Pakistan, Iran or other forces even further away.

Given that you have a political plan or strategy, you can support this with military force and humanitarian assistance. But neither military means nor humanitarian assistance will work in the long run unless it is based upon a political plan. Because every Afghan knows that sooner or later the foreigners will leave. And in order to secure his and his children’s future he will behave according to what is the most likely future outcome.

If we now look to Africa, the main issue is that there are many fragile states, states with very weak fundaments. Many of these states have totally artificial borders, with tribes and ethnic groups divided into separate states. In Cameroon there are more than 150 languages. This is somewhat different from Sweden and Norway. It is of course possible to gradually build some kind of fundament for a state, even with such a difficult point of departure. Football can be such a state building tool. During the last World Championship both rebels and government in the Ivory Coast supported the national team. It was one of the very few things they could agree on.

Since many African states lack instruments for state building, ethnicity will tend to take the upper hand. In Europe most political parties have in one way or other, been built on class. In Africa hardly any politician has succeeded in appealing to class.

The Ivory Coast is an example that clarifies this point. Ivory Coast was under a moderate form of dictatorship for many years. At the same time it was one of the economically most successful African states. What happened when democracy was introduced? When politicians started to appeal for votes, there was no other vehicle for mobilizing votes than ethnicity. In the Ivory Coast they decided that in order to become president, both your grand parents had to be born in the Ivory Coast. This rule was designed with one aim; to exclude the main candidate of the opposition, whose grandfather was born in Burkina Faso. This way the division of the country along ethnic lines started and it is now for all practical purposes divided into a northern and southern part, with peace keeping troops at the border line between them.

A factor often overlooked, but worth mentioning is the fact that at the time of independence most African states hardly had any, or at the best very small, armies. This of course made these countries very vulnerable to military coups. A couple of dozens young, armed soldiers taking the national TV-station and army head quarters, would in many cases be enough to establish a new government.

4. The need for a clear and strong mandate

When we use military force there must be a clear idea of what we want to achieve. And the mandate of the mission is of crucial importance. Exactly what do we want to achieve and what is our exit strategy? In many cases well intended interventions have not had any clarity of purpose, besides stabilizing the situation somewhat or to respond to the media’s calls for doing something.

On these matters the military tend to be much better than politicians. I believe it very important that the military continues to insist on these issues; a clear mandate and exit strategy.

Srebrenica showed the world how peacekeeping forces can offer poor protection if they do not also have a sufficiently strong mandate.

Today AU’s peacekeeping forces in Darfur similarly gets criticised for not having a strong enough mandate and not being able to do enough to protect the population.

Another important aspect is that in order to have legitimacy, the mandate should be a UN-mandate. Whether you ask NATO, EU, AU or some other force to carry out the mission is another matter, but the mandate must come from the UN.

5. Establishing peace and security requires resources

There is a huge disparity between the resources the international community makes available for operations in Africa and the resources they make available for operations in other theatres.

Comparing per capita spending and per kilometre troops levels, between the UN response in Kosovo and the DRC shows that the latter would require several hundred thousands of troops to perform the same tasks that peacekeepers perform in Kosovo.

The UN is currently deploying its largest integrated operation (MONUC) - counting around 17.000 soldiers and about 2000 civilians. Despite being the largest UN operation, such military presence is very limited in a country the size of Western Europe. The scale of the problem outnumbers by far any possible international military presence in the country.

We must make available more resources when we intervene in Africa.

Norway will continue to support the UN with substantial amount of resources. We are the seventh largest contributor to the UN in absolute figures, we have had over 50 000 Norwegians in peacekeeping operations, and we are engaged in a number of peace and reconciliation processes around the world. At the same time, we are among the countries in the world that devote the largest share of our GDP to international development assistance.

6. Composition of peacekeeping forces: Coordination and cooperation

There is some positive development with respect to coordination. The African Union has become an increasingly important partner for peace and security on the African continent, both through its recently established Peace and Security Council and by taking charge of several peace support mission, of which of course the present AMIS operation in Darfur is the most well known… and also the most difficult.

AU is also working to develop new security architecture on the African continent through the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) which may be used for peace support missions. The ASF will be based on five regional brigades, and is planned to be operational as from 2010. Norway has been requested by the AU to play a central role in the development of the civilian dimension of such a standby force.

The establishment of ASF has however been overtaken by events, particularly in Sudan, and getting AMIS fully operational the most burning issue at the moment.

Aware of the problems that AU and the AU Commission is facing, Norway – together with other donor countries - has actively tried to assist the organization in building capacity to deal with crises management on the African continent. This is something that we shall continue to do.

Let me finally point out that in Sudan there have been three different missions. The most successful has been the most limited; The multi-national monitoring mission in the Nuba mountains in Sudan from 2002 to 2005. The mission was called JMC (Joint Monitoring Commission), consisted of 40 internationals, and was headed by the Norwegian Brig. General Jan Erik Wilhelmsen. The basic reason for the success was that all the parties wanted it to work. And the operation was also conducted in a very sensible manner.

Then you have the UNMIS in southern Sudan. UNMIS is much larger in size than the JMC, and is based on a solid mandate (chap. 6) from the UN Security Council. 10.000 soldiers, police and monitors are spread over Southern Sudan and in Khartoum. This is not peace enforcement mission, but there are still more than 7.000 protectors, i.e. personnel with guns. However: The mission is not built on a “joint” concept, where the two sides are drawn in. The parties have, in stead, formed joint integrated units in all the same areas, according to the cease-fire agreement.

The AU mission in Darfur (AMIS) has been even less successful in relation to its stated aims. It has had a weak mandate and has so far not been able to establish any meaningful peace in Darfur with the 7.000 soldiers and police at its disposal. The war is taking place at almost the same level as when this force entered Darfur, and is now spilling over to Chad and the Central African Republic. The “African” profile of the mission was supposed to mend fences between the parties in Darfur, but it has had a very limited impact. Despite this it has made Darfur a better place than it would have been without this mission.

There are many ways of conducting a peace keeping operation and we should look in to the different ways and try to identify the specific needs of the specific situations.

Thank you.