A changing High North – how can Norway, Finland and Sweden strengthen their cooperation?

From time to time we find ourselves at an important turning point in history, at a crossroads where we have the opportunity to start again and put painful chapters of history behind us.

Many of you here today have stood at such a crossroads, many have made such choices. I am thinking of the end of the Second World War, which made it possible to create a single, peaceful Europe. I am thinking of the end of the Cold War, which finally did away with the divisions on our own continent. 

Both these crossroads have offered new opportunities: for development, peace and stability. They have created new room for manoeuvre that countries and their politicians have sought to utilise for the benefit of their people. But both have also been followed by surprises and setbacks. They have reminded us how important it is that our policies have strong anchor points, and that these are maintained. Anchor points we rely on as time goes by. Anchor points that demonstrate their importance because although much is in flux, there is also much that stands firm due to our fundamental political values such as democracy and freedom, due to our geographical location and due to our closeness to natural resources.

It is precisely here – in the effort to strike the right balance between renewal and continuity – that foreign policy and security policy challenges are most often found.

This afternoon I returned from Bodø, where I had invited my colleagues from Finland and Sweden to discuss foreign and security policy cooperation. While we were at Regional Headquarters North Norway, we were given a briefing on developments and challenges in the north. There are plenty of challenges. And many of them are difficult ones. But as the experienced Admiral Trond Grytting pointed out, one thing they all have in common is that they are not solely the responsibility of the Norwegian Armed Forces. They are not challenges that can primarily be addressed by military means. Whereas we previously had to make plans for dealing with a major military threat, today we are facing a wide range of challenges, opportunities and risks that we have to find ways of addressing and dealing with. 

The High North is home to huge fishery resources that must be managed wisely. It is here we find what is becoming Europe’s new energy province. Here you can see – not just read about – climate change. Here maritime transport is growing in step with new economic activities. Here our new and increasingly complex neighbourly relations with Russia are being forged.

We are looking at a region that not only requires cooperation between a range of Norwegian actors – mainly civilian but also military. It is a region that also requires cooperation and dialogue with a number of other countries, primarily those we border on, those that face the same challenges, opportunities and risks that we do. 

It would have been unthinkable to invite my Finish and Swedish colleagues for such a visit in 1980. It would have been unlikely in 1990. But in 2007 it is not only possible, it is the right thing to be doing.

I would like to take the opportunity this evening to talk about how I view the prospects for this trilateral cooperation in the time to come. It is a many-faceted relationship. This evening I will focus in particular on the foreign policy and security policy aspects. 

The previous security policy differences between Norway, Finland and Sweden have now been transformed into an arena for cooperation that is full of opportunity, a meeting place between NATO and the EU with a common geography and a shared international outlook. The end of the Cold War has even made it possible to revive discussions on issues that Nordic politicians felt they had to put aside some 60 years ago.

The dividing lines that arose in international politics during the Cold War cast long and heavy shadows over our own part of the world and imposed limitations on cooperation.

It was not until the early 1990s that the foreign minister and defence minister of the country chairing the Nordic Council of Ministers were able to address the Nordic Council. Right up until the end of the 1980s, these policy areas were considered too sensitive to be discussed in this Nordic arena.

Now we are all part of the EU internal market with everything this entails. In fact, the EEA Agreement and the whole legal framework established in connection with the internal market constitute the most important Nordic cooperation agreement ever concluded. Moreover, from a certain perspective, this common legal basis has important security aspects in a new era. Common rules link us together and help us to deal with uncertainty. 

In terms of security policy, our relations with Russia are no longer a response to an existential threat, as was the case during the Cold War. Different security policy choices no longer limit the opportunities for cooperation between the Nordic countries. As my Finnish colleague, Ilkka Kanerva, said in Bodø today, there is not a single foreign policy or security policy topic that our three countries cannot discuss today. If anything, the opportunities for deeper and broader cooperation are increasing, including in the security policy area.  

These are exciting opportunities, for our region is developing by leaps and bounds. The Baltic region has been singled out by the international press as one of the most interesting regions in the world in terms of economic and technological growth potential. If we add to the picture the resources and knowledge found in the Barents region, the perspective becomes even more interesting. The Arctic and the High North were featured in a recent issue of Time Magazine. The front cover showed the Norwegian and Danish flags stuck in the ice together with the US, Russian and Canadian flags.

The discovery of huge energy resources, the technological developments that make it possible to produce them, the activity that they will generate both on- and offshore in a vulnerable environment, the research and development involved, the prospects of booming business development in the northern parts of Norway, Finland, Sweden and Russia, melting ice and new shipping routes that are opening up as a result of climate change, some of the world’s largest surviving fishery resources – all this brings Norway and its Nordic neighbours together, and it brings some of us into contact with our Russian neighbour.

And as a result, the High North is once again taking a prominent place on the European stage.

Less than 20 years ago, the eyes of the international community were focused on the military tension in the north. Then much of the attention shifted elsewhere. Now it is returning, but with a new agenda – a tough agenda – but it is an agenda for cooperation and for facing and mastering risks. It is no longer an agenda of confrontation. We must take a proactive approach, we must have state-of-the-art knowledge, and we must do what we can to ensure that the High North is developed in accordance with the rules of international law.

Our relations with our big Russian neighbour have many aspects, and some of them are demanding. We are, and must be, level-headed realists in terms of Russia’s development. We do not want to return to the turbulence of the 1990s. But we will also speak out when we see signs of authoritarian tendencies in any European government. The rhetoric used in exchanges between the West and Russia has become more heated. There are greater differences on key foreign policy issues than there have been for a long time. We feel this as well. Last Sunday, the first anniversary of the unsolved murder of Anna Politkovskaya was commemorated, reflecting the challenges to freedom of expression in our neighbouring country.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that the Nordic countries, especially Norway, Finland and Sweden, have developed a unique form of cross-border and regional cooperation with Russia. Fifteen years of Barents cooperation has created a community of interests and opportunities for creating growth throughout the High North. Neighbours have grown closer. We have increased our room for manoeuvre, which makes it possible to take advantage of this community of interests.

The challenge is how we can best utilise this new room for manoeuvre. The Government’s High North strategy provides important guidelines for just that.

In my view, the Nordic countries have shown a will to create new regional opportunities in the Baltic and Barents regions. We will continue to do so. The Norwegian idea of a cooperation zone extending over the Russian border has grown out of this tradition.

But it is also a fact that we can best manoeuvre in new political waters and currents if we keep our most central anchor points. Being part of the transatlantic community is one such vital anchor point – now as before.

Our membership of NATO and our relations with the US form our security policy guarantee. And guarantees must stand firm. Close friendships, not least with the US, must be fostered and renewed. We share the responsibility for this. For Finland and Sweden, membership of the EU is a similar anchor point. And for all of us, the cornerstones of our foreign and security policy are the UN and international law.

But although these anchor points stand firm, they are also changing in the face of new challenges. Membership of NATO still entails solidarity among all the members of the Alliance. There is no change here. But the perspectives on today’s security challenges vary more than they used to from one member country to another.

The security policy viewpoint of the global superpower the US is different from what it is in Norway. And in the Baltic countries it is different from ours. It is more clearly apparent in the Baltic than in other regions that new lines of conflict are not replacing the old ones but are being added on top of them.

The essence of NATO membership is that we all take each other’s perspectives into account. This is why the Alliance immediately invoked Article 5 of the Treaty for the first time ever in response to the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. We were facing a common threat. And this is why Norwegian F-16 fighter jets took part in monitoring the Baltic countries’ air space when they became members of NATO. We had a common task before us. Soon these aircraft will be back in the Baltic countries on the same assignment.

And just as we take the perspectives of others into account, so our allies take ours into account. It is up to us to describe our perspectives clearly and unambiguously. This is also an important aspect of our High North policy.

However, membership of NATO means much more than solidarity in the event of an attack on our territory. It is a military alliance, but it is also an arena for political consultations and coordination. The Treaty gives us the right to consultations in situations where we believe that our country is threatened. The Alliance also provides a forum for discussions at all levels on the foreign and security policy issues that concern the member countries. These discussions take place on an ongoing basis. They may be on specific subjects such as energy supply, or they may be on general developments in the member countries’ neighbouring areas.

It is in this context that I have been invited to the North Atlantic Council in the middle of November to brief the member countries on the situation in the High North. Our allies want to know more about the rapid developments in this region. Our knowledge and experience are in demand, and it is in Norway’s interests that our allies become more familiar with the changes that are taking place in the northernmost part of Europe. My visit to NATO will be a follow-up to the talks and discussions I have had with individual partners in the Alliance during the last year, either when they have joined me on trips to the north or when I have visited them.

But at the same time I would like to stress that we should not be worried that our neighbouring areas are not on the Alliance’s day-to-day agenda. This reflects the basic fact that the Cold War is over and that the High North is characterised more by the need for cooperation than the threat of confrontation.

Indeed, it reflects the fact that where previously NATO would have been holding consultations about the Soviet Union and later Russia in the North Atlantic Council, it is now consulting with Russia in the NATO-Russia Council. Norway has been, and still is, at the forefront of efforts to promote such contact.

The security policy perspectives of the member countries are more complex than they used to be. And for this very reason, the cooperation structures that constitute our anchor points must be flexible and must be adapted to the challenges we face today. NATO – as we have known it – is still needed. But while NATO, together with the Norwegian Armed Forces, provided most of the answers during the Cold War, the wide range of new challenges and opportunities makes it necessary to find new answers that are adapted to today’s situation.

We must do this ourselves and together with others, not least with countries that have similar interests and challenges to Norway, particularly the countries that border on the same areas.

It is precisely for this reason that closer foreign and security policy cooperation between the Nordic countries is so important, and it is in this context that we should view the closer trilateral cooperation between Norway, Finland and Sweden. Together we want to develop new responses to the challenges arising in our own neighbourhood and in connection with cooperation between the EU and NATO, not least with regard to joint participation in international operations. The aim is to make ourselves, NATO and the EU more relevant in our neighbouring areas and to take advantage of the opportunities that have arisen.

One of the clearest indications of NATO’s ability to adapt is precisely the way in which it has developed its relations with other organisations, primarily the UN and the EU. For many years, its relations with the UN were characterised by distance and mutual scepticism, right through the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. And for a long time, right up until three or four years ago, its relations with the EU were characterised by rivalry and competition.

In the last few years, a closer partnership has developed between the three organisations, based on cooperation and a division of labour. NATO operations are no longer restricted to Alliance members. Nor are EU operations restricted to EU countries. Thus Sweden and Finland now make important contributions to NATO’s efforts in northern Afghanistan – alongside Norway. And Norway is taking part in EU operations and in the EU Battlegroups, together with Sweden and Finland. 

But the cooperation between NATO, the EU and the UN can still be improved. Closer Nordic security policy cooperation would be a step in that direction.

We share a growing community of interests, room for manoeuvre and political will to take advantage of these opportunities. We will do so with full respect for the commitments we – individually – have undertaken in relation to NATO and the EU. And we will do so in a way that strengthens the broader Nordic cooperation, showing Denmark and Iceland openness in the process.

For I would like to underscore that I am not talking about some kind of exclusive trilateral cooperation, but rather cooperation based on the widely discussed concept of variable geometry, where closer cooperation between certain parties can strengthen cooperation between all. And as times have changed, it is not necessary for all five countries to follow one another along every track. We have a firm common basis in the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers, supplemented increasingly frequently by contributions from our Baltic friends, and we all work  together with Russia and our Baltic and Barents partners.

What is happening now is that Norway is intensifying its cooperation with all of the Nordic countries on the basis of a more closely interwoven community of interests.
Norway and Denmark are facing common challenges due to their territories bordering on the Arctic.

In April this year, we concluded an agreement on closer cooperation with Iceland, and Iceland has concluded a similar agreement with Denmark. These agreements were drawn up after the US withdrew its aircraft and helicopters from the Keflavik base. The US presence, which was established in a different era, was discontinued because the US had greater need for its military resources in other parts of the world. 

Our cooperation with Iceland has been forged in a new era and addresses the need to monitor vast sea areas where we are likely to see a steep increase in civilian maritime traffic in particular. There is talk of some 300 tankers using the sea lanes towards the west and south from the Barents Sea every year. And the traffic is increasing. This is a challenge for coastal states such as Iceland and Norway. This is a cooperation agreement that will both draw the Nordic countries closer together and send a clear message of allied solidarity – and that also serves the interests of NATO members the UK, Canada and the US as coastal states.

There are two main dimensions in the cooperation we are now discussing with Sweden and Finland: cooperation on and in our neighbourhood, and cooperation in international operations.

I would like to start with our neighbourhood. Here, as you know, we have made good progress in our cross-border cooperation with Russia. We want to take this further, to our mutual benefit, and not least in the light of the activity in the Barents Sea and the Barents region.

Our efforts involving our Nordic neighbours in the north are also progressing well. These include political dialogue, closer foreign and security policy consultations, business cooperation and common arenas and networks for research and competence building, as well as an important long-term information effort.

A large Swedish business delegation headed by the Swedish Foreign Minister and Minister for Enterprise and Energy visited North Norway earlier this year. As hosts we saw that there is great potential for cooperation and a wealth of opportunities. This is something that we will follow up on.

Finnish companies have already been involved in the development of Snøhvit and Ormen Lange, and Swedish engineers have worked on Snøhvit. I envisage Finnish business interests in the Barents region becoming involved in the construction industry, including the development of infrastructure, and in the longer term in the service sector, as a result of the increasing regionalisation of North Norway. And we must remember that both North Sweden and North Finland are seeing tremendous development, with increasing opportunities for Norwegian companies and research institutions as well.

The perspectives for this cooperation must also include our Russian neighbour. As close neighbours in the north, we are facing the same challenges with respect to environmental degradation and climate change, maritime safety and resource management, and organised crime and human trafficking.

Our approach must be to regard Russia as a partner in our efforts both to realise these opportunities and to meet these challenges. This was not the case during the Cold War. It has taken us some time to change our mindset, and we see that it is taking time for the Russians too. For a long time, we in the Nordic countries have seen the prospects for regional cooperation as a win-win opportunity. My impression is that Russia does not always see it this way. We must endeavour to show that this is the case, to show how much all parties stand to benefit from closer cooperation in the north within a clear and transparent regulatory framework .

At the same time, we find today that Russia is more assertive in its foreign policy. We have seen the Russian flag being planted on the seabed at the North Pole, and we have seen Russian aircraft flying close to our territory. We are seeing greater Russian interest in Svalbard, for example a new commission has been appointed by the Russian Government to facilitate Russian business development and settlement on the archipelago.

All in all this adds up to increased activity and what I would call a more assertive approach in the north on the part of the Russians. But we must not draw conclusions based on old reflexes. Sometimes reflection is better.

The planting of the Russian flag at the North Pole has drawn greater attention to the natural resources and the question of jurisdiction in the Arctic. This is not surprising. But the planting of the flag was a symbolic action and nothing more. And I think this is what Russia wanted – to display a symbol of its ambitions in the north.

But it has no legal significance. We take it for granted that all parties will abide by the international Law of the Sea, including in Arctic waters. We need to settle whether the subsea ridges in the Arctic Ocean are to be considered as a natural extension of the coastal states’ land mass and thus be defined as part of their continental shelf. This requires the collection and interpretation of data under the auspices of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which was set up under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
 
Russia has complied with the rules and submitted such data as early as 2001. It is now compiling new data to complete its documentation. We submitted our data in November last year. It is now up to the Commission to make its recommendations. Norway is not, however, among the countries that could be entitled to a continental shelf at the North Pole. Our continental shelf comes to an end more than 500 kilometres short of that point.

With regard to the increased Russian interest in Svalbard, I would like to say that Norway appreciates the good relations it has with Russians on the archipelago. They date back many years. The Russian presence and activities within the framework of the Spitsbergen Treaty and in accordance with Norwegian law are something that we welcome. But this is not unique to our relations with Russia. It is Norway’s responsibility to take the same approach to the presence of persons and companies from all the countries that have signed the treaty. And it is Norway’s responsibility to ensure that it is able to enforce Norwegian law in the whole of Norway, both on the mainland and in Svalbard.

And finally, we are not concerned about the increase in air traffic in the north. These flights have been going on close to our territory all along. There was a break of a few years, and we did not miss the planes, but I have no reason to say that they indicate any increase in the attention the Russian Armed Forces are directing towards us.

For me, Russia is a key partner in the north, but it is a demanding partner that we should devote time and energy to understanding. Here too, Norway, Sweden and Finland have much to gain from sharing assessments and reflections. About the High North and about Russia. Just as we did in Bodø yesterday and today.

At the same time we must enforce our rights and fulfil our obligations in the north. This is a question of being recognisable. The seizure of the Russian trawler Elektron – the day after this Government took office two years ago – showed how important it is to have routines for handling this type of incident and the means to do so. This was not a military incident. And our response to incidents of this kind is not to view them from a military perspective.

The need for a strengthened military presence in the High North is about the normal presence any coastal state needs to have in our modern age when traffic is increasing and increasing numbers of actors are flocking to our waters. A clear political signal has been given for the further development and location of our defence structures.

Our cooperation with Finland and Sweden in the north can stimulate development in the northern parts of Norway. Together we can help to give new impetus and greater breadth to our cooperation with Russia. And this trilateral cooperation can help to foster a broader Europeanisation of our own High North policy. This is something we welcome.

It is also in this perspective that I see our close dialogue with other European countries on High North issues. An example is the German Foreign Minister’s visit to Tromsø and Svalbard in August.

We are best served by linking regional arrangements in the north more closely to European processes. For several years Finland has played a leading role in getting the EU to direct more attention and resources northwards. The EU’s Northern Dimension has now become a stable framework for this focus on the north. The Northern Dimension includes the Environmental Partnership, which deals with issues such as nuclear safety, and the Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being. Russia, Norway and Iceland have now been drawn in as full participants.
It is in our interest to strengthen this framework, for example through broader cross-border regional cooperation in the north.

We have good cooperation structures in Northern Europe. There is the Baltic Sea cooperation and the Barents cooperation. Both were breakthroughs in terms of approaches to cooperation at the beginning of the 1990s, when new opportunities were opening up. Now there is a growing need for more extensive cooperation. The question is how to adapt the established structures.

Looking ahead, we can envisage the Northern Dimension – with Russian, Norwegian and Icelandic participation – as an umbrella for regional cooperation structures. The question of how these structures could best be merged is currently being considered both in the EU and in the Baltic Sea region. We should start thinking along the same lines as regards the structures in our own neighbouring areas. In this connection we should look for opportunities to build new bridges between the Baltic Sea cooperation and the Barents cooperation.

Then there is the issue of climate change. Here the Arctic Council is an important organisation. Norway holds the chairmanship until 2009, and will be followed by Denmark and Sweden. Together, our three countries must actively stress the need for action to deal with climate change, which is so evident in the north.
Let me now turn to the other main dimension of the trilateral cooperation we want to develop. It has to do with our ability to address the challenges related to international crisis management.

Our engagement in Afghanistan is a natural point of departure. Here the three countries are deployed in the same regions in the north and northwest.
We have already gained experience that it is natural to build further on. Until recently, Finland participated in the “Norwegian” Provincial Reconstruction Team in Meymaneh in the Faryab province. When the Norwegian company faced a critical situation in February 2006, Norwegian and Finnish soldiers stood shoulder to shoulder. A Finnish soldier was subsequently killed while serving in the team.
Sweden has its Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-e-Sharif, where there is also a Norwegian-led Quick Reaction Force. So we are geographical neighbours in Afghanistan as well. We are contributing forces that are intended to complement each other, and our policies are similar on many points as regards the balance between military and civil efforts. This is a good starting point.

In Stockholm and Helsinki – as in Oslo – the composition of the military contributions in 2008 is already being discussed as part of the ongoing planning of national force contributions. We will make our own assessments, based in part on the fact that Norway is a member of NATO. But coordinating our planning with Sweden and Finland can increase predictability and optimise the use of resources, both for our three countries and for NATO.

A question that arises, and that we will look at more closely now, is the following: could we coordinate our training of the Afghan security forces? President Karzai and the Afghan Government consider it crucial to strengthen these training efforts.
Could we coordinate our stabilisation efforts in such a way that the people of Afghanistan perceive our contributions as parts of a larger effort?

Could we over time establish joint units, and possibly also a rotation arrangement between the three countries for certain selected force categories? Potential areas of cooperation might include air transport, medical units and guard and security duties.
Could we cooperate more closely in other parts of the security sector where we are all involved, for example in the training of police forces, which is of critical importance?
If we succeed in establishing closer trilateral cooperation of this kind, it would also help to mobilise even stronger popular support for our efforts in our three countries.
Coordinating our efforts will take time. The results will not be visible from one day to the next. What we have done now is raise the questions. Thus, the first step has been taken.

Of course it is not the first time the Nordic countries are participating together in international operations. Nor is Afghanistan the only place we are involved together.

Let me mention a few examples:
Norway, Sweden and Finland have a tradition of close and trusting cooperation in UN operations. We participated together within a UN framework in UNPROFOR during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s. That was a demanding task. At the beginning of the current decade we cooperated in the NATO operation in Kosovo. Together we faced a significant challenge when a Kosovo Albanian crowd rioted. And together we showed that we were able to deal with such a challenge in a way that elicited the admiration of other participating countries.

If we look ahead, the three countries will be participating – under Swedish leadership – in the EU’s Nordic Battlegroup, which will be on standby from January next year. Through participation in the battlegroup, personnel from our three countries will regularly take part in joint exercises. This is an important step in the development of long-term military cooperation. Today these three are the only Nordic countries that are participating with military forces within the framework of the EU security and defence policy. It is therefore only natural that we look ahead together and discuss what role we want to play.

It is also from January next year that Norway and Sweden are scheduled to deploy a joint engineering unit as a contribution to the UN/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The fact that Denmark is now considering contributing a force protection unit to the operation is an example of the variable geometry and flexibility we are aiming for. And let me add that increased Norwegian engagement in UN-led operations will be an important step towards achieving one of the priorities the Government set itself when it was formed.

By engaging in this kind of cooperation, the three countries are strengthening the international community’s overall capacity to carry out complex international operations. By involving Finland and Sweden more closely in NATO-led cooperation, we are strengthening the Alliance. At the same time, Norway – by participating in the EU’s international operations and forces – is closer to the processes that are shaping the EU’s future security and defence policy. And we are increasing the EU’s crisis management and conflict resolution capabilities.

And finally, we are helping to bring NATO and the EU closer to a strategic partnership.
At the same time, our defence authorities are discussing how such strengthened cooperation can be consolidated. Sweden and Finland have already established cooperation on maritime surveillance and are preparing similar cooperation on air surveillance. Norway and Sweden are exploring opportunities for closer defence policy cooperation. The fact that we are geographical neighbours, face common challenges and have limited economic resources makes such cooperation a natural option. This is reflected in the feasibility study conducted by the Norwegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence. Here force production plays a key role, through materiel procurement and training and exercise activities. The study presented by the two Chiefs of Defence is ambitious. They outline possibilities and perspectives. It will be up to the politicians to consider what can be realised and what time horizons should be applied.

In Finland this process is being followed with considerable interest. Finland is now launching a similar feasibility study together with Sweden. There is also interest in going through the same process with Norway. It is therefore natural that the three countries exchange ideas and prepare themselves together.

The work we are putting into this reflects a trend we will see more of in the future. And it isn’t anything new. For years Norway has been engaged in close cooperation with the F-16 countries Denmark and the Netherlands. This cooperation has proved useful both in Afghanistan and in the Baltics. Close allies, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, are for example moving towards an integration of their navies. But it is probably the first time allied and non-allied countries are thinking along the same lines. The fact that this is possible shows how much greater the room for manoeuvre has become. But closer cooperation between us must strengthen, not limit, our ability to operate independently and fulfil the obligations each of us has taken on, both in NATO and in the EU.

In his most recent book, A Brief History of the Future, Jaques Attali, one of former French President Mitterand’s most influential advisers, who now has close ties with President Sarkozy, discusses which regions may take a leading role in the world. As regards Europe, he is intrigued by the potential he sees in cooperation between Norway, Sweden and Finland.

Attali says the region is in an exceptional situation due to a level of industrial development ranking among the highest in the world, a very high level in research and education, considerable energy resources and a high degree of social security. But he questions whether we are ready to seize the opportunity the future holds for us, or whether is it is more likely that we will consolidate what we have achieved and close ourselves off from the rest of the world.

To me, this is among the most exciting aspects of the decades ahead of us.
We must seize the opportunity the future holds for us. Norway’s policy must be both dynamic and firm at the same time. We must lay the foundations for development, but it must be in a predictable environment.  We must have the required means at our disposal – military, political and civil – to create this predictability.

At the same time, we must ensure that we have well adapted cooperation arrangements that give us the strength and impetus we need to address challenges we so far only see the contours of. We can achieve this by means of close and trusting cooperation with our neighbours – Finland, Sweden and Russia – broader European engagement and our strong transatlantic ties to the US and Canada. Think of the historic event that will soon take place: in a few weeks’ time the first vessel loaded with natural gas will leave Melkøya, outside Hammerfest, bound for Cove Point, Maryland, on the east coast of the US. A new transatlantic bond will be forged.

I would like to return to the briefing we were given at Reitan yesterday. Admiral Grytting, Commander of Regional Command North Norway, stressed how important it is to understand the shape and breadth the challenges in the north have acquired. The old threat is no longer there, not even in a limited or less probable form. It has been replaced by a need to address a new set of risks that cover a broad range of fields: environmental issues spanning from pollution caused by transport and economic activity to nuclear safety and climate change, fishery resources, oil and gas, terrorist activities and organised crime – and exercise of sovereignty.

Today the threats are found further afield – in Afghanistan, the broader Middle East region and Africa. Threats in the form of failed states, ethnic and religious conflicts that provide a basis for terrorism and extremism, drugs production and weapons of mass destruction.

And of course addressing threats means being prepared to deal with the unexpected – both in our vicinity and far away.

So, to sum up, we will cooperate – more closely than previously – with our Nordic neighbours. It is not a question of changing the anchor points of our policy, neither for them nor for us. It is a question of adjusting our mental maps and making sure that we make use of the room for manoeuvre the new era has given us.