Welcome Address at Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges

Distinguished participants, dear friends,

In 2005 the first Human Security Report documented a dramatic, decline in the number of armed conflicts over the past decade.

To many of you, this is no longer new information. Analysis of modern conflict outlines several reasons for this change. Yet, one explanation highlighted in the report is worth while recalling as we meet today. The authors argue that one of the most compelling explanations for this decline is what it terms “the unprecedented upsurge of international activism, spearheaded by the UN, which took place in the wake of the Cold War”.

This we need to welcome. The result is less human suffering for people who otherwise would have been vulnerable. There is a steady move towards increased prosperity and democratic rule in a growing number of countries. A majority of the world’s population live safer lives.

Yet, a large minority is not able to benefit from these developments.

For about a sixth of the world’s population living in some 50 countries, the trend is towards greater instability, declining security and dwindling prospects for the future. They are the victims of crumbling state institutions, asymmetric warfare, terrorism and violence.

There is also a deeply worrying trend towards a blurring of the distinction between combatants and civilians. The number of soldiers killed in battle is down. The number of civilians killed and affected by conflict is up. That is a source of great concern.

In many parts of the world affected by indiscriminate violence, civilians and humanitarian actors are targeted as combatants: in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Darfur, in Somalia, in DR Congo. Virtually unable to protect themselves as they are, civilians suffer massively.

What can we do to put an end to this?

And what is the role of UN peace operations in the broader picture of international peace and security, humanitarian assistance and development?

There is no single answer to these questions. But they need to be addressed and we need to envisage a way forward.

Such a way must include strengthening our capacity to meeting the immediate humanitarian needs.

It must include enhancing our capacity to securing a political process that can identify legitimate political leaders who can take responsibility for both ending conflict and building peace.

It must include our collective ability to address urgent security issues and, in some cases, be ready and capable to use force.

It must include a better capacity to help secure functioning government institutions. It must bring and anchor the benefits of long-term development to the population.

And it is critically important that all of these efforts include active involvement of local participation. Decades of development cooperation have taught us some dire lessons: Our efforts – well intended as they may be – will fail if they lack local ownership, participation and accountability.

The role of international actors is to support national efforts and actors, not substitute them. Afghanistan is but one vivid illustration of this.

If there is a short version of how we can devise an exit strategy for foreign troops in Afghanistan it is this:

First there is security – and here we – the UN mandated ISAF operation must do our part. Then – and at the same time – there is development. For every effort we accomplish for Afghanistan’s development this must be the rule: All we do must include Afghan participation. Everything we initiate must be tailored in such a way that Afghans can take it over.

All such settings are complex. We should be cautious not to lock answers into theoretical straight jackets. But since most responses are multifaceted our ambition and intention must be to ensure that all efforts support each other. In short, what is needed is an integrated approach to our work in countries ridden by war. 

On this note, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to welcome you all to Oslo, to this conference on integrated and multidimensional UN peace operations.

Many of you took part in the conference on Integrated Missions here in Oslo in May 2005. The fruitful discussions and positive feedback from the conference led us to hold a follow-up series of six regional seminars on the subject, the first of which was in March this year.

Seminars have been held in Beijing, jointly with China, in Johannesburg, jointly with South Africa, and in Addis Ababa, Geneva, New York and Brussels.

Through these gatherings we have put our ear to the ground on four different continents.

We have listened to the voices of affected people, troop-contributing countries, local and international NGOs, inter-governmental institutions and academia.

We have compiled a wealth of personal experience from the field, as well as academic observations and analyses.

We have found that beyond comparison the UN is the largest international peacekeeping organisation - in terms of both the number of operations and personnel on the ground.

We have also found that in the broad majority of cases the UN operates in tandem with other organisations – in various forms of hybrid arrangements.

This is good. The unique universal mandate of the UN does not mean that it should operate in splendid isolation. We see it on so many accounts in today’s interdependent world. To succeed the UN needs to link up with other stakeholders.

Take global health. A successful mobilization for the Millennium Development goals directly depends on the ability to interact, stimulate and include other actors, be they public, private or voluntary. That has been our approach as we bolster support for a dedicated effort to reach MDG’s 4&5 on reduction of childhood and maternal mortality.

The challenge is to make such partnerships work – and to effectively learn from both successes and failures of past attempts. That is what this new gathering in Oslo is all about.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Many of you have contributed actively to this work – let me thank all of you – both individuals and institutions – who have been involved in this process, including the governments that have co-hosted the seminars. 

But let me also challenge you. Please join us here in Oslo to deepen our understanding and devise new and innovative approaches. I believe we agree why our effort matters. The question we must address now is not why; it is how.

At the end of this process, our ambition is to provide further advice, input and guidance to the United Nations and its member states on how to make optimal use of limited resources when striving to build lasting peace in countries affected by war.

For this to be relevant and useful our guidance should be applicable in all peace operations, irrespective of which organisation is in the lead and which main partners are involved.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We must be mindful of the strains the management of peace operations entails.

Since the turn of the century, the mandates of these operations have become increasingly complex. The objectives are more ambitious.

Operations are required to respond to acute situations in fragile and poor states, where political conflict is accompanied by unrest, violence and humanitarian crisis. The root causes of violence may be difficult to grasp and peacekeeping efforts are often based on incomplete, fragile peace processes.

Still the number of UN troops continues to grow. Currently, around 110 000 “blue helmets” and “blue berets” are deployed throughout the world.

Wherever a peacekeeping operation is set up, it draws on a plethora of actors. Some may have been there since before the conflict broke out, and may have taken part in facilitating a peace process and long-term development activities. Others are involved because of the humanitarian consequences of the conflict. 

Individually, these players may have smooth working procedures and highly competent people on the ground. However, the question remains – and this is often a test case of possible success: How well they are working together?

The fact is that the challenges facing peace operations today can only be met with a coherent, multidimensional approach, clear guidelines and institutional flexibility.

Engagement must be long-term, well planned, properly coordinated and must have sufficient and reliable resources.

Traditional peacekeeping alone will rarely be successful in the long term unless it is integrated into a wider strategy that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict.

And as we see over and over again: The ultimate test of our ability to respond with a coherent strategy comes when things change quickly on the ground.

Let me share one example: Earlier this year, UN forces in Haiti responded promptly and, with remarkable efficiency, took control of Cité Soleil, an area previously controlled by armed gangs. The local population welcomed liberation from the gangs’ rule of terror. At the same time – and for obvious reasons – they had enormous expectations of how the UN would improve living conditions and give people a better future.

The problem was: There was no a plan for that.

UN security regulations did not allow humanitarian and development actors to move into the area to deliver services. The military did not have the funding to implement projects themselves. Through the good leadership of MINUSTAH, we were able to assist in developing a new mechanism – a reconciliation fund – that helped bridge the gap and provide available funding to such activities.

This approach worked. As a result of these quick impact projects, people in Cité Soleil gained confidence and trust in the UN. Stability improved. Humanitarian and development actors are now moving into the area to take over projects from the military – but they do it in accordance with their own mandates.

I believe that such as mechanism could serve as a model for other peacekeeping operations that are facing similar challenges.

One critical condition, however, is that the military is even handed in the way it makes such assistance available – to all and not to the few. And that the military as soon as possible open up to civil organizations that are best positioned to do development work.

Managing complexity in peace keeping processes is difficult. But the UN has improved greatly in this respect. All UN operations since 1999 have had multi-dimensional mandates. Planning and implementation have significantly improved.

But much remains to be done. For example, a very accurate measure of success in peacebuilding is to what extent the lives of women are improved.

Peace keeping is not just an exercise involving combatants; it must involve the whole of society – not only as victims but also as actors.

If it doesn’t, something is wrong. And even worse when half of the population – women – are absent from the process.

A joint donor assessment last year of four major UN operations – DR Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo – concluded that accountability for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on women, peace and security was limited.

But, interestingly, the review team found a strong correlation between the inclusion of gender perspectives in the missions’ activities and the level of cooperation between the mission and the UN country team. In fact, the level of implementation of UNSCR 1325 served as an indicator of how integrated the mission really was – in the plans but not least in the field.

Failure to include women in the peace process and to provide a peace dividend to women suggests that the peace process itself is likely to fail.

Experiences from such different parts of the world as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Haiti, East Timor, Burundi, Sudan, Afghanistan and Kosovo, to mention but a few, further underline the importance of delivering early, coherent and effective security and development dividends.

At this very moment, the UN, together with the AU, is preparing a long-awaited peacekeeping operation in Sudan’s western province of Darfur – the Hybrid UN/AU operation.

As new peace negotiations for Darfur are about to start in Libya, let me take the example of Darfur to reflect on some of the challenges that peace operations are facing today.

UNAMID – the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur – will be deployed in the beginning of 2008. Norway together with Sweden has proposed a common battalion to join the early phases of the deployment.

One obvious obstacle will be that there is no peace to keep. Since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja in May 2006, the situation has only worsened. The rebel groups are increasingly fragmented, and the violence is causing new displacements every day. 

Gender-based violence continues to be used as a weapon of war, and women and girls are constantly at risk. The internally displaced in the overcrowded camps are loosing confidence in the present AU mission. They have, at the same time, very high expectations of the UN.

Humanitarian agencies working in this region are increasingly being targeted. They are facing the risk of losing an aid worker’s life every time they try to save someone else’s life. 

To be able to work, humanitarian agencies depend upon trust – from the people they are trying to assist and from the parties to the conflict. The population must be in no doubt about the role and mandate of the agencies seeking to assist them.

Humanitarian organizations are not parties to the conflict. They have but one mandate – that to save lives and to assist people.

UNAMID was planned on the basis of a wise decision – to maintain a clear organizational distinction between the coordination of humanitarian efforts and the peacekeeping integrated mission. This is essential.

The mission in Darfur will build on the endeavours of an AU mission known to be under-staffed, under-financed and under-equipped. But, and let me stress this, a mission that has been very brave. 

The African troops will still constitute a major part of the new hybrid. “Rehatting” the troops will not, however, automatically create a firm understanding of the new integrated mandate they are supposed to implement.  

Mutual awareness of different mandates – and their implications for action in the field - must be ensured through training and guidance – and accurate information to the affected populations.

And as the UN/AU force enters in, the international community must stand ready to intensify humanitarian and other development programs.   

In Afghanistan, to take another example, the international community chose a relatively small UN-mission with no security pillar. A so-called lead-nation concept for key sectors and two separate international military operations were put in place.

Has this concept worked to our expectations?

It is now safe to conclude that the Afghanistan model has not delivered the results we had hoped. The main problem has been that overall coordination and international coherence has been lacking – especially on the civilian side.

We know that there are security challenges. But for the military component we have ample coordination mechanisms in ISAF and in NATO.

The civilian support to the Afghan society, however, has been too weak and too fragmented. In recent months the situation has been improved. There is a greater focus on the need to succeed the development agenda. More nations are backing the development agenda. Still there is much to be done to improve the coordination and the common focus.

Here the UN must be key and central. The Afghan experience underlines the need for investing further in more effective UN multidimensional and integrated missions.

No other international body has the range of means at its disposal as the UN, and no other organisation enjoys such broad legitimacy in the field of international peace and security.

So, where are we, at the outset of this concluding conference?

I note that there seems to be broad agreement on the principle of integration – and a stronger readiness to take steps to mainstream such a principle into operations.

We agree on the need for a more coherent UN presence in the field, based on more inclusive planning, better coordination between different agencies, clearer division of labour and better use of possible synergies. Constructively using the opportunities we have in the Peace Building Commission must be among the strategies to pursue.

However, we should not assume that the concept of integration is understood in the same way by everybody. A more precise definition is called for. We must identify what to integrate when it should be integrated and better tools for how we do it.

We must see integration as a way of improving the impact on the ground.

Irrespective of definition, our findings indicate that there are some very real practical barriers to integration. Not all of them are new. Yet, they still need to be addressed.

Not surprisingly, our consultations have confirmed that integration cannot be based on inflexible blueprints. New situations call for new structures. The Democratic Republic of Congo requires a different set of response initiatives than Western Sahara. Darfur represents a whole new set of challenges compared to southern Lebanon. The situation in Haiti is very different to that in Cyprus, and East Timor is yet another reality.

Furthermore, it seems clear that integration can play a critical role in easing the interface between peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and restoring national capacities in countries emerging from conflict.

Finally, we must balance the need to maintain a humanitarian space in a conflict situation with the need for security. The obvious need for coordination between the two remains a challenge, but one that can and must be managed.

Basic humanitarian principles must form the basis of humanitarian engagement. We must not accept that the humanitarian imperative be absorbed into rivalling military and security mandates.

But again – a lot can be achieved through better coordination.

I look forward to hearing what has worked and what has not worked and your suggestions for how integration can be improved over the next two days.

Dear friends,

If there is one lesson from the process we have initiated, it is that no one actor can do it on their own. Military and civilian practitioners, humanitarian and development actors in the field; planners and managers at headquarters; decision makers who provide mandates and resource the operations; policy-makers and representatives of contributing countries:

All need to understand the extent and limitations of their own contributions, and how that should facilitate and underpin the contributions of others.

For that to happen, these actors need places to meet. It is therefore surprising that no such meeting place currently exist - except for the series of seminars and conferences we conclude in Oslo this week. But even with the best of recommendations - the job is not done. There will still be need for opportunities to exchange experiences, ideas and increase understanding on how to improve the chances

for success in environments where the odds of failure are often low.

I therefore suggest that a contact group be established, with representation as reflected in the participants list of this Conference, perhaps supplemented by other relevant resource persons.

An Integrated Missions Contact Group could be organized at capital level, and could meet once or twice a year in various places - UN headquarters, capitals and possibly in countries with active missions. For each meeting a specific and limited agenda should be agreed - starting perhaps with pursuing some of the recommendations from this conference.

As a contributor to the UN's integrated peace operations we would be prepared to host the first meeting of the Contact Group sometime next year.

Friends,

I look forward to receiving a strong set of recommendations for integrated and multidimensional operations, recommendations that can be shared with the wider UN constituency.

The results of our endeavours could form a “make or break” opportunity – not only for the UN and its role as peacekeeper, but also for thousands, maybe even millions, of victims of conflicts that they have no part in.

Thank you.