Address at the Kazakhstan–Norway Conference on Nuclear disarmament strategies, non-proliferation and export control

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Foreign Minister,
Ambassadors,
Ladies and gentlemen,

• First of all, to state the obvious: Kazakhstan is a key operator on the international scene. Now, Norway and Kazakhstan are developing an important relationship.  
• Next, I’d like to express my gratitude to the Government of Kazakhstan and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) for making this conference possible. This is an area of high priority for both our countries. I am convinced that today’s event will pave the way for enhanced cooperation between Norway and Kazakhstan.  
• The threat from nuclear weapons is both frightening and frustrating. The frightening part is clear: there are enough nuclear weapons in the world to obliterate all life on earth, more than once. A shocking number of these weapons remain on high alert, ready for launch on warning. Equally terrifying is the thought of terrorists getting their hands on such weapons. 
• The frustrating part is that the threat from nuclear weapons is a man-made problem, yet it seems extremely difficult for men to fix it.
• You all know that the abolition of nuclear weapons has been on the United Nations agenda for 65 years – since the very first resolution was passed by the General Assembly in January of 1946, six months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
• Against this background, there are encouraging parts of this long story as well. In fact, the prospects for eliminating these weapons are probably better today than ever before during these 65 years.  
• Now, our challenge is to translate these prospects into action and real results. This demands realism and determination.

 

Ladies and gentlemen,

• Let me extend a particular welcome to the Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, my good colleague Mr Saudabayev, and thank you for sharing your thoughts with us this morning. It is an honour to have you here in particular during your tenure as Chairman of the OSCE, itself a driving force for disarmament and non-proliferation.
• Kazakhstan is (as you said) the first country in Central Asia to chair the organisation. I appreciate the commitment to international peace and security shown by Kazakhstan, and I look forward to the OSCE Summit in Astana in December.
• This will be the OSCE’s first Summit Meeting in the region and the first Summit Meeting in 11 years. As most of you know, the OSCE has not met at this level since Istanbul in 1999 and then under Norwegian chairmanship (when former Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik held the chair, and he is also here at this conference today).
• Norway greatly appreciates Kazakhstan’s deep commitment to the nuclear disarmament agenda, and to our common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. When I visited Astana in February this year, these issues were prominent on the agenda in all our meetings.
• I find that very encouraging. The people of Kazakhstan have learned lessons that they can offer the world in this respect. You have experienced close up the frightening effects of nuclear weapons, having been the involuntary host to the Soviet Union’s primary testing ground for nuclear weapons. It is encouraging to see how the Kazakh leadership and people have taken this heritage of the Cold War and turned it into a more positive driving force in the modern world.
• Now, Kazakhstan is member of a very exclusive club when it comes to nuclear weapons, being one of only four countries to have abolished them entirely. President Nazarbayev’s decision to unilaterally renounce the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world in 1994 served as an important inspiration to the whole world. It undoubtedly inspired Ukraine and Belarus to make similar moves. It is encouraging to see that Kazakhstan has continued this commitment to the disarmament agenda. This is of no less relevance today than before.

 

Ladies and gentlemen,

• As you said, Kazakhstan and Norway held a similar conference on these themes here in Oslo in March 2009. At that time, there was a sense of optimism in the air. President Obama had just assumed office and we heard rumours of a new START treaty in the pipeline. This was a refreshing change from the previous lost decade for nuclear disarmament.
• Today we can say that the sense of optimism was not unfounded. Just days after our last conference, President Obama entered the stage in Prague and invited all countries to join him in working towards a world free of nuclear weapons. This now famous call was echoed in the unanimously adopted resolution of the Security Council Summit in September 2009.
• The momentum was further strengthened by the entry into force of the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in July 2009.
• More than half the countries in the world are now covered by such zones and more states continue to join. Nuclear weapons free zones are important tools both for non-proliferation and for disarmament. They serve to underline that there is no real rationale for maintaining a category of weapons that should not – and could not – be used.
• Kazakhstan is already party to such a treaty; indeed it plays a leading role in the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The treaty entered into force in 2006, after having been signed in Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan. For those of us who grew up with the Cold War, the venue was very significant. Semipalatinsk was the largest test site for nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union – and the second largest in the world.
• Last year the UN General Assembly, responding to a Kazakh proposal, recognised this by declaring 29 August – the date in 1991 when the Semipalatinsk test site was closed – the international day against nuclear testing.
• Since our last bilateral conference in 2009, we have also seen the signing of a new START treaty that will significantly bring down the number of deployed Russian and US warheads. We await its ratification.
• And then, of course, we had the Review Conference of the NPT in May this year. It was met with great expectations and a strong need for restoring confidence after the serious failure of the previous review in 2005.
• The fact that the conference actually managed to agree on an Action Plan with 64 concrete action points on disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use, and agreed to convene a conference in 2012 on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was an important achievement.
• Many of us would, however, have liked to see even bolder commitments to disarmament in the form of tangible benchmarks and timelines for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

 

Ladies and gentlemen,

• Norway – not being a nuclear state – firmly subscribes to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and in this we are not alone. In fact, the vast majority of countries in the world share this goal.
• Increasingly we have also seen former advocates of nuclear weapons retention – political, military and academic – change sides and acknowledge that there is but one feasible way to solve the nuclear weapons challenge of the last six and a half decades: to eliminate them completely. There is a momentum now.
• The implication of this shift in the debate should not be underestimated. The question we are faced with today is not whether a world free of nuclear weapons is feasible, but how to achieve it. And how to achieve it in an irreversible, transparent and verifiable manner. These are fundamental principles upon which any international arms control regime must rely. But the thing is: we can achieve it.
• I would also like to mention that I have taken a joint initiative with the Foreign Minister of Poland to increase attention to short range nuclear weapons in Europe. We need to work towards improved transparency, concrete reductions and ultimately total elimination of this category of weapons too. (The problem is that today they are not covered by any treaty.) I believe this will improve security for all European states.
• There have long been calls for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, in line with the provisions of article VI of the NPT. Norway for its part recognises the need, as well as the obligation “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”, as the International Court of Justice unanimously and wisely concluded in its advisory opinion in 1996.
• At the same time, we must acknowledge that not all agree on how nuclear weapons should be eliminated. There is no unified roadmap towards a nuclear weapons free world.
• Now, I believe we have much to learn from other processes, like the ones leading up to the Mine Ban and Cluster Munitions Conventions, with regard to approach, substance and process. Let me refer to these two:
• One of these lessons is that such negotiation processes should be open to all interested states and stakeholders. This does not lead to more “chaos”, but to stronger momentum. Disarmament is in our common interest, and it should be a joint endeavour. It cannot be left to diplomats and technicians alone. It concerns us all. 
• A broader range of actors who share the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons with us should be engaged. And in my view, it is crucial to also apply a humanitarian perspective and to engage humanitarian actors (in connection with the humanitarian consequences of certain weapons). They were key partners in the processes that led to the banning of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, and they can be equally important in our efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.
• We have also seen this in the former Soviet Union, where the Nevada Semipalatinsk Movement was the first anti-nuclear NGO in the country. The movement grew out of cross-border contacts between activists and played an important role in protests as regards the Semipalatinsk Test Site.
• Of course, NGOs have a similarly important role in other spheres of society, such as promoting freedom of speech, independent media, free and fair elections, universal human rights. Partnerships should also be developed with scientific and academic actors and communities, with the aim of gaining better understanding of how full nuclear disarmament should be undertaken.

 

Ladies and gentlemen,

• We must also ensure that our systems of verification are robust enough to win the necessary confidence in connection with both non-proliferation and in disarmament.
• An illustration here: the United Kingdom and Norway have for some time been working together on verification of nuclear warheads dismantlement. In December, Norwegian experts will conduct a trial inspection in the UK.
• If successful, this test will demonstrate how international inspectors can access sensitive sites without violating the non-proliferation regime, and without gaining access to other sensitive information.
• With regard to verification of non-proliferation, a comprehensive system is already in place, in which the IAEA plays the key role. This needs to be strengthened and universalised and it is vital that all states abide by the standards of transparency, access and inspections set by the IAEA.
• This includes both the NPT standard safeguards agreements, and the Additional Protocols, which allow the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared activities. Norway urges all countries that have not yet done so to sign and ratify these instruments.
• Additionally, we must all contribute our share of the resources necessary for the IAEA to carry out its mandate. We cannot allow its budget to shrink.
• It is also important that we strengthen our multilateral and national export control regimes.
• In this regard we must continue to work for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540, which sets a high standard for our joint efforts in preventing terrorists and other non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
• This is an area where the OSCE, as a regional organisation, has already contributed substantially, and I commend the Kazakh chairmanship for continuing these efforts.
• In our globalised world a component can be produced in one country, transported through another, assembled in a third, and sold in a fourth. This also applies to the production of crude nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
• So, even a state that does not possess any WMD-relevant item or material may still end up being used as a hub for the illicit transfer of such materials. This underlines how the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 depends on the active cooperation of all states. And it tells us why the Security Council invoked its Chapter VII prerogatives to ensure that all states take their share of responsibility in this endeavour.

 

Ladies and gentlemen,

• Implementing and maintaining export and border controls is a continuous challenge: it is a race against rapid technological and scientific developments that can enable items intended for civilian purposes to have potential military applications.
• And this again requires unremitting efforts from states and private companies to maintain close national, regional and international coordination and cooperation. I appreciate our longstanding cooperation with Kazakhstan on these issues, in particular within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
• Moreover, in 2008, the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (I see that Director General Ole Harbitz will speak later today) signed an agreement with its counterparts in Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan to advance cooperation in this field. The agreement covers issues like radiation protection, waste handling and the management of pollution from uranium.
• Last year, the Norwegian research institute NORSAR (which is also participating at this conference) entered into a three-year partnership programme with Kazakh authorities in the field of seismology and infrasound, with particular focus on capacity-building in relation to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). (I appreciate the meeting I had this morning with Mr Tibor Tóth.) NORSAR has also previously cooperated with the Government in Kazakhstan on these issues.
• Both Norway and Kazakhstan have enjoyed longstanding cooperation with our common neighbour Russia on many of these issues, and we should look (more) at how we can benefit from our common experience in this field.
• We appreciate also our longstanding cooperation with Kazakhstan within the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And Norway has welcomed Kazakhstan’s application for membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). I believe that Kazakhstan, being an important technological country, will help to enhance the effectiveness of the MTCR and our common efforts to prevent proliferation of military missile capabilities.  
• Finally, dear audience, I welcome the Kazakh proposal to become a host state for IAEA’s fuel bank. Norway has strongly promoted this project, as I have personally too, as you know. I see the nuclear fuel bank as a means to facilitate and ensure the right of all interested countries to peaceful use of nuclear energy without necessarily having to establish a separate fuel cycle. This would also represent important non-proliferation gains. I really hope that the fuel bank will be established soon.

 

Dear colleague, ladies and gentlemen,

• Right now, in our times, we have a historic opportunity to take unprecedented steps towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. The world community must seize this opportunity. We must continue to discuss, deliberate and improve our understanding of how progress on nuclear disarmament can be achieved. We must push the agenda forward. This is why conferences like this are important. We need commitment and new perspectives, and we look forward to constructive and analytical input from NGOs, experts, diplomats, the media and from our guests from Kazakhstan.
• As I said at the beginning – and as Mr Saudabayev underlined in his address – the threat we face from nuclear weapons is a man-made problem. So, it can only be solved by men’s imagination, innovation, political will and perseverance.

Thank you.