Debate on High North/Arctic strategies

Member of Parliament Mr Ivar Kristiansen (The conservative party):
“The Government considers the High North to be Norway’s most important strategic priority area. One of the aims of the Government’s High North strategy has been to raise international awareness about the High North. Over the past two years a growing number of actors have discussed the High North and developed their own High North/Arctic strategies, including the US, Russia, the EU, Denmark and Iceland. How does the Foreign Minister assess these strategies in relation to Norwegian interests and objectives for the use and protection of the Arctic, and what is his response to those who call for a clearer definition of what is covered by the High North concept?”

Check against delivery
Translated from the Norwegian

Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s main statement:
Mr President,

I would like to thank Mr Kristiansen for raising questions that have a bearing on important foreign policy trends in the High North, a geographical region that he no doubt knows well.

We enjoy broad consensus on the main features of the Norwegian High North strategy. The white paper on the High North presented by my predecessor Jan Petersen received widespread support. There has also been broad support for the increased emphasis the Stoltenberg Government has placed on the High North by defining the area as Norway’s most important strategic priority area, with associated strategies, action plans and allocations.

It is clear to us that a High North perspective must also include our parts of the Arctic region. This is, I believe, a new realisation. We must therefore take an interest in the management of the Arctic as a whole – a region that is now attracting growing attention in strategic terms. An Arctic region whose waters and transportation routes are becoming more open as a result of melting ice, and which is lying there as a link between continents. A region that has been mapped and that is partly under the jurisdiction of coastal states. A region whose resources are potentially vast, but which is also environmentally vulnerable and remains inaccessible due to harsh conditions, the polar night, ice, and great distances.
First, I would like to discuss the concept of the High North. It is quite true that in our High North efforts, the High North is not precisely defined in terms of geographical coordinates, nor is it limited to Norwegian areas. We can perhaps say that the High North is a political concept, a political definition: the northernmost part of Europe including the northern part of Norway, both large sea areas and populated areas of land.

Norway has important interests that are affected by developments in this area and in the Arctic region as a whole. Our efforts in the north must be seen in a geopolitical context, and therefore the terms “High North” and “Arctic” may well be partly overlapping. But in a Norwegian perspective, the term “High North” will usually refer to the northernmost parts of Norway and our neighbouring areas, i.e. north-western Russia and the counties in the Barents region, while it is more usual to use the term “Arctic” when the focus is on more specifically Arctic matters, for instance related to the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic Rim. But, as I have said, I do not believe a clear distinction is necessary. In strategic terms, all these areas are part of a broader, common framework. Although the Government’s High North efforts focus primarily on Norway’s northernmost areas and our cooperation with Russia, a number of the main priorities in the High North strategy are also important in our Arctic policy and in our contact with a whole range of countries.

Our foreign policy in the High North and the Arctic covers at least five dimensions:

• First: We will exercise our authority in the High North in a credible, consistent and predictable way.
• Second: We will be at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and about the High North.
• Third: We intend to be the best steward of the environment and natural resources in the High North.  We will pursue an active policy of value creation, as set out for instance in the report New Building Blocks in the North, presented by the Prime Minister in March 2009.
• Fourth: We will continue to promote peace and stability in the High North, and we will seek to strengthen our close bilateral and multilateral cooperation with relevant actors in the Arctic region – in the Arctic Council, in the Barents Cooperation, in the Nordic context and in other forums.
• Fifth: We will uphold international law and in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as the fundamental international legal framework for the Arctic Ocean and other Arctic areas.

As far as the last point is concerned, I would like to add that as early as 2007, Norway took the initiative to gather the Arctic coastal states – Norway, Denmark/Greenland, the US, Canada and Russia – for a meeting in Oslo to discuss the international legal framework for the Arctic Ocean. This meeting was followed up at ministerial level in Greenland in May 2008. The declaration from this meeting, the Ilulissat Declaration, sets out the principles that these coastal states will follow in order to meet the challenges relating to the Arctic Ocean. The key point of the declaration is the clear reference it makes to the extensive international legal framework, including the Convention on the Law of the Sea, that also applies to Arctic waters. As I have often stressed, both in Norway and abroad, it is important to realise that the Arctic Ocean, despite its somewhat mythical aura, is not an area that is not governed by law. It is an ocean, just like any other.

Our main task is therefore to develop policies and legislation that make full use of the existing international legal framework – precisely in order to address the opportunities and challenges of the ice-free Arctic Ocean of the future. It is neither necessary nor desirable to develop a new international legal regime, because the Convention on the Law of the Sea already gives us both rights and duties. These relate, for instance, to the requirement that natural resources are soundly managed in areas of sea under our jurisdiction.

As Mr Kristiansen has pointed out, we expect increased activity in the Arctic in the years ahead. This will require a greater Norwegian presence in the region, in the form of increased monitoring, improved search and rescue services and enhanced maritime surveillance systems. The Government is therefore strengthening Norway’s operative capacity, for instance by adding new frigates, not in response to any military threat, but as a way of exercising our authority in the High North in a credible, consistent and predictable way.

There is well-developed cooperation in the Arctic and the High North, both bilaterally, for instance through our High North dialogues, and multilaterally. As Mr Kristiansen has noted, the Arctic Council is the key international cooperation forum for discussing issues relating to the Arctic. The Government intends to continue its efforts in the Arctic Council, so that the Council’s position as international agenda-setter in questions relating to the Arctic can be further strengthened in the time ahead. The Arctic Council already plays a central role in political discussions and initiatives leading to binding decisions in international organisations such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The five Arctic coastal states cooperate closely in other forums too, such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. As far as our neighbouring areas are concerned, our extensive cooperation with Russia is particularly important. And as Mr Kristiansen has said, I will be having talks on this topic in Moscow tomorrow.

Clear rules, safe navigation routes, predictability and close cooperation are all crucial if we are to be able to avoid, or ease, any tensions over security policy that may arise as a result of the increased activity in the Arctic as it becomes more accessible. It is also important that a wider group of actors has a high level of awareness and sound knowledge of development trends in the Arctic. This is why I use and seek out opportunities to inform our allies, partners and other interested parties, both about broad trends and about more specific developments. This includes the larger strategic picture, for instance in relation to NATO, where we aim to inform and raise awareness among our allies about developments in the north, and thereby help to ensure that the alliance continues to have a realistic understanding of the situation.

Mr Kristiansen has raised various questions relating to the increased international focus on the High North and other countries’ strategies. In general, I would say that it is positive that other actors in international politics – states and organisations – are well informed about Norway’s interests, policies and strategies. Similarly, it is positive that other countries also express their views and ambitions. We therefore welcome the fact that other countries are presenting their strategies. Generally speaking, these strategies share two characteristics: firstly, they reflect the position of the individual states concerned – for instance, Canada’s strategy focuses on matters relating to the Northwest Passage. Secondly, we see a growing convergence of ideas on policy and law, for example an emphasis on the key role of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

In recent years we have engaged in active diplomacy in order to pursue a dialogue with other countries while they develop their High North strategies. In my view, we have made good progress in this respect. We started early, and our aim has been to be clear, dynamic and proactive. The fact that interest in the High North is growing is neither negative nor a threat; nor is it necessarily a source of conflict. But our aim must be to avoid any ambiguity with regard to the fundamental rules and conditions for cooperation. If such ambiguity were to develop, tensions could emerge due to greater activity, increasing focus on the region, and perhaps also heightened competition. It is therefore in Norway’s interests that other countries have also developed and considered their Arctic strategies. This helps to bring about a common mindset, up-to-date information, greater transparency, clarity and predictability.

There are, then, some clear common features in the strategies that have been presented. Allow me to mention a few of them now in closing. The most important common feature is that all the strategies attach decisive importance to international cooperation and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea for governance of the Arctic. Further, they point out that we do not need any new legal framework for the Arctic. In its strategy, Russia makes it clear that the law of the sea applies. Other common features are that sustainable management of resources is given high priority, and that the precautionary principle must be used as the basis for any extraction of oil and gas. The strategies also place emphasis on the need to develop an effective search and rescue system, they display a common intention to strengthen climate research, and they stress that the Arctic Council should be the cornerstone of cooperation in the region and that any disputes should be settled by peaceful means. All this is in line with important Norwegian priorities.

On the other hand, there is no disguising the fact that Norway has had to work actively to correct misunderstandings about the Arctic, particularly with regard to matters relating to international law – for instance, by explaining that we cannot think about the Arctic in the same way as we think about the Antarctic. This is nothing new, and since confusion about these matters arises regularly, we will continue to give priority to our efforts to correct misunderstandings. Our aim is to strive for clarity as far as international law and the distribution of responsibility in the Arctic are concerned, and to promote full implementation of the law of the sea. 
As mentioned, it is significant that the role of the Arctic Council as the key international cooperation forum for discussing common challenges in the Arctic is emphasised. But membership in the Arctic Council is quite narrow, with just eight member states and a limited number of observers, whose role is fairly passive. A number of other actors have applied for permanent observer status, including China, Japan and the European Commission. These are major political actors.
In Norway’s view, we must give the observers in the Arctic Council a greater role, in order to make sure that the Council maintains its relevance and political influence, and to prevent the possible development of competing channels for cooperation. There must of course be a distinction between member states and observers, but it is in Norway’s interests that the Arctic Council remains the relevant forum for cooperation not only for its eight member states, but also for other actors.

I have devoted most of my statement to the situation in the Arctic. Mr Kristiansen has also raised many interesting questions about our High North efforts taken as a whole. In this context, I would like to refer to the strategy documents that the Government has presented, in particular New Building Blocks in the North, which sets out what the Government intends to do in the High North in a long-term perspective. I am willing to have a debate on this in connection with the current debate if there is an interest in this.

*****

The Foreign Minister’s answer:
Mr President,

I note that Mr Kristiansen warns against talking over the heads of people in North Norway. During my travels in the north,  I have actually never experienced that this debate goes over people’s heads. The people in the region are playing a proactive role to put these issues onto the agenda in strategic, political and concrete terms. People do not live out at sea, for the most part they live their lives on land. For that reason, I would say that the worrying demographic trends that Mr Kristiansen has correctly pointed to relate to all aspects of politics. One of the things that made the biggest impression on me when we started our High North efforts in 2005/2006 was how important it was that we managed to turn around municipal finances – that there was quite a different political will to provide funding. For small municipalities in Finnmark, this was of decisive importance. It meant the difference between an extremely grave development trend and a situation that was altogether more positive, with greater hope and better prospects. Here we are down to the bare basics of politics, and that is the way it should be.

I agree with Mr Kristiansen that no area of policy is served by becoming too all-embracing. But when we are talking about the High North and the Arctic, the geographical areas are so vast that we in fact need to have some large-scale geographical and strategic perspectives. Value creation is central, and energy is absolutely central. I would again like to refer to New Building Blocks in the North, which is a thorough report that addresses one area after another, and sets out what the Government intends to do. Here, too, value creation and energy occupy a central place.

Now, to the question of the EU’s Arctic strategy. What concerned us was the possibility that the EU might take the same approach to the Arctic as to the Antarctic. Many leading, insightful and reasonable figures in the EU have been of the opinion that we could apply the Antarctic regime to the Arctic. Norway argued strongly against this, on the grounds that the two regions are fundamentally different. The Antarctic Treaty is quite unique: Antarctica is a huge land mass surrounded by an ocean, while the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by coastal states. Although the Arctic Ocean is partly covered by ice, it is no less an ocean. In other words, the law of the sea applies, and this must be our starting point. As long as the law of the sea forms the basis, Norway is interested in any measures that can improve sustainability, protect the environment and promote sound resource management in the Arctic. However, I have my doubts as to whether a treaty would be an appropriate tool. My impression is that this topic no longer seems to attract much attention in EU circles. It was discussed a great deal in the European Parliament in earlier phases, but did not feature prominently in the Parliament’s final deliberations. In the Council’s own strategy, the idea of a treaty has, as far as I can see, been abandoned.

What I see as the challenge, then, is that although we have the foundation in place, we must now add policies and a regulatory framework for the region. This must happen in the IMO, in regional bodies, in connection with our search and rescue efforts and coastal monitoring, in the development of our own legislation, in DNV (Det Norske Veritas), at the Norwegian Polar Institute, which engages in transfer of expertise, and in cooperation with Russia with regard to HSE standards for activity in the Barents Sea. There is a long list of measures of this kind. But the foundation is in place. We already have a treaty ¬– the Convention on the Law of the Sea ¬– and we do not need another, in my view.

*****

The Foreign Minister’s final comment:
Mr President,

I would also like to commend Mr Kristiansen for raising these issues and thank him for the debate. It is through debates of this kind that we actually define and hone our understanding of our strategy and the course we have set, so all contributions to this are welcome.

We have great ambitions for our High North policy during this parliamentary period. I am referring to the Building Blocks report – I keep returning to it, and I am glad that Mr Kristiansen mentioned it and is holding us accountable for what is written there. The report gives us a very good starting point for our further efforts in this area. It has broad support, including here in the Storting. My main point here is that it is important that the whole country stands behind our efforts in the High North.

Not surprisingly, this debate has been dominated by representatives from the north of Norway. But everyone looks to the north, and in my view it is very important that everyone in Norway feels a sense of ownership for our High North efforts, and that there are also people outside Norway who are driving them forward. If we are to succeed in terms of generating the knowledge we need, we must draw on the experience and expertise on energy that we have in Rogaland, our commercial expertise in Bergen, our technological expertise in Tromsø, and so on.

It would be strange if we were to only mobilise support for our High North efforts, which are so important for Norway, in an area north of a line drawn on a map. But there must be support and a sense of ownership for them in the north. In my view, we managed to achieve this in the last parliamentary period, when we had a committee of experts chaired by the Rector of the University of Tromsø, which gave the Government valuable advice and input. We are now working to establish a value creation panel, which will feed experiences from value creation, and needs identified in this connection, into the Government’s efforts in this field.

The representatives from the Progress Party were concerned about the military dimension, and this is important. Making sure that we have enough personnel and expertise to operate our vessels is clearly a challenge. But I believe that we will soon be able to say that Norway’s marine capacity is the most advanced in the High North, with state-of-the-art vessels and additional capacity. It is important to prioritise this. But I would warn against the view expressed by Member of the Storting Woldseth that we must fight for ownership of our areas in the High North. By having a military defence and belonging to an alliance we will be prepared, if necessary, to fight for what is ours, but my point of departure, basing myself on the law of the sea and the existing conventions, is that what is ours is ours. Currently, there are no open territorial disputes in the north over land or sovereignty. It is therefore important to follow up the Convention on the Law of the Sea, map the continental shelf and resolve outstanding issues. During the last parliamentary period we were able to draw straight lines in all sea areas in the north to mark the extent of Norway’s continental shelf, with the exception of the delimitation line between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, but here too we are now engaged in constructive cooperation. In any case, I would like to thank you for the debate, and I welcome further discussion on these matters.

*****

For all minutes from the debate (in Norwegian) see www.stortinget.no