Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. A Norwegian perspective

Many countries share our views and objectives on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. However, I would like to highlight the special relationship we enjoy with Germany in this field. We are working closely and constructively on these issues with our German partners in all international forums, including NATO, where we are actively engaged in reviving the Alliance’s emphasis on disarmament and arms control.

Elimination of weapons of mass destruction

A world free of nuclear weapons has been a longstanding objective of Norway’s foreign policy. Indeed, all parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty, as well as numerous civil society groups in nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike, are committed to this goal.

Much progress was made up until the 1990s. Since then, we have witnessed a nuclear renaissance despite the persistent threat of nuclear war and accidents and the growing risk of proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

North Korea has acquired nuclear weapons. So have India and Pakistan. There are deep uncertainties regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions. Israel’s “neither confirm nor deny policy” is not reassuring. And most nuclear weapon states are modernising their nuclear arsenal despite their obligation to reduce their dependence on, and eventually abolish, their nuclear arms.

It simply does not make any sense that, 20 years after the Cold War, there are more than 25 000 nuclear weapons in the world. A small fraction of these weapons would be sufficient to eliminate most life on earth.

Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons will require a reversal of the last year’s developments and a new commitment to nuclear disarmament. Fortunately, there are signs in many countries of a growing consensus, among politicians and the public alike, that global security will be enhanced by the elimination of nuclear arms and that the security of even the most powerful states will be better served in a world without nuclear arms.

I fully agree with what my friend and colleague Frank-Walter Steinmeier, German Minister of Foreign Affairs, said during the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2008. “Disarmament and arms control therefore belong right at the top of a new transatlantic agenda, alongside the major future topics of climate change and energy security”.

Later the same month I had the privilege of hosting an international conference on nuclear disarmament together with former Senator Sam Nunn and former Secretary of State George Shultz. The conference gathered some of the world’s leading experts on nuclear issues. There was remarkable consensus on the advisability of moving towards elimination of nuclear weapons. It was underlined that if we are to make progress, the personal engagement of national leaders is imperative; their leadership is needed in order to involve key stakeholders and build public support. The conference also agreed that taking disarmament seriously means that we must begin taking concrete steps in that direction.

Nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated overnight. There can be no fast track. Elimination will have to be a gradual process based on verified reductions over time.

At some stage we have to start discussing how to organise a post-nuclear weapon era. But our more immediate goal should be to achieve security and stability at a much lower level of nuclear armament. To this end, we should focus on the following steps:

Firstly, reduction in the number of nuclear warheads. Given the fact that the US and Russia possess more than 95 per cent of the world’s nuclear arsenals, they must take the lead. There have been considerable reductions since the end of the Cold War, but much still remains to be done. As a first step, the bilateral US-Russian START and SORT treaties need to be replaced by new binding agreements on further cuts in strategic nuclear arsenals. Other nuclear weapon states must follow suit.

Secondly, we must prevent any possibility of a new nuclear arms race. A legally binding and comprehensive ban on nuclear testing and on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes are essential tools in this respect. Agreements must be transparent and verifiable so that the international community can feel confident that no nuclear warheads are produced in secrecy.

Thirdly, we must reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in security policy. This could be done in a number of ways. Steps must be taken to reduce the operational status of deployed weapons in order to prevent accidental use. We should diminish the geographical scope of nuclear weapons by supporting the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones. We should encourage nuclear weapon states to provide assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, particularly states belonging to nuclear-free zones. We need to reassess the role of deterrence.

The deterrent role of nuclear weapons should also be discussed in NATO. Germany and Norway have sought to foster a candid discussion of this question in the Alliance. We hope that NATO will gradually reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and will advocate this approach in the broader discussion on NATO’s Strategic Concept.

Fourthly, the total elimination of nuclear weapons is dependent on a much more robust and credible non-proliferation regime than the one we have today. This will require expansion of the regime and closure of the current loopholes. Existing nuclear material must be secured, and assistance must be provided to countries that are not able to fulfil their non-proliferation obligations due to limited resources.

Fifthly, we cannot make genuine progress on non-proliferation unless we can ensure that all NPT states have the opportunity to benefit from nuclear energy and technology. The right to peaceful use must not undermine our non-proliferation efforts, nor our efforts to ensure human safety and protect the environment.

One way of accommodating peaceful use in connection with non-proliferation is through multilateral cooperation on handling the whole nuclear fuel cycle. As a first step, we should set up a fuel bank under IAEA auspices to ensure supply of nuclear fuel to all bona fide NPT states. This might discourage a number of countries from building their own fuel production capacity, which is both expensive and, more importantly, could increase proliferation. Norway will contribute USD 5 million to such a fuel bank and is engaged in building broad international support for this initiative.

There is no ban against nuclear weapons. But for most nations of the world, an effective prohibition is already in place in the form of the NPT.

We marked the 40th anniversary of the NPT in July this year. The treaty has served us well. It has saved us from the frightening scenario of a world with several dozen nuclear weapon states. It has enabled non-nuclear weapon states to benefit from civilian nuclear applications. It has committed nuclear weapon states to disarm.

Despite its solid record, the NPT is under growing strain. There are a number of reasons for this highly unfortunate state of affairs. There can be no doubt that the current outstanding proliferation challenges are a major factor. It is furthermore deplorable that so many countries are failing to take the appropriate steps to sustain the global non-proliferation regime. Finally, there is a widespread perception that the nuclear weapon states have not delivered on their disarmament commitments.

The path towards a nuclear weapon free world is difficult. We cannot make progress unless we are able to define common ground among the nations of the world.

Such consensus has been lacking for too long. Norway is working actively through the Seven-Nation Initiative on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to build bridges over past differences and to define the elements that could form a new international consensus. The other countries taking part in this Initiative are Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Romania, South Africa and the UK, i.e. countries from all the regional and political groupings in the world.

If the countries in the Seven-Nation Initiative can reach agreement on key steps, that would greatly facilitate consensus building on a larger scale.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must go hand in hand. Norway will continue its strenuous efforts to implement Security Council resolution 1540 and to persuade all other countries to follow suit. We will also continue our commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives such as the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the EU strategy in the same area, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Although biological and chemical agents are generally considered to be of less military utility, the prospects of terrorist groups using such materials are frightening. Norway will therefore continue to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and promote its universal ratification. We will also continue our efforts to ensure full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention by all states parties.

Conventional arms control and disarmament 

However, most of those killed or wounded in modern wars and armed conflict are victims of conventional weapons, particularly small arms and other light weapons, landmines and cluster munitions. The vast majority of these victims are civilians.

The overwhelming share of global military spending is on conventional weapons and equipment. In many cases, the trade in such weapons – particularly small arms – is very poorly controlled and often veiled in secrecy and lack of transparency. This paves the way for corruption, crime, violent conflict and war. In turn, this is hampering social and economic development.

Therefore an important motivation for disarmament is to reduce human suffering by contributing to good governance and redirecting military expenditure to more productive areas.

This is disarmament as humanitarian action. International treaties in the field of humanitarian disarmament will further enhance regional and global cooperation and strengthen international law.

For all these reasons, Norway is a strong supporter of arms control and disarmament accords. We are working towards our disarmament objectives through a number of global and regional organisations.

Foremost among these are the UN, NATO and the OSCE. In all these forums we work closely with countries that share our mind-set and ambitions, such as Germany. To an increasing degree, we are seeing that it can be useful to cooperate more closely with countries that belong to other regional or political constellations. We are doing this through the Seven-Nation Initiative, as I mentioned above.

The UN is the world’s most important normative organisation. This also applies to arms control and disarmament.

We should therefore place great emphasis on strengthening the UN’s role as regards both norms and specific measures in this area. Norway wants the Security Council to retain its authority in the area of arms control, and to give it more visibility, but we would also like to see the General Assembly playing a stronger role.

We believe that the best way to enable the General Assembly to play the key role originally envisaged for it is to reach agreement on specific disarmament and non-proliferation measures.

During our chairmanship of the UN First Committee in 2006, Norway’s main priority was to improve the committee’s effectiveness and efficiency. I believe that discussions in the First Committee today are more focused and consensus-oriented than they used to be.

It is clear that the work of the UN Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament is not satisfactory. These two UN bodies used to play important roles in achieving broad-based agreement on important arms control issues.

It is totally unacceptable that they have been obstructed in their efforts in recent years by a small number of countries. Such methods are damaging both to the UN and to global disarmament efforts. 

Some of the most successful disarmament accords are regional in nature. The 1992 Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe has played a key role in safeguarding stability in post-Cold War Europe. For Norway, the so-called flank limitations have been of particular importance, both in military terms and as confidence-building measures.

The CFE Treaty, in its adapted version, should continue to be a cornerstone of European security in the future. Norway therefore deeply regrets the unilateral Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty. At a time when there is increased tension between the Russian Federation and the West, the CFE Treaty is more important than ever. Neither the Vienna Document of 1999 nor the Open Skies Treaty of 2002 can compensate for the suspension of the CFE Treaty. I therefore urge Russia to return to the negotiating table so that we can find a mutually acceptable solution.

Ban on weapons that cause unacceptable human suffering

Certain types of conventional weapons have particularly serious humanitarian consequences. Ten years ago, attention was focused on the humanitarian- and development-related challenges posed by anti-personnel mines. Efforts in this field led to the Mine Ban Treaty, which was adopted in Oslo in 1997.

Norway will continue to actively promote and facilitate the fulfilment by all states parties of their obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. The Treaty is a key instrument for both disarmament and humanitarian efforts. It prevents human suffering and ensures assistance for many landmine victims.

Recently, the humanitarian agenda witnessed another landmark decision. In Dublin, on 30 May 2008, 107 states agreed to the Cluster Munitions Convention, thus fulfilling the commitment they made in Oslo the previous year.

The new convention prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. Separate articles in the Convention address assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles.

The Convention is a result of the Oslo process, an open process that was launched in 2006 and included states, civil society, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN. Countries like Norway and Germany engaged in cross-regional partnerships with affected countries and stockpilers, and achieved a result no one thought possible only a few years ago.

The Cluster Munitions Convention will be open for signature in Oslo in December 2008. It is our ambition that the Convention will be signed by more than 100 states to ensure rapid entry in to force. Now that the Cluster Munitions Convention has been established as the international norm, we expect that states that are not party to the Convention will also respect its norms and principles and refrain from using cluster munitions in the future.

International organisations and civil society played important roles during the processes leading to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Cluster Munitions Convention, alongside the states that took part in the negotiations. They are also essential actors in securing implementation of the conventions.

It is my belief that the engagement of civil society will be crucial if we are to overcome the huge challenges we face in our efforts to achieve both nuclear and conventional arms control and disarmament. This will be a vital step towards a world in which the security of countries, as well as individuals, is based more on international cooperation and international law, and less on fear and military force.