Norwegian Policy on Sri Lanka

Translated from the Norwegian. (Abstract from the debate)

 

MP Eva Kristin Hansen (Labour Party):
The elections in Sri Lanka have recently ended and the Norwegian Government has congratulated the President on his re-election victory. For years, Norway had a considerable engagement in Sri Lanka. It has now been several months since the war ended in Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers were defeated. The situation of the internally displaced Tamil people has been described as precarious and untenable by humanitarian observers. There have since been reports of positive developments and the start of the process of returning displaced people. What consequences will the new political situation in Sri Lanka have, and how does the Government view the possibility of a renewed political commitment on the part of Norway?

Response by Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store (Labour Party):
I would like to thank Ms Hansen for a pertinent and thoughtful question on an important issue for Norwegian foreign policy. I would like to take this opportunity to present the status of Norway’s Sri Lanka policy since the military defeat of the Tamil Tigers last spring. The dramatic months leading up to 18 May last year resulted in large civilian casualties, nearly 300 000 internally displaced people and a precarious humanitarian situation for a large section of the Tamil population. Today, the LTTE is an insignificant force in Sri Lanka.

President Rajapaksa was re-elected by a clear margin on 26 January this year, and will probably remain in power for the next six years. His party is expected to win a clear majority in the forthcoming parliamentary elections on 8 April. The Rajapaksa regime has thus been given a clear mandate to rule Sri Lanka.

Ten months after the end of the war, there is still no sign of a political solution. On the contrary, the ethnic divisions have been intensified by the large civilian casualties, the treatment of IDPs and the influx of Singhalese to areas previously dominated by minorities. The Sri Lankan authorities’ will probably respond to these issues by promoting economic development and reconstruction in the north and east, rather than seeking a political solution that is acceptable to the minorities.

Let me make it clear: Our engagement as facilitators in various peace processes has always depended on us being in a position to make a difference and our involvement being requested by the parties. It was against this backdrop that Norway was able to support the parties in their efforts to achieve a political and peaceful solution, and their conclusion of the ceasefire agreement in 2002.

Developments took a new direction a few years later. We made it clear that the parties themselves were responsible for the results achieved. They had to take responsibility for both the breakthroughs and the setbacks in the peace process. When military logic took over completely, we saw that the peace process was really over. The basis for Norway continuing to play the role it had played since the end of the 1990s was no longer present.

Norway has currently no special role in the country. The end of the military conflict also meant the end of ten years of Norwegian engagement as a facilitator for a negotiated solution. Our special role came about at the request of both the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE.

The new political situation necessitates a shift in Norway’s approach. At the same time, our objective of helping to bring about a political solution in Sri Lanka remains unchanged. When the Norwegian Government congratulated President Rajapaksa on his re-election on 26 January, we expressed the hope that he would demonstrate the will to reach out to the minorities. We assured him that if he does, he can count on our support.

The Sri Lankan authorities have in turn made it clear that they would like to normalise their relations with Norway and regard the peace process as a closed chapter. The outcome of the war and the views of the Sri Lankan authorities will have consequences for Norway’s political approach, in terms of both aid and the use of other resources.

Let me now focus on our approach to Sri Lanka in this new situation. There are three main tracks.

First, Sri Lanka will continue to receive special attention in Norwegian foreign policy. The war has not resolved the underlying political conflicts. It is important that Sri Lanka is encouraged both by us and by others to find good solutions for all ethnic groups. So far, President Rajapaksa has not taken advantage of his election victory to reach out to other ethnic groups.

Indeed, developments have been in the opposite direction. The authorities’ grip on the media has been tightened. Journalists are being persecuted. The circumstances surrounding the arrest of opposition candidate Foneska indicate an atmosphere of fear and control rather than trust and openness.

Suspected violations of humanitarian law and war crimes in the war’s final phase may be what the Sri Lankan authorities are most worried about. Norway has made it clear that we want the facts to be brought to light, and that we would support an investigation under the auspices of the United Nations, if the Government does not itself take credible initiatives and action to this end.

It is in Norway’s interests for political relations with the Sri Lankan authorities to be normalised. Sri Lanka has long democratic traditions, strong institutions and an elite that is generally well educated and has close ties to the West. The isolation of Sri Lanka is not desirable. Norway will therefore maintain a critical dialogue with the authorities and speak out with a critical voice in the public space.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a number of other centres of expertise have developed significant knowledge of Sri Lanka. We hope, of course, that this knowledge and commitment to peace and reconciliation can be used in a positive way.

We will maintain our contact with and support for Tamil groups and organisations both in Norway and in other countries. Tamils should not feel that Norway’s commitment to the Tamil population has come to an end. Many Tamils in Norway, as Ms Hansen mentioned, want to help their relations and local communities, and Norway will continue to play a role in these efforts. At the same time, we must set requirements to the Tamil communities that they work in a democratic manner and give up all attempts to resume armed struggle. We will support efforts to ensure that Sri Lanka respects the rights of minorities and gives greater autonomy to the Tamils within the framework of the Sri Lankan state.

The second main track in our approach is that it is important to be realistic about what exactly Norway can do in the present political situation in Sri Lanka. It is appropriate to reduce our total aid to the country now that Norway no longer has a special role to play there. This must be done gradually, and we will not of course turn our backs on any long-standing commitments.

The greatest challenges are still in the humanitarian area. Ms Hansen points to the positive trend in the return of internally displaced people. We have indicated to the Sri Lankan Government our recognition of the positive steps taken in November and December last year with regard to resettlement and greater freedom of movement for refugees. About two-thirds of the nearly 300 000 IDPs who had been in closed camps have now been released and returned to their homes.

However, this development slowed as the election campaign drew to an end. Just under 100 000 people are still in camps. The Government’s promise that it would empty the camps by 31 January has not been fulfilled. A particular cause for concern is that many LTTE members are in closed camps where there is no access. Huge challenges also remain in connection with resettlement and rehabilitation.

As a result of the war, Norway’s humanitarian aid in 2009 amounted to NOK 94 million, which was double the amount planned. This placed Norway among the five largest donors of humanitarian aid to Sri Lanka.

Our intention this year is to provide NOK 35 million in humanitarian aid and NOK 24.2 million in transitional aid. The immediate needs in connection with the return and resettlement of IDPs in the north and east are still considerable. Our funds have therefore been earmarked for reconstruction, resettlement, rehabilitation and mine clearance in the north and east. These funds are channelled through Norwegian, international and local NGOs. We will also continue to work together with other countries to improve NGO access to these areas.

Given Sri Lanka’s status as a middle-income country, changes will be made to more long-term development cooperation, and this will gradually be reduced. The funds that have been specifically linked to Norway’s role as facilitator in the peace process will be phased out.

The third main track is a reduction in the human resources we have been providing in connection with our engagement in Sri Lanka. The additional personnel at the Embassy in Colombo and the Foreign Ministry who were assigned to work on the peace process are no longer necessary. The staff at the Embassy will be reduced by two positions from the autumn of 2010. The post of Special Envoy for Sri Lanka in the Ministry was phased out in the spring of 2009, and the team in the Ministry that was working with the peace process will function as an emergency response unit from the autumn.

Finally, I would like to mention that we have decided to initiate an external, independent evaluation of the peace process and Norway’s role. An international tender for this assignment will be announced in the spring.

The purpose of the evaluation will be to accumulate generalisable knowledge of how Norway can play a role in peace processes, based on lessons learned in Sri Lanka. It should also provide input to the academic debate on international contributions to conflict resolution and give a politically neutral assessment of Norway’s role in Sri Lanka – for present and future use. And, as has been highlighted in previous debates in this chamber on Norway’s engagement in peace efforts, we intend to undertake a thorough evaluation so that we can apply useful lessons to future engagements.

I look forward to the evaluation and the debate that will follow, and hope it will interest a wider audience and provide an opportunity for discussion and reflection – both on our experience with Sri Lanka and on the Norwegian policy of engagement in general.

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