Address to the Storting on the Government’s follow-up of the 22 july Commission’s report

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1. Introduction                                                                                

Mr President,

On 22 July 2011, Norway was hit by the worst atrocity it has seen since the Second World War. The explosion in the Government Office Complex and the massacre on Utøya claimed 77 lives. Many were seriously injured. Vital institutions were affected.

The nation came together and respofnded with dignity, in a demonstration of confidence in our open democracy and our society’s ability to deal with this ordeal.

The Government decided early on that there must be a full review of everything that had happened.

In the spirit of openness that characterised the response to 22 July, we asked for the bare facts to be put on the table. What exactly had happened? How could this have happened? And what can we learn from it all?

We invited the Storting to take part in this effort. On 12 August 2011, the Government appointed the 22 July Commission, with Alexandra Bech Gjørv as chair. Both the composition of the Commission and its mandate were discussed with the party leaders. Between them, the members of the Commission had broad expertise in national security issues. The mandate was comprehensive. The task was clear: to write the history of 22 July truthfully and without embellishment.

The Commission worked on this task for a year. Their efforts resulted in the publication of Official Norwegian Report 2012:14. The report is thorough and concrete. Serious and disquieting. It is the report we asked for.

I am grateful for this. Even though it makes uncomfortable reading. The most important thing is that we now have a common understanding of what happened.

This is a necessary first step towards learning and taking action. The Government has already made a start, guided by the final words in the Commission’s conclusion, which stressed the urgency of this work.

We will learn from the mistakes and shortcomings that have been revealed. We will take action to make our society more secure. We will galvanise the public administration into a common effort that restores confidence. And again we will invite the Storting to cooperate in this work.

Immediately after the report was presented, I asked the President of the Storting for the opportunity to give an address to the Storting on the report and on the efforts to improve national security and emergency preparedness. I am pleased that the Storting was able to meet so soon to listen to this address and to that of the Minister of Justice and Public Security.

I will begin by saying a few words about the Commission’s main findings, and our response to these. Then I will go through other important findings in the report and outline how we intend to follow up the report in the time to come.

 

2. The commission’s report

2.1 The main conclusions

The Commission has drawn six main conclusions. They are as follows:

• The attack on the Government Office Complex on 22 July could have been prevented through effective implementation of security measures that had already been adopted.
  • The authorities failed to adequately protect the people on Utøya island. The police could have responded faster. The perpetrator could have been stopped earlier on 22 July.
  • More security and emergency preparedness measures to prevent attacks and mitigate their effects should have been in place on 22 July.
  • The health and rescue services cared well for the injured and the next of kin in the acute phase.
  • The Government communicated well with the general public. The various ministries managed to continue their work despite the casualties and material damage.
  • Better ways of working and a broader approach could have alerted the Police Security Service (PST) to the perpetrator before 22 July. However, the Commission does not have grounds for contending that PST could and should have prevented the attacks.

These are serious findings. They show that too many aspects of the response operation failed. Vital parts of our emergency preparedness and crisis management system proved inadequate when they were most needed. The Commission has revealed that we face a profound challenge. Where failures have been identified, these are primarily due to fundamental weaknesses:

• The problem is not that there are no plans, but that they were not put into operation.
• The problem is not that exercises are not held, but that there has been insufficient ability to learn from them.
• The problem is not primarily that there is a lack of resources, legislation or organisation, but that changes are needed in organisational culture, attitudes towards emergency preparedness and coordination capacity.

And the Commission itself stakes out the approach that is needed.  

It points out that the tragedy of 22 July reveals the need for many different kinds of change: in planning systems and rules, in the way expertise and resources are used, in organisational culture, priorities and focus, and indeed even in attitudes in society as a whole.

Some of these changes can be decided by the authorities. These are the easiest changes to make, as long as there is sufficient political will. Others are more fundamental – such as changes in attitudes, leadership and culture – and must be developed over time.

The Commission makes it clear that its most important recommendation is not to allocate more funding, whether to the police or the Armed Forces, for more equipment or for surveillance.

On the contrary, the Commission says that its most important recommendation is that leaders at all levels of the public administration should work systematically to strengthen their own and their organisations’ fundamental attitudes and culture as regards:

• risk recognition and awareness,
• implementation capacity,
• coordination,
• use of ICT,
• performance-based management.                                                                                 

The Government is starting to deal with the fundamental challenges that the Commission describes. Individual decisions will not be enough. We need to take action at many levels.

The easiest job is to allocate more money, draw up new plans and restructure organisations. But the most important task is more challenging. It is a question of leadership. Fostering the right attitudes, changing cultures surrounding emergency preparedness, understanding the threats that may arise in a secure society.

The responsibility for this lies with leaders at all levels. With the Prime Minister and the other Government ministers, with the administrative leadership in the ministries and in government agencies, in every department and office in the public administration.

Everyone in this chamber understands the magnitude of the task before us. We will draw on the best in the traditions and culture of the Norwegian public administration: duty, responsibility, loyalty and integrity. Together we will demonstrate that Norway is able to take on this challenge. To acknowledge where we failed. To focus on the key task: the security of our citizens, the security of our society.

And we must start at the top:

• I have already asked the Government ministers to strengthen their own and their ministries’ fundamental approach to risk recognition and awareness and implementation capacity.
• The Government has decided to hold regular dedicated meetings on national security and emergency preparedness.
• The Commission’s first and vital recommendation will guide the Minister of Justice and Public Security in the review of the Norwegian police.
• The Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs will this autumn convene a conference for all those in senior management positions in the public administration to discuss their responsibility for organisational culture and attitudes to national security. I will open this conference myself together with the Minister of Justice and Public Security and the Minister of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs.

Competent change management is vital for achieving improvements.

In addition to learning from our mistakes, we must also learn from what worked well. We will examine carefully what worked as it should in the health sector and in the Armed Forces, with a view to transferring experience and providing inspiration for other sectors. We will also learn from the petroleum sector, where a longstanding effort has been put into developing a culture of safety and emergency preparedness. And we will draw on the experience of other countries, and learn from them.

Mr President,

I would like to acknowledge to the Storting that the failures in Norway’s emergency preparedness documented by the Commission are more extensive and more deep-seated than I had expected. These facts are hard to face.

But I am confident that we will rectify these failures. We will create the opposite of the situation criticised in the report.

A leadership that fosters pride in preparedness and security. A leadership that gets things done. A clear leadership.

We will not put this right just by making a decision. We will meet resistance, and the process will take time.

But there must never be any doubt about the direction and the goal. This will be one of my main tasks.

And I intend to succeed.

 

2.2 Responsibility

A central issue in the debate that has followed the Commission’s report is responsibility. What does being responsible mean? And what does taking responsibility mean?

Emergency preparedness is the responsibility of the authorities. This is why I have underlined several times that I have the ultimate responsibility. For emergency preparedness, for the emergency services, for the Armed Forces and for the health service. I am ultimately responsible for what went wrong and what went right during the response to the 22 July attacks.

In addition, I myself and the Government as a whole are taking responsibility in the wake of 22 July. First of all, we took responsibility for establishing the facts. We appointed a commission to work independently of the Government, the Storting and the public administration. The result was a report that has won widespread confidence. It has given us a common understanding of what has happened.

And we are taking responsibility for acting. We will be using the insights we have gained to improve security. We will reduce the risk of a future attack and we will reduce the consequences in the event of a future attack. 

The fact that, as Prime Minister, I am ultimately responsible does not relieve others of their responsibilities. According to our system of government, each minister is constitutionally responsible within their sphere of responsibility, and within the legal and financial framework determined by the Storting.

Each agency and service also has responsibilities. Several central and local Government agencies are responsible for various aspects of emergency preparedness. The Police Directorate is responsible for how the police service functions. The health authorities are responsible for medical preparedness. And this system must be maintained. Otherwise we risk erosion of responsibility and lack of clarity.

The Storting has made it clear that our emergency preparedness and response system is based on the principles of responsibility and subsidiarity.

The principle of responsibility means that the body responsible for a particular area is also responsible for emergency preparedness for, and for the response to, crises and disasters.

The principle of subsidiarity means that crises must be dealt with at the lowest appropriate level. Those who are closest to a crisis are best suited to deal with it.

But it is of crucial importance that the emergency response services are equipped to take this responsibility, and that they actually do so in a crisis. The Government and the Storting are responsible for the first of these points; the leaders of the emergency response services are responsible for the second.

Mr President,

On another note, let me remind us all of the most important fact when we speak of responsibility. It is the perpetrator who is responsible for the attacks. He alone. We must never forget this.

 

2.3 Some of the Commission’s findings

Before I move on to the follow-up of the report, I would like to briefly respond to some of its other key findings.

First a few words about the police. One of their fundamental functions is to protect the general public. The 22 July Commission’s review of the way police dealt with the attacks on the Government Office Complex and on Utøya revealed a failure to do so in several significant respects.

The police response was impeded by a shortage of key personnel, and by inadequate tools for coordinating their operations both within police districts and between the police districts concerned.

There was too little focus on safeguarding Norway against further attacks and apprehending the perpetrator. Operative measures to prevent or prepare for possible follow-up attacks could have resulted in identification of the vehicle and the perpetrator.

The systems for calling in local teams and requesting assistance from neighbouring districts did not function adequately. The plans that should have been used in the event of a terrorist attack were not put into operation.

The Commission found that the police did not have an overall, up-to-date ICT strategy. We know that the police have had longstanding ICT problems. These were pointed out by the Office of the Auditor General as early as 1998.

Furthermore, the Commission established that various errors and a lack of coordination delayed the arrival of the police on Utøya.

However, it also found that once the police arrived on the island, they demonstrated an impressive ability to take action and arrested the perpetrator very quickly. It also highlighted the significant police contribution to the rescue effort both in Oslo and on Utøya.

The Commission identified weaknesses in the Police Security Service’s routines and administration system. It also pointed out that the Service needs to show greater persistence, imagination and open-mindedness in identifying possible new threats. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security will present lessons learned in this connection in due course.

Turning now to the security of the Government Office Complex. The Commission identified serious shortcomings, and concluded that the terrorist attack here could have been prevented.

In the autumn of 2002, a major project was initiated to analyse government security and draw up plans for security in the event of various types of threats. The objective was to safeguard the individual members of the Government in the best possible way and at the same time ensure that the Government as a whole could continue to function in various situations. It developed into a larger-scale project designed to improve the security of the whole Government Office Complex. In the Commission’s view, this was a good, forward-looking initiative.

It resulted in a number of analyses and recommendations for action, many of which were followed up by various ministries. One concrete result of the security project was that, long before 22 July 2011, the Prime Minister’s Office drew up plans for evacuation from the Government Office Complex and carried out evacuation exercises. According to the Commission, this meant that the Prime Minister’s Office was well prepared to deal with the situation that arose on 22 July.

The security project also included identifying ways of improving security in the Government Office Complex, and recommended 197 measures to protect against different kinds of threat. The responsibility for following up these recommendations lay with the Ministry of Government Administration and Reform, as it was called then. And in the period from 2005 to 2011, the security of the Government Office Complex was significantly upgraded, for example with the introduction of various physical barriers, more stringent access control and screening equipment. Windows were improved. All these things had been done, and probably saved lives.

But, one crucial measure had not been completed: the closure of a street running through the Government Office Complex, Grubbegata. Administrative procedures at central and local government level took five years. Permission to start this work was given in October 2010. The work had been started by 22 July 2011, but the street was still not closed. The work was due to be completed in October. That was too late.

The Commission’s report gives a thorough account of why this process took far too long. It reveals a lack of risk recognition and awareness, management and control. And it points out that the process would have been quicker with a central government zoning plan. I believe the Commission is right. The Government will have a lower threshold for making use of this possibility in the future. But we will also consider whether other measures are necessary to speed up planning processes. 

The Commission’s discussion of police errors and the street closure process reveals major weaknesses – in terms of both crisis prevention and response.

At the same time, the Commission has pointed out that many aspects of the crisis on 22 July were dealt with well. It is important to remember this. Not least in order to learn from these events and transfer experience to other sectors. For example, the medical and rescue response functioned well. The Commission found that the injured and the next of kin were well cared for by the health, fire and rescue services during the first phase of the response. The health service rapidly mobilised extensive resources after the bomb attack in the Government Office Complex. The whole region was mobilised. Ambulances in Sweden were also alerted and ready to provide assistance if needed. 

Oslo University Hospital, Ullevål, provided excellent treatment for the most critically injured. Ringerike Hospital also provided vital treatment. Patients were also admitted to several other hospitals in the area. Hole municipality and Sundvollen Hotel attended to the needs of those who had been on Utøya and their next of kin. The local health service has been praised for its excellent work. Many volunteers also provided essential help.

Generally, the response of the Armed Forces also functioned well. The Commission concluded that the preparedness and capacity of the Armed Forces were not put to a real test on 22 July. However, they were able to provide support when requested by the police. The Armed Forces were well prepared.

 

2.4 Errors and shortcomings                                                                                                                         

Mr President,

The Commission has revealed errors, deficiencies and shortcomings. In the response to the events of 22 July. And in the weeks, months and years preceding the attacks. It has found underlying weaknesses in our systems and pointed out specific errors of judgement.

Sound decisions were taken both on 22 July and before. But poor decisions were also taken. And important decisions were not carried out quickly enough.

Three of the Commission’s conclusions are:

• Grubbegata should have been closed. It was not.
• The perpetrator could have been apprehended earlier. He was not.
• More security and emergency preparedness measures should have been implemented. This was not done.

This I deeply regret.

We cannot put right past mistakes. But we can learn from the past. We can acknowledge that we have made mistakes. And we can do what needs to be done to make the future more secure.

 

3. What has been done since 22 July?                                 

Mr President,

I will now take a closer look at what we have done so far and what we are planning to do in the future.

In recent years much attention has been given to improving national security and emergency preparedness in many areas:

• We have significantly strengthened our rescue helicopter service. Six helicopters are now required to be on standby and ready to go at 15 minutes’ notice – in all parts of the country.
• The development of the emergency communications system has been approved. Funding has been allocated and the system is being expanded.
• The police have been given more resources. The number of people training to be police officers has increased. The Police Counter-Terrorist Unit and the Police Security Service have been allocated additional funding and more equipment.
• The Norwegian Armed Forces have been modernised. This has enhanced their capacity to provide assistance to the police in matters of national security.

But the events of 22 July last year clearly showed that this was not enough. That is why the Government did not wait for the Commission’s report before introducing further measures. We have learned that time is precious. It is vital that we act quickly. 

Over the past year a number of measures to strengthen our national security have been introduced or are being developed. The Storting has been actively engaged in this work, through the select committee established in November 2011 to consider the statements made by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Defence concerning the events of 22 July, and has proposed a number of concrete measures. The Government presented a white paper on civil protection to the Storting in June and the long-term plan for the Armed Forces in March. Together these two reports cover all aspects of civilian and military emergency preparedness.

At the same time the attacks of 22 July underlined the need for better coordination in the area of civil protection and emergency preparedness. The question has been raised as to whether responsibility for coordination of national security and emergency preparedness should be assigned to the Prime Minister’s Office. This has not been recommended by the Commission.

The Commission points to the close links between national security and the tasks of the police. For this reason both this Government and the previous one have chosen to place responsibility for national security and emergency preparedness with the recently renamed Ministry of Justice and Public Security.  

This was reinforced and clarified when Grete Faremo was appointed Minister of Justice and Public Security.

She was given a clear, strong mandate with responsibility for national security and emergency preparedness, and the Ministry’s role as lead government body in this area was strengthened. New instructions for this work were established in June.

A number of individual measures have been implemented or initiated since 22 July last year:

• The police helicopter service has been strengthened, and will be strengthened further.
• In September last year we re-established the Armed Forces’ stand-by helicopter service at Rygge (66 kilometres from Oslo).
• A new civil situation room has been established under the Emergency Management Support Unit.
• A number of measures to increase capacity for receiving calls via the police emergency telephone number 112 have been introduced.
• New instructions on the provision of assistance to the police by the Norwegian Armed Forces have been established. These include requirements for joint police and Armed Forces exercises.
• We have initiated an external review of the resources available to the Police Security Service.
• A new national red alert system is currently under consideration, and will be put in place as soon as possible. In the meantime the existing system has been tested and improved. It was used recently, and worked.
• The role of the Government Emergency Management Council has been clarified, thus enhancing central crisis management. The Council will hold regular meetings to consider relevant incidents and exercises.
• We have circulated proposals to criminalise the planning and preparation of terrorist acts for comment.
• A new security department has been established at the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs, which will have responsibility for rebuilding the Government Office Complex in Oslo. 
• The Home Guard’s role and tasks in relation to target protection have been clarified in the long-term plan for the Armed Forces. And the King’s Guard has been given an enhanced role in relation to security in Oslo.
• The Norwegian Police University College has implemented a training and refresher programme for emergency personnel. As of next year, there will be annual training sessions on “ongoing shooting incidents” for several sections of the police force.
• The emergency communications system is being expanded.
• We are introducing a new system for the communication of highly classified electronic information between the ministries and key national security bodies.
• In spring of this year, the Storting approved plans to introduce a new priority access scheme for the mobile telephone network. This should be in place by the end of 2013.
• New national guidelines for ICT security will be presented by the end of 2012.
• The Norwegian Directorate of Health and the Police Directorate are preparing joint guidelines for coordination at incident sites that have not been secured.
• We have increased requirements for crisis management exercises in the ministries.
• During the course of the past year the Government has implemented extensive measures to increase the security of the Government Office Complex in Oslo. Guard services have been strengthened. Certain streets have been closed off.

Several of the measures I have mentioned are in line with the recommendations of the Storting’s 22 July select committee.

Priority is being given to following up the recommendations of the select committee, and updates on the status of this work will be presented to the Storting.

 

4. The work ahead                                                                          

4.1 Further follow-up of the Commission’s recommendations               

There has been a change of tempo. Much has been done over the last year. But more needs to be done. We will present more initiatives, measures and changes in due course. All of the Commission’s 31 recommendations will be thoroughly considered and the conclusions presented to the Storting.

The Minister of Justice and Public Security is responsible for this work, and will submit a white paper to the Storting on the follow up of the Commission’s report as soon as possible. However, some of the Commission’s recommendations can be followed up immediately. Let me mention some of them:

Firstly, we will carry out more and better exercises. These will include regular crisis management exercises at all levels of the public administration, and exercises requiring coordination and cooperation both within the various services and government agencies and between them. We will also improve our ability to learn from these exercises. In the budget that is to be presented in October, we will propose increased allocations for preparedness planning, exercises, crisis management and control.

Secondly, we are establishing a new emergency management centre for the police in Oslo. The aim is to have the Police Helicopter Service, the Norwegian Counter-Terrorist Unit and the Police Dog Unit all based in Oslo Police District. 

Yesterday, the Minister of Transport and Communications sent a letter to NSB (the Norwegian State Railways) and Jernbaneverket (the Norwegian National Rail Administration), announcing that a plot of land at Alna in the north of Oslo, which is currently owned by an NSB subsidiary [1], is to be made available for this purpose. We will propose allocating funds in next year’s budget for planning and designing this centre.

Thirdly, we are enhancing the ability of the Armed Forces to assist the police in crisis situations. As of next January, the Armed Forces’ stand-by helicopter service at Rygge will be able to provide operational and law enforcement support to the police as necessary, i.e. it will be possible to deploy military helicopters to assist in armed interventions. We have also started work on establishing the legal basis for the instructions on the provision of assistance to the police by the Norwegian Armed Forces, which the Commission also recommended.

Fourthly, we are strengthening efforts to protect targets that may be particularly vulnerable to attack. On Friday, the King in Council approved the instructions for detailing and clarifying roles and responsibilities in connection with target protection for police and Armed Forces personnel.

Fifthly, the Minister of Health and Care Services has examined the Commission’s recommendations in the field of health. One is to clarify the interpretation of the Health Personnel Act, so that the health service can apply the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality in crisis situations, for which the Act provides. The other is that the health service should maintain its crisis management capacity and flexibility, including securing the resources needed to conduct exercises.

The Minister of Health and Care Services agrees with the Commission. The Directorate for Health and Social Affairs and the regional health authorities have already been tasked with following up the recommendations, in cooperation with the municipal authorities.

The Minister of Justice and Public Security will outline additional measures in her address to the Storting.

 

4.2 Political considerations

Mr President,

As I have tried to show in this address, the Government has already implemented and will continue to implement many measures, both large and small. This is crucial, and we don’t have any time to lose. Let me nevertheless caution against calling for hasty measures and seemingly simple solutions. Work of this kind often entails dilemmas. Political leadership means striking a careful balance.

One important balance that has to be struck is between general political leadership and control of individual matters. It has been said that good political leadership involves seeing the bigger picture rather than getting too caught up in the details. That Government ministers should focus on the course ahead. And that the underlying agencies should have the freedom they need to do their work.

The Commission has asked whether the Ministry of Justice and Public Security has been too involved in the Police Directorate’s activities. At the same time, we know that policy is often in the details. Policy is measured on results, every single day. And as this chamber is well aware, it may be necessary to focus on quite specific individual matters, which fits badly with an ideal of leadership at an overarching level.

The answer is probably neither the one nor the other, neither absolute autonomy nor complete political control, neither full responsibility for implementation nor complete freedom from that responsibility.

We need to be more aware of the importance of striking the right balance here. We need to enhance, not restrict our ability to follow through on our plans. We must demand results, but at the same time distinguish between what is essential and what is not.

The Commission has also found that expectations in the area of emergency preparedness have been unclear in relation to the expectations and goals set in other areas. It pointed out that there is a general tendency to focus on areas where performance can be measured, with the result that other tasks may be neglected. For that reason, what we need is not more goals. In fact, we probably need fewer goals. But above all, we need better goals. Goals that as far as possible remain valid over time. And we must also set priorities; some goals are more important than others.

Another balance we need to strike is between efficiency and broad participation in decision-making. For example, this is an issue when deciding whether a matter should be considered at national or local level. Whether thorough consultations are necessary or rapid implementation is more important. We all want a rapid response and effective implementation of decisions. But we will not arrive at good decisions unless we take the time to listen to objections and consider alternatives that haven’t occurred to us. Indeed, we need to actively seek out objections and counter-arguments ­­– both relating to the specific matter at hand and relating to political considerations. This means that decision-making and implementation may take time. Sometimes, however, we must be able to cut through all this and take immediate action, even when the counter-arguments are valid and some would have preferred a more thorough process.   

But here, too, it is a question of striking a balance. Intervening in local democracy and the municipal authorities’ planning responsibilities is no simple matter. Many people were against the closure of the street through the Government Office Complex, Grubbegata. Some were deeply engaged in this issue. And some were still against closure of the street after the police had explained why they considered it to be so important.

A third balance that needs to be struck is between openness and security. We want more openness, but we will not be naive. The desire for openness can sometimes conflict with the need for security. The Commission found that the Storting and the Government have struck a reasonable balance between openness and security in the areas it has examined.

However, it is not possible to find the right balance once and for all. These are considerations that will have to be weighed up time and again. Security is not possible in a society with complete openness. On the other hand, a society that is 100 % secure is not an open society. It is not a society any of us would want to live in.

Here again, the question of closing Grubbegata is a good example. It is tragic that it was not closed in time. But even if it had been, this may not have prevented an attack on the centre of Oslo. In other countries where government targets are far better protected, we have seen that terrorists simply attack other more vulnerable targets instead.

 

5. Conclusion                                                                                     

Mr President,

Crises give rise to lessons learned and enhanced knowledge. People make mistakes in crisis situations, sometimes with tragic consequences. Nevertheless these mistakes can help us to improve.

In Norway, the lessons we have learned after disasters like the collapse of the Alexander Kielland oil rig, the fire on the passenger ferry Scandinavian Star and the Indian Ocean tsunami have enabled us to develop systems that function better.

The same is true for terrorist attacks. For decades, the UK and Spain have been targeted by terrorism. The US has also been brutally attacked. Mistakes were made in the response to the attacks on New York in 2001, in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005. This is made clear in the Commission’s report. The countries concerned have learned from these mistakes, and have improved their routines and systems accordingly.

We learned similar lessons from 22 July. The price we paid for these lessons was outrageously high, but we have an obligation to use the knowledge gained to make Norway more secure.

In closing, I would like to remind you of three important points.  

Firstly, in the midst of all the criticism, let us not forget all the people who made an outstanding effort in a situation of chaos and fear. Those who were in the Government Office Complex in Oslo or on Utøya island and were directly affected, local volunteers, police officers and health personnel, and people working in the public administration.

Secondly, we must not forget that the fight against terrorism is not just about emergency preparedness and crisis management. Work is being done to counter radicalisation and violence in a number of different arenas: in an inclusive school system, in dialogue between religions in an atmosphere of mutual trust, and in tireless efforts to prevent the marginalisation of individuals in society.

Thirdly, and most importantly, each and every one of us can stand up for democratic ideals. Each and every one of us can be on the lookout for signs of violent extremism. Each and every one of us can report weaknesses in our emergency preparedness system.

Ultimately, our society’s best defence against violence is its people.

 

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