INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS




Biological Weapons Convention Supporting Health: Reducing Biological Risk by Building Capacity in Health Security,

18-19 June 2009, Oslo

Guénaël R. Rodier Director, International Health Regulations Coordination



International Health Regulations ... Milestones






International Health Regulations ... WHO's milestones





International Health Regulations ...

WHO's milestones





International Health Regulations ...


WHO's milestones






International Health Regulations ...

WHO's milestones





International Health Regulations ... WHO's milestones



Purpose of IHR

"to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade" (*Article 2*)



IHR (2005)

Three Paradigm Shifts

- > From control of borders to [also] containment at source
- > From diseases list to all public health threats
- > From preset measures to adapted responses



A commitment of 194 States Parties



IHR

- Global health agenda
 Global Health security
- Result of negotiation
 - international disease spread

 → trade and travel

 Art. 2 on purpose and scope
 - global collaboration
 → national sovereignty

 "may / should / would / in general / to the extent possible" ...
- Intersectoral
 health / transport / agriculture / commerce / defence / ...
- Innovative
 - containment at source → core capacity requirements
 - decision instrument → risk assessment is core



National Securit

Travel and

Transport

Public Health Emergencies


Industry

Food chain


Animal health:

Farming

Wildlife



Seven strategic actions to guide IHR(2005) implementation



Strategic actions 2-5 are key because they call for significantly strengthened national and global efforts.

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

1

Foster global partnerships

WHO, all countries and all relevant sectors (e.g. health, agriculture, travel, trade, education, defence) are aware of the new rules and collaborate to provide the best available technical support and, where needed, mobilize the necessary resources for effective implementation of IHR (2005).

Other Technical Intergovernmental organizations

e.g. FAO, OIE, ICAO, IMO, UNWTO, IAEA, WTO, UNEP ...

Development agencies / Regional intergovernmental organizations

e.g. AFD, CIDA, DFID, JAICA, USAID, ADB, ASEAN, EC, MERCOSUR, WB ...

WHO Collaborating Centres and Technical partners

International Networks / National agencies / NGOs: e.g. GOARN, IANPHI, Pasteur IN, MSF, TEPHINET, DoD-GEIS, ICMM, CDC, ECDC, HPA, InVS ...

- Industry associations e.g. ACI, IATA, ISF, ISO ...
- Professional societies e.g. ASM, APHL, ISTM ...



STRENGTHEN NATIONAL CAPACITY Strengthen national disease Each country assesses its national resources in disease surveillance surveillance, prevention, and response and develops national action plans to implement and meet control and response systems IHR (2005) requirements, thus permitting rapid detection and response to the risk of international disease spread. Strengthen public health The risk of international spread of disease is minim d through effective security in travel and transport permanent public health measures and response of city at designated airports, ports and ground crossings in all countrie Health system Ports Epidemiology Laboratory Airports Preparedness Ground crossings Case management Infection control Intersectoral Social mobilisation Communication **International Health Regulations Coordination**


STRENGTHEN NATIONAL CAPACITY

2 Str

Strengthen national disease surveillance, prevention, control and response systems Each country assesses its national resources in disease surveillance and response and develops national action plans to implement and meet IHR (2005) requirements, thus permitting rapid detection and response to the risk of international disease spread.

Core capacity requirements for surveillance and response (Annex 1A):

"capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events ..."



15 June 2009

(Annex 1A): "capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events in accordance with these Regulations ...".

Investing in

- Human resources (training, distance learning, twinning programmes ...)
- Infrastructure (buildings, equipments, logistics ...)
- Standard Operating Procedures (investigation, response, biosafety ...)

Focusing on

- Laboratory quality system (EQA programmes, biosafety, specimen collection, lab regional network ...)
- Event-base surveillance system (epidemic intelligence, field investigation, data analysis, risk assessment, reporting ...)
- Communication (social mobilization, media, web ...)

Building on

National and Regional strategies (e.g. APSED, IDSR)





External Quality Assessment Programme Africa: 74 Laboratories from 47 countries

Diagnostic capacity:

- Enteric pathogens (Diarrhoeal diseases)
- Bacterial meningitides
- Plague
- Tuberculosis
- Malaria

Languages:

French: 22 countries

English: 20 countries


Portuguese: 5 countries

3 panels per year

Support: WHO LYON Office / NICD, Johannesburg / USAID







Biotechnology revolution


Powerful, rapid, affordable

- Rapid diagnostic tests (e.g. HIV, influenza, plague, cholera, meningitis)
- PCR machines (a global epidemic!)
- BSL3 / 4 laboratories (projects ongoing in many countries)
- Private sector is driving the change

A revolution which is not over

How a laboratory will look like in 2020?







Inform@tion revolution

"The nations of the world are caught up in a revolution: a technological revolution, which is bringing about <u>dramatic changes</u> in the way we live..."

Tom Forester *in* High-Tech Society: The Story of the Information Technology Revolution

... and is bringing dramatic changes in the way we conduct disease surveillance

• how surveillance will look like in 2020?



Decision instrument (Annex 2)

4 diseases that shall be notified polio (wild-type polio virus), smallpox, human influenza new subtype, SARS.

Disease that shall always lead to utilization of the algorithm: cholera, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, VHF (Ebola, Lassa, Marburg), WNF, others....


Q1: public health impact serious?

Q2: unusual or unexpected?

Q3: risk of international spread?

Q4: risk of travel/trade restriction?

Insufficient information: reassess





Strengthen public health security in travel and transport

The risk of international spread of disease is minimized through effective permanent public health measures and response capacity at designated airports, ports and ground crossings in all countries.

At all times

Annex 1B

- Access to medical service
- Transport of ill travellers
- Inspection of conveyances

 (e.g. Ship Sanitation Control Certificate)
- Control of vectors / reservoirs

For responding to events

- Emergency contingency plan
- Arrangement for isolation (human, animal)
- Space for interview / quarantine
- Apply specific control measures






CHALLENGES

STRENGTHEN NATIONAL CAPACITY

NATIONAL SURVEILLANCE

- No one size fits all
 - diversity of national systems
 - national legislation
- Special areas
 - With little or no government control
 - Megacities and periurban areas
- Donors partly on board
 - no global cost estimate
 - cross cutting not attractive
 - monitoring indicators currently being field tested




PREVENT AND RESPOND TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES

4

Strengthen WHO global alert and response systems

Timely and effective coordinated response to international public health risks and public health emergencies of international concern.





Response Strategy and Operations




IHR (2005): 10 Parts, 66 Articles, 9 Annexes

PART I	DEFINITIONS, PURPOSE AND SCOPE, PRINCIPLES AND RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES
PART II	INFORMATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE
PART III	RECOMMENDATIONS
PART IV	POINTS OF ENTRY
PART V	PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES
	Chapter I General provisions
	Chapter II Special provisions fro conveyances and conveyance operators
	Chapter III Special provisions for travellers
	Chapter IV Special provisions for goods, containers and container loading areas
PART VI	HEALTH DOCUMENTS
PART VII	CHARGES
PART VIII	GENERAL PROVISION
PART IX	THE ROSTER OF EXPERTS, THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE AND THE REVIEW COMMITTEE
	Chapter I The IHR Roster of Experts
	Chapter II The Emergency Committee
	Chapter III The Review Committee
PART X	FINAL PROVISIONS



Responsible authorities (Article 4)

"National IHR Focal Point" means the national centre, designated by each State Party, which shall be accessible at all times for communications with WHO IHR Contact Points under these Regulations;





PART II – INFORMATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE

Article 5 Surveillance

"capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events in accordance with this Regulations ...'

Article 6 Notification

all event that may constitute a Public Health Emergency of **International Concern**

Article 7 Information-share

Consultation Article 8

Article 9 Other reports

Article 10 Verification

Article 11 Provision of infor

Article 12 Determination of

Article 13 Public health res

Article 14 Cooperation of V

.. <u>irrespective of origin or source</u>... shall provide to WHO all relevant public health information

If insufficient information to notify, State Party can consult with WHO


... where it is duly justified may WHO maintain the confidentiality of the source

initial reply within 24h. ...WHO shall offer to collaborate ... If the State Party does not accept the offer of collaboration ... WHO may share with other States Parties

WHO shall not make information generally available to other States Parties unless ...

International Health Regulations Coordination






1 / 1 🕞 🕙 75.5% 🕶 😝 🚱 Find	1	/ 1	0	•	75.5% -	++	#	Find	
----------------------------	---	-----	---	---	---------	----	---	------	--

Agenda 22 April 2009


Event ID	Hazard	Syndrome	Disease	Aetiology	Country	Verification	Incoming dt L	.ast update
New event								
2009-E-3545	Infectious	Acute Watery Diarrhoeal Syndrome			Nigeria	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-03	2009-04-20
Ongoing event								
2009-E-3538	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome			Russian Federation	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-15	2009-04-21
2008-E-3370	Infectious		Cholera		South Africa	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2008-11-20	2009-04-21
2009-E-3484	Infectious		Cholera		Zambia	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-02-27	2009-04-21
2008-E-3353	Infectious	Acute Watery Diarrhoeal Syndrome	Cholera	V. cholerae O1 Ogawa	Mozambique	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2008-11-04	2009-04-21
1959-J10-11-ID	Animal	Acute Respiratory Syndrome	Influenza due to identified avian or animal influenza virus	H5N1	Indonesia	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2005-07-13	2009-04-21
2009-E-3520	Infectious		Meningococcal disease	N. meningitidis serogroup A	Central African Republic	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-03-26	2009-04-21
2009-E-3536	Undetermined	Unknown and unspecified causes of morbidity or			Nepal	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-14	2009-04-17
2009-E-3532	Infectious		Cholera	V. cholerae O1 Ogawa	Paraguay	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-08	2009-04-16
2008-E-3367	Infectious		Cholera		Zimbabwe	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2008-11-18	2009-04-20
2008-E-3402	Animal	Acute Respiratory Syndrome	Influenza due to identified avian or animal influenza virus	H5N1	Egypt	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2008-12-16	2009-04-20
2009-E-3531	Infectious		Meningococcal disease	N. Meningitidis serogroup A,	Chad	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-03	2009-04-15
2009-E-3493	Infectious		Meningococcal disease	N. meningitidis serogroup A	Niger	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-03-04	2009-04-17
2009-E-3451	Infectious		Meningococcal disease	N. meningitides, serogroup A	Sudan	No verification requested	2009-02-03	2009-04-14
2009-E-3432	Infectious		Meningococcal disease	N. meningitidis serogroup A	Uganda	WHO-NFP risk assessment concluded	2009-01-22	2009-04-02
2008-E-3405	Infectious	Acute Neurological Syndrome, unspecified	Meningococcal disease	N. meningitidis serogroup A, W135	Nigeria	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2008-12-17	2009-04-16
2009-E-3518	Infectious		Yellow Fever		Congo	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-03-24	2009-04-17

Color legend:	New event		Update received by ARO		Awaiting upda
---------------	-----------	--	------------------------	--	---------------









One week later ...

Awaiting update

Agenda 29 April 2009

Event ID	Hazard	Syndrome	Disease	Aetiology	Country	Verification	Incoming dt L	Last update
New event								
2009-E-3568	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine influenza)	Belgium	Verification requested from NFP	2009-04-27	2009-04-2
2009-E-3569	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine influenza)	Czech Republic	Verification requested from NFP	2009-04-28	2009-04-2
2009-E-3567	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine Influenza)	Germany	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-27	2009-04-2
2009-E-3572	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine influenza)	Ireland	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-28	2009-04-28
2009-E-3570	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine influenza)	Italy	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-27	2009-04-28
2009-E-3571	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine influenza)	Russian Federation	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-28	2009-04-28
2009-E-3565	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine influenza)	Sweden	Verification requested from NFP	2009-04-27	2009-04-28
2009-E-3566	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(Suspected swine infulenza)	Switzerland	Verification requested from NFP	2009-04-27	2009-04-28
Ongoing even	t							
2009-E-3555	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine influenza)	France	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-26	2009-04-28
2009-E-3556	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome	Influenza due to identified avian or animal influenza virus	Swine influenza A/H1N1	Israel	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-26	2009-04-28
2009-E-3542	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome	Influenza due to identified avian or animal influenza virus	Swine influenza A/H1N1	Mexico	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-16	2009-04-28
2009-E-3553	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome	Influenza due to identified avian or animal influenza virus	Swine influenza A/H1N1	New Zealand	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-26	2009-04-28
2009-E-3554	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome	Influenza due to identified avian or animal influenza virus	Swine influenza A/H1N1	Spain	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-26	2009-04-28
2009-E-3415	Animal	Acute Respiratory Syndrome	Influenza due to identified avian or animal influenza virus	H5N1	Viet Nam	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-01-05	2009-04-28
2009-E-3559	Infectious			(suspected swine influenza)	Colombia	Verification requested from NFP	2009-04-27	2009-04-27
2009-E-3558	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine influenza)	Australia	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-27	2009-04-27
2009-E-3557	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome		(suspected swine influenza)	Costa Rica	Verification requested from NFP	2009-04-26	2009-04-27
2009-E-3538	Infectious	Acute Respiratory Syndrome			Russian Federation	WHO-NFP risk assessment ongoing	2009-04-15	2009-04-21

Color legend: Update received by ARO New event


WHO INTERNAL WORKING DOCUMENT; CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR FURTHER DISTRIBUTION

OR ANIMAL	FIRST REPORT VERIFIED 2008-12-16 cases: 1; deaths: 1 UNOFFICIAL 2008-12-31 cases: 1; deaths: LAST UPDATE: GPHIN 2009-01-26 VERIFIED cases: ; deaths: UNOFFICIAL cases: 1; deaths: NEW AFFECTED AREAS: CONFIRMED BY: LABORATORY: Yes NAMRU-3	LAST INCOMING INFO 2009-03-11 EMRO: MoH reported a new confirmed human case; a one and a half year old female from Menofia Governorate. Her symptoms began on 6 March and she was hospitalized on 9 March where she remains in a stable condition. Infection with H5N1 avian influenza was confirmed on 10 March by the Egyptian Central Public Health Laboratory. Investigations into the source of her infection indicate a history of close contact with dead and sick poultry prior to becoming ill. Of the 58 cases confirmed to date in Egypt, 23 have been fatal SUMMARY INFO • 2009-03-10 - DON publication: MoH reported a new confirmed human case; a two and a half year old male from Amaria District, Alexandria Governorate. His symptoms began on 3 March and he was hospitalized at Alexandria Fever Hospital where he remains in a stable condition. Infection with H5N1 avian influenza was confirmed by the Egyptian Central Public Health Laboratory on 4 March. Investigations into the source of infection indicate a history of close contact with dead and sick poultry prior to becoming ill. Of the 57 cases confirmed to date in Egypt, 23 have been fatal. • 2009-03-05 - GPHIN: 8 y.o. male suspected of having human AI from Alexandria Province. The case has a history of close contact with sick and dead poultry.	POINTS OF CONTACT HQ: Keiji Fukuda RO: H. El Mahdi El Bushra Daily list: 2008-12-16 IHR site (ex OVL): No (0) Web: No Press pelcase: No CRITERIA FOR INT.C. • Serious Public Health Impact • Unusual or unexpected • Int. travel or trade
-----------	---	---	---

EMRO: confirms 57th case for Egypt in a 2.5 y.o. male from Amaria District, Alexandria Governorate. Onset of symptoms began on 3 March and was hospitalized at Alexandria Fever Hospital on the same day. The child received treatment with Tamiflu on the same day of hospitalization (3 March). Infection with H5N1 avian influenza was confirmed by the Egyptian Central Public Health Laboratory on the 4th of March. Investigations into the source of infection indicate a history of close contact with dead and sick poultry prior to becoming ill. The child is in a good health condition and he is stable.

ACTION DON publication








Information sources and verification outcome

Media remain a key source of timely primary information





Type of events: June 2007 - January 2008, n = 210

Туре	Infectious	123
	Animal	38
	Food safety	19
	Undetermined	17
	Product	8
	Chemical	4
	Natural disaster	1

Initial information source

Media	103
IHR NFP or Government	43
Other org., NGOs, etc.	38
WHO	22
Foreign government	4

WHO coordinated response (GOARN)

H5N1, Pakistan / Ebola, Uganda / Ebola, DRC / RVF, Sudan / Marburg, Uganda







Information for action GOARN Support System at WHO

Operational Support Team

GOARN management Field epidemiology unit

Logistics unit

Field logistics

Stockpiles

Logistics mobility unit (Dubai)

Electronic tools

Event Management System (EMS)

Field Information Management System (FIMS)

Early Warning Alert and Response System (EWARN)

Strategic Health Operations Centre (SHOC)






WHO Strategic Health Operations Centre (SHOC), May 2009




International Health Regulations Coordination




GOARN: Institutions and Partner Network






Timelines Depend on both National and Global Efforts







BTWC Article X

► Grants the States Parties to the Convention the right to participate in, and the undertaking to facilitate, the exchange of equipment, materials and information for the use of biological agents for peaceful purposes, as well as scientific cooperation in the field.

IHR Art 5

► Each State Party shall develop, strengthen and maintain, as soon as possible but no later than five years from entry into force of these Regulations for State Party, the capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events in accordance with these Regulations, as specified in Annex 1.




Art.44 Collaboration and assistance

- 44.1 States Parties shall undertake to collaborate with each other, to the extent possible, in:
 - (a) the detection and assessment of, and response to, events as provided under these Regulations;
 - (b) the provision or facilitation of technical cooperation and logistical support, particularly in the development, strengthening and maintenance of the public health capacities required under these Regulations; and
 - (c) ...



A Challenge for Intersectoral Collaboration

avoid intersectoral confusion!





Thank you

www.who.int/ihr

