Historical archive

Pulling out, pushing on? Or just going home?”

Historical archive

Published under: Stoltenberg's 2nd Government

Publisher: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Panel debate, CMI in Bergen, 21 October 2010

Introduction by Jonas Gahr Støre, Minister of Foreign Affairs to a debate on Afghanistan and Pakistan at CMI in Bergen 21 October 2010.

Introduction by Jonas Gahr Støre, Minister of Foreign Affairs to a debate on Afghanistan and Pakistan at CMI in Bergen 21 October 2010.

Støre based his address on some of the following key points: 

 

  • Thank you for the invitation. Important forum and discussions taking place here.

  • Change and dynamism: Where are we in 10 months’ time?

  • The title “Pulling out, pushing on? Or just going home?” The challenge: Getting these things right. Enabling Afghanistan to run Afghanistan. When to withdraw.  

  • Challenging – because of a situation that is difficult to read, to interpret. What is the true situation? Risk of misreading events. 

  • I) Complexity: Transition. Afghan priorities (budget, money) and ownership.

     
  • Transparency. Human rights.

     
  • Mutual expectations.

     
  • Afghan leadership: with ISAF present/when ISAF has withdrawn.

     
  • Political solution. What is intended. What is needed. 

  • “An Afghanistan good enough is good enough”. What is good enough? 

  • II) Is a political solution sustainable? Fighting insurgency, corruption and other problems: Will never be better than the quality of the government we try to support.

     
  • Outreach. Does governance work?

     
  • Army – and government.

     
  • Fighting other people’s war.

     
  • Human rights situation.

              
  • Returning to: “An Afghanistan good enough”. Living with warlords. Political realities. The ethnic groups, the ethnic mix. 

  • Reconciliation. On the verge, different traditions, difficult tests.

     
  • III) Long term/short term. 

  • Military capacity, capacity building.

     
  • The discussion military/civil. Now paying the price for blurred lines. Well documented that so-called quick impact projects carried out by military forces rarely bring about stability or achieve what they set out to. 

  • Afghan police. 

  • IV) The region.