The new NATO

Translated from the Norwegian

After the Bucharest Summit. NATO’s centre of gravity has moved eastwards. In terms of both geography and policy. This is a challenge. But it also represents new opportunities for Norway.

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The end of the Cold War. I can remember in the early 1990s diplomats in Brussels saying that NATO was beginning to lose its raison d’être, its purpose. The Cold War was over. In fact it had been won; the Soviet Union had been dissolved, the Berlin Wall had been torn down.

But then the conflicts in the Balkans broke out, and the message from the countries that had been part of the former Soviet sphere of interest was clear: They wanted to join NATO and the EU. They wanted to safeguard their independence through the collective security provided by NATO and the economic and political community provided by the EU.

New members. The NATO Summit in Madrid in 1997 marked the first step towards giving the go-ahead signal to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. This decade, they have been followed first by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and then by Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria.

Then, at the Bucharest Summit last week, Albania and Croatia were added to the list. Macedonia will join as soon as the dispute over the country’s name has been resolved with Greece. The main discussion was on the way forward for Ukraine and Georgia. The message from NATO is clear. It is a question of when, not whether these countries can join the Alliance.

Collective security. The expansion has not altered the core principle of NATO: collective security. It rather underscores its importance. Any member that is threatened or attacked can expect the support of the whole of the Alliance.

Nevertheless, NATO’s identity has changed somewhat. There are two reasons for this.

Firstly, the concept of common security challenges altered with the end of the Cold War. We were no longer concerned about a major attack from the east. And today we are engaged in NATO’s first extensive operation in such a far away place as Afghanistan.

Secondly, NATO’s identity has changed through new members bringing their experiences of security issues into the Alliance’s discussions. For example, in the discussions on membership for Ukraine and Georgia, it was very clear how the recent history of these countries shaped their attitudes.

The new member countries are led by people who have experienced the Soviet period themselves. Some were in positions of responsibility at that time too, but have since changed direction and today speak out for western integration. Most were active in the opposition to the various communist regimes and are still marked by dramatic personal experiences.

Discussions with colleagues from these countries bring an important part of modern European history to light.

Russian dominance. These new member countries have a unshakable faith in NATO membership and in the importance of joining the EU. Their goal is to reinforce their position as independent states and to free themselves from what they see as Russia’s continued desire for dominance.

They believe that Russian leaders still consider their territories as a sphere of interest, and will take every opportunity to thwart these ambitions.
This is why these countries are such staunch supporters of Ukrainian and Georgian membership. And this is why they are so amenable to the US plans for a European missile defence system. It is not necessarily because they strongly believe in this idea, but because they welcome a US presence on their soil.

Forging agreement and building bridges. However, the differences between these countries and the other Western NATO members on this issue are not profound. NATO’s great strength is its ability to find positions that unite the Alliance and build bridges.

The NATO summit declarations bear witness to this tradition of consensus.  This was true for the Bucharest Summit also. All the member countries were able to agree on a declaration that leaves the door open for both Ukraine and Georgia.

Russian policy. At the same time we can see clear contrasts. The “oldest” European members have put the Soviet era behind them to a greater degree. They are developing new relations with a Russia that is undergoing major change. They are critical to the authoritarian tendencies in Russia, and they are frustrated over Russian policies in a number of areas that highlights that Russia is still “somewhere else”. But they are also looking for new channels of cooperation.

While they do not want to give Russia the right of veto on NATO decisions, they do want to listen more to Russia’s point of view.

Constructive cooperation. Here Norway finds itself in an interesting position – once again.

On the one hand, we have credible stories to tell of constructive cooperation with Russia. We have positive experience of our Barents cooperation. We have good, stable neighbourly relations with Russia. Developments in the High North will always allow room for challenging differences of interests.

Common challenges. There is a growing realisation that many of the tasks ahead will require closer cooperation with Russia, and that we are facing common challenges. For Norway, Russia is not part of the problem, but part of the solution. We are also developing our approach to Russia in cooperation with our Nordic neighbours.

We bring these points of view to discussions in NATO. We advocate further development of the NATO–Russia Council. We attach importance to involving Russia in the response to new security challenges that are far removed from the logic of the Cold War.

Realities have changed. On the other hand, NATO still has crucial security policy importance for Norway, just as it has for the new member countries. Meanwhile, for several of our allies in Western Europe, security policy realities have completely changed since 1989.

This is not the case for Norway. Our geographical situation as a neighbour to a large and not entirely predictable Russia has not changed. Neither has our responsibility for ensuring stability and predictability in large sea areas. The natural resources in the High North are gaining increasing importance. And they are attracting increasing attention from other countries too.

Cooperation and security. Therefore certain principles stand firm for Norway. NATO membership gives us security, ensures that our backs our covered, and provides a firm anchorage, including in our neighbourly relations with Russia. We seek cooperation in the High North, with Russia, with our Nordic neighbours and with other European and North American partners.

However, we will resist any attempts by other countries to establish an exclusive right to exert an influence through their geographical position or political or military power.
Individual freedom. Russia has taken a negative view of NATO’s expansion from the start. From the perspective of history, we can understand this.

But it is also crucial that every country is free to choose its own alliances. This is the same freedom that Norway exercised in 1949, when we took part in the formation of NATO.

In Russia’s interests too. We must work towards a gradual normalisation of relations between NATO and Russia. The expansion of NATO has resulted in a noticeable stability in the former Eastern bloc countries and Central Europe.

This is also in Russia’s interests. Several of the new member countries have indicated that their relations with Russia are on the way to becoming “normal”, not despite of, but because of, their membership of NATO. This is a situation that we recognise ourselves.

So one of NATO’s tasks is to further develop its consensus, including developing a relationship with Russia that is appropriate to these new times. Norway has an important role to play here.