Norway's foreign policy and opportunities for cooperation with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

Check against delivery

Ladies and gentlemen, friends,

It may sound like a repetition – but no matter how we try to approach our changing world, we observe how pressing issues, challenges and opportunities are interconnected. It is a striking phenomenon. And – we are compelled to add – how pressing our need is to strengthen our capacity to deal with these interconnections. Policies – or politics – are lagging behind.

Migration, health issues, trafficking, crime, climate change, energy security, nuclear proliferation and so on – all these features of globalisation link people and communities together. They enhance our experience of being interdependent.

A few days after this year’s “Schuman Day” – the 50th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome - there are still multiple approaches to understanding the phenomenon that is the European Union. If I were to select one approach today, it would be its remarkable accumulative capacity of uniting European states. – This is what stands out 50 years after its inception.

There is the internal market, which is, of course, important as it is for jobs and welfare. But even more remarkable is the attempt – a long line – to build and secure a political response to the forces of globalisation and interdependence.

– The ability and courage to reach out to new member states, when Europe was facing the dramatic and welcome change of reunification.

– The determination to become a global actor, not so much driven by hard power and military might, but more by the soft power of economic integration and by all those values that give us Europeans a common identity: the rule of law, human rights and democracy.

– And the ability to change and correct the process of globalisation, to address climate change and to fight global poverty.

This is not the time – as the Commissioner said – for another debate on Norwegian accession to the European Union. But let me add – just on a personal note – that it is precisely these political dimensions that underpin my own conviction that Norway should have become a full member of the EU – and of this political process.

A majority of Norwegians ruled differently in 1994 – and this I do, of course, respect. But for Europe’s peace and security – and thus Norway’s – I am extremely pleased that the rest of Europe chose the way of cooperation and integration.

*****

Today, the EU is involved in foreign policy on a broad basis with its own security and defence policy based on the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003.

The Commissioner has presented to us the scope of the EU's foreign policy today. From my perspective, these developments are welcome.

The EU and its member states are our closest partners and our neighbouring countries. In broad terms they represent the same values and goals that our own foreign policy is based on – the rule of law and respect for human rights, the importance of international law, and the belief in conflict prevention through democracy and dialogue – our faith in cooperation, engagement, involvement.

Professor Timothy Garton Ash at Oxford University has written extensively on the need for a new – and true – “European story” woven “from six strands, each of which represents a shared European goal”. The six strands, which he names, –are freedom, peace, law, prosperity, diversity and solidarity.

I agree with him: we need an updated narrative, one that offers our citizens a broader vision than the predominant one based on unilateral force.

For decades, we here in Norway have viewed the EC and then the EU mainly as a single market. The internal market is now a reality and we have sought to manage our relations with this market through the EEA Agreement.

But perhaps the structured format of the EEA, with its focus on directives and acquis, has somewhat narrowed our perception of the emerging role of the EU, the true nature of the political dimension of the EU’s role in the field of international relations.

The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Norwegian Parliament got the point, I believe, when it explicitly – and in unison – made its recommendation on how to pursue our relations with the EU:

“The Committee is of the opinion that the EU has played an important stabilising role in Europe through the last half century ... [and] has influenced and promoted democracy in many former dictatorships, and continues through its expansion to exert a positive influence on the democratic development of many states.”

Let me reiterate: for reasons of history, values and interest, Norway’s foreign policy goals are close to those of the EU and its member states. It is indicative, I think, that we choose to align ourselves with most of the political statements issued by the EU, as they so clearly are in line with our own views.

We are, however, not a part of the institutional framework or informal processes that often promote the convergence of views and a strong, efficient network.

EU foreign ministers – and other cabinet members – meet several times a month, informally and formally, and this contributes to a continuous dialogue on current challenges –including in the foreign and security policy arena.

From time to time I join this process when I meet foreign ministers who are also party colleagues for dinner the day before a meeting of EU foreign ministers. It is a valuable setting for listening and adding Norwegian views. But is also an instructive illustration of how policies are hammered out in today’s Europe, quite different from in the past.

Thus – as a non-member – how should we relate to the role and the activities of the EU in foreign and security policy?

How can we add value, how can we work together, and when can our interests – and perhaps also broader interests – be better served by pursuing more independent policies?

Let me also question the very notion of an “independent foreign policy”. Of course, we all value independence – as opposed to being dependent on others. But how much sense does independent foreign policy make in a world of so much interdependence?  

In certain settings independence would almost equal irrelevance. A nation’s foreign policy interests today must be married with the need for international cooperation, it must maximise interest precisely by seeking a broader web of mutual interest.

So it is perhaps more useful to speak of a certain autonomy rather than independence. And as we are outside the EU and its decision-shaping and formal decision-making, we should wisely utilise – where appropriate – this state of autonomy.

*****

Although Norway and the EU may agree on most goals, there are crossroads where the choice of strategies may lead to different policies.

One example is the Middle East. Here too, in the broader setting, our strategic goals are shared: we wish to see peace in the Middle East based on the relevant UN resolutions, the Road Map, a two states solution between Israel and the Palestinians, and freedom from violence and terror for all.

We agree on the strategy, but we may not apply the same tactics at every crossroads. Again, our decisions are autonomous – we closely follow the 27 members of the EU, but we have to decide for ourselves, and it may happen that we make decisions that are distinctive.

We see this right now in our relations with the Palestinian National Unity Government. Norway decided on 17 March to normalise relations.

This means, in short, to be ready to talk to them, talk with them, with all the members of the National Unity Government – just as President Abbas has urged the international community to do.

Talking and engaging mean holding them to their joint platform. It means starting to normalise the way we channel our financial support, from temporary mechanisms – as the Commissioner mentioned – to more normal procedures under the control of the Palestinian Finance Minister.

We are not pursuing this policy in a vacuum. We find it important – even essential – to keep in close contact and consult, more or less on a daily basis, with the parties, the members of the Quartet, including the EU, and countries in the region, to clarify our choice and the reasoning behind it. And we find that the positions of the EU and Norway are close rather than far apart.

What has changed since 17 March?

On the political side, I believe, quite a lot. The EU and the EU member states are now dealing with Palestinian government ministers, although not all of them. The point here is that there now is engagement. Last week the Palestinian Foreign Minister met with the European Council of Foreign Ministers, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and Javier Solana. The Palestinian Finance Minister has been widely received, including by the US Secretary of State.

On the financial side, things are also changing. Finance Minister Fayyad has now structured a financial account through which we can channel our support in a more normal fashion. Norway is preparing to do so very soon with a transfer of USD 10 million. I urge others to follow.

So I believe there is progress. But it is too slow. The dramatic events in Gaza tell us all about that. Norway has condemned the violence and the unacceptable launching of rockets from Gaza towards Israel. It has to stop, and we keep on stressing this to the Palestinian leaders.

But at the same time, if we are to see security prevail and violence stop, then we need to engage and work with the National Unity Government, supported as it is by President Abbas. How can Israel expect the Unity Government to successfully intervene when Israel has combated it from the very first day, withholding Palestinian funds and urging the world to boycott all members of the cabinet?

Perhaps Palestinian leaders will be able, once again, to calm down their own people. But I believe we must be frank: if this Palestinian Unity Government fails, then politics will fail. And the alternative to politics is violence.

We need to demonstrate that we are ready to engage, politically and financially.

We need to enable the moderate forces to stand out and tell their people: “Look, by seeking unity and working politically, we can improve the situation, we can gradually start paying teachers, nurses and policemen, we can fix the sewage and the water, and not the least, we can tell the young generation of Palestinians that this is how we can move forward towards peace with Israel, towards peace in the region and to have our own state”.

If we do not engage explicitly and swiftly, then I fear that Palestinian leaders from all ranks will have to conclude: “Look, no matter what we do, it does not work, they are not ready to see and reward change, they – the world outside – are not ready to engage”.

And then violence and extremism will prevail. Then President Abbas and key ministers we now trust and work with will loose.

And then we will be faced with the alternative: civil war, chaos, more suffering and ever mounting insecurity – not only for the Palestinians, but indeed also for Israel – and this will be a serious blow to the efforts to make progress between Palestinians and Israelis.

During the last two months I have sensed a shared evaluation of the realities among EU colleagues. However, now time is an essential factor, and I urge the EU to keep moving forward as it has been doing during the last weeks. We are working closely with the EU, with the Commission and the member states. I really hope we will be able to continue complementing each other’s efforts.

*****

Let me now continue on a related area where Norwegian foreign policy has taken a distinctive course in recent years, yet in concert with the EU - our involvement in a number of peace processes in various parts of the world. Much of our engagement is well known, from the Middle East to Sri Lanka and Guatemala. Some of it is, however, not publicly known at all for obvious reasons of discretion.

It has been claimed that Norway can only assume such roles since we are not a member of the EU and thus not bound by its common policies. In some cases this is probably correct.

There are examples of common EU positions making it difficult or impossible for EU member states to contribute to peace processes. One such example is what happened in Sri Lanka when the EU chose to put the LTTE on its list of terrorist organisations. As a consequence the LTTE withdrew their security guarantee for the EU nationals in the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, and consequently, Sweden, Denmark and Finland had to pull out their monitors.  If we had done the same, there would be nobody left.

In general, one could argue that Norway, being outside the process of shaping and deciding on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), is able to engage with the degree of flexible diplomacy that peace processes often demand.

However, we should remember that the EU and individual member states have played important roles in a number of processes around the world. This fact is often neglected in the Norwegian public debate. The Norwegian efforts in the peace process in Sudan were made as a part of a troika with the United Kingdom and the United States. We work alongside Spain in Columbia, and we cooperate with Finland in Aceh in Indonesia.

It is the rule rather than the exception that our efforts are made in cooperation with the EU and its member states. For example, the EU, represented by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, is a member of the co-chairs group, and thus our partner in Sri Lanka.

However, in some settings we may pursue a division of labour. I think this is an important point to make. In some situations we can present views and promote initiatives that would be more of a risk for the EU to spearhead, but which it nonetheless might choose to support.

*****

Friends,

Then there are many, many areas where the interests of Norway and of the EU meet and often converge, and where we seek to maximise our common efforts.

Let me mention just a few examples: the High North and our relations with Russia, our cooperation on crisis operations in conflict areas, our cooperation on development policy issues and – not the least – the long-standing cooperation regarding developments in the Balkans, where we work hand-in-hand.

Finally, we cooperate in areas that are highly relevant to today’s broader security concept: the fight against organised crime, including illegal immigration, trafficking and terrorism. – A lot of the cooperation in these areas is a result of our participation in the Schengen cooperation.

The High North, including the development of our relations with Russia, is a top priority for the Government, and therefore also in our cooperation with the EU. We need the EU in the High North, and we need the EU in our relations with Russia.

In this picture, the EU’s Northern Dimension has increased the relevance of the High North in Brussels. The new platform that was finalised last November includes Norway, Iceland and Russia as equal partners. We attach great importance to this cooperation scheme. I think that the EU’s Northern Dimension also illustrates how smaller member states have taken on important roles in the foreign policy arena while holding the EU Presidency.

My message to EU colleagues and to various EU institutions is that the High North – the north of mainland Europe and the Barents Sea – is emerging with distinct strategic importance for the EU. Because of its energy resources. Because of its fish. Because of its environment, and because of the challenges of climate change.

The immediate result is a gradual deepening of relations with our EU neighbours Sweden and Finland. These two countries have a land-based perspective on the High North. Norway for its part has a predominantly ocean-based perspective.

Now, we wish to see more complementarity between these perspectives. In two weeks time, I will meet with my Swedish and Finnish colleagues in Stockholm to take stock of the challenges and opportunities in the High North. Then, from 10 to 12 June, Carl Bildt and I will be joined by a high-level Swedish-Norwegian business delegation to visit Tromsø and Hammerfest to highlight the perspectives and the potential for more cooperation.

I believe developments in the High North will bring important political perspectives in these three countries closer together, and I believe this can add new relevance to the way we shape our foreign and security policies. And, by definition, this means that Norway will work more closely with the EU through Sweden and Finland, and they will work more closely with NATO through Norway.

The sum of all of this – I believe – is enhanced security. This is an integral part of our High North policy. And it goes without saying that it is also an integral part of our European policy.

Beyond the Nordic family, I welcome the intensified dialogue we have with the Commission and the EU institutions and a number of EU states on issues related to the High North, from energy, maritime security and fish to the new opportunities of genomics.

The shared and increased focus on the High North may serve as an additional perspective as the EU deepens its neighbourhood policies. Norway fully supports the new European Neighbourhood Policy initiated by the EU, which aims to promote stability in areas to the east and south. Our ambition is to support the ENP through projects in the same areas, first of all in the CIS area.

Then there is cooperation in the field of security and defence policy — the ESDP. This is of course key. The ESDP contributes to our own security. As a NATO member anchored in a solid transatlantic tradition, we support a strengthened EU role in security matters and crisis management.

Our commitment can be seen through contributions of Norwegian personnel to EU operations, be it in the Balkans or Indonesia, and to the future civil operation in Afghanistan, where our cooperation will be even more active and involve an even greater number of personnel. We are participating in one of the new EU battle groups together with Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Ireland. And in March 2006 we entered into an agreement with the European Defence Agency (EDA) – as the first and so far only non-EU member.

Take but one example here: last week, my colleague, the Norwegian Minister of Defence signed an agreement on a joint investment programme on force protection under the EDA agreement, which involves Norwegian financial support of EUR 1.5 million.

We also have a close dialogue with the EU on matters of security and crisis management in Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan — and not least in the Middle East, as I mentioned. And let me also mention that we work closely with the EU on issues related to the Balkans, not least Kosovo where Norway plans to contribute to the EU mission. This will be the largest civilian ESDP mission so far. 

Dear friends,

Then there is the common objective of the fight against poverty and the twin issue of climate change and energy policy, which is now quickly climbing to the top of most agendas, including in Norway’s foreign policy consultations with the EU.

This is in fact the first speaking point for my own talks with European colleagues, parliamentarians, European think-tanks and NGOs. We are keenly following the implementation of the new ambitious Energy Policy for Europe and the EU’s ambitions of reducing CO2 emissions.

In the whole perspective of energy security and climate change Norway is a partner. And in all modesty, I believe that on both fields Norway and its resources and technological potential will always be part of the solutions.

*****

The historian Olav Riste has pointed to a typical dichotomy in Norwegian foreign relations that has existed more or less since our independence in 1905 – a dichotomy of political exclusiveness combined with economic internationalism.

Perhaps this is part of our personality as a state. I believe, however, that we need to be alert to grasp the needs and challenges that follow with the growing interdependence in our contemporary world.

This leaves us with the potential of seeking close cooperation with the EU, opting for common action and common positions where possible, and autonomous decisions where we see fit – but always keeping our EU partners informed. Perhaps our relations can be summed up in three points:

First, closeness: Norway has every interest in maintaining close relations with the EU, consulting it on issues, sharing views, identifying common objectives. 

Second, complementarity: we have assets that allow Norway to do a number of things that may not always be as easy for the EU as a group to do. We can – in other words – complement EU efforts. Rarely would we be on an opposing course.

And third, utility: our respective foreign policy assets and our complementarity make us useful to each other – the EU certainly is to us, and Norway – we like to think – can be useful to the EU.