Perspectives on the Government’s High North policy

Bodø University College
Opening of the High North Centre for Business
15 March 2007

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Translated from the  Norwegian

 

Rector, Ambassador, President of the Sami Parliament, Mayors, dear friends,

It is exciting and inspiring for me to be here Bodø, and though I am a guest, I feel quite at home. Thank you for you words of welcome, Rector Mellemvik.

And let me add that it feels good to be back in Nordland county to speak about the High North. I spoke on the same topic here in Bodø last year, and I have remained in contact with many articulate dialogue partners in the county. But at the same time I have felt the tensions: how much time do I spend in Finnmark, how much in Troms, how much here in Nordland?

This will most likely even out over time, but my point is nevertheless that the focus on the High North is not a county or regional effort. It is a national effort aimed at developing our northern areas, our neighbouring areas. Of course this also has a regional perspective, but I think it is important to hold on to the idea that this is a national initiative with European and international inspiration. It reflects an ambition of presence, activity and knowledge in a long-term perspective.

And speaking of knowledge, Rector, it is very inspiring to be invited to speak in an academic setting such as this one — multifaceted, rich in ideas and innovative, housed in a spectacular building. Up here in the north, here in Bodø, you have shown an impressive ability to keep ahead of developments.

Bodø University College is ahead of developments in many areas. When I hear the words home ground and Bodø, what first springs to mind is Aspmyra Stadium — which is of course important — but my next associations are our High North policy and Russia. The establishment of the High North Centre for Business at Bodø University College is a concrete expression of the capacity for renewal — and a highly valued initiative.

Through the establishment of the Centre, you are addressing the knowledge dimension and the Russian dimension in Norway’s High North policy and foreign policy. And you are doing so in a way that enables us to better develop the potential for cooperation and value creation in the whole region.

Today Bodø University College is relevant to and engaged in current developments here in the north. Under Frode Mellemvik’s leadership, the college has become an important actor in connection with the focus on the High North as well. I would like to commend you for this.

I particularly have in mind your efforts as regards economics education and cooperation with Russian universities in Moscow, St Petersburg, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The presentations I just saw, prepared by the students and staff, were a vivid illustration of this.

Your list of achievements is impressive. Let me mention a few figures:

• Five Norwegian-Russian master’s programmes in economics and administration.
• More that 1000 graduates from these programmes.
• More than 100 Russians have taken a Master’s of Science in Business here in Bodø — I just had an opportunity to meet some of them.
• The college has assisted in retraining 1300 officers of the Russian Northern Fleet in Murmansk for civilian jobs.

In addition there is the innovative Norwegian-Russian energy programme — in which about 60 students are currently participating — which focuses not only on management and project management in the petroleum sector, but also on the environment, ethics and corporate social responsibility.

I have noted that the college has received well deserved praise for the Corporate MBA programme it has developed for the Russian oil company Rosneft, which 19 students are currently following.

In fact, I had to go back to check that I hadn’t misread something when I saw that Bodø University College has concluded cooperation agreements with 80 educational institutions all over the world. With over 5000 students and 500 staff, and more than 100 different programmes, the college is part of a large, global network.

From my angle, I see how closely this coincides with what is intended to be the core of our focus on the High North, which is one of the Government’s main priority areas:

Knowledge, initiative, partnership and an international outlook — from a well established Norwegian vantage point.

For knowledge is at the heart of the Government’s High North strategy.

Knowledge is crucial for Norwegian value creation, natural resource exploitation and environmental management. It has a bearing on jobs, culture and the conditions under which our children grow up.

We need to be at the forefront of expertise on the High North. And cooperation is necessary to achieve this. It is only natural and right that you, who live and work in the north, should develop and be the custodians of this expertise. Here in Bodø, you are doing just that, as they are at Narvik University College and other centres of expertise in the north.

It’s all about people. That was also the title of former Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg’s autobiography. In the book, he discusses the importance of knowledge, networks, experience and ideas. You yourselves have underlined the importance of cooperation among knowledge institutions and organisations — in both the academic and the business world. I would particularly like to commend the business sector for supporting the establishment of the High North Centre. I am very much in favour of this cooperation, not least because formal and informal networks are essential if Nordic centres of expertise are to be competitive in the international arena.

Such efforts require patience. Things take time — these are the three difficult T’s for those of us who are impatient.

But if we take the time it requires, we will achieve results. The human infrastructure in the north is being developed through international cooperation. Here, the educational and research programmes the Bodø University College has developed in cooperation with its Russian partners serve as a good model. It is the concrete efforts that count.

A model for innovation — and also for partnership. This is not a job for the ministries. It is you, who know the local market and local opportunities, who should take such initiatives. But we in the ministries can then be involved as partners.

On the one hand, we wish to create conditions that attract more Russian students and researchers to Norway, and the establishment of a High North grant scheme is an important part of our strategy. This is also why we want to make it easier for Russians to finance their studies through the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund.

We have been through the preparations, and now it can be put into practice. We can look forward to seeing the first Russian High North grant holders here in Bodø or at other educational institutions in North Norway this autumn. This has been made possible thanks to allocations in the 2007 budgets.

On the other hand, it is important that Norwegian students and researchers go the opposite direction — to Russia. Because we need more expertise on Russia. We need more knowledge about past, present and future conditions in Russia so that we are able to make the best possible use of our common opportunities and to meet our common challenges in the north. We need a two-way exchange of students and researchers in order to create greater mutual interest and understanding. I was impressed — once again — when earlier today I met young Russian students who have learned Norwegian.

The Russian labour market should be perceived as an arena of opportunity for Norwegians with special expertise. We might imagine that in the future a wider variety of Norwegians may find their way over the border, not only professional bandy and football players as is the case now — although this is of course an exaggeration. It is our vision that Norwegian petroleum engineers, project managers, business people and artists see opportunities in the Russian offshore sector or elsewhere in Russia.

*****

Friends,

I will devote a substantial part of this address to Russia, focusing on our relations with Russia, particularly at the important, practical human level.

The chair of the Conservative Party of Norway, Erna Solberg, claimed recently that I do not want a public debate about Norway’s relations with Russia — that in fact I am hampering a debate on developments in Russia and do not want to discuss the matter. This is entirely wrong. I have on many occasions spoken about Norway’s relations with Russia and developments in Russia, both in the Storting and in other forums.

Let me start with a few words about the larger picture: Russian as an international actor, developments in Russian society, Russia as a large neighbour.

This picture presents us with challenges and opportunities. For many years, we focused firmly on the challenges. In fact for a long time my generation only saw the challenges — and with good cause, as it was against the backdrop of the Cold War. With the fall of the Berlin Wall we could open up to the opportunities. This led to the Barents Cooperation, cooperation on environmental protection and nuclear safety, and numerous new cross-border ties, like the ones you have helped to forge. We have had to change our mental map, our perspective.

We are following developments in Russia with great interest and expectation, with excitement, but also with a certain amount of apprehension. We see a more self-assertive actor, a major energy power that has paid off its debts and is internationalising its economy, modernising its armed forces and taking an active role in a number of areas.

There are those who are eagerly studying this picture to find features that give cause for concern. I think we should be cautious about doing so. Our goal and our policy line should be to involve Russia in cooperation, create stronger dynamism in the cooperation between NATO and Russia — my Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, will be coming to Oslo in April — and to engage more closely with Russia on international issues such as the Middle East. Norway is doing all of this and is benefiting from it. For the first time in recent history we are able to cooperate with Russia on achieving common goals, and there are many issues of common interest, such as the Middle East. What a contrast to the period before 1990.

But we must approach Russia realistically and pragmatically. As a neighbour, we have long experience of doing so. Where we see opportunities, we should seize them. And if we see developments that concern us, we should seek to understand them and respond to them.

However, we must not respond to developments with what I would call “Cold War reflexes”. But as I mentioned earlier, to several generations of Norwegians they are still second nature.

There is nothing wrong with reflexes. But in this case they must not be allowed to take the place of reflection.

We must at all times have the necessary expertise and capacity to understand developments, acquire our own knowledge and share it with others, not least by means of our ongoing political contact with Russia itself. And naturally our NATO membership and our many ties to our European partners are still important in defining Norway’s allegiances, also when it comes to continuing our close and constructive relations with our neighbour Russia.

Part of the picture is Russia’s internal development. Let us take a look at the larger picture. Russia is more democratic and predictable today than it was 10, 20 or 30 years ago. But at the same time, we see features of Russian policy that are not quite in line with what we expect of a democratic member of the Council of Europe. Questions are rightly being asked about respect for the rule of law, freedom of expression, human rights and democracy, and about the unacceptable killing of journalists.

Such questions are part of our broad dialogue with Russia. They belong there, and our interest in these developments should be predictable and recognisable to the Russian authorities. The fact that we raise issues that involve critical comments is nothing new. It is, on the contrary, recognisable.

Human rights are not something we can tick off and consider over and done with. They are something we need to focus on continuously.

We will follow developments in the Russian armed forces. There is nothing new about countries modernising their defence forces. We do it too. But it is worrying that the major powers are allocating considerable new funds to military purposes. We know that a new arms race could be a short step away. And that is not something the world needs more of.

In my view, one thing must be clear — here as in foreign policy in general: it is in our interest to pursue a policy of engagement, it is in our interest to maintain contacts with Russia in a broad range of areas.

In this connection our High North policy is essential, as it opens many new doors and increases our interfaces, and here both Bodø and Nordland county have played a key role.

Bodø University College will continue to be a pioneer in the education and research sector in the High North. Nordland county has spearheaded the development of cross-border regional cooperation with Russia.

As early as in 1987 — before the Wall fell — key persons in the county launched an initiative for closer cooperation with Leningrad. In retrospect we see that this initiative was in fact the start of a process that has led both to the Barents Cooperation and to the focus in recent years on the High North. It all began here.

Norway as a nation is now benefiting greatly from the relations Nordland county developed with Leningrad oblast and the city of St Petersburg. I saw this for myself a year ago. They are helping to strengthen the networks under the Barents Cooperation and to expand contacts with northwestern Russia. This is an example of the three T’s: things take time. But it works: results are achieved when wise men and women put their heads together and think long term.

St Petersburg is the economic centre of gravity of a region that is of great importance to the whole Nordic area, both economically and politically. The 20th anniversary of the cooperation with Leningrad and St Petersburg will be celebrated in May 2007. I would like to congratulate Nordland county. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has chosen to organise the Barents Days 2007 here in Bodø. You can take that as a symbolic recognition of the role the county and the city are playing, both in relation to Leningrad and St Petersburg, and in the Barents Cooperation.

Anniversaries trigger retrospection, but it is my feeling that the county is most concerned about launching new initiatives. The last one was a programme on young people and democracy in cooperation with St Petersburg. The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (KS) was responsible for the programme, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided economic support. Now a follow-up project between Leningrad oblast and Nordland county is being planned. It will focus on young people, entrepreneurship and democracy. This is very positive. Let me mention a parallel: in my previous role in the Norwegian Red Cross, I saw at close range how much could be achieved through people-to-people cooperation, with its focus on the individual.

Another reason why Nordland county plays an important role in our High North policy is its industry. The county has a considerable energy-intensive export industry, which is setting new standards.

The Government intends to further develop this industry within predictable framework conditions, which includes providing stable, long-term electricity contracts at competitive prices. Broad-based efforts have been launched with a view to finding long-term solutions.

Now the High North Centre for Business at Bodø University College will lead the way. The goal should be to strengthen cooperation between the business sector and the education and research sector, both in the county and in the whole of North Norway. This is necessary in order to make better use of the entire potential for value creation in the High North. This applies to the marine sector, the maritime industries, the energy sector and tourism. Nordland offers opportunities for business development in all of these areas.

Nordland, Troms and Finnmark counties have different perspectives as regards our High North policy and relations with Russia, although they share the same perspective when it comes to the development of resources, expertise and knowledge in the High North. I find it quite natural that there should be different perspectives on these matters. In fact I believe it is desirable.

Finnmark’s focus is on cross-border cooperation with Russia and relations with Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts. Troms county takes more of an Arctic perspective, which is in keeping with the county’s rich whaling and Arctic maritime traditions. Finally, Nordland county’s focus on economy, industry and business has opened an axis that stretches southeast through Sweden and Finland to Leningrad oblast and St Petersburg. This is where the new High North Centre for Business can play a role.

The different perspectives taken by the three counties complement each other and strengthen Norway’s High North policy. They support cross-border regional cooperation in the northern parts of Finland, Norway and Sweden and in the Barents region. Together, the three counties are adding to the breadth and diversity of the cooperation between Norway and Russia, and also within the Nordic framework. The Barents Cooperation has given the counties a role in foreign policy, and this is something we must maintain.

*****

The aim of the implementation of the Government’s High North strategy, which was launched in Tromsø on 1 December 2006, is to translate political visions and ambitions into specific projects and practical results. Again, we cannot dictate the outcome of efforts of this kind. It is the energy and dynamism of the partnerships that produce results. The challenge is to get these partnerships to complement each other and function.

In this year’s budget, the Government has allocated about NOK 250 million extra for measures related to the High North. These funds are primarily for more research in connection with the International Polar Year, which has now begun, geological surveys and implementation of the integrated management plan for the Barents Sea and the sea areas off the Lofoten Islands, and knowledge-building programmes. These funds come in addition to the considerable annual allocations for research and development, innovation and business development, infrastructure measures and environmental and resource management in the north. We are talking about substantial sums of money.

However, I would warn against focusing exclusively on budget allocations in connection with the High North strategy. There is a similarity between the establishment of the Barents Cooperation and our focus on the High North.

First, the increase in budget allocations for the Government’s High North policy from one year to the next is not necessarily a meaningful measure of the effect the policy is having. This is a long-term effort, a project with a generational perspective.

Second, to a large extent these efforts are not easily measured in terms of money, as they involve more than just resources. Take our political cooperation and High North diplomacy, for example. They have been given a new dimension that includes a stronger, clearer strategic focus on safeguarding our interests in the north. This is not a question of money, but rather of discipline, management and the ability to set priorities. There are many other examples of measures and priorities that cannot be measured in terms of budget allocations, such as the fact that the German Foreign Minister has visited North Norway several times, and that I am given the opportunity to speak at Harvard on the High North, climate change, energy and security.

It is up to the various ministries to implement the High North strategy in their respective areas of responsibility. I devote a lot of time to my role as coordinator and promoter. It is a task I take seriously. We cannot measure the success of the High North strategy by whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs comes out as winner in the annual budget process.

I attach great importance to Barents 2020, the Government’s programme for research and development in the High North. Barents 2020 is about filling knowledge gaps and stimulating the development of new knowledge. A number of interesting projects have been proposed. Much of the focus has been on the potential for energy development in the Barents Sea. Naturally, a breakthrough here is dependent on new discoveries being made. That will be crucial to future developments. But once again, things take time.

Our ambition must be to let knowledge guide us.

One exciting project proposed under Barents 2020 is the development of an integrated monitoring and notification system for the Barents Sea. This involves improving coordination between at least nine different monitoring and surveying initiatives so that an integrated national system can be developed. If we succeed in doing so, we will have a good tool for environmental and resource management in the north and for dealing with major environmental disasters at sea.

Another proposed project under Barents 2020 is aimed at establishing a common practice on health, safety and environment in connection with oil and gas activities in the Barents Sea. This also applies to the transport of oil and gas in tankers. This project would require cooperation between Norwegian and Russian authorities and oil companies. There is also a proposal for a research and development project on petroleum production and oil spill response in icy conditions.

Furthermore — and this concerns me directly — it has been proposed that funds should be allocated under Barents 2020 to foreign policy research on issues related to the High North. Together with the Research Council of Norway, we are now discussing the possibility of launching a strategic programme for research on High North issues, aimed at providing more knowledge and insight.

Relevant research institutions and networks will be invited to compete for funding under the programme, which would last for a period of four or five years. The rationale for opting for a programme rather than a project format is to ensure a more long-term, more strategic approach to High North-related research and to build up expertise for the years to come.

*****

The High North strategy is not carved in stone. It should evolve, be responsive and have the ability to adapt. At the same time, our High North policy must be predictable and recognisable. Key words are presence, activity and knowledge.

I have already spoken about knowledge.

I would now like to take a broader perspective again and consider the more recent past. The external parameters in the north are changing — as they are globally. Like research, information and education, foreign policy must have the ability to respond to these changes. The world is changing.

The High North strategy reflects the opportunities and challenges created by developments in Russia in the past few years, and in the energy sector and with respect to climate change. These are probably the three dominant elements when we think about the High North: Russia, energy and climate change. Of course there are also other dimensions, such as culture.

In Russia, our neighbour in the east, the changes during the past two decades have been particularly rapid and dramatic. First there was the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. During part of the 1990s, Russia’s economy was in ruins. Today — as I said earlier — a strong and self-assertive Russia is emerging, thanks to the enormous revenues from gas and oil exports.

We have responded to this changing reality with a consistent, predictable foreign policy that aims to engage the Russians in mutually beneficial cooperation in the north.

It started with the Barents Cooperation, which also became a tool for handling the transition from confrontation to cooperation after the end of the Cold War.

As I mentioned earlier, the Norwegian counties and Russian oblasts emerged as indispensable key actors and partners from the very start. Through the Barents Cooperation, we also engaged our Nordic neighbours in regional cooperation in the north.

During the past 15 years, the Barents Cooperation has provided an invaluable arena for Norway’s relations with Russia. An arena in which we have gained knowledge and useful experience, built trust and developed an extensive network.

We will bring all of this with us into a new era— an era where petroleum activities are likely to be the key driving force and challenge, and to play a defining role in the cooperation between Norway and Russia.

The transition to a new, more business-focused phase in Norwegian-Russian relations is providing new opportunities for the Barents Cooperation, but only if we are able to identify the opportunities that are opening up in this new era.

In order to look ahead, we need to understand what lies behind us. Therefore, we are planning to carry out an external evaluation of the Norwegian part of the Barents Cooperation in the course of this year. We will also review the experience gained in connection with the long-established nuclear safety cooperation.

This review will include an evaluation of concrete projects we have allocated funds to. How successful and effective have the projects been? What has been achieved? Could these funds be better utilised? Could more be achieved if we took a new approach?

I would also like us to undertake a broader review of the cooperation architecture in the north to ensure that the range of tools in our High North policy is suited to the current challenges.

We should, for example, review the Barents Cooperation in the light of the new energy and environmental challenges in the north. We should perhaps also assess the Barents Cooperation in relation to other cooperation schemes in the north — not least as a consequence of the transformation of the EU’s Northern Dimension, which has been operative for nearly ten years. Now that it is well-established, we have a clearer picture of this EU initiative, and Norway, Russia and Iceland are participating.

I have noted that my Swedish counterpart, Carl Bildt, has proposed significant changes to the Baltic Sea Cooperation. Mr Bildt is also knowledgeable about and interested in the High North. Developments are taking place at a rapid pace in Sweden and Finland as well. We should devote more energy to exploring the opportunities for identifying links between the High North policies in Norway, Sweden and Finland — and for combining our Nordic neighbours’ focus on inland areas with our focus on coastal and sea areas.

An important feature of the developments in the Barents region has been the financial support provided by Norway for projects in Russia. This policy is to an increasing degree being questioned, and we welcome debate on this issue.

Some are of the opinion that we should change our policy. They point out that Russian is no longer a poor country, and that we should therefore stop giving money.

I do not agree with this criticism. Our policy is not to give away money, but to allocate budget funds for purposes that serve Norwegian interests.

However, this criticism is justified in one important sense. Russia is in a process of rapid economic development. This has had, and must continue to have, an impact on how we set our priorities.

There are those who have argued that it is time we terminated our nuclear safety cooperation with Russia. We spend NOK 110 million on this annually. Other countries, such as the UK, Germany, Canada and the US, are spending a lot more. And the Russians are actually spending the most on this.

Our participation is important because it helps to maintain the rapid pace of the clean-up, and this is most definitely in our interest. Another important reason for participating is that the various projects involve close technical cooperation. This is useful to both parties.

Nevertheless, I think this type of cooperation will play a less prominent role in the years to come. That is quite natural. The decommissioned submarines in northern Russia will be gone within three years. This year Norway will dismantle a fifth submarine, in close cooperation with the UK, with which it is splitting the costs fifty-fifty.

In two years’ time we will also have eliminated all of the 180 nuclear-powered lighthouses from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts, Nenets okrug and Novaya Zemlya. Here I would like to commend the previous Norwegian government for its efforts.

Of our main priorities, that leaves just the Andreyev Bay, close to the Norwegian border. And it is no small challenge.

The form of our cooperation must and should change as the times change. But I would like to say one thing: I can’t see any reason why we should lower our ambitions. Quite the contrary, we need to target our cooperation more closely.

Precisely because Russia is in a process of rapid economic development, it is possible that the next phase of our cooperation will include an industrial and economic cooperation zone in the north.

In the High North strategy the Government has indicated that it will consider the establishment of such a zone, which would include border areas in both Norway and Russia. Imagine the following: look at the coast in the north and remove the borders, the barriers. What would the result be?

I have tested out this idea on my Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov. He took a positive view of the idea as such, and asked us to present a more concrete draft proposal, something we are currently working on. I intend to send it to Lavrov in a few weeks’ time, and hope we will receive feedback from the Russians before the summer.

The main purpose of the proposed zone is to engage the Russians in a dialogue on the practical organisation of our economic cooperation. The aim is to realise our shared ambition of establishing a Norwegian-Russian strategic energy partnership in the north, which President Putin has invited us to participate in.

We for our part see opportunities for making joint use of labour resources, technology and infrastructure in the north, particularly in connection with the petroleum activities in the Barents Sea. We want to start exploring the Russians’ interest in special cooperation schemes at the border. The proposal for the establishment of a cooperation zone is, in other words, a vision aimed to get the ball rolling. In the north it is necessary to think big and along new lines.

If, in our dialogue with the Russians, we see that they are interested in the draft proposal, we will launch a major study involving centres of expertise in all parts of North Norway. Because, as I have already pointed out, this zone is not primarily a regional matter. It is a national project rooted in North Norway.

The proposal for a cooperation zone in the north must also be seen in connection with efforts to ease procedures for crossing the Norwegian-Russian border. Unless they are simplified considerably, it will be difficult to make such a cooperation zone work. On the other hand, the zone project could itself function as a lever for the introduction of simplified procedures. This applies not least to Norwegian businesses’ access to Russian labour resources.

The Norwegian-Russian border should be a bridge, not a barrier.

We are actively engaged in efforts to make it as simple, practical and inexpensive as possible to strengthen cross-border ties between Norway and Russia in the north. One thing we can do is to implement measures to ease border-crossing procedures for Russian nationals entering Norway.

This work is well under way. We have negotiated a new visa agreement with the Russians, which will soon enter into force. We have reduced the processing time for visas at our consulate general in Murmansk. We are reviewing the opening hours and other practical details at the Storskog border crossing, including architectural and constructional features. One example is the soot-stained windows towards the public, which by many are perceived as an alienating remnant of the Cold War.

We are now ready to implement a pilot project with extended opening hours. And together with the police, we are assessing what can be done to simplify control procedures at Storskog. Russians arriving at Storskog should feel just as welcome as they do when they arrive at Oslo airport.

A frequently voiced concern in North Norway — one that is often brought to my attention — is the need for measures that will make it easier to recruit Russian labour. Here we could achieve a lot by cooperating with the Russians. Under current Norwegian legislation it is quite easy for businesses in North Norway to recruit skilled labour from Russia.

This is an opportunity that is not much used, and I would like to find out why. We also have schemes designed to make it easier to recruit other labour resources from the Russian part of the Barents region, including for seasonal labour. Here too we need to find out why so little use is being made of these schemes and opportunities.

Two weeks ago we had a fruitful debate on these issues in the Storting. Several members of parliament from North Norway presented a number of good ideas, which my staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are now looking into.

*****

Before closing, I would like to say a few words about a quite different issue.

On Tuesday, I met Al Gore in Kristiansand in connection with his film An Inconvenient Truth, which some of you may have seen. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has established that there are climate changes under way that we will be unable to reverse because it is already too late. The polar ice cap is melting more quickly than previously assumed.

For this reason, climate issues will be an increasingly important political theme in the time ahead. The EU is taking the lead. Climate policy is geopolicy, because climate change will have geopolitical consequences. It will have an effect on both the distribution and the management of important natural resources and on shipping routes.

We know that climate change first becomes evident in polar areas, and that this is where it is most noticeable. And it will have major impacts. Changes in sea temperature can result in fish stocks changing their migration patterns, and the fish may shift away from their traditional fishing grounds or disappear. Fish stocks that today are a source of considerable revenues for Norway may find new feeding grounds, thus undermining the basis of the coastal fisheries. New species of fish may establish themselves. The polar bear, which has become a potent symbol for the campaign against climate change, will be in serious trouble when the ice disappears. These are just a few examples. The scenarios are frightening.

All of this means that the living conditions for people in the north will change. Not least for the indigenous peoples.

Rising temperatures also create new conditions for business activity in the north.

At the same time, new transport corridors are being opened. We have for a long time been talking about the northern sea route, the shortest route between Europe and Japan. It poses many new challenges as regards the environment, safety and a number of other aspects. Will the Arctic Basin become ice-free?

The Russians are establishing a separate office in Arkhangelsk dedicated to the northern sea route and the prospects it offers. We Norwegians should be exploring these ideas. What would such a sea route mean for us in practice? How can we best make use of these opportunities? What should Norway’s role be?

For example, it is not inconceivable that large terminals for the transhipment of goods to ice-class vessels could be located in eastern Finnmark or in a prospective Norwegian-Russian cooperation zone.

During the past 20 years, there has been increasing focus on the polar route, that is to say the sea route from the US to Europe across the Arctic Ocean. Such a sea route is likely to have a number of consequences:

First, Svalbard, which today is a remote outpost in the far north, would become the gateway to the Arctic Ocean. This opens interesting prospects for the archipelago. Terminals for the transhipment of goods to ice-class vessels and new types of industrial activity will be needed.

Furthermore, this vision has foreign policy implications as well. The question of the future regime for and use of a polar sea route must be the subject of international dialogue. This is a dialogue we want to engage in.

Let me now shift my focus to Narvik, in order to put this issue into a concrete context. Narvik is an important port and a key knowledge centre with a university college just like the one here in Bodø. The port of Narvik figures prominently in the discussion about an international transport corridor involving a rail link from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This is an innovative and exciting project, and it has therefore been given an important place in the Government’s High North strategy.

I know there is strong local and regional enthusiasm about this project. And I am aware of the intense frustration caused by the fact that the Government did not provide funding for the company NEW Corridor AS — the issue was raised in the Storting last week — and that we were not prepared to provide financial support and a financial guarantee for trial services along the corridor.

This does not mean that we dismiss the idea, the vision and the initiative. What it means is that it is necessary to further explore the basis for the operation of such a transport corridor in terms of organisation, financial viability, agreements with customers, border-crossing and transit procedures, and capacity on the Russian side of the border.

This will primarily be a task for Nordland county and its local and regional cooperation partners. It is also essential to involve commercial actors in the project. As I have already said, this must be based on partnerships. The commercial actors must define their interests and responsibilities. It is unlikely that this project can be realised unless private business interests are prepared to make a commitment and are willing to take some risk.

Once it is clear that there is a commercial basis for operating the corridor, the authorities will assess whether this project is eligible for business development support on the usual terms. Several of us in the Government are willing take a new look at the NEW corridor project once these matters have been settled. I believe it would be unfortunate for our efforts in the High North and for the many large projects involved if we did not apply the same strict requirements to them as to other innovative projects before we spend considerable public funds on them. In the long run, this will benefit all our efforts.

Whatever the outcome, the port of Narvik is a major asset. It is also possible to envisage Narvik playing a key role in connection with a polar route, as it provides an important interface between rail and sea.

*****

I would like to close with a few concluding perspectives.

In my mind’s eye I see Norway’s High North policy placed in a triangle where energy, Russia and climate issues form the corners. Other themes such as labour, education and culture in the north are also included. At the same time, our High North policy is being shaped through interaction with other major players, and in close cooperation with the other Nordic countries, the EU countries and the US.

There is currently considerable focus on the constellation energy–climate change–foreign policy. I notice this all the time on my travels and in meetings abroad. We are also seeing how energy is being used as a strategic political tool.

It is impossible for Norway to pursue a foreign policy, and particularly a High North policy, that does not include energy issues. Unless we give these issues their due role in Norwegian foreign policy, others will do so.

Our relations with Russia are an important element of our High North policy quite simply because we have a mutual interest in cooperating, and we cannot see any alternative to maintaining close cooperation with the Russians in the north based on trust.

Climate change is the new, indeed urgent, issue in foreign policy. No country can meet this challenge on its own. In the time ahead, we will focus efforts and resources on the relationship between climate change and foreign policy. This involves our High North policy and security policy. But this could be the theme of a future meeting here in Nordland, here in Bodø, with the aim of sharing ideas and looking ahead.

In his introduction, the Rector mentioned Elias Blix. At the beginning of Growth of the Soil, Knut Hamsun describes a man on his way north, carrying a sack containing some food and a few tools. This is the main character, Isak, who is going north in search of a better life. Hamsun wrote the novel in the course of seven productive years, leading up to 1917, at Hamarøy. I don’t want to stretch this point too far, but providing the basis for a good life in the north is in fact the overriding goal of our High North strategy. Our efforts are aimed at expanding the tool kit Isak brought with him up here to Wonderland.

Thank you.