We share Europe’s future

Translation from the Norwegian

Mr President,

This address is a follow-up to the Storting’s request in Recommendation No. 114 (2006–2007) to the Storting — in which reference is made to Document No. 8:105 (2005–2006), which requests that the Storting should be given the opportunity for an open debate on major EU/EEA matters that involve questions of principle and that the Government should hold biannual addresses to the Storting on important EU and EEA matters.

I appreciate being given this opportunity, Mr President. Apart from a few passages of the annual foreign policy address, we have not had a suitable framework for considering broader European policy trends. I am pleased that all parties, regardless of their position on the EU and the EEA, have called for this.

We have other forums in this house where we discuss a great number of specific issues, particularly ones related to the EEA and the flow of directives and regulations. In this address, I will seek to give a broader assessment of important trends in the EU. There is a risk of our being overwhelmed by the mass of individual matters, and that as non-members of the EU we may lose sight of the overall picture. Where is the EU headed? Where is Europe headed — now that it to an increasing degree coincides with the EU geographically, and to an even greater extent is perceived to coincide with the EU politically?

There is no textbook answer to such questions. But we need to ask them and be open to a debate and reflection on what they mean for Norway. Such debates — twice a year — will help to achieve the Government’s and the Storting’s goal of promoting greater openness and stimulating more interest and dialogue on European policy matters.

(a more strategic focus)

Mr President,

Norway is not a member of the EU, and the question of membership will not be put on the agenda at this point. However, developments in the EU cooperation are affecting more and more aspects of Norwegian society, as the Storting has underlined.

This is a result of our ties to the EU through the EEA and Schengen. It is a result of the EU’s role in the global arena. And it is — if I can put it like this — a result of Norway’s geographical position, Norwegian trade, Norwegians’ travel patterns and the fundamental fact that we are firmly rooted in the same culture and values. Our relations with the EU are therefore our closest globalisation project.

In Recommendation No. 115 (2006–2007) to the Storting, a unanimous Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs stated that “the EU has played an important stabilising role in Europe […] and has contributed to economic development and people-to-people contact”. The Committee “notes at the same time that closer cooperation between the EU countries could raise challenges for like-minded, non-member countries such as Norway.”

We are linked to the EU through the EEA and Schengen, and in addition we have thousands of bonds that link us to the EU member states and their people. The Government has made it clear that we must think and work along more strategic lines in our relations with the EU and its member states, and we must get better at prioritising which issues we choose to pursue.

These efforts are politically important — for the Government, for the Storting, and for Norwegian civil society as a whole. It is a question of increased awareness, clearer priorities and more strategic focus — and of pursuing a recognisable Norwegian policy.

(the EU’s development. Norway’s bilateral relations with EU member states)

Mr President,

In spite of the EU’s legislation and basic documents, its development is to large extent determined by developments in the individual member states. There is nothing new about this, but it is worth recalling because we see it so clearly now.

This underlines one of the Government’s main messages in this address: we need to work effectively in relation to key EU institutions and at the same time more actively develop our bilateral European policy in relation to the EU capitals — from Lisbon to Ljubljana, from Rome to Riga, from Stockholm to Sofia, and the remaining 21 countries. There are clear signs that various bilateral networks are emerging. This is only natural now that the EU consists of 27 countries, not 12 or 15.

There is nothing to prevent us from both understanding and approaching such networks — where we have something to offer and something to gain.

My point is the following: at any given time it is the member states that set the limits, define the scope for action and indicate the direction for the future development of EU cooperation. It is from the political mosaic in the individual member states that new initiatives must find their substance, cohesion and inspiration, and it is this very variety that can cause political project to deadlock. Some people may find this frustrating. But that is how democracy works — and therefore it is part of Europe’s strength.

These are things we need to analyse in more depth and understand better in order to see how political trends can result in the EU taking new directions.

If we are to have influence, we need to get involved at an early stage and work for — or against — such new directions, particularly when they affect the interests that are at the top of our agenda, such as natural resource management, fisheries, energy, climate change, environmental protection and research — to name a few examples — or migration, which is posing a challenge to the whole of Europe in different ways.

(internal bilateralisation within the EU)

And my other point, which I have already touched on, is this: there is an ongoing process of internal bilateralisation within the EU, that is to say a closer cooperation involving two or more countries. It is interesting that on accession, the Nordic countries that have joined the EU expected that the need for bilateral diplomatic and consular missions would decrease, but their experience so far has if anything been the opposite. The need for these missions has increased, precisely because of the increasing bilateralisation of the EU under a common EU umbrella. And while we saw that at an early stage of their membership, the new Nordic EU members were cautious about entering into alliances, they are doing this more actively now.

In other words, we need to look at what the individual member states are doing and listen to their reasoning. We must choose appropriate issues when we approach individual member states and the presidency. And we need to develop better systems and strategies for doing this. We must ask ourselves what can be achieve when such and such a country takes on the presidency, or takes the lead in an alliance in a given field? Where, how and when can we have most influence?”

(dialogue with the Presidency)

Portugal, which will take over the presidency on 1 July, has jurisdiction over 50% of the EU’s sea areas. Traditionally, we have had a number of interests in common with Portugal — sea and coastal areas, fisheries management, import/export of fish, shipping, a transatlantic focus, the desire to further develop our ties with Africa and Latin America, and an engagement for peace in the Middle East. Our bonds with Portugal are growing stronger, also because for many years, Norway has contributed to programmes aimed at reducing economic and social disparities. These bonds set the backdrop for the Prime Minister’s talks with his Portuguese counterpart during his visit to Lisbon last month, and I will follow up during my visit to the same capital in July.

In our contact with the German presidency we have had a clear focus on energy, energy security and the High North. During the past half year, we have had close contact with Germany at all levels. Foreign Minister Steinmeier visited Oslo and Hammerfest before Germany took over the presidency, and he will accompany me to Tromsø and Svalbard in August to further explore the opportunities for intensifying Norwegian-German and European cooperation in the areas of energy, research and development, and climate change. Networks are being further developed and contacts deepened.

Similarly, we are seeking to deepen our relations with selected EU countries with which we have mutual interests that can be developed. This applies, of course, to the Nordic countries, and also to established member states and the new ones, where our contributions through the Financial Mechanisms have to a large extent paved the way.

Mr President,

There is a whole array of figures that reflect our ties with the EU and the EU member states — on trade and students, on gas export and capital investments, on researchers, tourists and artists. I will not go into these figures in detail.

The purpose of the most important agreements we have concluded with the EU is to provide a framework for all of these bonds and points of contact, and to ensure the best possible conditions for cooperation, competition and legal protection. We are a state governed by the rule of law and we want the same rules to apply to everyone in Norway, and this is a basic attitude we bring with us and wish to see extended to the whole of Europe.

(the EEA Agreement)

The Government is of the view that the EEA Agreement has served Norway well and continues to do so. Every single day of the year, around the clock, it gives Norwegian actors predictable, equal and functional framework conditions for exports and imports and a whole series of other activities in the large area the EEA constitutes.

But there are also challenges: market access for certain Norwegian export products is not satisfactory. In these cases, the authorities and the business sector have a joint responsibility for persuading the EU to discontinue measures that restrict trade. Here I am thinking in particular of the restrictions the EU has imposed on imports of Norwegian salmon and trout.

(Schengen)

Through our membership of Schengen we are involved in important areas of EU cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs. This cooperation has also served Norway well. This is an arena where Norway plays a significant role in areas that are important to the EU, and where we can act jointly with the EU to ensure effective and sound control of the external borders.

All things considered, these agreements are therefore comparatively comprehensive. But they have one structural political weakness: they are focused largely on single issues, on directives and Community acts, which although important, do not necessarily reflect political developments. They do therefore not reflect the increasingly extensive cooperation in the area beyond the internal market, cooperation that is not to the same extent regulated by treaties.

We are not part of this, so it is only reasonable that we should be left out. But since we are virtually automatically linked to the internal market, we must beware of deluding ourselves into thinking that the same applies to the broader political processes. We will have to engage in these more actively and devote time to understanding them and to seeking new ways of gaining influence where this is desirable and possible.

(the EU’s future course)

Mr President,

What trends are setting the tone for the further development of the EU today? What direction is the EU cooperation taking?

These are difficult questions to answer, for the EU’s course is constantly being adjusted. The picture I am presenting today is defined by the fact that Norway is on the outside looking in. I will not try to make it look otherwise.

In March this year, the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the European Community was celebrated in great style, and Europe Day — the commemoration of the Schuman Declaration — was celebrated on 9 May. In May 1950, Schuman made the speech in which he presented his visions of how industrial cooperation could be used to stabilise Europe. Now, for half a century, the EU has been a project in political innovation, organisation and joint governance. Increasing interdependence has built and strengthened the Community.

The history of the EU is the history of the development of a system of governance at the European level, which has had a global impact. The main emphasis has been on economic cooperation with an explicit peace policy goal — a great political vision.

(issues on the EU agenda)

Over the years, we have seen that virtually all types of issues have been put on the EU agenda. The need to find common solutions to major global challenges has always been a driving force in this cooperation. What have appeared to be crises have led to new breakthroughs and new leaps forward, and have driven the EU’s development, enlargement and increased integration — all at the same time.

In recent years we have seen how for example energy has climbed to the top of the political agenda. The development of a common energy policy has been on the agenda for a long time, but it gained new impetus when energy prices began to rise, particularly when Russia stopped its deliveries to Ukraine and Belarus. We hear one leader after another saying that energy is at the top of the political agenda. For Norway, this means new opportunities and challenges.

There is growing recognition of the fact that we need to address climate change — another area where initiatives originate in the member states before making their way to the EU institutions. EU cooperation in this area is growing, and the EU has ambitions of taking the lead.

(EU foreign and security policy)

EU cooperation on foreign and security policy — which primarily involves intergovernmental cooperation — has increased significantly over the last 10–15 years. Conflicts and warfare in the western Balkans have in many ways acted as a touchstone for the EU, and have led to a recognition that a common effort is needed and that good coordination can produce results.

The EU’s role in the global fight against poverty and its engagement in peace and reconciliation processes should also be highlighted.

Over the years, the EU has engaged in no less than 16 military and civilian crisis response operations in various parts of the world. Dramatic incidents such as the terrorist attacks in Europe after 9/11 have led to closer coordination of measures to combat terrorism and international crime.

However, the EU does not always speak with one voice on international issues. Two EU member states have permanent seats on the UN Security Council. As regards the global agenda, EU countries like the UK and France generally have two roles — one independent role and one EU role. It is still the case that you cannot pick up the telephone and dial a single number for Europe as Henry Kissinger pointed out in his often quoted lament. And as the situation stands today, the EU’s role in the foreign policy arena does not correspond to the role it plays in the global economy. The disagreement over Iraq was an example of this. However, the crisis this caused led to a broader internal discussion of the need to take a common position on foreign policy.

The German presidency, together with the forthcoming Portuguese and Slovenian presidencies, has set strengthening the transatlantic ties as an important goal. There is broad support for this initiative in the EU, not least among several of the new members. Now that France has a new government that explicitly shares this goal, we can expect the EU to focus more strongly on cooperation with the US, particularly when Europe starts preparing to deal with a new US administration.

A stronger focus on European-US relations is a development Norway should welcome. As a NATO ally that sees its transatlantic ties as the mainstay of its security policy and at the same time has a large number of political, economic and cultural ties with the rest of Europe, Norway has nothing to gain from deeper differences between the US and the EU.

(the EU–Russia, Norway–Russia, trade and energy security)

Mr President,

Today, relations with another emerging superpower and close neighbour — Russia — pose a challenge. Not a week passes without some aspect of our relations with Russia dominating the agenda — whether nuclear storage sites on the Kola Peninsula, disarmament agreements, fisheries management, cross-border trade, our neighbouring areas in the north or Russia’s changing relations with its neighbours.

Several EU countries regard Russia as a strategic partner, while other member states are concerned about their strong dependence on Russian energy supplies. Today, Russia provides more than a third of the gas consumed in the EU. These deliveries account for more than 80% of Russia’s gas export. The EU is, of course, dependent on Russia, but it is important to underline that the dependence is mutual — Russia is also dependent on the EU market.

We need to keep things in proportion here: a weak, disintegrating Russia is not in Europe’s interest. Since the 1990s broad cooperation has developed between the EU and Russia. The network of contacts is growing, both in breadth and in depth, in part due to the current partnership and cooperation agreement. This is a positive development. St Petersburg is no longer a distant city “on the other side”. It is emerging as a vibrant European city on the Baltic.

Nevertheless, there are clear signs of a cooler climate between the EU and Russia, as there are between the US and Russia, and the rhetoric is becoming more heated.

The EU-Russia summit in Samara on 18 May did not bring the parties any closer to agreement on a framework for a new partnership agreement. The EU stood united in Samara in its position on the challenges the new member states are facing. There are still a number of member states that do not want to move forward on the agreement, due to problems such as those related to meat exports from Poland to Russia and oil deliveries from Russia to a refinery in Lithuania. We are increasingly seeing signs of tension and budding conflicts between Russia and countries that used to belong to the Soviet sphere. We saw this most recently in the relations between Estonia and Russia.

It is essential that both the EU and the US — and Norway fits in here naturally — take a firm stand on principles of democracy, the rule of law, civil society and the media’s role in the global community, which by the way is the theme of a major international conference being held in Oslo today and tomorrow.

Russia is a young and fragile democracy. Now, as elections are approaching, this democracy is being tested publicly on the international stage. And there is no better measure of a democracy than its respect for the voters’ right to express their views freely and safely. There are some worrying sign in this connection, and that is something we must speak out about.

At the same time, cooperation with Russia is necessary, for example in the efforts to find lasting solutions to issues as varied as the future status of Kosovo and the Iranian nuclear programme — and not least climate change. As Russia’s neighbour, we have a fundamental interest in seeing cooperation between the EU and Russia develop in a positive direction.

*****

For a long time, Norway found itself in a strategically important position, having US as its closest ally, and sharing a border with the Soviet Union, and then Russia — in a landscape that was relatively stable, predictable and recognisable, yet cool. Today, the landscape has changed, and it is possible to discern a triangle formed by the EU, Russia and the US that gives rise to new perspectives and challenges as regards Norway’s interests. Norway and the EU have common challenges vis-à-vis Russia in areas such as visa issues and the export of fish and other foodstuffs. Our visa agreement with Russia is, for example, based on a Schengen model.

At the same time, there are areas that are unique to Norway. Together with Russia, we own and manage the cod stocks in the Barents Sea together, and Europe is the market. We are neighbours who share a clearly defined land border and a sea boundary that has not yet been settled. And then there energy supply and energy security. As I have already mentioned, Norway, together with Russia, provides a large share of the gas that is consumed in the EU.

But there is one important difference. Although we both supply gas, Norway is an “internal supplier” because we are a party to the EEA Agreement. Unlike a number of EU countries, we have implemented all of the EU’s energy legislation in Norwegian law — a fact it is worth bringing to the attention of EU representatives.

My point here is that our membership of the EEA, with the obligations it entails, does not weaken our position as an energy supplier. On the contrary, I would say that it strengthens our position because it contributes to the predictability and long-term reliability that are such important hallmarks of Norway’s role as energy supplier. The EU knows that Norway does not politicise the sale of gas. And this strengthens Norway’s position.

One of the Norwegian Government’s overriding aims is to engage Russia in all cooperation — in all areas — and to cooperate with Russia both in our neighbouring areas and internationally. Russia is now a more self-assertive actor, a major energy power, that is internationalising its economy. But there is no need for us to respond to all of this with what I would call “Cold War reflexes”, as if there were cause for alarm.

There is nothing wrong with reflexes, but reflection is a better tool. We must pursue a recognisable Norwegian foreign policy towards our neighbour in the north on energy issues, fish resources, business and industry, research and development, climate change, and human rights and freedom of expression.

Norway has considerable expertise on Russia, and many EU countries make use of our analyses and assessments. It also provided the basis for Prime Minister Stoltenberg’s programme and talks in Murmansk, Moscow and St Petersburg when he visits Russia later this week.

*****

(High North strategy)

All of this is clearly reflected in the Government’s High North strategy, and our High North policy is thus an integral part of our European policy. Our relations with Russia play a key role in this, as we have discussed in this chamber several times during the past few months. But it is also essential that we create broader communities of interests with our European partners in the north.

The Government is seeking actively to develop such communities of interests and to raise awareness of their importance. Not least with regard to our closest neighbours. The current review of what could be termed the cooperation architecture in the north was in part stimulated by the EU Northern Dimension, where Russia, Iceland and Norway are participating. In the EU, the north, south, east and west will always be vying for attention. We must do what we can to keep the EU’s focus trained on the north.

We must do this in cooperation with our Nordic neighbours. Mr President, I believe we can revitalise Nordic cooperation provided that we are prepared to take new directions and that we successfully manage our relations with the EU.  

In further developing our security policy cooperation, we must be alert to the new political realities in the north. These involve challenges related to the environment, climate change, transport, resource management and production, and cross-border person-to-person contact. They are all soft security challenges.

The MoU on security and defence policy cooperation we signed with Iceland in April is one example. As coastal states, Norway, Denmark and Iceland engaged in closer cooperation when the US withdrew the last of its aircraft and personnel from the Keflavik base. Norway is also open to closer cooperation with Sweden and Finland. The first meeting between the three countries’ foreign ministers took place last week, and was also attended by state secretaries from the respective countries’ defence ministries. Our defence authorities, particularly in Norway and Sweden, are cooperating more closely.

And in terms of foreign policy, we see that there are an increasing number of areas where we have common interests — ranging from relations with Russia in the north, business development in the north, the environment and climate change, to our joint participation in the EU Battle Groups and — going one step further — to closer cooperation in international military operations, such as in Afghanistan.

We will continue our talks. And this cooperation has a wider significance because it involves both EU and NATO countries, which is why I have included it in my address today on EU matters.

(ways of working, and cross-sectoral strategies and networks)

Mr President,

The EU agenda is constantly changing and expanding, and member countries are cooperating in more and more policy areas. It is worth noting that next year will be the first year in the EU’s history that less than 50% of the budget resources are allocated to agricultural policy and structural funds. A greater share of these resources are being channelled to new priority areas instead.

This focus on new areas has been accompanied by the emergence of new ways of working, more use of government-to-government cooperation and more emphasis on cross-sectoral strategies.

We see this for example in the economic area, as reflected in the Lisbon Strategy, which covers economic, social and environmental policy, in the area of employment as reflected in the Luxembourg process, and in the cooperation on financial policy. And in the EU’s global efforts where a combination of tools from foreign, trade, development and justice and home affairs policy are employed — precisely in order to meet more complex challenges. It is important that Norway recognises that this is the reality we have to deal with.

In parallel with the various networks between governments, closer ties and networks are being developed between national parliaments, local and regional administrative levels and, not least, between organisations, research institutions and civil society actors across national borders in the EU.

These networks are gradually changing Europe, both politically and culturally. This may be one of the areas to which the Government and the Storting should devote most of their attention in the time ahead. This also applies to other actors in Norway that have contacts in Europe.

We have to admit that this is a demanding task. In the new, enlarged EU, alliances and the nature and strength of the ties vary from issue to issue. It is not easy for Norway, as a non-member, to safeguard its interests in this new European picture with its complex — and often confusing — cooperation patterns, emerging trends and increasing diversity.

At the same time we must focus on the opportunities, because what counts more frequently now is what and who can help to deliver solutions, rather than the specific status of each individual country. But are we taking good enough advantage of these opportunities? Can we think even more strategically here? I think we can, Mr President.

And we must not forget that Norway needs to continue to work constructively vis-à-vis the Commission and the European Parliament, which has gained more influence due to the extension of the codecision procedure in a number of areas and through active involvement in foreign policy. We are focusing on this through the work of our mission to the EU, and I am happy to note that several of the parties represented in the Storting are more actively developing contacts with the European Parliament. This is a welcome development.

(pluralism, soft power, EU enlargement)

Mr President,

In an article published in the international press last November, my colleague Carl Bildt wrote about the importance of pluralism and of ensuring that new member states are not absorbed by the EU. The new members are positive additions to the EU and serve to strengthen it. According to Bildt, enlargements have a stabilising effect. This is an interesting point of view.

The EU enlargements are helping to create a zone of stability in Europe. In a sense this is having a disciplinary effect. The EU represents a kind of “soft power”, which is the only real tool available in today’s Europe, a power that forges bonds and enhances security. Soft power can be quite formidable, particularly when we so clearly see that although “hard power”, i.e. military power, is still important as a deterrent, it is not appropriate for building security and promoting development. Particularly in the new member states, and even more so in the troubled Balkans.

The challenge lies in creating conditions that make it possible to make use of soft power, i.e. the incentives provided by the prospect of EU membership, support for reform, student exchanges, massive transfer of experience and expertise — everything that can help to develop the rule of law, new democracies.

Mr President, we tend to forget the great prospects offered by EU enlargement. Twelve countries are now integrated into something that, in a larger perspective, is a historic commitment to democracy, market economy and the rule of law. The transfer of resources from west to east in the EU — where we are participating through our programmes — is today’s political version of the Marshall Plan.

How can such a diverse, enlarged EU function?

The German presidency’s aim is to negotiate an agreement of a roadmap for what may end up being called an “addendum”, rather than a new constitutional treaty.

There is general agreement among the member states on the importance of — as a minimum — making institutional changes that will result in a more effective decision-making structure involving 27 member states and an agenda that is constantly getting longer. Agreement on such institutional reforms is also a prerequisite for further EU enlargement.

This work has taken on a new momentum and will be the main theme at the EU summit later this month. The German Chancellor will play a leading role in negotiating an agreement. The new French President has said that he sees no need for a new referendum, provided that the treaty proposal is less comprehensive than the draft that was voted down a little more than a year ago. Prime Minister Blair has indicated that the UK will take a similar stance.

It is difficult to predict the outcome, but several analyses indicate that it may be possible to reach agreement on a less comprehensive treaty. It has been proposed that constitutional trappings and symbolic language that evoke associations of the EU as a state should be deleted. The result could be an institutional “clean up”, and a strengthening of common organs, for example, through the establishment of the posts of EU president and EU foreign minister, who would have seats in the Council and the Commission.

Decisions concerning common action on climate change and energy and closer cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs could also be adopted. There may also be a discussion of the degree to which social rights should be included and an attempt may be made to revive the debate on the distribution of weighted votes in the EU Council. All of these important issues will be dealt with at the meeting of the European Council on 21 and 22 June, and the aim is to agree on a mandate for further negotiations at an Intergovernmental Conference in the autumn.

(enlargement and differentiated cooperation, different constellations)

Mr President,

Historically, enlargement has always gone hand in hand with further deepening. It has never been a matter of either/or. Enlargement has gradually been followed by further deepening. At the same time the EU discarded the most far-reaching visions as regards deepening when it made the historically important choice of enlargement as its strategy after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

We should now take note of the growing tendency towards what is known as “differentiated cooperation”, i.e. the distinction between promoters and sceptics of closer EU cooperation. This has in practice resulted in integration at different speeds and intensities in the sense that several of the countries that are most sceptical about integration do not participate in all aspects of EU cooperation.

For example, the UK, Denmark and Sweden have remained outside the European Monetary Union, which will be enlarged next year to include Malta and Cyprus. The UK and Ireland do not participate in the Schengen cooperation. And Denmark has maintained its formal reservations, including in the area of security and defence cooperation. All of this is a result of negotiations, either in connection with treaty revisions or in connection with membership negotiations.

In today’s EU-27 — and the prospect of further enlargements — it is possible to envisage a trend towards cooperation involving different constellations of actors, focusing on different themes such as a deepened EMU, foreign, security and defence cooperation, or justice and home affairs. The debate on differentiated integration will continue, at the same time as the member states seek to resolve the institutional challenges.

(Turkey)

Today the issue of further enlargement involves the western Balkans. But the dominant theme is Turkey. This is a controversial issue, because the question of Turkish membership is something that really fuels the debate on what the EU’s identity should be and where its borders should go.

Norway is hardly in a position to have strong views on which countries should be EU members. However, we note that the EU’s open door to states that comply with the requirements as regards democracy, rule of law and human rights has influenced developments in many of the new member states. I believe that Europe would be living up to its own values if Turkey were offered such an open door — all the way to membership.

*****

Mr President,

Two major themes have been lifted high up on the EU agenda — and on our own, for that matter — the first being climate change and energy, and the second migration and development. The debate on these themes is taking place alongside the one on the treaty. I would like to conclude by saying a few words about these matters.

(energy supply security, climate change)

The EU countries’ focus on energy supply security and measures to mitigate climate change have been widely discussed and are well known in this chamber. At the Council meeting in March, the EU member states decided on common goals and measures. The EU is a key actor in global climate policy. The EU countries account for one third of global GDP.  EU emission reduction measures and mechanisms will thus be vital for ensuring sustainable development.

Norway firmly supports the targets the EU has set itself, and part of our own solution will be linked to our participation in the EU emission trading scheme from 2008. The development of more efficient, environmentally sound technology is an important part of this picture. This also applies to value creation on the Norwegian continental shelf. In Norway’s view, it is important that capture and storage of CO2  is not restricted by state aid rules. We must ensure that our expertise and knowledge are utilised in projects and activities in this field where we are cooperating with the EU.

The major global problem of climate change is forcing us to reconsider the interfaces between politics and governance, business, industry and technology. There is an important message here: both in the EU and in Norway there are new forms of cooperation with civil society, business and industry, which are actively involved, see opportunities and are working hard on innovations that satisfy increasingly stringent requirements.

But we may also be facing new challenges. On 9 May, the EU Commissioner for Justice, Franco Frattino, proposed legal standards to combat “green crime”. These include draft legislation and sanctions for, e.g., pollution with hazardous substances and other environmental crimes. The proposal is now being considered in the EU system. It is interesting that such an initiative is being taken in the field of environmental crime, particularly because the EU has not previously been engaged in criminal law. In my view, such a proposal would have been unthinkable just two years ago. This is a new trend that we must examine carefully.

In other words, this is an example of today’s new way of thinking — where foreign and domestic policy are interwoven, at both the global and the local level, and many actors are involved. And where we have many opportunities. It is up to us to seize them.

(migration)

Migration is another policy area where the EU countries are seeking to agree on common solutions, both at home and abroad, and where the challenges and differences within the EU are vast. Europe needs labour immigration, and there will be an increasing need for labour. Internal migration in the EU and the EEA is already on the increase. Norway is receiving over 50% more labour migrants from the EU-10 area than Sweden.

People from the new EU member states are making an important contribution in providing the Norwegian economy with labour. We should be very grateful for their contribution to our economy. This also makes the challenge of securing sufficient labour and at the same time preventing social dumping and exclusion very real.

Migration flows cannot be managed without an international development policy that alleviates the destitution and poverty that gives rise to migration. Efforts to manage migration flows are therefore a part of our policy for development, democracy and stability, and poverty eradication.

Norway has been invited to participate in the development of the EU’s global approach to migration. We welcome this invitation. It gives us the opportunity to participate at an early stage in policy development and in cooperation on development measures and initiatives in the migrants’ countries of origin and transit countries.

The EEA Agreement and our participation in cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs put us in a good position to conduct a dialogue with the EU on these policy areas. The EEA Agreement and our participation in research programmes also provide a framework for cooperation on labour migration.

Such frameworks are essential for addressing global challenges that are common to all European countries.

*****

(globalisation, interdependence, conclusion)

All in all, Mr President, it is interesting to note — and here I would like to quote a recent analysis published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs — that “in foreign policy, the views of Norway and the EU coincide on most issues, as reflected by the fact that Norway frequently aligns itself with EU foreign policy statements”.

But in a globalised world, this is not the whole picture. In some areas we are still lacking a satisfactory institutional framework that allows us to cooperate effectively and democratically, in a spirit of solidarity.

It is a paradox that although there is a need for strong international organisations, these organisations have little credibility in some circles. This is perhaps one of the greatest democratic and foreign policy challenges we politicians are facing today.

The EU has come a long way when it comes to establishing well-functioning and effective economic, judicial and political cooperation. We must ensure that we continue to be closely involved here — in addition to our extensive cooperation under the EEA and Schengen agreements.

For the tasks that need to be dealt with are enormous, and what many of them have in common is that the EU — and for that matter Europe — is expected to take a leadership role in addressing the challenges involved. It is therefore in Norway’s interest — and in the interests of the world at large — that the EU should have an effective decision-making system. The backdrop here is that the globalisation of the economy and communications has gone further and at a quicker pace than the globalisation of politics.

I would like to quote a few lines of a speech EU foreign policy coordinator Javier Solana made in Washington D.C. in March this year: “Global governance is an awful term but a vital concept. We need it because of a simple reality: interdependence. . . On the whole, our capacity to analyse problems is good. But even when we agree on what has to happen – we still don’t manage to translate that consensus into results on the ground.”

In a world characterised by increasing interdependence and challenges that can only be addressed and dealt with through joint action and in a spirit of solidarity, it is in Norway’s interest that global governance mechanisms should exist.

Mr President,

We are perhaps too accustomed to thinking of the EU as the internal market, as the EC, or even as the EEC. But the EU is much larger, it has been extended and enlarged, and it is an important global actor in the foreign policy arenas. Our ties with this cooperation have increased in number and density. We share Europe’s future.