Opening address at the workshop Biological Weapons Convention and global health

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Dear friends,

I am very happy to see such a great number of experts on arms control and on global health – from some thirty countries and international organisations – gathered here in Oslo. Welcome to you all.

At first glance, the theme of our workshop might seem a bit strange to the casual observer. What does arms control have to do with promoting health? How do these two agendas come together? What could possibly be the common ground?

The simplest answer is that both communities share a common agenda for promoting human security and safety. Because health is our first line of defence – if the worst should happen.

These topics are now highly relevant. On Monday (15 June) I attended the UN Secretary-General’s forum on advancing global health in the face of crisis in New York and later that day I launched the 2009 report of the Global Campaign for the Health Millennium Development Goals Leading by Example – Protecting the most vulnerable during the economic crisis.

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a normative and legal barrier against the use of biological agents as weapons, disease used as a means of warfare. From my time in the WHO I know that the global health community aims– at reducing the general biological risk to human health, no matter what the origin of the risk or possible intent involved.

As such, this crossroads is a perfect example of the kind of interconnectedness between global health and foreign policy that my six colleagues from Brazil, France, Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa and Thailand and I drew attention to when we launched the Foreign Policy and Global Health Initiative here in Oslo in 2007. We then met at the UN General Assembly in 2008 and we’ll meet again this year.

Not only is health fundamental to economic growth and development, a link that seems all the more relevant in today’s critical economic situation – the financial crisis – in many countries around the globe. Threats to health could also compromise a country’s stability and security. Health emergencies can bring already fragile political situations to a breaking point. Outbreaks of animal and plant diseases can have devastating economic and social effects. As I said, health is our first line of defence.

This is of course one of the reasons why the Biological Weapons Convention is of such fundamental importance, not only from a socioeconomic and humanitarian point of view, but also in a security perspective.

But of course the equation works the other way as well: when we seek to deepen our cooperation to strengthen disease surveillance and promote health security – as is called for in the Convention's Article X – we strengthen the health systems that protect our societies against human, animal and plant diseases. – Again: our first line of defence.

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In other words, our foreign policy strategy includes promoting global health. Should biological weapons ever be used, disease surveillance would be our means of detection and damage assessment. Against biological weapons, well-resourced and effective health, veterinary and agricultural systems are our only effective line of defence, our protection.

The Foreign Policy and Global Health Initiative – which I stood behind – challenges the traditional habit of slicing politics into separate pieces.

Important insights on the causes and consequences of our political actions elude us if we focus exclusively on one piece and fail to see the puzzle as a whole. Globalisation and increased interdependence among nations add to the urgency of broadening our traditional views of foreign and security policy.

The message has been heard. The G8 have devoted increasing attention to global health in recent years. Last fall, 50 countries joined together in the UN General Assembly to pass a resolution on global health and foreign policy. ECOSOC has devoted a series of regional and thematic sessions as well as this summer’s annual ministerial review to health.

Our workshop here today is yet another way of exploring the links between health and security.

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Indeed, the arms control community should also be an active player in the field of health security.

Some might of course ask what added value this community could bring. Let us be frank: we all know that multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation have been struggling for more than 10 years. In the field of nuclear weapons, we even refer to the lost decade.

At the same time, we have seen recent developments that spell real progress, and most interestingly with respect to disarmament motivated by the concerns for human life and health.

A landmark event took place here in Oslo in December last year when we adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions – and it was signed by nearly 100 States Parties. The new Convention prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of cluster munitions. It also deals with assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles of weapons that have no justifiable use today.

Like the Mine Ban Convention ten years ago, the new Convention clearly demonstrates that multilateralism should not be dismissed as an academic pursuit of negotiators and technical specialists.

Multilateralism – if we really put it to work – is a real world tool for achieving results that make a difference in the everyday lives on people around the globe.

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Indeed, the BWC itself has contributed by setting a new tone in multilateral arms control diplomacy. A period of highly polarised – and so far futile – negotiations on a protocol to further strengthen the Convention came to a temporary end in 2001. Instead, the States Parties agreed – as you know – on a pragmatic intersession work programme focusing on selected topics.

Truth be told, expectations were not very great as to what would come out of this exercise. Stalemates have a discouraging effect.

However, in our view, the work programme exercise has in fact proved very useful. The BWC Review Conference two and half years ago successfully adopted an improved work programme. The BWC showed that it was possible to put aside past differences and focus on areas where State Parties could unite in constructive ways.

We are now in the midst of implementing the work programme. One of the main topics last year was biological safety and security. In June 2008, Indonesia, together with the Implementation Support Unit of the BWC and Norway, organised a regional workshop for South East Asia in Jakarta. The workshop drew on lessons from a cooperative effort between Indonesia and Norway on safety and security measures for advanced laboratories and worked to the benefit of the BWC process at large.

Today, there is a real sense of new optimism with respect to multilateral disarmament also in general terms, and a sense of hope that the progress achieved in the field of humanitarian disarmament can be matched in other areas of arms control as well. We should therefore not become too cynical.

We see encouraging prospects of a positive conclusion of the 2010 Review Process of the NPT, of creating real movement towards the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.

And those of us who follow these things recognised that the diplomatic equivalent of a true miracle took place in Geneva some weeks ago when the Conference on Disarmament, after more than 10 years of persistent inaction, reached agreement on a work programme!  

This new, positive and inspirational atmosphere should also have an impact on the BWC. The BWC and the 1925 Geneva Protocol have set fundamental norms against using disease as a means of warfare. The Convention contains clear legal obligations to not develop, produce, stockpile or transfer biological agents for hostile purposes. There are also clear legal obligations with respect to stockpile destruction.

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Thus, the BWC is an essential instrument in moving forward towards a world without weapons of mass destruction.

But – as we all know – any international convention is – and only will be – as strong as the political energy supporting it. Complacency and indifference will undermine the BWC norm. So we must ensure that all provisions of the Convention are fully implemented, not least with respect to Article X on promoting the fullest possible cooperation in life sciences.

We know that there have been differing views on Article X in the past. There is a widespread perception that the aspirations of developing countries to benefit from development, advances and discoveries in the biological sciences have been held hostage to the non-proliferation agenda of industrial nations.

These perceptions should be recognised, but from my perspective there is no reason why the needs of the developing countries and very legitimate non-proliferation concerns should not be reconcilable. This is simply not a zero sum game. We all stand to gain from improved non-proliferation efforts at national level.

Likewise, we all gain from enhanced international cooperation in combating disease and limiting biological risk. Indeed, extensive and transparent international cooperation is quite indispensable in this effort. – As we see now when combating a global flu epidemic.

 The BWC is part of a broad political partnership for promoting global health. As was also clearly stated at the last review conference, the BWC should note the role of other agencies, such as the WHO, FAO and the OIE. These are the bodies that survey and combat disease on a daily basis, to the benefit of the health and security of us all. We are very glad to see these indispensable bodies represented here today at this workshop.

The point is that the BWC must not seek to duplicate the efforts of other institutions, but rather contribute to developing new synergies and building stronger partnerships. I both hope and expect that this workshop will contribute to this end. – Thank you, and again welcome to Oslo.