

# Cooperation, Development and Security: Evolving Perceptions of Article X

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UNITED NATIONS  
OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS



Workshop on the Biological Weapons  
Convention Supporting Global Health

Oslo, 18-19 June 2009


Convention on the Prohibition of  
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## BWC Article X

- (1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.
- (2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

# WMD treaties: peaceful use provisions



# Security vs. Development?




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


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# Security vs. Development?



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# Some “traditional” BWC perceptions

- Tension between Art. III and Art. X: strengthening implementation of one weakens implementation of the other
- Article X is a “reward” for giving up biological weapons
- Article X is a distraction from the security aims of the BWC
- Implementation of Article X is not taken as seriously as implementation of other articles



# Efforts to strengthen the BWC

- Review Conferences every five years (1980, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 – next one in 2011)
- Confidence-building Measures (CBMs) introduced 1986, expanded 1991
- Attempt to negotiate protocol from 1991-2001
- Failure in 2001 sparks crisis, reorientation
- 2003-2005 intersessional process surprisingly successful
- 2006 Review Conference consolidates new direction






## New direction for the BWC

- Focus on improving and coordinating national implementation of BWC
- Annual work programme deals with specific topics; exchange of technical expertise
- Range of different actors and organisations involved
- Implementation Support Unit coordinates activity
- Renewed focus on CBMs, universalization

## So what changed?


- Political deadlock: “necessity is the mother of invention”
- Bioterrorism becomes major concern after September 11, 2001
- Rapid development, growth and spread of biotechnology capabilities worldwide
- Recognition of interconnection of BW with other biological risks

# The Spectrum of Biological Risk



“We must look at [the BWC] as part of an interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems” – Kofi Annan, 2006

# Network approach to implementation



# BWC intersessional work program

BIOSAFETY & BIOSECURITY

OVERSIGHT, EDUCATION & OUTREACH

RESPONSE TO USE OR  
THREAT OF USE

2007

2008

2009

2010

NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION

REGIONAL ACTIVITIES

CAPACITY BUILDING FOR DISEASE  
SURVEILLANCE, DETECTION,  
DIAGNOSIS, AND CONTAINMENT

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## Sixth RevCon: Article X outcomes

- Recognised that scientific and technological development represents both a risk and a means of mitigating that risk
- Urged States Parties to develop frameworks for disease surveillance and response at the national, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels
- Called for strengthening existing international organizations and networks; improving communication and coordination
- Encouraged support for capacity-building
- Recognized the role of the private sector in technology transfer
- Established ISU: clearing house role for offers of and requests for assistance

# A new vision of the BWC



**Mutual reinforcement:** cooperation reduces risks; reducing risks encourages cooperation.

# A new vision of the BWC



Kofi Annan,  
2006

“Building public health capacities can strengthen safeguards against bioterrorism. And being better prepared to deal with terrorism can mean better public health systems overall. Similarly, the availability of training and technology is crucial to improving laboratory safety and security, and making labs safe and secure encourages cooperation and creates opportunities for development.”

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# A shared responsibility



“Governments alone cannot confront the risks posed by biological weapons ... to manage the full spectrum of biological risks, you need a cohesive, coordinated network of activities and resources. Such a network will help to ensure that biological science and technology can be safely and securely developed for the benefit of all.”

- Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 2008

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