Address to the Storting on the situation in Afghanistan and Norway’s civilian and military engagement in the country

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Mr President,

Over the years, we have established a broad common platform for Norway’s policy on Afghanistan on the basis of addresses to the Storting and parliamentary debates.

This has been of benefit to Norway, and to our military and civilian personnel serving in Afghanistan. And it has given the Norwegian authorities a better opportunity to state our views clearly and demonstrate our commitment internationally, in Afghanistan itself, and within the UN and NATO.

Part of this common platform consists in developing our understanding of the challenges we are facing, i.e. our understanding of a conflict that a unanimous UN Security Council has repeatedly referred to as a threat to regional and international peace and security.

Before I speak about the focus of Norway’s engagement in the time ahead, I would therefore like to start, Mr President, by outlining some of the main elements that make up this understanding following last autumn’s presidential election in Afghanistan, the adjustments made to the US strategy for Afghanistan and the recent international conference on Afghanistan in London.

Mr President,

It goes without saying that our understanding of the many challenges in Afghanistan cannot be static.

The picture is complex, and it is a challenging task to identify new trends and new realities – whether political, social, military or strategic – and then allow them not only to shape our own understanding of the situation and our strategy, but also to influence the direction of the multinational engagement of which Norway is a part.

Nevertheless, there are some fundamental considerations that shape our understanding of the challenges facing us at the start of 2010. I would like to touch on ten of them here today.

First, the purpose of Norway’s presence in Afghanistan is to promote social and economic development in the country and stability in the region. We will help to build Afghan capacity to provide security and development, and we intend to strengthen the UN’s coordinating role.

Our aim is to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base for international terrorism.

Afghanistan must therefore be further stabilised. Social and political nation-building and state-building in Afghanistan are not merely goals in their own right; they are measures to make the country more stable and eliminate the threat not only to Afghan children, women and men, but also to the international community, of which Norway is a part.

Second, there is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. All complex conflicts are unique, but taking a historical perspective, it seems reasonable to assert that virtually no other comparable conflict has been resolved by military means alone. A political solution must therefore be found. And it must be firmly rooted in Afghan society.

Third, a military presence will be necessary on the way towards a political solution. Not just as a means of resolving the conflict, but to provide sufficient security to create a space in which political and economic development are possible, and to make it clear to the insurgents that they will not be able to achieve a military victory.

If the military presence is to help create the space required for finding a political solution, a lot will hinge on the conduct of the military forces. The Afghans must perceive the military presence as a source of security, not fear.

Fourth, the Afghans must take the lead in finding a political solution that embraces all parts of Afghan society – in all its complexity – and addresses the relations between Afghanistan and its neighbours in the region. This is why Afghan political reconciliation and reintegration processes will be so critical in the time ahead, as was underscored at the international conference on Afghanistan that was held in London on 28 January this year.

Fifth, the Afghans must take the lead both as regards their own security and as regards economic and social development. Decades of experience of development assistance have taught us that the key to progress is capacity-building: the recipients must be enabled to continue projects and initiatives on their own.

Therefore, as contributors of development assistance, we must to a greater degree assist, and to a lesser degree do. We must be very careful that we do not replace the very Afghan solutions we are trying to promote. Instead, we must support them, which in some cases means stepping aside and accepting that the Afghans do things in their own way.

Sixth, we cannot look at Afghanistan in isolation. It is crucial for the stability of the country that the region is stable as well, and that Afghanistan and its neighbours strengthen regional cooperation and together take a lot more responsibility for ensuring stability in the region.

Seventh, we need to be aware of some of the long lines that run through Afghanistan’s past to understand where the country is coming from, and what we can realistically expect when the Afghans exercise one very important right – the right to govern themselves.

We will, however, stress the importance of the country’s obligation to uphold fundamental human rights. But we must realise that also in future the Afghans may make decisions and hold values that are alien to us, and that we may in some cases find downright unacceptable.

Eighth, we take a long-term perspective on our engagement in Afghanistan. But our military presence will last no longer than what is strictly necessary. It can be scaled down gradually as Afghan forces become increasingly able to take responsibility for the country’s security. The course has been set for such a transfer of responsibility. But it is impossible to indicate an exact date.

We are now in the transitional phase  of transferring full responsibility to the Afghans. Norway is not acting alone or unilaterally. We entered into this together with our allies, and the pace and manner in which we scale down and terminate our military presence will be coordinated with our allies and the Afghan authorities.

Ninth, in our debate we must take account of the complexity that will always characterise Afghanistan. In the international media, it is the insurgent attacks that dominate the news. They are indeed serious, and are increasing in number. They are also killing more people. These include military personnel, also Norwegians, but the largest numbers of fatalities are among Afghan civilians.

Part of the insurgents’ strategy is the use of spectacular attacks to create a sense of chaos. To a certain extent, the increase in the number of incidents is explained by the fact that the scope of the military presence has increased. Now that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan security forces are more effectively present in more parts of the country compared with a few years ago, their contact with insurgent groups has also increased. But an increase in the number of incidents does not necessarily mean that the situation of the Afghan population has deteriorated.

However, Mr President, we must not forget that there is also another picture of Afghanistan – one that does not show chaos, but considerable progress in the living conditions of millions of Afghans.

We should not attach too much importance to surveys, but it may come as a surprise that according to a reliable opinion poll conducted in January for the BBC, among others, 70% of Afghans consider the country to be moving in the right direction, as compared with 40% one year ago.

And tenth, there is one more thing that must form part of our understanding of the country and determine our approach to all aspects of the Afghan challenge: the effectiveness of the fight against insurgency, terrorism and instability is closely linked to the quality of the government we choose to support.

We need to achieve a more reciprocal partnership. One where on the one hand, we who are contributing from outside can hold the Afghan leadership accountable for improving governance, fighting corruption, curbing the power of the drug lords and promoting reconciliation among Afghans. On the other hand, the lawfully elected Afghan authorities must be able to hold us, i.e. those who are contributing from outside, responsible for improving donor coordination, respecting civilian lives and accepting the fact that the Afghans deal with their conflicts of interest in their own way, not as dictated by outsiders.

Mr President,

This is the backdrop to the assessment we are now making as regards Norway’s further efforts in Afghanistan.

We are responsible for the strategy for our own efforts. However, our strategy must fit into a broader strategy for the UN, ISAF and NATO. And our efforts must be aligned with priorities set by the Afghans.

A number of issues have been clarified in the course of the past six months – most recently at the London Conference, where the Afghan authorities and the international community agreed on a common map for the way ahead.

Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that the operation in Afghanistan is among the most complex imaginable. This is both because the task at hand in Afghanistan is complex in itself and because it involves a partnership between dozens of participating countries. At the same time, it is a process in which global and regional powers are positioning themselves in a larger strategic picture, in which they see the task in Afghanistan as one element.

We have had to redraw our map to reflect changes in the terrain. That is to say that we have been forced to adjust our strategy in response to negative developments on the ground. The security situation has deteriorated over the past few years. Humanitarian organisations and aid workers also find the situation more difficult.

We note that the Taliban and other insurgent groups are gaining strength, and we have seen an increase in the number of attacks, including in Kabul. ISAF has been subject to more attacks, and more soldiers have been killed in the past few years than previously.

We must honour the memory of the Norwegian soldiers who have lost their lives in Afghanistan: Claes Joachim Olsson, on 25 January this year; Trond Petter Kolset, in April 2009; Kristoffer Sørli Jørgensen, in November 2007, Tor Arne Lau-Henriksen, in July 2007; and Tommy Rødningsby, in May 2004.

The Afghan security forces are also suffering losses. But as in all armed conflicts, the civilian population is hit the hardest. Afghanistan is no exception. We see that many insurgent attacks are deliberately targeted at civilians.

We must ask ourselves, Mr President, what are the causes of this development? Once again, the picture is complex.

First, the Taliban and other insurgent groups have become stronger in military terms. They have the ability and capacity to carry out operations in large parts of the country, including in the north. The Taliban has established parallel power structures in most provinces.

However, there are few indications that a majority of Afghans would prefer a return to Taliban rule.

Let me add that the very term “Taliban” is a catch-all. Much of the insurgent activity we are now seeing is inspired and led by the Taliban leadership that ruled the country up to 2001. But insurgent activity is also being carried out by groups that are either independent of or only loosely connected with the Taliban. And then there are insurgent forces that are rooted in Afghanistan’s intricate fabric of ethnic and clan-based conflicts, and then again there are some that are motivated by crime.

It is essential that we take on board this complexity. Reducing the insurgence to one single enemy is an oversimplification of the Afghan reality we are dealing with.

Second, the insurgent forces have changed their tactics. They are increasingly employing roadside bombs, suicide bombers and complex attacks.

This is a type of warfare where the prime objective is to demonstrate the ability to launch attacks, even if there is no immediate political or territorial gain. Whereas in 2004 there were about 300 such attacks, in 2009 the number had risen to more than 7000. In other words, the tactical objective of the insurgent groups is not necessarily to capture territory from the government forces or ISAF, but rather to chip away at support for the government and to demonstrate their own strength.

Third, Afghanistan’s governance structures are still in the making. They are weak and lack the ability to exercise control and influence, particularly in the provinces and the rural districts.

Last year’s presidential election, which was marred by irregularities, contributed to undermining confidence in President Karzai and his government. Still, we should note that it was in part Afghan monitoring bodies that uncovered the irregularities and demanded a second round of voting. This shows that independent institutions are beginning to gain a foothold in the country.

Fourth, there are clear signs of economic improvement, but many Afghans feel that economic and social progress is too slow.

The Afghans, who have been through 30 years of war, expect the extensive international engagement to deliver tangible results. The slow rate of progress is due to the vast scale of the needs in the country, which is the fifth poorest in the world, as well as to the Afghan authorities’ lack of capacity, corruption and the fact that the international efforts are still being hampered by conflicting interests and insufficient coordination.  

But as mentioned, Mr President, The picture is not all black; there are also glimmers of light: Images of girls with satchels on their way to school. Images of well-functioning health clinics. Images of the country’s security forces taking responsibility for the Afghan population and dealing with violence in the towns. Images of young Afghans, imbued with faith in a better future, creating new arenas for political debate.

When I last visited Afghanistan, in November, I met civil society activists who believed there were grounds for cautious optimism.

Slowly but surely, Afghanistan is being rebuilt. We need to bear this in mind, as we have done in previous reviews of the situation in Afghanistan here in the Storting. Let me give you some more examples:

More than half of all Afghan children now attend school, and almost half of all young people between the ages of 15 and 19 can read and write. This corresponds to around seven million children, compared with two million just a few years ago.

One quarter of all women in Afghanistan now receive assistance from healthcare personnel during childbirth. Not long ago, only 16% received medical assistance. Today, 95% of all children under the age of five have been vaccinated.

A nationwide survey has shown that 61% of people in Afghanistan now believe that their children will have a better life than they themselves have had.

Agriculture is the most important source of income, and the number of Afghans who have access to arable land rose by eight percentage points, to 55% during the period 2005–2008. This increase is mainly due to improved irrigation systems.

Infrastructure is crucial for economic development. Work on the ring road that connects virtually all parts of Afghanistan will soon be completed. A railway line is under construction between Herat and Iran, and several other large projects are under way.

More than 70% of the population of Afghanistan live in the immediate vicinity of transport arteries. According to a survey, more than half of all households are of the opinion that the condition of roads has improved in recent years. Better roads mean easier access to health services and markets.

In 2005, 23% of the Afghan population had access to electricity, compared with 42% today. 

As far as general security is concerned, 80% of those asked in a survey commissioned by UNDP described the security situation where they lived as good.

The elections in 2009 were marred by fraud and manipulation. Nevertheless, many Afghans, including women, defied the insurgents and chose to cast their vote. We saw that election campaigns were held in much of the country, with far better media coverage and more open debates than before. The public arena has expanded, and debates have become freer.

Here it may be added that developments in 2009 have also brought Afghanistan a step further in terms of building democratic political institutions. The Afghan parliament has taken a more proactive role, as we saw in January, when it rejected many of President Karzai’s cabinet nominees.

A number of formerly bitter opponents are today choosing to work in accordance with the political rules of a democratic political system. This is an important step forward for the war-torn country.

Mr President,

The main tasks of the UN in Afghanistan include building up public institutions, supporting political reform processes and coordinating civilian efforts.

Once again I would like to point out that the UN state-building efforts in the country started too late. Together with some of the decisions that were made during the Bonn Conference in 2001 concerning the Afghan system of government, this is one of the obvious mistakes of the past that we have carried with us. In retrospect it is easy to see that crucial years in the work to secure a stable Afghanistan were lost because the international effort was far too fragmented in the beginning and because there was far too little focus on civilian and political needs.

But the London Conference showed that the international community has the will and ability to look ahead. UN Special Representative Kai Eide has put a great deal of work into making the UN engagement more focused and effective – and into strengthening essential political contact between the UN and the Afghan authorities. He is rightly gaining recognition for his work to strengthen civilian coordination, and he deserves our praise as his two-year term now nears its end.

However, the UN is encountering ever greater challenges on the ground, and the organisation is struggling to secure the resources and personnel it needs to fulfil its role as lead coordinator. It was therefore decisive that the UN General Assembly approved a 60% increase in the budget for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on 24 December last year. Norway has played an active role in this respect, and will continue to exert pressure on the UN Secretariat to fill the vacant positions quickly, so that UNAMA gains the tools it needs to coordinate the international efforts together with the Afghan authorities.

But, as always, the UN will never be better than its member states make it. Norway has sought continuously to strengthen UN coordination of international efforts in Afghanistan, and to ensure the best possible coordination with the Afghan authorities. This is an approach we will continue to pursue.

The parliamentary election is now due to take place on 18 September 2010. If this election is to have legitimacy and people are to support democracy, it is important that reforms are implemented before the election and that the lessons learned from the presidential election are taken into account. We support the efforts to secure the independence of the election commission. This is essential if we are to be sure that future elections are free and fair, without the sort of irregularities we saw last year. The UN will play a crucial role by providing technical support for the Afghan electoral institutions.

Mr President,

The international conference in London had as its motto “Afghan Leadership, Regional Cooperation, International Partnership”. The conference clearly showed that we are now entering a new phase where two things in particular will be important: first, establishing a political process; and second, organising efforts in such a way that the Afghan authorities can take greater responsibility for the country’s security and economic development. This is positive, and it is in line with an approach that Norway has advocated for a long time.

As far as the first point, the political process, is concerned, President Karzai proposed starting a peace and reconciliation process. He also announced plans for a “peace jirga”, or assembly of elders, in which leaders of all tribes and ethnic groups will take part. This is important, and it is an attempt to include the groups that were not included in the 2001 Bonn process, for instance key Pashtun groups.

The international community should support a peace and reconciliation process, but the Afghans themselves should take the lead. It must be their responsibility to find Afghan solutions that are in keeping with the country’s constitution. The process must include all groups that make up Afghan society.

UNAMA and the Afghan authorities have also proposed reviewing what is known as the “1267 List”, or “Consolidated List”, a sanctions list of Taliban members and others, as a confidence-building measure ahead of the forthcoming political process.

In order to support the peace and reconciliation process, a new reintegration programme and fund were presented at the London Conference. The international community pledged to contribute a total of around USD 140 million for this purpose. Norway is positive to the intentions underlying this initiative, but has so far not pledged its support. Moreover, we would like to know more, for example about how the fund will be organised.

The other main theme in London was strengthening the Afghan authorities, both civil and military. As far as security is concerned, President Karzai implied that they would be able to take over responsibility for the country’s security in the course of the next two to three years. This will be a demanding task. NATO is now considering the criteria for such a handover of responsibility.

On the civilian side, too, there was greater awareness that international efforts must to a greater extent focus on channelling support through Afghan budgets, and on capacity-building and improved governance, so that the assistance is more effective. These are views that Norway has advocated for a long time, and we will seek to keep them high on the international agenda.

The London Conference also had a clear focus on anti-corruption. President Karzai made it plain that this will be his main priority in the time ahead. The Government has presented an anti-corruption strategy that proposes strengthening the High Office of Oversight, which will have the authority to carry out investigations, and setting up a panel of independent experts to draw up benchmarks for progress.

Conferences – such as the one in London – create obligations, but history has shown that conferences are not sufficient to change the direction of Afghanistan’s development. The Afghan authorities bear the main responsibility for achieving the results that were promised in London in January. This is the only way of ensuring that the process has the necessary legitimacy, that there is a sense of national ownership, and that development is sustainable.

However, the Afghan authorities have the right to demand that the international community align its assistance more closely with Afghan priorities, and they have grounds for doing so. A persistent problem is that only 10–20% of international civilian support is directed through Afghan channels, and that the remaining aid is allocated according to donor priorities to a greater extent than Afghan priorities.

Mr President,

General McChrystal’s (COMISAF) assessment of ISAF’s military strategy has won the approval of NATO and the ISAF partners. General McChrystal recommends stepping up both civilian and military efforts to ensure that the Afghan authorities will be able to take over responsibility for the country’s security.

President Obama has endorsed the main recommendations in COMISAF’s assessment, and the US troop build-up in Afghanistan has begun. The US presence in the country is being strengthened with the addition of more than 30 000 troops. In the months ahead, most of these will be deployed to the southern and eastern parts of the country, but there will also be a build-up of US troops in the north, which will provide opportunities for closer cooperation between Norway and the US. The main tasks of the forces will include protecting the civilian population and strengthening the capacity of the Afghan security forces.

This is also a key part of ISAF’s strategy. Today, Afghan army units participate in as much as 70% of planned ISAF operations, and they lead half of these. This is a sign of increased Afghan capacity, which is now being developed further.

At the last meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) in Kabul, the Afghan authorities received the Board’s endorsement for increasing the number of soldiers in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the number of police officers in the Afghan National Police (ANP) to a total of 305 600 personnel by October 2011. This decision gained widespread support at the London Conference. The US will cover the costs of this expansion of the Afghan security forces until the end of 2010, and NATO is now investigating what implications the expansion will have in terms of resources.

Norway’s efforts will also focus to an increasing extent on capacity-building. This in itself is nothing new. For a number of years, Norway has given priority to training and providing advice and guidance in our efforts vis-à-vis the Afghan security and police forces. However, the focus of Norway’s military efforts and its efforts in the civil security sector will be shifted further towards training and guidance in the years ahead, in keeping with the guidelines set by NATO and ISAF.

As part of these efforts, the Government intends to propose a total allocation of NOK 660 million for the period 2010–2014 for training, advisory services and guidance for the Afghan security forces. The funding will be channelled via the two funds that have been set up for the ANA and the ANP. 

Mr President,

One of the major challenges in connection with engagements like this one in Afghanistan is ensuring that the civilian and military efforts function well and smoothly together. 

In the debate on civil-military coordination in Afghanistan, questions often arise about mandates, the distinction between civilian and military tasks, and the appropriate division of responsibility. A recurring question is to what extent military forces should be given tasks that involve what is quite clearly civilian assistance, such as delivering food or building roads.

We must uphold certain fundamental principles. Norway attaches importance to protecting the humanitarian space. This means that there are humanitarian tasks that should, as far as possible, be kept separate from political and military strategies. This applies in Afghanistan, just as it applies in other countries where we are engaged. All research and experience indicate that this approach gives the best results in the long run.

In a country like Afghanistan, the political loyalties of various groups have a tendency to shift. If we blur the distinction between civilian and military roles, i.e., if civilian assistance is earmarked for those who are on “our” side in the conflict, this linking of aid to one side in the military conflict can easily put recipients as well as aid workers and their organisations in danger.

This is also the rationale behind the division between our civilian and military efforts in Faryab province. Here, the military actors are responsible for security, while the civilian actors focus on social and economic development, but their efforts are closely coordinated. This principle is also central to the Government’s strategy for a coherent civil-military effort in Faryab province.

The distinction between the roles of civilian and military actors must be made clear. But this does not mean that their efforts cannot, or should not, be coordinated. We aim to have close cooperation ­­– but to avoid confusion. Norway has achieved a lot in this respect, and we will continue to develop this approach, which has also attracted the attention of the Afghan people, the Afghan authorities, and other donors.

Mr President,

Let me reiterate that one of the basic elements of our understanding as regards the way ahead in Afghanistan is that stability and peace must be secured by means of a broad political solution that as far as possible includes a number of the groups that are today categorised as insurgents.

Moreover, the initiative for a political reconciliation process must come from the Afghans themselves.

A survey conducted by the Asia Foundation shows that Afghans are more receptive to such political solutions today than they were a few years ago. This has been welcomed by the international community, as was underscored in London. 

A constructive reconciliation process is dependent on political agreement and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of insurgent groups. The aim must be that the insurgents, who are generally poor, unemployed Afghan men living in rural districts, find work or join the Afghan security forces.

This is a huge and demanding task. Having said this, such an approach has proved decisive in most of the reconciliation processes that have succeeded in the last few decades, whether in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East or the Balkans.

Here, too, we must bear in mind the complexity of Afghan society. There is no room for categorical distinctions between forces of “good” and “evil” in such reconciliation processes. The mental maps drawn by some following 9/11 must therefore be adjusted if we are to make progress in Afghanistan.

At the same time, we must respect the fact that many fear that a political agreement with insurgent groups would considerably strengthen the pre-2001 reactionary forces, and thus undermine the position of women and of human rights in general. This concern is not limited to parts of the Afghan population; it is shared by a number of countries in the region, which fear a return to Islamist rule in Afghanistan.

The process of reconciliation and the reintegration of the Taliban are clearly no easy task, but we have to realise what a heterogeneous alliance the Taliban is. It is often a matter of finding ways of integrating the Pashtun population into Afghan society. Should the Afghans opt for such reintegration, will not oppose it, as it is in keeping with our strategic objective, which is to prevent the country from once more becoming a base for terrorism and from remaining a source of regional instability.

However, we will make it clear that it is important to differentiate between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which is a group or network that has not had any deep ties to Afghanistan or to Afghan traditions, history or culture. The prospects of a genuine Afghan reconciliation process will be greatly enhanced the day leading elements within the Taliban break with al-Qaeda.

A successful reconciliation process is also dependent on political agreement among the Afghans on the importance of respect for the rights of women and children’s education. In efforts to find political solutions, particular importance must be attached to strengthening civil society and the position of women in Afghan society.

Women must be seen and heard, and the Afghan legal system must be strengthened in order to ensure the greatest possible degree of justice.

We have to realise that this may be difficult to envisage even for our partners in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is, and must continue to be, part of the international community, and what we are talking about are fundamental, universal values that can be neither overlooked nor negotiated away.

Mr President,

A solution for Afghanistan must also  involve a solution for the region that includes Afghanistan’s neighbours and ensures that they take responsibility for efforts to achieve stability.

The situation in Pakistan is particularly worrying in this connection. There has been a continuous string of terrorist attacks that have killed and maimed large numbers of civilians, undermining the central authorities and spreading instability. Therefore it is essential that the Pakistani civil and military authorities continue their efforts to limit the influence of groups that resort to violence and militancy.

Pakistan seems to be taking a wait-and-see attitude. Pakistani power structures are fighting their own insurgent groups, but appear reluctant to do anything about the cross-border activities of the Afghan Taliban in what they view as an unresolved power struggle between the Afghan Taliban and the Karzai Government and its international supporters.

This is an attitude that is shared by a number of actors in the region. They don’t necessarily want a Taliban-led Afghanistan, but they are awaiting the outcome of the Afghan conflict before pledging their full support to either side.

Mr President,

Last October, the Government initiated an internal review of Norway’s overall civil engagement in Afghanistan. This gives us a basis for setting clearer priorities in the areas where Norway possesses high-level expertise and where there are great needs.

Our main finding is that the areas currently prioritised by Norway generally coincide with areas where there are great needs, and that our strategy should be to continue our efforts in selected areas.

Many years’ experience has shown that, provided that we have acceptable means of monitoring the use of assistance and that there is agreement as to the actual needs, channelling assistance through multi-donor funds to Afghan budgets is the most cost-effective way of supporting Afghan priorities. This also helps to improve alignment with these priorities and strengthens the capacity and competence of those responsible for public financial management.

This also supports the development of an Afghan political system. If the Afghan people are to take their political institutions seriously, they must see that decisions taken by the parliament and the government are translated into action. As is the case in other countries, politics in Afghanistan is not least a matter of how public finances are managed. The international community has in fact helped to undermine this important connection between public finances and politics by channelling its support outside the Afghans’ own budgets for such a long time.

As I have already mentioned, about one fifth of the international assistance to Afghanistan is channelled via Afghan budgets today. This is a very small share.

Norway channels about 32% of its assistance to Afghan budgets through the World Bank Multi-donor Trust Fund, and 27% through various UN funds and programmes. In other words, around 60% of Norwegian assistance is provided via channels that take Afghan priorities into account.

The Government’s aim is to channel an increasingly greater share of our total assistance to Afghan budgets through the World Bank and UN multi-donor trust funds. This is also something the Afghan authorities have requested.

This increase will be contingent on the Afghan authorities’ ability to improve the efficiency of their financial management, reduce corruption and utilise the assistance.

However, this reveals a serious paradox. It seems that many donors are reluctant to give funds to Afghan institutions precisely because they fear corruption and inefficiency. This is understandable. But the result is that Afghan institutions remain weak, and we have a negative spiral that propels us away from sustainable solutions.

If the Afghan authorities meet the demands of the international community, the Government intends to complete this adjustment of our assistance channelled to Afghan budgets in the course of our current parliamentary term.

Norway gives particular priority to Faryab province, where the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is located, which currently receives approximately 15% of Norwegian assistance to Afghanistan. We will continue to work to ensure that Faryab receives a reasonable share of Afghan budgets, in keeping with Afghan national priorities.

So far Norway’s main priority areas have been education, good governance and rural development, as I noted in the interpellation debate here in the Storting on 17 November last year. One result of our internal review is that we have decided to focus our civilian engagement even more closely. We will also reassess our main priority areas, with a view to including higher education and energy among them.

We will also intensify efforts to support civil society and human rights work, including women’s participation in society.

With regard to civilian efforts in Afghanistan, and in terms of both the volume and the form of the assistance provided, we have promoted international donor coordination, channelled our assistance through multi-donor trust funds and aligned it with the Afghan authorities’ priorities. We have also made a distinction between civil and military roles and focused on women’s empowerment and participation. As regards our contribution to the Norwegian-led PRT, we have largely channelled our assistance through multi-donor funds and aligned it with Afghan priorities.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about some of the new priority areas.

The first is education. Afghanistan needs a better education system, and higher education is particularly important in order to ensure long-term development and a pool of qualified Afghans who possess the expertise needed to run the country.

Our starting point must be the country’s own long-term needs. This will involve training professionals who have the necessary expertise to develop various sectors in the public and private spheres.

Second, energy and resource management. This is an area where Norway is in a good position to make a difference. We have already provided Afghanistan with expert assistance in this field, and we intend to continue doing so.

Third, building a strong civil society is a prerequisite for the democratisation of Afghanistan. Civil society in Afghanistan is weak today. In the time ahead, Norway will support political processes and the building of open, public platforms for debate, which ensure freedom of expression and respect for the rule of law and which also support human rights defenders.

We have been clear and unequivocal in our support of Afghan civil society actors, and we will continue, and intensify, our efforts in this field.

The Nordic embassies in Kabul are participating in a pilot project on Nordic cooperation in the areas of civil society, women’s empowerment and human rights. In connection with this, we will establish a Nordic financial mechanism for supporting civil society, which will be in place in the course of the year. The project has attracted the interest of other international partners, and the British authorities have expressed a wish to participate in it.

Fourth, in order to put an end to poverty and war in Afghanistan, the influence and power of women in society must be strengthened. This is indicated by all comparative research. Together with the other Nordic countries, Norway will work actively to promote women’s participation in efforts to achieve the necessary economic development and stability in Afghanistan. The gender perspective will therefore be mainstreamed in all Norwegian support.

The fact is that war and conflict affect men and women differently. Norway was one of the sponsors of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. We have drawn up a separate action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council

Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security. In connection with our own implementation of the resolution, we have now assigned a gender adviser to the Norwegian military contingent in Faryab, who is to ensure that this perspective is taken into account in our military operations. We have also posted a gender adviser to ISAF headquarters in Kabul.

Combating corruption is an integral part of all Norwegian efforts. This applies not only to our own projects, but also to our work to strengthen international anti-corruption efforts.

Last but not least, Norway will continue to maintain a strong focus on humanitarian efforts, which in volume constitute approximately one fifth of our civilian efforts in Afghanistan. Our humanitarian efforts must be seen as part of our long-term engagement. Preventive measures and reconstruction are important parts of this work. At the same time there must be resources available for responding to crises and acute needs, for example drought.

Mr President, I would like to sum up this address by reiterating that the main strategic objective of Norway’s and our partners’ presence in Afghanistan is to prevent the country from once more becoming a base for international terrorism, and promote stability in the region and social and economic development in Afghanistan.