The Minister’s talking points
Check against delivery

(Afghanistan)

• I would like to commend the US for the thoughtful analysis of the challenges we are facing in Afghanistan. We share your analysis, which reflects a shift in emphasis and underscores that there is a need to increase the civilian efforts to reach our overarching goals. We need a broader take on how we can reach our common goal: that Afghans are able to rule and set the course for Afghanistan.
• I came back from a week in Afghanistan last Saturday, where the message I heard repeatedly from people I met from north to south and east to west – not least from the military themselves – was the following: what Afghanistan needs is capacity. Capacity to govern. Capacity to fight corruption. Capacity to fight drugs. Capacity to fight the remaining warlords and insurgents. Capacity to develop.
• Since we last met in New York and Riga, there has been a growing awareness of the need for a comprehensive approach that brings military, political, development and humanitarian efforts together in a coordinated manner. The US has illustrated how this can be done.
• Afghanistan will need military support to create the conditions for development. That is what the ISAF mission is all about.
• But military action alone will not put Afghanistan back on track. Only good governance and real development will. And this works both ways – failing governance creates breeding grounds for recruitment of insurgents and military threats. The Afghans desperately need a framework for Afghan politics and a solid framework for the rule of law. Without such key elements of political and societal infrastructure, I fear everything else will derail.
• Norway’s military commitment to ISAF remains firm. We see our engagement –– which involves striving to get in-depth knowledge of the provinces where we have PRTs or other responsibilities – as a long-term engagement. We have no formal caveats, and we will adapt our presence in order to be as useful as possible. Our aim is to maintain our current troop level of about 550 soldiers. In addition Norway will increase its civilian assistance by more than 50%, to some 80 million dollars. This will make Afghanistan the second largest recipient of Norwegian development assistance.
• Militarily, 2007 may turn out to be as demanding as 2006. We must be prepared to meet the challenges wherever they may arise and prevent violence from spreading to other parts of the country. We must use the relative calm where it exists to demonstrate that there can be a “peace dividend”.
• To meet the challenges of 2007, there are some basic considerations that we should keep firmly in mind:
• • First, we must remain militarily prepared to deal with the insurgents wherever they are and prevent violence from spreading to other parts of the country.
  • Second, we must conduct military operations in a way which ensures the support of the Afghan population and of our own public opinion. We must do our utmost to minimise civilian casualties. If we – inadvertently – contribute to the recruitment of a military opposition in Afghanistan and political opposition in our member states, then the strength and sustainability of our efforts will suffer.
  • Third, as our military leaders have underlined, we must avoid a “body count” media policy, which is counterproductive in Afghanistan as well as in our own countries. Military presence alone, even with the friendliest of intentions and most accurate of mandates, cannot ensure development and governance.
  • Fourth, we, the international community, cannot win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Only the Afghan Government can. Our military engagement must therefore be conducted in a way that opens up sufficient space for an Afghan reconciliation process and for development under Afghan leadership.

• There is an urgent need to strengthen the ties between the democratically elected leadership in Kabul and the traditional structures across the country. We must therefore, in our military and civilian efforts, do our utmost to promote this process.
• I listened carefully to the advice of the most prominent Afghan representatives during my visit. And that advice was clear, and in fact quite similar to the advice of a number of our own military leaders: What we need is not more international troops, but better Afghan troops. We should all engage more forcefully in the training of the Afghan army and police. For our part we will double the number of police instructors in Afghanistan, and we welcome the establishment of a EU mission in this field.
• Norway has decided to put a special emphasis on capacity-building in the government administration in Kabul and in the provinces. We will do this by supporting the establishment and running of a Civil Service Institute and educational institutions to recruit personnel to the administration across the country on a permanent basis. We will also support the Afghan Government in developing the framework for exploiting their energy resources by offering Norwegian experts who have experience to share.
• I agree with the US that the UN should assume a stronger leadership role. We will support UNAMA in order to ensure closer humanitarian coordination out in the provinces as well. No other organisation can replace the UN in this leading role. The JCMB should be fully utilised. It is gradually gaining in authority, and the upcoming meeting in Berlin will be important. The roles of the co-chairs, the Afghan Government and the UN, should be given more prominence. This will meet two important objectives: strengthening the role of the UN and – even more important –underscoring the ownership and leadership of the Afghan Government in all our efforts.
• There is today much talk about “national caveats” in our military engagement – and for good reason. But there is little or no discussion about the “national caveats” that exist for civilian engagement. These caveats are very significant. They lead to waste and uncoordinated use of resources, and they hamper the crucial process of Afghanistan. We should all take a look at how we engage in order to remove or reduce such national restrictions. When strong international donors operate with significant national restrictions, then setting a clear Afghan agenda becomes very difficult.
• Finally, just a few words on Kosovo: As an Alliance, we urgently need to define our role post-status. Only NATO can ensure the stability required for the successful implementation of the status agreement. This has to be done in close cooperation with the EU. We have common strategic interests and should act accordingly. An informal dialogue is urgently required, and I would urge the Council to mandate the Secretary General to engage in such a dialogue with his EU counterpart as soon as possible.